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SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL BRIGHAM-KANNER PRIZE:
DINNER PRESENTATION AND
AWARD RECIPIENT SPEECH
AWARD RECIPIENT
Henry E. Smith, Fessenden Professor of Law and Director of the Project
on the Foundations of Private Law, Harvard Law School
INTRODUCTION
Lynda L. Butler, Chancellor Professor of Law and Director, Property
Rights Project, William & Mary Law School
BUTLER. Each year, the Brigham-Kanner Prize is awarded to someone who has made significant contributions to our understanding of
property. Prior recipients have included the nation’s leading property scholars, a Supreme Court justice, a leading practitioner, and a
Peruvian economist. This year’s recipient, Henry Smith, is one of the
deepest thinkers we have recognized. By that, I am referring to
Henry’s ability to innovate, introducing new methods and ideas about
property that have led to the emergence of a theory of property focusing on its architecture.
Whether it is his work on the relevance of an old doctrine, his
explanation of the interface between contracts and property, his
insights into a well-managed semi-commons, or his work on two
strategies for delineating the nature and scope of property rights,
Henry continues to push the boundaries of property theory in ways
that reveal its complexity. Very few scholars can take a seemingly
obsolete doctrine, like numerus clausus, and give it modern relevance.
Very few can bring property from what critics predicted was its demise, its disintegration, to its re-emergence as a powerful system.
His analysis is complex. Reading his work is not a leisurely walk in
the park. But, the lessons learned are so invigorating that the careful reader will inevitably have an “aha” moment. Henry’s numerous
publications include books on property, on patent, on the economics of
property law, and on linguistics. He has also published many articles
in the top journals, including Yale, Harvard, Columbia, Michigan,
Chicago, William and Mary, and the Brigham-Kanner Property Rights
Journal. A member of the American Law Institute, Henry is the Reporter for the Fourth Restatement of Property—a monumental task.
1
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Professor Smith received his AB in German studies from Harvard,
an AM in German and a PhD in linguistics from Stanford, and a JD
from Yale.
After clerking for Judge Winter on the Second Circuit, Henry
joined the Northwestern Law School faculty in 1997. He returned to
Yale as a faculty member in 2002 before joining the faculty at Harvard in 2009, where he now directs the Project on the Foundations
of Private Law and is the Fessenden Professor of Law.
Both academics and practitioners have praised Henry’s contributions. When Justice Kagan was the dean of Harvard Law School,
she praised Henry as “one of the nation’s leading lights in the crucial fields of property and intellectual property” and as producing
scholarship that is “as original as it is rigorous, as brilliantly interdisciplinary as it is deeply rooted in the law.” Bob Ellickson described
Henry as “universally admire[d]” and a leading property theorist,
and Joe Waldo, whose commitment to property rights led to the creation of this Conference, described Henry as “a remarkable scholar”
and praised his leadership of the Fourth Restatement. Joe especially
appreciated Henry’s recognition of the importance of practitioners
to the restatement project.
Henry, we are deeply honored that you are here virtually to receive
the Brigham-Kanner Prize. Now I am going to do a virtual presentation of the prize to you. This is what I’ve been worried about the entire
day because the Crystal is very beautiful but very heavy.
Congratulations!
SMITH. Thank you so much, Lynda. That was such a kind and gracious introduction.
I have to say that not only am I virtually honored and humbled
to receive this award. I am actually honored and humbled to receive
this award.
It’s really a surreal experience because this is a conference I’ve
attended many, many times. I consider it the sort of high point of
the property year.
And I’ve always enjoyed this Conference very much and have always profited from it greatly. Your leadership of the Conference has
been incredible. You’ve stimulated people to really do their best work.
My thanks first of all to Joe Waldo and Andy Brigham for making
this work and Conference possible. As I said, the Conference is really
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a boon to the whole field, and really the high point of the year for people in the field of property. It’s one, as was mentioned, that brings
together the whole property community, academics and practitioners and judges, which is incredibly valuable for obvious reasons,
but also ones that I’ll talk about in a moment. I’m also very grateful
to my former neighbor Dean Ben Spencer, as well. William & Mary
Law School is incredibly lucky to have you as its leader, and I really
appreciate the William & Mary Law School and Ali Trivette for
handling everything so well here.
If there’s any group I’d be thrilled to join and thrilled to be joining, it’s this group of property prize winners. I looked over the list
again today and I really didn’t have to do it. I think I could have
actually recited them from memory because they are really a super
group, and it’s really hard to believe that I’m joining them, not just
at a conference but actually joining their ranks.
Among others, that group includes people with whom I have a deep
friendship and value as colleagues: Frank Michelman and Joe Singer;
two of my friends and mentors, Bob Ellickson and Carol Rose, who
taught at Yale when I was a student; and my longtime friend and collaorator Tom Merrill. (I’ll have more to say about that in a minute.)
So, I’m definitely surprised to be a part of their revered company,
but I’m surprised for other reasons as well, because I did not know
always that I would be a property person. I did not think of myself
as a property person when I went to law school, while I was in law
school, or even after I was in law school.
But I would say maybe it was a little bit of revisionist history. I
always was a property person and let me explain how that works.
I came to law school having earned a PhD in linguistics. I’ll say
more about what the connection is later, but it really wasn’t apparent at the time. I did not set out to do law and linguistics. I wanted
to take law on its own terms and see how things went, and when I
started teaching at Northwestern after my wonderful clerkship with
Judge Winter, the law school tried to get me to teach property. I
actually argued them out of it, which is a testament to how nice the
people are at Northwestern because usually when, for curricular
reasons, they ask a junior faculty member to teach a subject, that’s
not really a request. But I made some argument about how I was
hired to teach commercial law and so I should start with contracts
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and so forth. They actually bought the argument. Well, little did I
know that they were right and I was wrong.
At the time I was trying to apply new institutional economics, in
particular the property rights economics of economists like Yoram
Barzel, to the question of how we give remedies under contract law.
I think it’s still a good idea but what happened was that during the
course of gearing up for this, I ran across the puzzle of the medieval
open field system, the system of scattered strips that would be
thrown open for common grazing after harvests and in fallow periods. This was always treated as a puzzle because these long thin
strips seem to be very inconvenient. The explanations, if that’s what
they can be called, ran from statements like you know people just
didn’t know better to a possible insurance arrangement. I had the
idea that maybe this was a way of constraining strategic behavior
in certain ways.
And then I thought, well, okay, that’s kind of an interesting idea,
maybe I’ll write a little paper on that and then get back to business
with contracts—take a little tangent and then get back to where I was.
And I’m still on that tangent. So I never got back to business, and
here I am. And I’m very glad of that.
So, basically, as Lynda mentioned, I came to property through contract. I was both writing and teaching on contracts and encountered
property questions from time to time. I certainly thought back to
Bob Ellickson’s property class when I was doing it. It was really quite
puzzling—the idea that property facilitates bargains and promotes
human flourishing of people’s projects, allowing them to conduct
economic activity—all sorts of activities that are protected. The
protected activities have their limits—based on anti-discrimination,
public policy, excessive restraints on commerce, and so forth. So,
there were a lot of similarities and I thought, well that’s not surprising. After all, a lot of people said, “oh you know private law is private
law and maybe all law is law, there really shouldn’t be anything
special about areas of law,” and yeah, property did seem to be special
in a variety of ways. In particular, even though in many (though not
all) of its guises, property like contract was facilitative—property
provided a platform for people to do their thing—property still was
very different from contract in that a lot of property was mandatory.
That is, property law tells you: OK, if you want to do this, then you
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have to use this form. You can’t make up your own form, and here’s
a menu of forms to use. That is not the way that the contract law
works. This and various other aspects were kind of puzzling. One
day I dropped by my next door neighbor at Northwestern, who was
none other than Tom Merrill. And I have to say that it’s hard to
imagine a neighbor as fun as Tom. You could just drop in anytime
and that was one way to spend the afternoon. It was very productive
because when I mentioned these things that were puzzling me, he
said well actually there’s a name for that and it’s called numerus
clausus. So we started talking about why property is standardized,
and why it serves its purposes the way it does and maybe there is
something to the idea that property is in rem addressing the world
at large. If I have a property right, I’m holding it with respect to
everybody in many cases, and that’s very different from contract.
We would have these very productive conversations.
And, you know, over time, I realized that this is very relevant to
a whole gamut of issues in property law, from mortgages to customary law, and so forth, where who the participants are, their social
distance from the thing itself, and the people who are asserting the
rights, are very important. One thing led to another, with one puzzle
leading to another and then another. Property obviously is not
formalized all the time. It’s not a system of purely mandatory rules.
Part of property is very context-specific. We have trust law, we have
equity, and we used to have special chancery courts to deal with
equity (as evidenced by the brass plaque and the marble tablet
behind Andy noting that George Wythe was a judge of the Chancery
Board). The element of equity in our legal system is still very important and I’d like to talk a little bit about that tomorrow, but the idea
that property law has this complex and hybrid character where its
doing many things at one time is very important.
So looking back I realized that I was actually always a property
person. I was Bob’s RA on his land use book and I was a director of
the landlord tenant clinic, where I worked for the late Frank Dineen
at Yale. I was trying to remember at what point I got the idea that
I was a property person because I’m making this sound like one thing
led to another, and that’s basically what it was. I remember a workshop dinner at Yale. Bob and Carol were both there, and the paper
was somewhat property related, and we started getting into this
highly raucous and wide-ranging discussion about property.
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I don’t think I can even recall all the things that this conversation
touched on, but I think it included water, infrastructure, and land
records, and I don’t know what else. I realized that, maybe to borrow a phrase, property is about life in all its fullness. And I think
that’s very important. At the same time, it’s a very specific set of
institutions, and these are important institutions that need our
urgent attention precisely because they touch upon life in all of its
fullness and all of its aspects. What could be more important!
So when Ricky Revesz asked me to be the reporter for the Fourth
Restatement of Property, I certainly was somewhat hesitant. I’d
always been kind of skeptical that this could work and I convinced
myself partly because of what I just said, that property is important.
It’s an important institution that deserves attention for what it’s
doing in so many facets of life. And yet I thought that there’s something that maybe past restatements did but we could do again and
maybe even more completely. The first restatement was only actually a partial restatement, unlike the torts and contracts restatements. I thought there was maybe the possibility that we could do
something that’s both systematic on the one hand and flexible and
empirically grounded and sensitive to the real world on the other.
That’s a very tall order, something no one person could possibly even
begin to do—it requires all sorts of different kinds of creativity and
expertise as inputs to a project like that. I’ve been very fortunate to
work with many different people with many backgrounds on the
team of associate reporters. They are an outstanding group and a
total pleasure to work with. And many of the people are here today,
including Molly Brady, Sara Bronin, Rick Brooks, Wilson Freyermuth,
John Goldberg, Dan Kelly, Brian Lee, Tom Merrill, and Chris
Newman. And in the spirit of this very prize, we’ve really benefited,
all of us have benefited from the expertise and wisdom of practitioners, and included in those are people on the program and involved
in this Conference, like Steve Weise and Joe Waldo.
And many of the academics here today are also advisors on the
project. As I said, this kind of project requires many kinds of wisdom
as an input, and I’m deeply grateful to them. Creativity in the service
of making things work is something that is really hard to appreciate
unless you actually try to do it.
As a result of the Restatement, I’ve been drawn into areas of
property that I never thought I would do—more on the theme of one
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thing after another. These areas include drone trespass and conversion of intangibles, trespass on the internet and things like that—
cutting-edge issues. I realized when I teach first-year property, if you
want to include cutting-edge issues in the property class, it’s kind
of hard to do.
I think it’s valuable to do, but it’s hard to do because they often
come in at the point where very basic concepts enter the course, like
possession and trespass and so forth. And I think that says something
very deep about property, that it’s precisely in those areas where the
combination of important technological and social change may demand some attention in the law. And that connection to reality is
actually why I went to law school in the first place. I love linguistics,
but I thought it was time to get real.
Over time, I have seen how what I did in linguistics is more relevant than I thought at first. You know, all sorts of aspects from the
ancient Indian grammarians who I studied in grad school, to the
sociology of audiences in discourse analysis, all grew more real and
more property related than I ever thought at first.
For me, then, this is an occasion to think about how all this actually fits together, at least in retrospect. And that brings me back
to the beginning, which is how I got into academia in the first place
through linguistics.
As Ben said, my family is here, my wife, Sun-Joo Shin, and our
daughter Hannah, and I certainly thank them most of all for their
support. I met Sun-Joo while we were working in a problem set group.
We formed our little two-person subgroup for problem sets. And I remember thinking at the time, what a miracle it was to be working
with the most amazing person in the world. And it’s been like that
ever since, so thank you.
BUTLER. Henry, that was a wonderful way to end your remarks.

PROPERTY BEYOND FLATLAND

HENRY E. SMITH*
INTRODUCTION
Although the world of property is wonderfully complex, property
theory invites diverse perspectives, and the word “property” itself is
elusively protean, there is one respect in which the field of property
is neither complex, nor diverse, nor protean. Property suffers from
a bad case of “dichotom-itis,” and like private law generally, it is stuck
in what, to borrow a term, I will call “Flatland.”1 In this Essay I want
to help us escape from Flatland.
To do so, our field needs to incorporate modern notions of complex
systems much more thoroughly than it now does. One theme I see
in property theory and increasingly in property practice is an excessive reductionism. Let me emphasize the “excessive”: the problem
is not reductionism per se.2 As limited beings, we are not capable of
dealing with all of life’s complexity all of the time.3 And yet too
* Fessenden Professor of Law and Director of the Project on the Foundations of Private
Law, Harvard Law School. Email: hesmith@law.harvard.edu. I would like to express my
gratitude to the Property Rights Project at the William & Mary Law School for conferring on
me this year’s Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Prize. For helpful comments I would like to
express my thanks to Bob Ellickson, Brian Lee, Carol Rose, and the conference participants.
All errors are categorically mine.
1. I am referring to the satirical novella of that name. EDWIN A. ABBOTT, FLATLAND: A
ROMANCE OF MANY DIMENSIONS (2005) (1884). I also acknowledge Carol Rose’s use of the term
“Propertyland,” which she contrasts to “Contractland,” and other territories. Also, as some of
my former students know, “Flatland” is the lightly fictionalized version of my hometown of
Chicago, which, particularly through its Flubs baseball team, makes regular appearances on
my final exams.
2. Thus, I need not assume strong anti-reduction which holds that reduction is not possible in principle. See P.W. Anderson, More Is Different: Broken Symmetry and the Nature of the
Hierarchical Structure of Science, 177 SCIENCE 393 (1972).
3. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 402 (J .P. Mayer & Max
Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1835) (In contrast to the divine
point of view that can take account of all particulars, “[g]eneral ideas do not bear witness to
the power of human intelligence but rather to its inadequacy . . . . General ideas have this
excellent quality, that they permit human minds to pass judgment quickly on a great number
of things; but the conceptions they convey are always incomplete, and what is gained in extent
is always lost in exactitude.”); Albert Kocourek, Formal Relation Between Law and Discretion,
9 ILL. L. REV. 225, 238 (1914) (“While the combinations of situations, persons, things, and
facts are beyond computation, yet these computations are not such that they cannot be
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much reductionism or reductionism of the wrong kind can be seriously limiting.
The way to overcome this misplaced reductionism is to get beyond
the dichotomies in property theorizing. And for that we need a better
handle on the role complexity plays in property institutions, as they
are embedded in real life.
By complexity, I do not mean complicatedness. Intricacy, elaboration, and the like are not complexity. Rather, complexity stems from
the interactions of the elements of a system. If a system is a collection
of interconnected elements, a complex system is one in which the
elements are not only numerous enough but interconnected enough
that properties of the system cannot be traced to the individual elements or their additive effect.4 Instead, the action is in the interactions, and system properties can be emergent.
And here is where the idea of Flatland is inspiring and a little
daunting. The characters in the two-dimensional world found the
introduction of three-dimensional beings into their world very strange,
and, seen in two dimensions, they were strange indeed.5 Stepping
outside a world of n dimensions and into one of n +1 or more dimensions is disorienting. At least in property theory, we have the advantage of legal systems of other times and places with which we can
compare our own. Further, in the spirit of Legal Realism, we have the
complexity of the real world and nonlegal institutions as sources of
comparison and inspiration (not, as we will see, simple mirroring),
which can be our starting point for looking more deeply into our property system. To begin with, we can ask why in the face of complexity
of the problems they confront, our legal system in general and
property law in particular should not adopt the methods of dealing
with complexity in these other aspects of life. Life in all its fullness
requires no less, and as limited creatures, we can meet this challenge in characteristically limited ways. This Essay is about those.
To be sure, something going under the banner of “complexity” has
often been invoked in property theory and in private law more
managed by the aid of legal science. The same multiplicity is found in the domain of nature,
but yet the external sciences are able to bring order out of chaos.”).
4. MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR (2011); HERBERT A. SIMON, THE
SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL (2d ed. 1981); Ludwig von Bertalanffy, An Outline of General
System Theory, 1 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 134 (1950).
5. The narrator in Flatland, A Square, was even an old-fashioned lawyer.
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generally. And, as we will see, Legal Realism has made great efforts
at dealing with complexity, in the course of which notions of complexity have been adopted that are not entirely on point or even
consistent with each other. I will draw on complex systems theory
to bring out the role that interactions—those between attributes of
resources, between resources, between aspects of the law, between
law and society and so on—play in property institutions and how we
can build our understanding of property law and institutions around
this complexity.
Essential to what follows is to recognize that complexity falls along
a spectrum (not a dichotomy) and that it matters greatly where,
along that spectrum, the complexity of property law and institutions
falls. The spectrum is defined by the nature and extent of the interconnections of the elements of a system. If the elements are not
connected at all—they are a heap, as it were—then we have simplicity. Change in an element does not affect other elements, and each
element contributes additively to the fitness of the entire collection.
A literal bundle of sticks would be a good example. At the opposite
extreme is disorganized, maximal complexity (even, in special cases,
chaos), in which elements of a system are densely and intensively
interconnected. Change in one element can have many and large effects on other elements and drastic effects on the performance of the
system. In between is what Warren Weaver called organized complexity, in which elements are connected but not maximally, and the
density of connections may not be uniform throughout the system.6
Instead they may cluster, and in some systems may form distinct
clusters that are connected much more intensely inside than outside
to the rest of the system. Such systems are “nearly decomposable”
(because the components are, unlike in simplicity, not totally unconnected7), and in such situations complexity can be managed through
modularity: internally complex components can be linked through
more sparse and stylized interfaces.8 A car is a modular system
(brakes and windshield wipers are not interconnected, and the drive
6. Warren Weaver, Science and Complexity, 36 AM. SCIENTIST 536 (1948).
7. SIMON, supra note 4, at 195–98.
8. See, e.g., 1 CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES: THE POWER OF MODULARITY (2000); Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in Technology and Organization, 49 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 19 (2002).

12

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:009

train is connected in specific ways to, e.g., the wheels), as are most
computer hardware and software.9 There is an active debate about
how modular the mind and human language competence are.10 The
more that elements are interconnected, whether organized in modules or not, the more we may expect system properties to be difficult
to trace to individual components. Such system-level properties are
emergent.11 Thus, the hardness of a diamond or the wetness of water
are not properties of carbon atoms or water molecules.
Because social and cognitive systems are complex—they fall somewhere along the spectrum of complexity well away from simplicity—
we lose something, including the possibility of emergence, when we
assume away those connections. The legal system as a whole, or
property law itself, may exhibit properties that cannot be traced to
a particular “legal rule.”12 Property law might be efficient or fair even
though one rule or especially an invocation of a rule (a suit in trespass) might not be efficient or fair.13
To capture this kind of complexity requires more structure and a
less homogeneous law than we often are led to expect. For one thing,
property theory sports a lot of dichotomous thinking, which we need
to overcome. I will explore a number of these dichotomies, the final
one of which is that between theory and practice. Current theorizing
is not just divorced from practice.14 It is a kind of practice itself, substituting theoretical constructs for the reality they are supposed to be
serving. This is deeply ironic given that the orientation in Legal Realism was to stress the “facts of the situation” and to fashion concepts to
be closer to particulars. At the same time, under the influence of
flattened property law, practice itself is not everything it could be.
I think something similar is true of property law, when current
theory at its most reductionist is confronted with the complexity of
9. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 8, at 149–217.
10. See, e.g., H. Clark Barrett & Robert Kurzban, Modularity in Cognition: Framing the
Debate, 113 PSYCH. REV. 628 (2006) (reviewing the modularity of mind debate); JERROLD M.
SADOCK, THE MODULAR ARCHITECTURE OF GRAMMAR (2012) (presenting theory of natural
language based on nonhomogeneous modules connected by meta interfaces).
11. For a strong statement, see Anderson, supra note 2.
12. Andrew S. Gold & Henry E. Smith, Sizing Up Private Law, 70 U. TORONTO L.J. 489
(2020).
13. Henry E. Smith, Property as a Complex System (draft June 2021) (on file with author).
14. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and
the Legal Profession 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
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the world. An engagement with practice in that world is the way out
of Flatland.
This Essay begins in Part I by setting out the partial view of complexity in property theory and how it expresses itself in a variety of
dichotomies that systematically fall short in capturing the reality of
property. Part II then turns to the kinds of system that might characterize property and how an understanding of organized complexity
avoids the traps commonly thought to be inherent in “systems” in law.
Turning to property on the ground (and in the air!), Part III shows
how theories of property incorporating organized complexity point to
solutions to a variety of problems, including aerial trespass, nuisance,
and the clustering of rights. I conclude with some thoughts on the role
of property theory in the world of property.
I. MISLEADING DICHOTOMIES IN PROPERTY THEORY
In property theory as currently practiced, dichotomies and reductionism abound. All stem from a lack of appreciation of complexity
in its full sense. The problem is often identified with the so-called
bundle-of-rights or bundle-of-sticks picture of property.15 However,
I think the problem extends far beyond the bundle picture, and the
bundle picture itself is more a remediable symptom of a deeper
problem—of complexity.
As with “property,” the term “complexity” is certainly used a great
deal in connection with property. Moreover, it was concerns about
“complexity” that led the Realists to embrace the bundle picture.16
“Complexity” also supplied an important motivation for the American Law Institute to initiate its Restatement projects.17 When these
15. See, e.g., J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711
(1996); Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012). See
generally Symposium, Property: A Bundle of Rights?, 8(3) ECON J. WATCH (Sept. 2011), https://
econjwatch.org/issues/volume-8-issue-3-september-2011?ref=issue-archive.
16. See, e.g., THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 114–16 (1937); JAMES
E. HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870–1970: A HISTORY 146–47 (1990); G. EDWARD
WHITE, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change,
in PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 136, 139 (Quid Pro Books 2010) (1978); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING (2013) (arguing from complexity against
formalism and for a new judicial realism).
17. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT ORGANIZATION
FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW PROPOSING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AMERICAN LAW
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consequential movements got their start in the 1920s and 1930s, our
understanding of complexity was intuitive but incomplete—sometimes
even flat. What was meant in those days by “complex” was often more
like complicated, having many pieces. Lawyers and commentators
worried about the burgeoning wave of case law, and the law itself
consisted of many rules. While complicatedness is a problem, it is a
different one from true complexity. Further, the world itself was
becoming more complex—new activities and industries were coming
to the fore and social conflicts were coming to a head—and although
this was closer in spirit to true complexity, many made the assumption that if the law were to meet each of these new challenges, it
would need more complex rules.18
The true complexity problem required something more, and there
were inklings at the time for a different take on complexity. In particular, the controversy in biology between vitalists and mechanists
led Ludwig von Bertalanffy to develop his general systems theory,
one of the first versions of modern complex systems theory.19 Systems
theory allows all the system properties to be grounded in elements of
the system and their interactions, without having to hold true or
even be identified with particular local collections of elements. Later
Herbert Simon (well known to behavioral economists) developed the
notion of complex system across fields. Simon was concerned with design (the artificial) across engineering, medicine, business, architecture, art, psychology, linguistics, and economics, among many areas,
and he found nearly decomposable systems and a role for modularity
in economic systems, business firms, computer programs, and even
watches (a famous illustration). In doing so, he made the intriguing
observation that complex systems theory makes it possible to be an
“in-principle reductionist” and a “pragmatic holist.”20 These days complex systems theory (alternatively known as complex adaptive systems
and complexity science) is an active field (it certainly promises a
INSTITUTE 12 (Feb. 23, 1923), reprinted in THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 50TH ANNIVERSARY
(2d ed. 1973); see Henry E. Smith, Restating the Architecture of Property, in 10 MODERN STUDIES
IN PROPERTY LAW 19 (Sinéad Agnew & Ben McFarlane eds., 2018).
18. See infra notes 31 and 94–99 and accompanying text.
19. See Bertalanffy, supra note 4; see also LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY, GENERAL SYSTEM
THEORY: FOUNDATIONS, DEVELOPMENT, APPLICATIONS (1969).
20. SIMON, supra note 4, at 195.
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great deal!),21 and there is increasing interest in seeing private law,
including property law, in terms of complexity.22
The upshot is that even a conceptual “reduction” of more abstract
notions to their “atomic” parts does not tell us which concepts we
should use in our workaday use of the legal system. Notions like corporation or thing or possession (and so on) can still be useful, including in legal reasoning—as long as that reasoning is pragmatic and
defeasible rather than rigidly deductive.23 And from a practical point
of view, concepts and rules of a middle-level abstractness are likely
to be especially useful.24 At the poles of extreme abstraction and
extreme concreteness, concepts leave actors in extreme epistemic
uncertainty. Super abstract concepts give little information at all,
21. In addition to the sources cited in note 4 supra, see, e.g., NINO BOCCARA, MODELING
COMPLEX SYSTEMS (2d ed. 2010); STEFAN THURNER ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF
COMPLEX SYSTEMS (2018); see also GERALD M. WEINBERG, A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO
SYSTEMS THINKING (2011).
22. See, e.g., Lynda L. Butler, The Importance of Viewing Property as a System, 58 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 73 (2021); David Harper, Property Rights as a Complex Adaptive System: How
Entrepreneurship Transforms Intellectual Property Structures, 24 J. EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 335
(2014); Jessica A. Shoemaker, Complexity’s Shadow: American Indian Property, Sovereignty,
and the Future, 115 MICH. L. REV. 487 (2017); Henry E. Smith, Systems Theory: Emergent
Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE NEW PRIVATE LAW 139 (Andrew Gold et al.
eds., 2020); Alan Calnan, Torts as Systems, 28 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 301 (2019); Spencer
Williams, Contracts as Systems, 45 DEL. J. CORP. L. 219 (2021); Joshua C. Teitelbaum, Computational Complexity and Tort Deterrence (Geo. Univ. L. Ctr., Working Paper No. 3480709,
2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3480709. See generally Simon Deakin, Legal Evolution:
Integrating Economic and Systemic Approaches, 7 REV. L. & ECON. 659 (2011); Eric Kades,
The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Implications of Computational
Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403 (1997); Daria Roithmayr, Evolutionary Dynamics and Method, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Gerrit De Geest
ed., 2d ed. 2012); J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. L. REV. 885 (2008).
23. See, e.g., Simon Deakin, Juridical Ontology: The Evolution of Legal Form, 40 HIST.
SOC. RES. 170 (2015) (presenting system of defeasible concepts as able to coevolve with social
and economic context); Kocourek, supra note 3, at 238 (presenting “legal science” as a method
for managing “combinations of situations, persons, things, and facts” where these are not
directly computable); F.H. Lawson, The Creative Use of Legal Concepts, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 909
(1957) (arguing for practical use of semi-abstract concepts that can be designed for convenience,
especially for non-litigation uses of law); Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in
Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097 (2012). See generally J.A. SCOTT KELSO & DAVID A. ENGSTRØM,
THE COMPLEMENTARY NATURE (2006) (showing how complementarity rises from systems
resolving internal contradictions).
24. Mario J. Rizzo, Abstract Rules for Complex Systems, EUR. J. L. & ECON., Mar. 2021 at
6; Douglas Glen Whitman, The Rules of Abstraction, 22 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 21 (2009); cf.
ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011) (arguing for mid-level
principles in intellectual property).
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and very concrete concepts mimicking the complexity of life are
uncertain in application and costly to process.
Property theory as currently practiced is suspicious of concepts of
even middling abstractness. Before turning to how such concepts
work better than is commonly thought, let me diagnose how property theory, by leaving complexity out of the picture, flattens the law
into a series of distorting dichotomies.
1. The Bundle of Rights. Although I do not see the bundle as a
huge obstacle to progress in theorizing about property (at least not as
big an obstacle as I used to think), it is a symptom of how complexity
has been read out of private law theory. There are different versions
of the bundle picture, and it is sometimes hard to know which we
are dealing with.
The bundle picture is so useful, seductive, and ultimately limiting
because it is a kind of reductionism. Notions like property or ownership can be broken into smaller pieces, and the properties of the whole
are reduced to the sum of the properties of these parts. One version
is the Hohfeldian system of jural relations (right-duty, privilege-no
right, power-liability, immunity-disability) and opposites across pairs
of relations (right-no right, privilege-duty, power-disability, immunityliability), which can capture what is going on in any legal situation—
especially in terms of who can prevail legally against whom in a
putative lawsuit.25 This has an appealing bottom-line or “brass tacks”
flavor, and the Legal Realists always wanted to keep close to the
facts. The flip side is that more aggregate notions like ownership and
property were downplayed or derided as “transcendental nonsense.”26
Legal concepts should be narrow and shallow and keep close to the
facts.27 While the Realists were motivated in part by their hope that
25. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913), reprinted in WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD,
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL
ESSAYS 23–64 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923).
26. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 815 (1935).
27. Smith, supra note 23, at 2102–06. For a moderate statement of the Realist position,
see Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431,
438–51 (1930) (distinguishing between abstract legal verbalisms and concrete empirical facts).
For a classic post-Realist statement, see Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in
NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). For a
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this picture would dethrone classical liberal notions of property and
deprivilege traditional baselines, the bundle picture is not ultimately
tied to any particular ideology.28 While reducing property to a pile
of sticks allows engineering to work stick by stick in isolation, libertarians and classical liberals have flipped the script: if each stick is
property, then it might get protection against government takings.29
Each stick is its own “denominator,” and the government would be
on the hook for compensation much of the time. Something isn’t
right here.
As I have argued elsewhere, what the bundle picture leaves out—
flattens out—is an essential kind of complexity—organized (or
structured) complexity to be exact.30 Realism made a major effort to
accommodate complexity, and complexity was a major reason cited for
the inadequacy of prior law and the need for a different style of judging and legal scholarship. Nuisance would be a primary example.31
However, the role of complexity was, well, complex, and Realism’s
treatment of it was not terribly consistent. Thus, on the one hand,
the world was taken as irreducibly complex, implying a high degree
of unorganized complexity. The solution, however, was to assume
that the law in general and the bundle in particular, needed to reflect that complexity stick by stick and rule by rule—without much
internal structure, or complexity, itself. Often assuming away such
internal connections, the picture of private law (especially the
common law) that emerges is quite simple, in a way: a system with
little internal structure or interaction among its parts. Notions like
modern defense of this moderate realist approach, see Hanoch Dagan, Doctrinal Categories,
Legal Realism, and the Rule of Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1889 (2015).
28. Grey, supra note 27, at 81 (noting that the legal realists “were on the whole supporters
of the regulatory and welfare state, and in the writings that develop the bundle-of-rights
conception, a purpose to remove the sanctity that had traditionally attached to the rights of
property can often be discerned”).
29. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist
Conceptions of Private Property, 8(3) ECON J. WATCH 223 (Sept. 2011).
30. Smith, supra note 22; Henry E. Smith, Complexity and the Cathedral: Making Law
and Economics More Calabresian, 48 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 43 (2019).
31. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 121 (2004) (“The essential
premise of much environmental law is . . . that the physical characteristics of the ecosystem
generate spatial and temporal spillovers that require restrictions on the private use of natural
resources far beyond those contemplated by centuries-old common law tort rules.”); see also
Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common
Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 9–36.
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“reasonableness” or even “in accordance with policy” can reflect
complexity but themselves are simple. That is, the law’s own contribution is to let the complexity of the world take its course, and the
law itself can be stated very briefly (and so, in that sense, simply).
The problem here is twofold, both theoretical and practical. As a
matter of understanding, much of the structure of law and everyday
cognition was simply assumed, in a way that traditional grammarians would assume the categories of Latin when analyzing non-IndoEuropean languages.32 Once we endogenize categories—in property
theory that would be things, bundles, and legal concepts—we get a
more explanatory theory. At the practical level, an attention to what
kind of complexity we’re dealing with (and when) is crucial for picking the rights tools. The conventional bundle picture assumes that
problems can be addressed in separate fashion—which is sometimes
true. For very advanced problems that can be taken in isolation without ripple effects (i.e., they are on a separable margin), it is highly
fruitful to regard entitlements in a disaggregated way. Because attention is focused more on such problems, the conventional bundle
seems more generalizable than it really is. We may forget that
property law and institutions are quite multipurpose, applying all
the way from the sandbox and the parking lot to our dealings with
everyday objects, like costs and watches, to residential leases and
sophisticated real estate deals.33
If the problems facing property law show complexity with some
organization, we might expect a different kind of reflection. The law
itself might show structure to its own complexity, and the law might
be a device for managing the complexity of the world through this
very structure. That is, the very organization of the world into legal
things that can be possessed and owned, and the definition of lumpy
packages of legal relations (sometimes called “property”) over them
will, in a sense I will explore, serve to manage the complexity of the
interactions among resource attributes and actors. Likewise, a set of
interlocking legal concepts (like possession) can respond flexibly but
at lower complexity cost than a more free-form or highly articulated
32. See, e.g., WILLIAM CROFT, SYNTACTIC CATEGORIES AND GRAMMATICAL RELATIONS: THE
COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION OF INFORMATION (1990).
33. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 398 (2002).
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style of law. Systems rest on interrelationships—between resource
attributes, legal relations, legal concepts, and the like—and on the
architectural approach we need to ask about their relationships.
Again, this need not mean any necessary or deductive relationship.
It might be complementarity or any other influence on the value of
one relation from the presence or absence of another.
The conventional bundle picture is only part of the story. First of all,
we need to be clear on what we are doing when we analyze property
into bundles. Hohfeld was engaged in conceptual analysis, and defenders of the bundle are on solid ground when they claim that as a
conceptual matter one can think of each stick separately.34 The problem is that in practice, conceptual separateness is treated the same
as practical distinctness and independence.35 To get from conceptual
separateness to practical independence we have to assume away the
actual contingent, empirical interdependencies among the sticks we
have identified.36
34. Shane Nicholas Glackin, Back to Bundles: Deflating Property Rights, Again, 20 LEGAL
THEORY 1 (2014).
35. Thomas Ross argues that the bundle-of-sticks metaphor itself implies strong
separability:
Although both the Hohfeldian abstraction and the pre-metaphor property law
[property as thing ownership] recognized the separation of particular property
interests, the metaphorical conception [bundle of sticks], when examined, emphasizes that separation. Within both the Hohfeldian abstraction and the
metaphorical conception, my legally recognized right, for example, to lease my
home is distinguishable from my other rights. But within the metaphorical conception if the state changes or takes away this particular right, all other rights
are presumptively left intact and unaffected. To take one stick out of the bundle
leaves the remaining sticks undisturbed. The metaphor not only makes analysis
by disaggregation seem natural and right; it also suggests the separability of those
disaggregated interests in a way not suggested by the Hohfeldian abstraction.
Once you embrace the metaphor, it becomes hard to imagine how the taking of
one interest could affect the interests remaining.
Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1061–62 (1989); see also, e.g.,
CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC
OF OWNERSHIP 280 (1994) (arguing that the bundle-of-sticks metaphor implies that rights
making up ownership are separable and “all more or less alike” and that seeing ownership
rights as more like “[t]oys in a toy chest”would be truer to how they are “interconnected and
interdependent,” perhaps in the service of “some larger general purpose”); Jane B. Baron, The
Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 967 (2010) (“In the sense of being
an agglomeration of separable powers, property can be said to be a ‘bundle of rights.’”); Anna
di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree, 66 VAND. L. REV. 869, 877–89 (2013) (setting out separability as element of the bundle theory of property); see generally Grey, supra
note 27 (arguing for disaggregation of property bundle based in part on separability).
36. Whatever those are: individuation is a related challenge.
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The nature and extent of such connections determine the type of
complexity and hence the version of the bundle of rights. Various
versions of the bundle picture correspond to types of complexity. If
the sticks in the bundle are totally unconnected, the effects of the
bundle are the additive sum of the effects of the sticks and optimizing
each stick never makes the bundle less fit (efficient, fair, autonomy
promoting) overall. This corresponds to simplicity. At the other extreme, each stick might be tightly connected (for example, by affecting
the value greatly) of every other stick. If so, any change can lead to
wild swings in the value of the bundle, which are very hard to predict.
In between we might have some degree of connection in the bundle,
and, importantly, greater internal connections within the bundle than
between elements in the bundle and those outside. Thus, the bundle
of rights includes rights of lateral support and rights and privileges
for use of adjacent watercourses, because support and uses of water
are highly complementary to what owners would do with land. (What
“land” is can be endogenized in this way.37) In other words, the system
overall is one of what Warren Weaver dubbed “organized complexity,”38 with a pattern of partial decomposability.39
A modular structure emerges, which can be modeled using networks.40 And the legal system can shape the interface between
modules further (e.g., by ruling out unvaluable potential connections
that could lead to costly complexity). Lee Alston and Bernardo Mueller
capture this range of bundle pictures by using Stuart Kauffman’s
famous N-K model of biological evolution (N genes and K epistatic
connections in the sense that the effect of a mutation in a gene depends on other genes).41 They show how these different degrees of
37. For an early and sophisticated attempt, see Stuart S. Ball, The Jural Nature of Land,
23 ILL. L. REV. 45 (1928).
38. Weaver, supra note 6.
39. SIMON, supra note 4, at 209–17; see also Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of
Complexity, 106 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 467, 477 (1962).
40. Ted Sichelman & Henry E. Smith, Modeling Legal Modularity (draft 2017) (on file
with author); see also MATTHEW O. JACKSON, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NETWORKS 443–57 (2008);
M. E. J. Newman & M. Girvan, Finding and Evaluating Community Structure in Networks,
69 PHYSICAL REV. E 026113 (2004).
41. STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH FOR THE LAWS OF SELFORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY 170–76 (1995); Lee Alston & Bernardo Mueller, Towards a
More Evolutionary Theory of Property Rights, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2255, 2262–63, 2265–68
(2015); see also James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 139 (2009).
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interconnection and hence complexity lead to different expectations
about the evolution of property bundles. The unconnected-stick
bundle, the simple one, has a fitness landscape that is like a smooth
mountain with one overall optimum reachable by any path. The
maximally connected bundle (or world) has a random-looking landscape: any change can lead to wild peaks and valleys, and the global
maximum may not be reachable through small changes. By contrast, the fitness landscape corresponding to the bundle showing
organized complexity is jagged, with several somewhat predictable
maxima, and with some improvements outside the reach of incremental changes.
This middle-range organized complexity promises to be the most
realistic. Alston and Mueller see my architectural approach as being
an instance of this middle picture, and it nicely captures some of the
stakes in the debate over the bundle. They give the example of the
statutory right to roam in England, which was generally considered
an unambiguous improvement (with one note of caution).42 Consistent
with a picture based on organized complexity, recent empirical work
suggests that the statute did negatively affect land prices—which
is not to say that this cost stemming from epistatic connections was
not worth incurring.43 Again, these connections are empirical and a
matter of degree.
The picture here is endogenous, not exogenous. That is, the bundle
endogenously responds to exogenous factors. We can thus explain the
contours of bundles and things and how they respond to external
change. Much of what can be owned is determined by purpose (land
and tools yes, air normally no) and feasibility (land and everyday objects yes, distant astronomical objects no, ad coelum notwithstanding).
Importantly, morality shapes what is eligible for property: wedding
rings and other familiar property for personhood emphatically yes
42. Alston & Mueller, supra note 41, at 2267–68 (quoting Henry E. Smith, Property Is Not
Just a Bundle of Rights, 8 ECON J. WATCH. 279, 286 (2011)) (“‘[A]dding or subtracting a stick
to the bundle affects the rest of the sticks. In principle the bundle theory could take this into
account, but it typically does not. Instead, the metaphor of the bundle of sticks is used to imply
precisely the opposite. In a bundle of sticks the sticks do not interact; you can add or subtract
them at will, and still you will have a bundle with roughly the same properties. Not so with
property: giving the right-to-roam stick to a neighbor or to the public affects the value of the remaining property, including “sticks” like the ability to grow plants, to eat dinner in peace, etc.’”).
43. See Jonathan Klick & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of the Right to Exclude: An
Empirical Assessment, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 917 (2017).
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and slavery emphatically no.44 What is definitely not true is that
everything that could be a thing can be owned. Complexity considerations will make some possible things infeasible and shape which
version of other things and bundles we see. On the margins, internal
“epistatic” connections help determine the contours of bundles and
affect the course of change.
In a sense, we need to adopt the spirit of Yoram Barzel’s theory of
property (and his related earlier work on taxation) to investigate how
“quality changes” can occur.45 Thus, for example a per unit tax on
light bulbs or cigarettes can lead to inefficiently durable light bulbs or
long cigarettes. And an ad valorem tax on cars can cause sound systems to be sold separately. The problem is that a tax can have an effect on the underlying things subject to taxation, because actors will
want to alter the nominal thing to minimize the tax. We need to allow
for the possibility of adjustment through the law and through actors’
responses to the law, both in terms of things and bundles of rights.
The same is true of property law: legal rules can shape the “things”
and the “bundles of rights” over them both directly and indirectly.
While it is often convenient to assume that the objects of the legal
system or taxation are given or constant, this can foreclose important kinds of description and explanation. It is not realistic.
Here, too, we need to get beyond an important reductionist dichotomy. Things and bundles are assumed to be either totally rigid or
totally plastic, and sometimes things are assumed to be fixed and
bundles plastic. It is sometimes assumed that allowing for fluidity
at the margins or for some resources means that somehow fluidity
reigns everywhere.46 Property is more complex.
44. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
Slavery is immoral whether or not one believes in Lockean fashion that we own ourselves or
that property only refers to objects separable from the self.
45. YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (2d ed. 1997); Yoram Barzel,
An Alternative Approach to the Analysis of Taxation, 84 J. POL. ECON. 1177 (1976); Henry E.
Smith, Ambiguous Quality Changes from Taxes and Legal Rules, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 647 (2000).
46. See, e.g., Katrina M. Wyman, The New Essentialism in Property, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
183 (2017) (arguing from edge cases that thinghood in the architectural theory has no stability
and is as protean as the bundle of rights). In a similar way, the usefulness of the bundle
theory at the margin does not make it a theory of property as a whole, nor does it preclude
that the bundle might have a relatively stable core. For analyses assuming a homogeneity in
the bundle in this sense, see, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor in
Property Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 57 (2013); Stephen R. Munzer, A Bundle Theorist Holds On
to His Collection of Sticks, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 265 (2011). Some theorists make the assumption
that both things and bundles are totally disaggregating. See Grey, supra note 27.
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2. System in Property and Private Law. The prevalent allergy to
system in law reflects another flattening dichotomy. System in law is
assumed to be fully deductive or nothing.47 Because the former is obviously inadequate and even undesirable, we seem to be forced into
anti-system. This doesn’t follow (deductively or otherwise!). In keeping
with complex systems theory, the real question is whether the parts
of property law and its institutions interlock in interesting ways—
and these ways need not be deductive.48
Basic notions of possession can be taken as emblematic of the
vagaries of system in property law. Starting with Savigny, possession
was taken as a central test for system in law and the use of Roman
law as such a system.49 This notion of system became more deductive
and ambitious over time. Even Savigny’s approach can be faulted for
not being policy oriented,50 and the Realists and their successors
zeroed in on possession as a classic instance of overtheorizing. They
went so far as to claim that there is no unitary notion of possession
at all in the law but rather a series of context-specific notions for
trespass, conversion, and adverse possession, all varying by resource,
and so on.51
47. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977) (claiming that in
supposed Langdellian formalism, “the law is a closed, logical system. Judges do not make law:
they merely declare the law which, in some Platonic sense, exists. The judicial function has
nothing to do with the adaptation of rules of law to changing conditions; it is restricted to the
discovery of what the true rules of law are and indeed always have been.”); Roscoe Pound,
Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 606 (1908) (“[T]he effect of a scientific legal
system upon the courts and upon the legal system is more subtle and far-reaching. The effect
of all system is apt to be petrifaction of the subject systematized.”). On the vast array of
varieties of formalism and the incorrectness of this picture, see Paul B. Miller, The New
Formalism in Private Law, 66 AM. J. JURISPR. (forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=3908595.
48. See, e.g., Gerald Postema, Law’s System: The Necessity of System in Common Law,
2014 NEW ZEALAND L. REV. 69 (2014) (arguing that non-deductive type of system is compatible
with common law reasoning); Jeremy Waldron, “Transcendental Nonsense” and System in the
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 16, 25 (2000) (discerning in law “a form of interconnectedness
(flagged by a corresponding technical vocabulary) that we might refer to not just as coherence
but as doctrinal systematicity—the way that, in specific areas of law . . . rules of different
kinds fit together in a structured and articulated whole as part of a system”).
49. FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, VON SAVIGNY’S TREATISE ON POSSESSION; OR THE JUS
POSSESSIONS OF THE CIVIL LAW (Sir Erskine Perry trans., London, R. Sweet, 6th ed. 1848).
50. Richard A. Posner, Savigny, Holmes, and the Law and Economics of Possession, 86 VA.
L. REV. 535 (2000).
51. See Joseph W. Bingham, The Nature and Importance of Legal Possession, 13 MICH. L.
REV. 535 (1915); Burke Shartel, Meanings of Possession, 16 MINN. L. REV. 611 (1932).
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These criticisms of extreme notions of deductive system are well
taken, but they can be mistakenly extended to kinds of system that
can prove their worth. The law should not try as a matter of book
learning to capture the nature of possessory control for each resource
in the world, which is more a matter of social fact upon which the law
draws. Moreover, we can avoid abstractions like “constructive possession,” if we recognize (as did Albert Kocourek) that possession concepts can be useful if we allow them to specialize.52 If “possession” is
a matter close to facts in the world,53 and we make many legal rights
turn on the “right to possess,” we can capture the law in a looser but
still somewhat systematic way. Moreover, some such structure reflects
the path of legal development, with possession and rights to possess
layered on top of each other as a matter first of custom and then of
law.54 At the same time, as Carol Rose has shown, possession is directed at an audience of sometimes socially close and at other times
socially distant potential duty bearers.55 Such communication must be
modulated in terms of its degree of formalism (versus contextualism).56
3. Formalism and Standardization as Categorical or Along a
Spectrum. System is often associated with formalism, because a
deductive system operates in a fashion relatively free from context.
(We define what is in the system and what is not.) Supposedly, formalists see law as an autonomous discipline and law as hermetically
sealed from politics—and perhaps some do. As Paul Miller has
shown, “formalism” has come to mean many things ranging from the
ridiculous (a matter of caricature) to the highly nuanced.57 Here is
not the place to explore all these notions of formalism, but I do want
to point out how we can avoid needlessly dichotomizing formalism and
contextualism, and thereby can open ourselves to true complexity.
52. ALBERT KOCOUREK, JURAL RELATIONS 364–71 (2d ed. 1928). For a compatible approach
to civil law, see Yun-chien Chang, The Economy of Concept and Possession, in LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 103 (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015).
53. EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 379–80 (W.
Moll trans., 1936) (1913) (providing an account of possession as resting on social facts).
54. Henry E. Smith, The Elements of Possession, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION
65 (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015).
55. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 78 (1985).
56. Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1105, 1115–25 (2003).
57. Miller, supra note 47.
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Formalism is not—as it is often taken to be—all or nothing. It is
often assumed that law is either totally deductive and autonomous
or it cannot be formal at all. Intractable complexity might point away
from formalism (but which way would it point?). Perhaps as in early
conceptions of the environment, everything is connected to everything else and context always matters, which would preclude the
use of shortcut or system of any kind.58 Clearly context matters a
great deal and interconnections are important, in the environment
and in law.59 The question is how to manage the challenge, and a
degree of formalism can sometimes be a part of the solution rather
than always the problem.
Although formalism takes many forms, it is surprisingly possible
to give general characterizations of formalism. Francis Heylighen
defines formalism as relative invariance to context.60 This definition
can be used in language (computer languages versus human language,
formal versus informal speech), scientific theories, and mathematical
notation (published proofs versus everyday work). Most interesting
for our purposes is the role of formality in communicating with
socially distant audiences who cannot be presumed to bring as much
background knowledge or common norms to the communication. In
rem versus in personam can be seen as an important example.61
If we take complexity seriously, we should treat formalism as
being a matter of degree—a matter of when, how much, and why.
Within the law, we should not expect the same degree of formalism
everywhere. When it comes to the most impersonal contexts, where an
in rem right is being asserted against people generally (“against the
world”), requiring duty bearers to process a lot of contextual information is not realistic.62 Famously, James Penner argued for the importance of in rem rights and the formal (not substantive) centrality of
58. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 239–40 (1949); JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER
211 (1911); Steven J. Eagle, The Common Law and the Environment, 58 CASE
W. RSRV. L. REV. 583, 594–95 (2008) (discussing the views of Aldo Leopold and John Muir).
59. Henry E. Smith, The Ecology of the Common Law, 9 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. J.
153 (2020).
60. Francis Heylighen, Advantages and Limitations of Formal Expression, 4 FOUND. SCI.
25, 26–28, 49–53 (1999); see also Smith, supra note 56, at 1148–57.
61. Smith, supra note 56, at 1139–67.
62. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 55 (2000); Henry E. Smith,
Toward an Economic Theory of Property in Information, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 104 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
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the right to exclude in property through the example of a parking
lot: duty bearers need to know not to take or meddle with cars, but
they need not know anything about the owner, the owner’s plans,
whether the car is borrowed from the user’s sister-in-law, etc.63 By
contrast to such in rem relations, where people are contracting
between themselves, we can expect and allow a lot more (but not
unlimited) idiosyncrasy, and it makes more sense to take context
into account. And between these poles (if that’s what they are), we
get a lot of variation. As Merrill and I have shown, there are many
property institutions that fall in between.64 Here the duty bearers
and other potentially interested parties are numerous but definite
or non-numerous but indefinite, making the audience of intermediate social distance. And in these “intermediate” situations, we find
intermediate degrees of standardization.65 And within such intermediate institutions, like landlord-tenant, bailments, security interests, and trusts, we find an intermediate degree of formalism with
standardization of the more in rem aspects and more tailoring and
use of context in the more in personam aspects.66 Boilerplate in
contract law falls between the in rem and in personam, and it exhibits a semi-formal modular structure.67
Indeed, this differential formalism based on varieties of audience
is very general.68 It occurs within human language, and even in realms
we might not expect it. For example, within the world of mathematical communication, which is sometimes taken to be totally formal,
degrees of formalism are crucial to the course of mathematical
understanding itself.69
63. J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 75–76 (1997).
64. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 773 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, The Property/Contract Interface].
65. Id.
66. Id. at 809–51.
67. Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1175, 1180 (2006); Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking
in Complex Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1420 (2016); see also Erik F.
Gerding, Contract as Pattern Language, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1323 (2013). This is not to say that
such contractual provisions are totally modular or that modularization comes without cost.
See, e.g., Matthew Jennejohn, The Architecture of Contract Innovation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 71
(2018); Tal Kastner, Systemic Risk of Contract (June 17, 2021), B.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3869216.
68. Smith, supra note 56, at 1125–67.
69. William P. Thurston, Proof and Progress in Mathematics, 30 BULL. AM. MATH. SOC’Y
161 (1994).
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Formalism sometimes manifests as standardization, and among
areas of private law, property is more standardized than most. Which
is not to say that it is always standardized or that the degree of
standardization is constant over time and place. Tom Merrill and I
offered a theory of standardization in property, known by the civillaw term “numerus clausus,” based on the benefits and costs of information implicated by in rem versus in personam rights.70 As
mentioned earlier, in rem audiences (of duty bearers and potential
acquirers) are more distant than those involved in corresponding in
personam scenarios. Moreover, someone creating an in rem right
does not necessarily face all the information costs thrown off by a
new form: an idiosyncratic form may cause everyone else to be on
the lookout for unwanted features along a variety of margins and to
fear surprises along unknown ones.71 Title records can help, but it
is an empirical question how much and when.72 And it is noteworthy
that systems of registration often have a stricter, not a looser,
numerus clausus. If, as some have argued, notice really cured all—
any detail in the land records provides sufficient opportunity for
notice—then we would expect freedom of creation should reign, and
registration, which gives the best notice, would allow more idiosyncrasies.73 Instead, if anything, we find the opposite, and it is not
hard to guess why: if the registrar must make a pronouncement on
title, the registrar stands in for the “in rem” public and will not want
to incur high information costs evaluating idiosyncratic interests.74
(Interestingly, when New Zealand tried to automate its Torrens
registration system, it had to standardize even further.75) Consistently with complexity economics, information is a way of framing
a substantive problem: in rem rights are nonconsensual, and we
70. Merrill & Smith, supra note 62.
71. Id. at 32.
72. Henry E. Smith, Standardization in Property Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 148, 165–67 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
73. For an argument to this effect, see Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract
in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1982); see also Alfred F. Conard, Easement
Novelties, 30 CAL. L. REV. 125, 131–33 (1942) (arguing that novel easements should be
enforceable as long as there is notice).
74. Benito Arruñada, Property Enforcement as Organized Consent, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
401, 416–20 (2003).
75. Benito Arruñada, Leaky Title Syndrome?, 2010 N.Z. L.J. 115 (April 2010).
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should hesitate in imposing on in rem audiences who do not agree
to be bound by idiosyncratic duties.76
Standardization varies over time in a complex way, but often not
in the way sometimes portrayed. It is said that some countries have
the opposite of the numerus clausus, a “numerus apertus” or open set
of property rights—free customization. This turns out to be somewhere between overblown and false: such systems, including those
of Norway, South Africa, and Spain, in practice are more standardized than they are in theory.77 On the other hand, in more close-knit
groups we can expect much less standardization, as we find with
customary regimes.78 Indeed, the question of how much a society-wide,
more impersonal legal system should recognize community custom
is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the numerus clausus.79
At the level of law, it is possible to be a functionally oriented
partial formalist.80 That is, the pattern of when formalism is (and is
not) desirable can be grounded in functional considerations (not
usually associated with strong forms of formalism). In personam
and in rem would be but one example. Thus, external perspectives
like functionalism need not read the concepts important to internal
perspectives entirely out of the law: concepts like possession can be
justified by their function in a system, a function that is not merely
given. By the same token, internal perspectives theorize from the
perspective of system participants and are often grounded in local
kinds of morality like corrective justice. These internal perspectives
76. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1597 (2008); Avihay Dorfman, Property and Collective Undertaking: The Principle
of Numerus Clausus, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 467 (2011); Joseph William Singer, Democratic
Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009).
77. Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, Convergence and Divergence in Systems of
Property Law: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 798 & nn.36–38
(2019) (discussing and citing sources for Norway, South Africa, and Spain).
78. See Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. 5 (2009). For this reason and because modularity is endogenous in the architectural theory,
I do not see this as a “modernist” project or geared exclusively to modern property systems.
Cf. Carol M. Rose, Modularity, Modernist Property, and the Modern Architecture of Property,
10 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. J. 69 (2021) (detecting a modernist theme in the architectural
theory). Perhaps the baroque would be a better architectural and cultural analogy?
79. See Henry E. Smith & Yun-chien Chang, The Numerus Clausus Principle, Property
Customs, and the Emergence of New Property Forms, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2275 (2015).
80. Smith, supra note 22, at 158; (“Applying systems theory to private law . . . allows us
to take seriously some of the structures of private law for functional reasons.”); see also Wyman,
supra note 46, at 206 (discussing functionally motivated formalism or functional formalism).
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should be open to functional considerations—to the way that the
functioning of concepts in society helps shape legal concepts. Thus,
both external and internal perspectives can converge to some degree
on a more varied picture of formalism.81
4. Information Costs. Related to system and formalism is the
notion of information costs. While not the sole or even the main focus
of property law, information costs are a source of potential flattening
in property they if they are not handled properly. They also shape
property law in characteristic ways.
Information costs are a broad category. They include much more
than the verification costs a party incurs in order to evaluate whether
rights are valid.82 Measurement costs of all kinds are information
costs, including the costs of figuring out the contours of rights and
their various implications.83 Highly interactive rights—where the interactions can have consequences but are not that valuable overall—
present a complexity problem. The emerging field of complexity
economics sees many of the benefits and costs of economic activity
in terms of information, a trend consistent with developments in the
natural sciences.84
Complexity gives rise to information costs. Complexity causes
uncertainty which can be measured in terms of entropy.85 That is,
complexity carries a lot of information both in the sense that it would
require a long description and that it has a lot of surprise value. From
a practical standpoint these aspects of complexity give rise to costs:
the resources for dealing with complexity or the losses incurred because of it can be classed as information costs. And different modes
of delineation are differentially costly. Just as we reserve a signal
81. On how complexity considerations point toward a partial convergence of external and
internal perspectives, see Gold & Smith, supra note 12.
82. If we focus only on verification costs to the exclusion of other information costs, the
problem of standardization in property looks much narrower than it actually is. See Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus
Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S416 (2002).
83. See Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J. L. &
ECON. 27 (1982).
84. See, e.g., CÉSAR HIDALGO, WHY INFORMATION GROWS: THE EVOLUTION OF ORDER FROM
ATOMS TO ECONOMIES (2015); HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON COMPLEXITY (J. Barkeley Rosser,
Jr. ed., 2009).
85. Ted M. Sichelman, Quantifying Legal Entropy (forthcoming 2021), in THE PHYSICS OF
THE LAW: LEGAL SYSTEMS THROUGH THE PRISM OF COMPLEXITY SCIENCE.
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like a light being on or a siren going off for the less probable state
(higher entropy in an informational sense), so we use the least cost
delineation for the “default” set of rights, such as the fees simple or
full ownership. This does not make them more important. It just
means that we can make property law serve our purposes at lower
cost. For all these reasons, formalism—a matter of degree—can be
seen as a response to information costs, and in my previous work I
have explored some of these implications.
It should be said that despite my architectural approach sometimes
being called (included by me) an “information cost” theory, I have
never claimed that the be-all-and-end-all or even the main purpose
of property is to lower information costs. The model is a benefit-cost
model (and even here I do not adopt such a model as any kind of
philosophical utilitarian).86 The point is to handle complexity: to
make it serve our purposes—and for present purposes I take these
purposes to be plural—without causing excessive problems, however
those are cast. Part of the point of emphasizing information costs is
that until recently they were often assumed away, to the detriment
of explanatory power. This is not unrelated to the bundle picture
and the reflexive dismissal of formalism of all kinds. It is true that
some of property’s characteristic devices are shaped by the cost of in
rem rights—costs incurred in achieving the benefits—and that this
causes property to be different in interesting ways from contract.
86. Smith, supra note 15, at 1725 (“I am not arguing for utilitarian foundations in a
philosophical sense. If explanations based on information costs, complexity, and the nearly
decomposable system of social interactions dovetail with moral theories, it is quite likely not
an accident. This convergence is a consequence of complexity. As Herbert Simon pointed out,
complexity can lead us to be “in-principle” reductionists and “practical” holists.”); Henry E.
Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American Property
Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 974 (2009) (“Undoubtedly, one can find convinced utilitarians
and consequentialists, but I suspect for many, including myself, utilitarianism is a method
of communication more than anything else.”); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E Smith,
The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1850–51 (2007) (“But it seems highly
unlikely that such a morality will be captured by many forms of utilitarianism. Pragmatism
is too uncertain, and case-specific cost-benefit analysis too demanding and error-prone, to
supply the kind of robust and widely accepted moral understanding needed to sustain a
system of property.”); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Architecture of Property, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORIES 134, 136 (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin
Zipursky eds., 2020) (“We do not claim that these purposes can be reduced to a single metric
(such as utility), although we do think that the kind of quasi-utilitarianism of law and
economics can serve as a provisional lingua franca or integrating tool of analysis (analogously
to the way cost-benefit analysis serves a role in the regulatory context).”) (footnote omitted).
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Indeed, one may even say that these characteristic devices, including
a large role for exclusion in modern property systems, are an “essential role” of property law in the sense of Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman’s work on organizations: these devices in property law do
something that could not feasibly be replicated by contract.87 Nevertheless, information costs are but part of the picture.
As with complexity, the problem of information costs and resultant partial formalism is far from limited to property. Similar patterns of “audience design” are reflected in natural language, with
more formal “high delineation cost” speech used for socially distant
audiences and more informal implicit communication for those
closer in social context.88 Closely related to this is how custom tends
to be partially formalized and simplified if it is taken up into the
law and applied beyond its community of origin.89 Even in an enterprise that has a clear-cut deductive image like mathematics the very
same patterns of communication can be seen.90
The need to achieve property’s purposes at reasonable cost helps
explain why the trust works the way it does and why it is such an
important legal innovation. Because the trustee has legal title, for
most purposes third parties can interact with the property in the
usual way. The trustee is subject to equitable duties (prominently
loyalty and prudence, but also accounting, information, etc.) to the
beneficiary.91 These can be very intense and context-specific because
they are mainly of relevance to these two parties. The one exception
is that if the trustee transfers to a third party who does not give
value (no reliance) or knows that the transfer is in breach of trust,
then the third party will be treated as a constructive trustee with a
duty to convey to the appropriate party.92 The beneficial interest is
87. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000) (arguing that asset-partitioning is not achievable by
contract, making it the “essential role” of organizational law); Brian Angelo Lee & Henry E.
Smith, The Nature of Coasean Property, 59 INT’L REV. ECON. 145 (2012).
88. Smith, supra note 56, at 1133–39.
89. Smith, supra note 78.
90. Thurston, supra note 69.
91. See, e.g., Ben McFarlane & Robert Stevens, The Nature of Equitable Property, 4 J.
EQUITY 1, 1 (2010); J.E. Penner, An Untheory of the Law of Trusts, or Some Notes Towards
Understanding the Structure of Trusts Law Doctrine, 63 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 653, 665–66
(2010); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621 (2004).
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 (AM. L. INST.
2011).
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therefore “in personam plus.” The arrangement achieves much of
the benefit of property for the beneficiary in a way that facilitates
expert management and the like, but does not present large information costs for third parties.
The trust exemplifies how attention to complexity and information costs can help us to see that the law achieves its purposes, here
quite important and sometimes idiosyncratic purposes, through
specialized structures. The traditional debates about whether trusts
are contract or property miss how it is a unique hybrid that makes
it possible to achieve many of the benefits of property (and more)
using mechanisms that in a sense hardly go beyond contract.93 The
trust is quite special, and its uniqueness is easy to miss if we are
looking for flattened law. Trusts help us break out of Flatland.
5. Purpose in Property Beyond the Mirror Principle. The flip
side of this more complete picture of where information costs come
from and why they (but not they alone) matter is the question of purpose in property law. Conventionally, property theory gets straight
to the purpose by expecting each component, including each stick in
the bundle and each “rule” of property law to reflect some purpose
directly.94 Systems need not work this way.95 This expectation that
property law’s purposes are close to the surface has deep roots in
Legal Realism and beyond. In characteristically pithy fashion, Oliver
Wendell Holmes proclaimed that “a body of law is more rational and
93. Compare F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 29 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J.
Whittaker eds., 1936) (“[T]he Chancellor begins to enforce a personal right . . . which in truth
is a contractual right, a right created by a promise.”); John H. Langbein, The Contractarian
Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 627, 669 (1995) (acknowledging that “[t]rust is
a hybrid of contract and property,” but maintaining that at bottom “[t]rusts are contracts”)
with Austin Wakeman Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 COLUM. L.
REV. 269, 289 (1917) (“[T]he rights of the cestui que trust . . . are treated like property rights
rather than like obligations.”); Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law:
A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 454–59 (1998) (arguing
for a property-based account of trusts); see also Merrill & Smith, The Property/Contract
Interface, supra note 64, at 843–49 (analyzing trust as an institution between in rem and in
personam); Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus
Common Law Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 13 (2012) (discussing trusts in context of
styles of legal systems).
94. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 86.
95. See GERALD M. WEINBERG & DANIELA WEINBERG, ON THE DESIGN OF STABLE SYSTEMS
299 (1979) (“[P]eople persist in the fallacy that mechanisms and variables are in one-to-onecorrespondence.”).
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more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately
and definitely to an end which it subserves, and when the grounds
for desiring that end are stated or are ready to be stated in words.”96
And the external and functional perspective advocated by the Realists
and their successors usually involved this rule-by-rule approach. Much
of law and economics, especially in its first generation, canvassed the
rules of the common law for efficiency.97 And this kind of reductionism
is furthered by the reductionism of the bundle of rights: drawing on
Coase (who adopted it for different purposes), law and economics
employs the separability of the sticks and the consequent ease of
optimization to make it more straightforward to evaluate and reshape the property bundle by the metric of efficiency.98
Just as we should neither assume that sticks are always easily
separable in practice, likewise we should be open to the idea that
rules or other constituents of the law and legal institutions might
work synergistically. Law is not just a heap of rules. Such a heap
would leave out the whole problem of complexity: sticks and rules
might be connected—might work together, might work at crosspurposes, etc.
Thus, when we come at it from the end of purpose—of ends, if you
will—we should not necessarily expect that a purpose will be achieved
directly by some single component of the legal system, whether it be
a stick in the bundle or a “rule” of law. Yes, this sometimes happens,
as where we might consider the implied warranty of habitability in
isolation. The implied warranty of habitability is embedded in the
lease and in landlord-tenant law more generally, but it is more
separable from the bundle than would be the notion of possession or
the right to repel gross physical invasions under the law of trespass.
Transacting behavior, such as in landlord-tenant and real property
96. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
97. This is what led Arthur Leff in his review of the first edition of Richard Posner’s
Economic Analysis of Law to identify Posner’s book as a picaresque novel in which “the
eponymous hero sets out into a world of complexity and brings to bear on successive segments
of it the power of his own particular personal vision.” Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis
of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 451 (1974). One theme of Leff’s
review is the problem of complexity and how Posner’s method, like any nominalism, assumes
it away. See, e.g., the section entitled “Avoiding Complexity.” Id. at 469–77.
98. On Coase’s adoption of the bundle of rights and its pervasiveness in law and
economics, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 33; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making
Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. & ECON. S77 (2011).

34

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:009

sales, is easier to regulate under antidiscrimination law than invocations of trespass at the proverbial dinner party. And, it should be
remembered, the intertwining of a “stick” is not a reason to avoid
touching it: the purpose or policy can be important enough to overcome the attendant complications. Thus, however integral to their
conception of ownership racially restrictive covenants were to those
who employed them, such covenants should not be enforced and
should be banned.99 Again, the what and the how of property’s purposes are two sides of the coin.
And stepping back to a comparative perspective, we see the residue
of these kinds of considerations of system and purpose. Having just
said that all else is not equal at the micro level—we need to compare
purposes and means for achieving them—in the large we should
expect aspects of the law in its initial or earlier states to be stickier
if they are more integrated or interconnected with the rest of the
system of property law.100 Yun-Chien Chang and I find evidence suggestive of a pattern of convergence and divergence in property law
across systems that reflects the architecture of the law. Aspects of the
law that serve functions relatively directly—“structural aspects”—
can be expected to converge if they respond to similar conditions.
More tellingly, those aspects of the law that are characteristic of a
legal regime but could easily be otherwise—the stylistic aspects of
law—will, if they start out from different initial states, tend to
persist if they are more interconnected.101 Thus, doctrines relating to
management of property, which are more intertwined with other
aspects of the law and property institutions in an ongoing relationship,
tend to diverge more across jurisdictions than the rules for judicial
partition, which are more discrete (ending the relationship).102
Much of the flattening of property law shows up as a series of
dichotomies revolving in one way or another around the bundle
picture, system, formalism, information costs, and purposes. Each
seems to be an all-or-nothing choice. These dichotomies seem to be
built into property law and theory because we have downplayed or
99. See RICHARD R.W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS (2013).
100. Henry E. Smith, The Persistence of System in Property Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2055
(2015).
101. Chang & Smith, supra note 77, at 804–08.
102. Id.
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overlooked the web of interconnections that lends property—and the
world—its organized complexity.
II. VARIETIES OF SYSTEM IN PROPERTY LAW
If the world in which property law is embedded is complex, it is
to be expected that property law and institutions would be shaped
by that complexity. And, as we have seen, complexity comes in different kinds. Those aspects of the world relevant to property law
could be simple or chaotic—or far more likely they could feature
Weaver’s organized complexity.103 Resource attributes, their values,
actors’ activities with respect to them, and so on, are connected but
not completely, and the pattern of connections exhibits some clustering
(attributes into “things” more or less, and legal relations into legal
interests). And if the kind of complexity we’re talking about is organized complexity, we might expect property to show a response to
that kind of complexity and exhibit a kind of organized complexity
itself. The world in general and property institutions in particular are
complex systems in which organized complexity plays a large role.
Consistently with organized complexity, when it comes to property law, the system is not purely deductive, but it is structured.104
Interactions that are dense but not maximal and that show some
clustering cause the system of property law to be neither simple nor
chaotic, but rather to exhibit Weaver’s organized complexity.105 System
is a matter of degree, including in how much it facilitates or impedes
dynamic change. Arms or gliding structures evolve into wings but not
eyes. And as we have seen, relatively detached features of property
law like partition evolve more readily than more connected facets
like management doctrines.106 We can ensure that needed change
happens more effectively by paying attention to complexity—by
having a more realistic and less nominalist view of what’s going on.
To start with, we need to drop the assumption that property must
be homogeneous, and thus flat in that sense. Sticks may cover all
manner of content, but their role according to the conventional
103. See Weaver, supra note 6.
104. This idea of system as being a way to overcome complexity and not necessarily
through deduction has deep roots, going back to Leibniz. See Smith, supra note 13.
105. See Weaver, supra note 6.
106. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
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bundle picture is much of a muchness. Such a picture of fully independent sticks and additive rules portrays property as more homogeneous than it is. Also, to assume that there must be one optimal
degree of formalism for all of property law (or all of law) is to make
the same mistake. Once we confront our theories with the complex
reality, it becomes clearer how we can do better.
Let me now briefly survey certain aspects of the system of property law that show nontrivial structure—that are anything but flat.
1. Exclusion Versus Governance. Let’s start with the question
of how property rights are delineated. These strategies can be placed
along a spectrum according to how much they focus in on specific
uses.107 An exclusion strategy employs rough proxies that are relatively easy to monitor (e.g., boundary crossings) but that are underand especially over-inclusive when it comes to regulating use.108 By
giving possessors and owners the power to control access, they can
protect a wide range of uses that need not be spelled out or justified
to a court (and harm need not be measured to get an injunction), but
given positive transaction costs, this power also prevents access by
those who would not do any harm.109 By contrast, governance involves proxies closely tied to use, as in an easement (a right to use)
and the more fine-grained aspects of nuisance, covenants and zoning.
As this last list indicates, governance can be supplied by various
institutions, including contract, tort, zoning, and the like. And if we
include self-help, social norms, and even “vibes,”110 some of which
107. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002).
108. And so are formal in Heylighen’s sense. See Heylighen, supra note 60, at 49–53.
109. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1327–28 (1993). For theories
that emphasize the right to exclude, which is one way to implement an exclusion strategy, see,
e.g., J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 30–32 (1996); J.E. PENNER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: A REEXAMINATION 139–56 (2020); PENNER, supra note 63, at 68–74; Shyamkrishna Balganesh,
Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593 (2008); Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Gridlock, 53
ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 17–28 (2011) (book review); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to
Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 731 (1998); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude II, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 1 (2014); see also Henry E. Smith, The Thing
about Exclusion, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 95 (2014) (distinguishing the right
to exclude from exclusion strategies).
110. Such vibes are especially likely to be problematic if they are designed to get around
legal prohibitions on or social disapproval of discrimination. In addition to exclusionary vibes,
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can be violent or immoral, exclusion strategies are not tied to any one
institutional source. Exclusion and governance are strategies, or
legal technologies, that fall along a spectrum defined by the degree
to which they zero in on specific uses.
Different resources call for different combinations of exclusion and
governance at different times. It is often thought that the Demseztian
evolution of property rights with increased value of and pressure on a
resource is one toward greater reliance on exclusion (and Demsetz’s
article can be read that way), but depending on the costs and benefits an increase in use governance can be the best response to new or
increased externalities.111 Thus, the “Demseztian” evolution of property rights might take the form of increased governance,112 as it did in
many historic grazing commons, with the addition and strengthening
of “stinting” rules among common grazers.113
Moreover, some resources call for a greater reliance on governance, and governance is especially important when it comes to what
I call “fluid” property.114 In an analog to physical fluids, which deform
continuously under shearing stress and flow in characteristic ways,
some resources are correspondingly hard to “bound.” These include
water, radio spectrum, and the subject matter of intellectual property. For these resources, particularly where uses are not only hard
Strahilevitz identifies “exclusionary amenities” as well. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information
Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1861–98 (2006); see also LIOR
J. STRAHILEVITZ, INFORMATION AND EXCLUSION (2011). Self-help can easily get out of hand,
as can informal enforcement of social norms. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Introduction: Property
and Language, or, the Ghost of the Fifth Panel, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 1, 13–15 (2006)
(discussing violent and symbolically violent efforts at exclusion in settings ranging from
lobster gangs to neighborhoods with racially restrictive covenants). Different devices can work
together, sometimes for bad ends. See BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 99, at 187–210 (discussing
signaling function of racially restrictive covenants).
111. Smith, supra note 107, at S453–56, S464, S483; see also Rose, supra note 31, at 9–12,
19–21 (setting out theory of management strategies for common resources use including
“RIGHTWAY”).
112. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967);
Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American
West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 170 (1975) (proposing model for degree of property rights activity);
see also Smith, supra note 107, at S468–78 (arguing that increased property rights might take
the form of more governance).
113. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 61–69 (1990); Karen J. Friedman,
Fencing, Herding, and Tethering in Denmark, from Open-Field Agriculture to Enclosure, 58
AGRIC. HIST. 584, 591–92 (1984).
114. Henry E. Smith, Semicommons in Fluid Resources, 20 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
195 (2016).

38

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:009

to disentangle but also hard to treat as a group and for which multiple access is valuable, we see the expected heavy reliance on governance relative to exclusion.115
Governance also shades off into more complex forms of property
we can call “entity property.” Another way to put this is that property is the law of partial separation, sometimes into modules.116 Just
as things are partially separated from their context and packages of
rights over them are partially separated from other relations, there
can be separation within packages of rights in quite sophisticated
ways. As we will see in the next Subsection, property regimes (private, common, and public) can be mixed into hybrids, and we can also
see even within private property forms of property that separate out
clusters of functions. In “entity property” we have separation of possession and management (common interest communities and, in a
functional sense, leases) and separation of beneficial interests from
management (trusts, corporations and other business organizations), with much internal governance.117
We should also expect exclusion and governance to work in tandem. Focusing in on certain uses through governance can increase
the effectiveness of exclusion strategies. Governance of uses works
better when exclusion takes care of many obvious problems based
on limiting access to the resource. Without such specialization, a
homogeneous strategy would always be entangled in “intermediate”
cases. An extreme version would be a universal balancing test for
every trespass.118
115. Henry E. Smith, Governing Intellectual Property, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: VOLUME 1: THEORY 47 (Ben Depoorter et al. eds.,
2019). In this respect patent law is more property-like than copyright and many other areas of
intellectual property. By covering generic use it comes closer to an exclusion regime, which
may find its explanation in the difficulty of specifying the set of uses in advance and the importance of commercialization and thus rights transfers. See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property
as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1799–1819 (2007).
116. Henry E. Smith, The Economics of Property Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS, VOLUME 2: PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 148 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017)
(analyzing property law as involving partial separation of various kinds).
117. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES
641–799 (3d ed. 2017) (chapter on “Entity Property”); THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH,
OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: PROPERTY 123–58 (2010) (chapter on “Governing
Property”).
118. For a proposal somewhat in this direction, see Ben Depoorter, Fair Trespass, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1090 (2011).
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2. Hybrids of Private, Common, and Public Property. Property
is not all of a piece. We need to distinguish private, common, and
public property, and different resources are best held in different
ways at different times.119 This goes beyond the shift from one mode
to another (eminent domain as private to public, enclosure movement
as common to private), but also includes mixing elements of private,
common, and public ownership with respect to the same resource.
Different attributes or even different uses of the same resource
might fall under different regimes.
Complexity is inevitable where two regimes come together.120
Even what we think of as the tragedy of the commons only has its
tragic tendency because common property abuts private property.121
If fish taken from a common pond were still common property (assuming that could be enforced in the face of efforts at concealment), then
there would be no incentive to overfish.122 Likewise, if the whole
pond were under single ownership there is no such incentive.123
This complexity of two regimes coming together has to be offset
against the benefits of the two separate regimes. The relationship
of the regimes might be synergistic but will often be one of conflict,
especially in terms of strategic behavior.
Where two regimes of common and private property come together
and interact intensively, we have what I call a semicommons.124 The
119. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 35 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith, eds.,
2011); Carol M. Rose, Thinking About the Commons, 14 INT’L J. COMMONS 557 (2020).
120. Streets and other public places often show complex interactions of private and public
elements, with concomitant strategic behavior. See Vanessa Casado Perez, The Street View
of Property, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 367 (2019).
121. Jens Warming, Om “Grundrente” af Fiskegrunde, NATIONALÖKONOMISK TIDSSKRIFT
495 (1911), Jens Warming, Aalgaardsretten, NATIONALÖKONOMISK TIDSSKRIFT 151 (1931),
transl. in P. Anderson, “On Rent of Fishing Grounds”: A Translation of Jens Warming’s 1911
Article, with an Introduction, 15 HIST. POL. ECON. 391 (1983); H.S. Gordon, The Economic
Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954); Steven N.S.
Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J. L. &
ECON. 49, 66–67 (1970).
122. Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 675 (1998).
123. Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 J. LEGAL STUD.
393, 422 (1995).
124. Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29
J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000); see also Fennell, supra note 119, at 46–49; Rose, supra note 119,
at 563–64.
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problem in the semicommons is that people may face even worse
incentives than in the commons, because they may try to benefit
themselves in the private property regime by using their access in the
commons regime to impose costs on others—and likewise to appropriate benefits. The two regimes may be so intertwined that in addition to governance one may see special structures of entitlements
to contain the strategic behavior. One such is the configuration of
entitlements to make them harder to exploit. I argue that the long,
thin, and scattered strips belonging to peasants in the medieval
open fields obscured ownership when the strips were combined and
thrown open for common grazing.125 In this seemingly strange
configuration, no one could strategically direct “goods” like manure
or “bads” like trampling from the combined group of animals onto or
away from (respectively) “their” plots in the non-commons period.
The benefits of multiple access and the intertwining of use often
lead to a semicommons in intellectual property.126
Complex governance rules can be used to manage the interface of
regimes as well. Indeed, many of the governance rules for the commons are actually there to handle excessive behavior at the interface
of common and private property. As we will see in the next Subsection, some more focused governance can take the form of equitable
intervention. I have argued elsewhere that one function of traditional equity (loosely associated with equity and not confined to it)
is to serve as meta-law—law about law—that will correct the law
and modify its results when the law goes off the rails.127 The need
for meta-law is greatest when actors are misusing the law, as in
unconscionability. And such misbehavior is especially hard to deal
with through regular law when it involves multiple interacting
actors and complex resources. So as a response to complexity and
uncertainty from polycentric problems, conflicting rights, and strategic behavior—all of which are implicated here—it is to be expected
125. Smith, supra note 124.
126. BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 302–03
(2012); Robert A. Heverly, The Information Semicommons, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127,
1184 (2003); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 11 (2005); Lydia Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works:
Enforcement of Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 14 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 271, 296–97 (2007); Smith, supra note 114, at 210.
127. See Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, 130 YALE L.J. 1050 (2021).
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that equity would be employed to rein in bad behavior at the interface of the commons and private property. A dramatic example is
the important role that equity played in dealing with the use of water
along a watercourse, a complex and variable resource involving
many parties.128 Likewise with borders across time, strategic behavior can be addressed through equity, as in the law of waste.129
3. Differential Formalism and Law Versus Equity. Above we
encountered differential formalism as a general matter,130 and it
would take us too far afield to canvas the ways in which property law
exhibits more formalism in some of its parts than in others. To the
extent that it does, property law cannot be said to be homogeneous.
Moreover, differences in formalism may be a sign that modular
components are interacting. One component may be more formal
than another, or we may be comparing a more formal interface with
interactions within a module, which are more intensive and so more
contextually sensitive—and so less formal.
Law and equity might, after the fusion of law and equity, seem a
somewhat surprising example of different subsystems of the law
that differ in their degree of formalism. In other work, I identify a
function loosely associated with equity, namely meta-law.131 Metalaw is a system that operates on the law—supplements it, aids it,
suppresses its results, even sometimes modifies it—without the reverse being true: the first level system (“regular law”) does not make
reference to equity. I said that this meta-law function is loosely associated with equity, because the term “equity” and even equitable
jurisdictional pedigree are not perfectly correlated with meta-law.
Parts of the legal system called “equity” that trace their pedigree to
equity jurisdiction are not meta-law (for example, certain purely
technical rules of trust law). By the same token, there are parts of the
law (doctrines like coming to the nuisance and modes like judicial
128. This is even true of prior appropriation, which is more use based and context specific
than is usually thought. See Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid
Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445 (2008). And equity plays a big role here too. Duane
Rudolph, Why Prior Appropriation Needs Equity, 18 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 348, 363 (2015).
129. Duane Rudolph, How Equity and Custom Transformed American Waste Law, 2
CHARLOTTE SCH. L. PROP. J. 1 (2015).
130. See supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text.
131. Smith, supra note 127.
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common law-making) that are meta-law.132 Nevertheless, from remedies like the injunction to doctrines of unconscionability and constructive fraud, from anti-forfeiture principles to equitable defenses,
equity kicks in when certain triggers—based on some combination
of bad faith, disproportionate hardship and vulnerability—push us
into a system of more direct and open-ended scrutiny for morality and
fairness.133 In systems generally, it is great uncertainty and complexity that call for meta systems. In the law, problems of polycentricity (many connected parties or elements), conflicting rights, and
especially opportunism are especially amenable to such treatment.
The expense and uncertainty of going to a higher level can be more
than offset by the benefits of targeted specialization, among which
is the ability of regular law to be simpler and more general than it
would be if it had to anticipate or react to all sorts of complexity,
especially that arising from opportunism.
When it comes to equity, we are dealing with a different dimension of structure than the modules of property law we have been
considering so far. If those are “horizontal,” then equity in its major
theme of meta-law is “vertical,” in the sense of being law about law
and intervening into the law, rather than from “within” it.
4. Degrees of Modularity. Because of the challenges of complexity, including the need to communicate in rem rights to a large and
indefinite audience, property shows a characteristic modularity. One
aspect of this modularity is the importance of a legal thing in property, making property law in some sense a law of things.134 Nevertheless, this does not mean that modularity is absolute or that things
are exogenously given.
Modularity is a method of managing complexity.135 If a system
permits interaction to be more intense within than across modules,
operations within modules and even changes to a module can happen without massive ripple effects. This relates to the phenomenon
of organized complexity leading to a rugged fitness landscape, rather
132. See John C.P. Goldberg & Henry E. Smith, Wrongful Fusion: Equity and Torts, in
EQUITY AND LAW: FUSION AND FISSION 309 (John C.P. Goldberg et al. eds., 2019).
133. Smith, supra note 127; Henry E. Smith, Equitable Defences as Meta-Law, in DEFENCES
IN EQUITY 17 (Paul S. Davies et al. eds., 2018).
134. Smith, supra note 15.
135. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 8; Langlois, supra note 8.
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than a random one.136 Organization (and ruggedness) come in degrees, and the property system is not fully but nearly decomposable.137 Take legal things, which are not identical to physical things,
and can indeed cover non-physical resources. The idea is to find
collections of resource attributes that go together, usually in the
sense of being complementary, and that as a group interact less—
even if they do interact—with the outside context (e.g., neighboring
parcels, the environment).138
One attraction of the architectural approach is that it points to
variables that can be operationalized. Using network models we can
measure the degree of modularity and show how bundles and legal
things might emerge endogenously as tight collections, not just aggregations of Hohfeldian legal relations.139 And such a theory built
on information can employ the tools of information theory.140
Returning to the legal thing, we see that far from being monolithic or absolute, we can endogenize legal thinghood itself and
make it a matter of degree. And thinghood can undergo redefinition,
in incremental fashion in courts and in a more thoroughgoing way
through legislation.141
136. Alston & Mueller, supra note 41, at 2265–67.
137. Smith, supra note 15, at 1701–02. On near decomposability, SIMON, supra note 4, at
195–98.
138. For a recognition of the role of complementarities, see, e.g., LEE ANNE FENNELL, SLICES
AND LUMPS: DIVISION AND AGGREGATION IN LAW AND LIFE (2019); Lee Anne Fennell, Property
as the Law of Complements, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORIES 155 (Hanoch
Dagan & Benjamin Zipursky eds., 2020); Smith, supra note 107, at S267–74 (analyzing
“organizational dimension” of property); Smith, supra note 15, at 1693, 1703–04 (discussing
clustering of complementary attributes); see also BARZEL, supra note 45, at 3–16 (setting forth
theory of property rights based on resource attributes).
139. See sources cited supra note 40. Classically, modules would not overlap, and this can
be an advantage, but the architectural approach can leave that question open. Cf. James Y.
Stern, The Essential Structure of Property Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1167 (2017) (arguing for
central role of thing-exclusivity in property).
140. Sichelman, supra note 85; see also Smith, supra note 56, at 1125–57. Even possession
is a technology for delineating things that is nonessential on an information-based theory that
endogenizes legal things. See João Marinotti, Tangibility as Technology, 37 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
671 (2021).
141. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 100, at 2069. Thus, the shifting tides of thinghood are
consistent with this approach rather than posing a problem for it. See Meghan L. Morris,
Property and the Social Life of Things (draft) (on file with author). Morris’s examples are a
mix of land and water and show some characteristics of “fluid property.” See supra notes
114–15 and accompanying text.
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5. Spontaneous Versus Directed Evolution. Often property
theorists come down in favor of seeing evolution in the law as spontaneous or directed. Sometimes the former is associated with the
common law and the latter with legislation, but the Legal Realists
could be taken as asking judges to engage in direct reengineering of
property law. By the same token, libertarians and classical liberals
often argue for the merits of what they see as spontaneous commonlaw evolution, even an evolution that tracks and in turn facilitates
custom and private ordering outside the law.142
I want to suggest that reality is . . . more complex.143 Property law
is a mixture of spontaneous and directed evolution. Custom does
feature importantly in the law,144 and sometimes some changes are
big enough to require legislation. This is particularly true in property where system effects (not least from in rem rights) are important. This is not a counsel of despair or a plea for the untouchability
of property law—which brings us to the question of institutional
sources of innovation in property law.
6. Common Law and Legislation. Another hybrid relevant to
property is institutional. Property law is shaped both by courts and
legislatures (sometimes acting through agencies). When it comes to
major changes in the menu of property rights, legislation has many
advantages, and by and large the numerus clausus does also stand
for a tendency for legislatures to take the lead in major innovations
in property law.145 These advantages include clarity, universality,
comprehensiveness, stability, prospectivity, and implicit compensation, and are reminiscent of Lon Fuller’s criteria for the rule of law.146
And compared to other areas of private law, legislation has a long
history in property extending back to the Middle Ages. Also, given
142. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 46–47 (1973); Richard A.
Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and Law as Sources of
Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REV. 85, 101–02 (1992).
143. Perhaps the kind of complexity I have in mind is close to that explored by Eugen
Ehrlich. See EHRLICH, supra note 53; David Nelken, Eugen Ehrlich, Living Law, and Plural
Legalities, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 443 (2008) (arguing that Ehrlich’s living law
captured the interdependence of official and unofficial law).
144. David L. Callies & Ian Wesley-Smith, Beyond Blackstone: The Modern Emergence of
Customary Law, 4 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 151 (2015).
145. Merrill & Smith, supra note 62, at 58–68.
146. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38–91 (rev. ed. 1969) (discussing criteria of generality, clarity, non-contradiction, constancy, and non-retroactivity).
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the rugged fitness landscape from organized complexity and the difficulty of reaching some maxima though incremental change, legislation has been the source of major remodularizations and changes
in legal style.147
This hybrid institutional sourcing of property law helps make
sense of some puzzles and complaints in certain areas. Common law
courts are not good at coming up with quantified regulations and
have limited ability to craft entire regulatory regimes. Thus, in oil
and gas, common law courts have been criticized for not doing more
to combat the tragedy of the commons, and the fault is laid at the
door of myopic formalism (again!),148 with its false analogies like
ferae naturae (“fugitive” resources are like wild animals).149 This has
things backwards. The analogy expresses the difficulty for commonlaw rules to deal with fluid resources, which is very different from
denying the problem.150 Instead, what the common law can do is
target the most flagrant abuses and serve as a platform for further
legislation and regulation, as has happened in oil and gas.151
This relationship of loose but nontrivial common law concepts and
other institutions can be generalized. We will encounter it in Part
III again in connection with aerial trespass.
147. Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, Structure and Style in Comparative Property
Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 131–60 (Theodore Eisenberg & Giovanni B.
Ramello eds., 2017).
148. See, e.g., BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION 2–5 (3d ed. 1989); Laura H. Burney, A Pragmatic Approach to Decision Making in the
Next Era of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence, 16 J. ENERGY NAT. RES. & ENV’T L. 1, 11 (1996) (“To
clarify the contours of the pragmatic approach I envision, and to demonstrate its value, I will
contrast it to two formalistic approaches used throughout the Great Era. As noted above, by
analogizing to the law of wild animals, many early judges myopically adhered to common-law
rules rather than venturing to fashion a unique jurisprudence for oil and gas law.”); John
Parmerlee, Mines and Minerals-Leases-Rentals Accruing Under a Subterranean Gas Storage
Lease, 21 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 217, 219–20 (1953) (“If the law pertaining to minerals in this
country is to retain its stability and uniformity it is mandatory that this vicious analogy
drawn between natural gas and animals ferae naturae which has reared its ugly head be
destroyed without delay.”); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth
Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 354–57
(1980) (portraying the ferae naturae “rule” as an inadequate way station between an
absolutist conception of property and an emerging reasonableness rule).
149. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA.
L. REV. 965 (2004); Rance L. Craft, Of Reservoir Hogs and Pelt Fiction: Defending the Ferae
Naturae Analogy Between Petroleum and Wildlife, 44 EMORY L.J. 697, 699, 713–14 (1995)
(documenting hostility and collecting references).
150. Smith, supra note 149; Craft, supra note 149.
151. Smith, supra note 149, at 1027–37.
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***
Returning to my invocation of Flatland, the problem with flattening
the law is that everything starts looking flat. Thus, when it is proposed that we need a complex hybrid of exclusion and governance,
it looks like exclusive focus on exclusion. When complexes of private,
common, and public property are put forth, they can look like privatization to some and collectivism to others. Differential formalism is
still formalism and so we are back to caricatures of Langdell and such
bogeymen. And by falling short of homogeneous formalism, the architectural approach seems to have opened the door to the Chancellor’s
Foot.152 Or modularity can be taken as hermetically sealed, a priori
monolithic concepts that are unchanging—when they are exactly the
opposite and ironically promise to capture legal evolution better than
supposedly more nuanced theories.153 Or thinghood can be taken as
too protean to be meaningful (as it would be if there were no theory
to endogenize it).154 Indeed, any realistic theory is going to have to
come to grips with the blend of spontaneous and directed evolution
and the mix of institutional providers that we actually see—and to
one degree or another are almost bound to see.
Nonetheless, the architectural framework is not a fudgy “middle
way” or split-the-difference waffling. It asks us to see complexity
where we ignore it, and to allow for structure in dimensions we
typically rule out of bounds without comment. Whether or not
information-based, complexity-oriented architectural theories will
make headway in measuring relevant quantities and making finegrained predictions, such theories do clear away some Flatland-style
preconceptions and thereby allow for a, yes, more realistic, view of
property institutions. It is to the reality of property we now turn.
152. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Shading Problem, 99 MARQ. L. REV.
1, 11–12 (2015); Robert E. Scott & Jody P. Kraus, The Case Against Equity in American
Contract Law, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2020).
153. Compare Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1855
n.3 (2012) (arguing that architectural theory cannot handle “governance property”) with
Smith, supra note 100, at 2073 n.71 (showing that governance in the architectural theory is
not limited to external relations and so its notion of “entity property” is similar to Alexander’s
“governance property”); see also David A. Dana & Nadav Shoked, Property’s Edges, 60 B.C.
L. REV. 753 (2019).
154. Wyman, supra note 46.

2021]

PROPERTY BEYOND FLATLAND

47

III. PROPERTY’S ARCHITECTURE IN PRACTICE
The real test of the architectural framework in property is like
that of architecture itself: how does it fare in the real world? For one
thing, does it hold up—or fall down? Does it allow us to serve our
purposes more effectively?155
1. Possession. Let me return to the concept of possession and how
it plays out in practice. Possession has been notoriously hard to pin
down because it is impossible to come up with a definition that covers
when someone is in control, when someone maintains such control,
and at the same time gives standing to sue to “possessors” for purposes of trespass, nuisance, and the like. As a result, great effort is put
into trying to show how some extended kind of control is maintained
when, say someone parks a car on the street and walks blocks away
or leaves a vacation home over the winter.156 Notions of “constructive
possession” start to abound, and the Realist critique that possession
is an empty and totally protean notion gains some plausibility.
What we need are specialized and interacting notions of possession. First, the law must draw on social norms and context in the
establishment of possession: what counts as control and manifested
intent to control sufficient for a claim of a legal status of possession
155. Architecture itself has seen debates over the role of modularity in design. See
CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER ET AL., A PATTERN LANGUAGE: TOWNS, BUILDINGS, CONSTRUCTION
(1977); Christiane Herr, Generative Architectural Design and Complexity Theory, INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON GENERATIVE ART (2002), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/30870757
/download; see also Henry E. Smith, Restating the Architecture of Property, in 10 MODERN
STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 19, 25 (Sinéad Agnew & Ben McFarlane eds., 2019). Perhaps in law
there is an analog to the contrast between the era of empirical rules of thumb and the
emergence of engineering based on mathematical formulas. A. Rupert Hall, Engineering and
the Scientific Revolution, 2 TECH. & CULTURE 333 (1961). One suspects that, when it comes
to law, we are still mostly in the earlier phase.
156. For a variety of approaches, see, e.g., HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 20 (3d ed. 1939) (“speaking generally . . . one is in possession of land when he is
in occupation thereof, with the intention, actually realized, of excluding occupation by others,
or when not in actual occupation, he claims the right of exclusive occupation, and no person
is in occupation opposing his claim”); GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 13.03(a) (1939) (“Possession, whether actual or constructive, is said
to be the right of exclusive physical control, coupled with the intent to possess.”); 3 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY 765 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) (“[A]ctual and legal possession of land
exists when an actual possessio pedis is established with the degree of actual use and enjoyment of the parcel of land . . . which the average owner would exercise over similar property
under like circumstances.”).
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and a right to possess.157 And while Kocourek thought we could mostly
make do with a concrete notion of possession and the right to possess,
current case law treats someone who has established control as being
“in possession” on an ongoing basis.158 That is, if someone establishes possession (as in the concrete notion of possession) and no one
else takes possession, this status of “possession” continues even if
the facts of control no longer obtain. So if I park my car and walk
away, I am in possession until someone takes it (e.g., a converter).
Beyond that, one can lose possession and have only the right to possess, or one can acquire ownership and along with it a right to possess. A right to possess is not possession, but the right to be put in
possession. This notion is at the heart of ejectment and replevin.
2. Aerial Trespass. To see how these notions can combine in subtle
ways, consider the law of aerial trespass.159 The law of aerial trespass
became controversial in the 1920s and 1930s because landowners
brought trespass claims, seeking injunctions, against overflights. They
157. See, e.g., MICHAEL J.R. CRAWFORD, AN EXPRESSIVE THEORY OF POSSESSION 60–121
(2020); LUKE ROSTILL, POSSESSION, RELATIVE TITLE, AND OWNERSHIP IN ENGLISH LAW 7–24
(2021); Thomas W. Merrill, Ownership and Possession, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION
9 (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015).
158. See KOCOUREK, supra note 52, at 365–71. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW SECOND, TORTS
(AM. LAW INST. 1965):
§ 157. Definition of Possession
In the Restatement of this Subject, a person who is in possession of land
includes only one who (a) is in occupancy of land with intent to control it, or
(b) has been but no longer is in occupancy of land with intent to control it, if,
after he has ceased his occupancy without abandoning the land, no other person
has obtained possession as stated in Clause (a), or
(c) has the right as against all persons to immediate occupancy of land, if no
other person is in possession as stated in Clauses (a) and (b).
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW SECOND, TORTS (AM. LAW INST. 1965):
§ 216. Definition of Possession of Chattel
In the Restatement of this Subject, a person who is in “possession of a chattel”
is one who has physical control of the chattel with the intent to exercise such
control on his own behalf, or on behalf of another.
159. STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY?: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL AIRSPACE FROM
THE WRIGHT BROTHERS ON (2008); THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 13–16, 258–59 (3d ed. 2017); WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, NONTRESPASSORY
TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN 155–62 (1977); Eric R. Claeys, On the Use and Abuse of Overflight
Column Doctrine, 2 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 61 (2013); Richard A. Epstein, Intel
v. Hamidi: The Role of Self-Help in Cyberspace?, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 147, 154–55 (2005);
Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459, 467 (2009);
Christopher M. Newman, Using Things, Defining Property, in PROPERTY THEORY 69, 89–98
(James Penner & Michael Otsuka eds., 2018); Smith, supra note 100, at 2079–80.
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invoked the strictness of trespass—no harm need be shown—and the
hoary maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos
(“whoever owns the soil owns also to the sky and to the depths”), or
ad coelum for short. Before that, it had not mattered whether or in
what sense owners claimed upward because the only kinds of invasions possible were close enough to the surface to interfere with the
owner’s own activities. Because use of airspace for airplane flights
entering the column of space did not seriously interact with owners’
activities except at low altitudes, extreme and literal invocations of
trespass made little sense. Courts were further worried that recognizing anything close to that would lead to takings claims, which likewise made little sense. This might even be true if a federal navigation
servitude were recognized but in derogation of owners’ rights. As a
result, courts pronounced that ad coelum was never the rule.160 This
probably meant not that owners had no claims upward (and downward) but that the literal versions of ad coelum being pushed by
landowners were never true. Instead, owners could claim in the
ordinary sense only what they could actually possess, and they would
have to show substantial harm as part of a trespass case based on an
invasion of effectively unpossessed superjacent airspace.161 At the
same time, courts recognized owners’ priority in the unpossessed
airspace in the sense of having a right to build up further (as long
as it was not spiteful).162 Aircraft operators could not complain about
160. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), in which Justice Douglas offered his
famous dictum:
It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land extended to the
periphery of the universe—Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum. But that
doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a public highway, as
Congress has declared. Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would
subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the
idea. To recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
seriously interfere with their control and development in the public interest, and
transfer into private ownership that to which only the public has a just claim.
Id. at 260–61; see also Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936); Swetland
v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F.2d (N.D. Ohio 1930), modified on other grounds, 55 F.2d 201
(6th Cir. 1932); Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 173 S.E. 817 (Ga. 1934); Smith v. New Eng.
Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385 (Mass. 1930); Johnson v. Curtiss Northwest Airplane Co. (Minn. Dist.
Ct. 1923), reprinted in Current Topics and Notes, 57 AM. L. REV. 905, 908–11 (1923); Gay v.
Taylor, 19 Pa. D. & C. 31 (1932); Commonwealth v. Nevin, 2 Pa. D. & C. 241 (1922).
161. See, e.g., Hinman, 84 F.2d at 759 (“Appellants do not, therefore, in their bill state a
case of trespass, unless they allege a case of actual and substantial damage.”). For a strong
version of this, see RESTATEMENT SECOND, TORTS § 159(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
162. See, e.g., Causby, 328 U.S. at 260–61; Smith v. New Eng. Aircraft, 170 N.E. at 389–90;
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new buildings unless they had an easement. Further, there are slight
hints that the substantial-harm requirement was not meant to narrow the notion of actual possession: invasions of airspace, especially
permanent ones, were still per se trespasses.163
In rejecting the extreme version of the “title” theory of ad coelum,
the courts are probably best seen as clarifying rather than reconfiguring the rights to airspace. Traditional invocations of ad coelum
were a shorthand that did not need to take account of air travel. The
cf. 3775 Genesee St., Inc. v. State, 415 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (finding no taking
where landowner had no reasonable possibility of building into the stratum of airspace subject
to the condemned avigation easement). After his high-price offers were refused, the plaintiff
in Hinman erected some blocking structures, which were enjoined as a private and public
nuisance in subsequent litigation. See United Airports Co. of Cal. v. Hinman et al., 1940 U.S.
Av. Rep. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1939). Thanks to Brian Lee for this discovery.
163. Even in Causby, Justice Douglas made it clear that possession and ordinary trespass
as on the surface do not end at literal physical occupation by plaintiff’s structures and such:
We have said that the airspace is a public highway. Yet it is obvious that if the
landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control
of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise buildings
could not be erected, trees could not be planted, and even fences could not be run.
The principle is recognized when the law gives a remedy in case of overhanging
structures are erected on adjoining land. The landowner owns at least as much
of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the
land. See Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 9 Cir., 84 F.2d 755. The fact that he
does not occupy it in a physical sense—by the erection of buildings and the
like—is not material. As we have said, the flight of airplanes, which skim the
surface but do not touch it, is as much an appropriation of the use of the land as
a more conventional entry upon it. We would not doubt that if the United States
erected an elevated railway over respondents’ land at the precise altitude where
its planes now fly, there would be a partial taking, even though none of the
supports of the structure rested on the land. The reason is that there would be
an intrusion so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner’s full
enjoyment of the property and to limit his exploitation of it. While the owner
does not in any physical manner occupy that stratum of airspace or make use of
it in the conventional sense, he does use it in somewhat the same sense that
space left between buildings for the purpose of light and air is used. The
superjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land that continuous
invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself. We think that the
landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to it and that invasions
of it are in the same category as invasions of the surface.
Causby, 328 U.S. at 264–65 (1946) (footnotes omitted). See also Smith v. New Eng. Aircraft
Co., 170 N.E. 385 (Mass. 1930); see also Smith v. New Eng. Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 522,
170 N.E. 385, 390 (1930) (“For the purposes of this decision we assume that private ownership
of airspace extends to all reasonable heights above the underlying land. It would be vain to
treat property in airspace upon the same footing as property which can be seized, touched,
occupied, handled, cultivated, built upon and utilized in its every feature.”).
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regime for aircraft that emerged early in the era of air travel clarified
an ambiguity, although landowners may not have seen it that way.164
In this flurry of judicial activity, what was left a little unclear was
whether an airplane flying super low would be subject to the substantial-harm requirement. For that matter, there was an idea, based
on early legislation, that 500 feet was some kind of zone in which
normal possession and trespass would apply, but that was never
clearly spelled out.165 Presumably against a defendant flying an airplane one inch from a structure it would be easy to prove substantial
harm, so this really was not an issue, apart from procedural issues,
like making out summary judgment.
Until now. With the advent of drones (or unmanned aircraft
systems), just such issues are coming to the fore.166 Because drones
can hover and typically fly closer to the ground, we need a way of
reconciling the navigation servitude and ordinary notions of possession along with the per se/substantial harm divide within the law of
trespass to land. One method would be to declare a height limit
below which per se trespass would apply, but, again, courts are not
good at this type of rule, and it is clear that a single height (say 200
feet) would not be universally appropriate. On the other hand, the
idea of extending the “substantial harm” regime down to the grass
tops and the paint on the top of buildings seems too unprotective of
owners. And it is hard to deny that owners could build further
upward if they chose to.
To address this problem in common law fashion and leave room
for legislation and regulation, we can exploit the specialization of
different possession-related notions and their interrelations. Working upward, per se trespass applies at the surface. Step a toe onto
someone’s land and you’ve trespassed. Displacing the landowner’s
physical objects is also per se trespass. Coming into the envelope of
an activity—space regularly occupied by that activity—is also a trespass per se. The space between two nearby towers would be trespass
164. Smith, supra note 100, at 2079–80; see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky,
Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015 (2008).
165. Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 166, 168–69 (2015).
166. See, e.g., Dana & Shoked, supra note 153, at 802–08; Robert A. Heverly, The State of
Drones: State Authority to Regulate Drones, 8 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 29 (2015); Lane Page,
Drone Trespass and the Line Separating the National Airspace and Private Property, 86 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1152 (2018); Rule, supra note 165.
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per se. And a bubble around buildings and activities that would be
needed for normal function should also be a per se trespass. Beyond
that, the owner is not in (current) possession but has only a right to
possess, which peters out at an indefinite height. Within the rightto-possess zone, the owner has first dibs on using the space and also
can sue for invasions of this space that cause substantial harm to
the subjacent airspace and or surface (or conceivably the subsurface).
Any interferences not in superjacent airspace would fall under the
law of nuisance (or negligence) at most.167
3. Nuisance. The law of nuisance is especially interesting from an
architectural point of view. It lies at the shift from exclusion to
governance strategies.168 Thus, invasion is important but not always. Nuisance also involves conflicting presumptive rights, which
invites meta-law, whether this is denominated equity or not.169
Nuisance naturally leads to borderline cases. In his paper in this
Symposium, Bob Ellickson sets out a recent controversy over an
apartment building in Houston.170 Houston has no zoning and relies
heavily on covenants. A developer proposed replacing a two-story
apartment house in a residential area with a twenty-three-story,
mixed-use condominium building. The trial court denied an injunction but awarded the successful plaintiffs $1.2 million in damages.171
The appellate court reversed on the grounds that the nuisance,
assuming there was one, was prospective.172 This doesn’t answer the
question we want answered: once built, would the apartment building be a nuisance? It should be noted at the outset that traditionally
nuisance law does not see apartment buildings as nuisances.173 An
apartment building is not invasive (not that that ends the inquiry,
but it is strike one), and courts in this country have rejected the idea
of being able to acquire rights to light and air prescriptively (unlike
167. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF PROPERTY vol. 2, div. I, ch. 1. § 1.2A (AM. LAW INST.,
Council Draft No. 2, Nov. 27, 2019).
168. Smith, supra note 149.
169. Goldberg & Smith, supra note 132, at 315–21.
170. Robert C. Ellickson, Can an Apartment Building Be a Nuisance? An Essay for Henry
Smith, 10 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. J. 57 (2021).
171. Loughhead v. 1717 Bissonnet, L.L.C., 2014 WL 8774079 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 2014).
172. 1717 Bissonnet, LLC v. Loughhead, 500 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Civ. App. 2016).
173. Maureen E. Brady, Turning Neighbors into Nuisances, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1609 (2021);
Ellickson, supra note 170.
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the doctrine, albeit quite limited, in England of “ancient lights”).174
According to the reconciliation of conflicting rights, the fact that an
activity lowers the market value of another parcel does not automatically make the activity a nuisance. Nevertheless, reasonableness in
nuisance law is more oriented to the effect on the potential plaintiff
than the merits or conduct of the defendant and its activity.175
Moreover, the history of labeling apartment buildings possible or
near nuisances has bad overtones.176 As mentioned earlier, numeric
height limits are also not the forte of common law courts.177 Not
surprisingly, covenants and zoning have been the tools to achieve
height restrictions. Indeed, common law courts have acted to prevent runaway dependencies, and hence complexity, at the interfaces
between packages of rights.178
4. Integration of Property. Finally, let me sketch another application of the complexity approach. Returning to the bundle of rights,
174. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So.2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959); but see Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982) (holding that blocking solar
access can be a nuisance); see generally Sara C. Bronin, Solar Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1217
(2009); Troy A. Rule, Shadows on the Cathedral: Solar Access Laws in a Different Light, 2010
U. ILL. L. REV. 851 (2010). The building of the addition to the Fontainebleau was motivated
in part by spite, and as Lynda Butler argues, a court could have curbed the malicious interference without holding that solar rights could be acquired by prescription or implication.
Butler, supra note 22, at 85–86. If we resuscitate the notion of equity, I wonder if activity like
that in Fontainebleau might be addressable: even though the addition was not purely out of
spite, and so would not count as a spite structure under current doctrine, certain aspects of
it—its location and lack of windows—were purely spiteful. Might we be able to see some
aspects as separable?
175. This is evident in a range of approaches in scholarship from outside the United States.
See, e.g., PENNER, supra note 109, at 143–56; Christopher Essert, Nuisance and the Normative
Boundaries of Ownership, 52 TULSA L. REV. 85 (2016); Donal Nolan, The Essence of Private Nuisance, 10 MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 71 (Sinéad Agnew & Ben McFarlane eds., 2018).
176. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (1926) (“[I]n such sections
very often the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of
the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the
district. . . . Under these circumstances, apartment houses, which in a different environment
would be not only entirely unobjectionable but highly desirable, come very near to being
nuisances.”); David Callies, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., in PROPERTY STORIES (Gerald
Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2d ed., 2009); Richard H. Chused, Euclid’s Historical
Imagery, 51 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 597 (2001); see also Brady, supra note 173.
177. It is true that the proposed building was much larger than any previous structure, and
I do not absolutely rule out the possibility that in some area a crystalized custom of restraint
in building might be provable. This is highly unlikely, especially in the case at hand.
178. See infra notes 183–87 and accompanying text. See also Smith, supra note 13. Such
dependencies can be transmitted through liability for damages, which also counts against the
result in the trial court in Loughead.
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it is worth noting that there are subtle differences recognized in law
as to how integrated a stick (if you will) is into the bundle. Easements are add-ons to the bundle of rights, and they can be created
through a grant or by various other means including prescription
and implication. Covenants are more contractual, but servitude law
lends them some of the attributes of property, most prominent the
ability to run to successors. The requirements for running, including
the touch and concern test, may have to do with keeping bundles from
becoming complex and hard to evaluate in the presence of imperfect
land markets.179 Appurtenant easements automatically run, but under
traditional servitudes law, covenants only run if they satisfy a list
of requirements including intent and touch and concern.180 This last
requirement guarantees a close association—I would say dense epistatic connections—with the rest of the bundle.181 By contrast, even
more integrated than easements in terms of integration with the
bundle are so-called natural rights, which are like easements but
are automatically part of the bundle and cannot be abandoned though
lack of use.182 These include lateral support and natural drainage in
a defined channel. These rights are if anything more epistatically
connected with the bundle than the typical easement. And finally
we have various other legal relations that are not even analogized
to easements because they are so integral to the package, such as
the right to possession, and many that are implicit, such as various
privileges of use that are indirectly protected by the right to exclude.
One implication of viewing the bundle as one of structured complexity is that it helps explain why the law pushes for coherent
bundles and disfavors “extraneous” bundling. If the sticks in the
bundle are not entirely separable, valuation and assessment are
more complex and uncertain than where there is separability.183 Far
179. See Antony Dnes & Dean Lueck, Asymmetric Information and the Law of Servitudes
Governing Land, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 89 (2009); Smith, supra note 13. The key to the complexity involved is inseparability, which can cause the kinds of wild swings in fitness associated
with unorganized complexity. Otto A. Davis & Andrew Whinston, Externalities, Welfare, and
the Theory of Games, 70 J. POL. ECON. 241 (1962).
180. See, e.g., CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH “RUN
WITH THE LAND” (2d ed. 1947).
181. Smith, supra note 13.
182. See, e.g., Duenow v. Lindeman, 27 N.W.2d 421 (Minn. 1947); Kleinberg v. Ratett, 169
N.E. 289 (N.Y. 1929); Scriver v. Smith, 3 N.E. 675 (N.Y 1885); see also Smith, supra note 13
(discussing natural servitudes).
183. See Davis & Whinston, supra note 179.
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from being limited to the numerus clausus, the law more controversially prevents people from tailoring packages of property rights
through the addition of extraneous covenants. The right to a weekly
haircut may seem innocent enough, but doctrines like touch and
concern prevent interdependencies from getting out of hand even if
someone sees fit to create them.184
This worry about information and complexity can help justify the
law’s approach to personal property servitudes as well. With some
ambiguity, the law has generally disfavored and even disallowed servitudes in personal property.185 These kinds of servitudes certainly pose
a problem of notice.186 As with touch and concern and real covenants,
the law tries to keep legal things and the packages of rights over
them in manageable units.187
Taking a step back, the hypothesis that property law is shaped by
organized complexity leaves a lot of room for further work. How interconnected are the attributes of resources and the activities of actors,
and what patterns do they actually fall in—or should fall in? And
although seeing a role for organized complexity does provide a partial
rationale for some traditional doctrines, it is not Pollyannish in any
sense. Organized complexity is not chaos, and it not the case that
any intervention into property law will cause more problems than it
solves. By the same token, though, the law is not so simple that successful tinkering along any margin will necessarily improve matters.
Reflecting organized complexity, we need to find a mix of spontaneous and directed change that will get us to reachable maxima. We
must ask how law and institutions are both simple and complex and
how they transcend the conventional reductionist dichotomies. A
184. Smith, supra note 13. In contrast to the haircut covenant, private transfer fee
covenants present a clearer complexity problem. See id.; see also R. Wilson Freyermuth,
Private Transfer Fee Covenants: Cleaning Up the Mess, 45 REAL PROP., TRUST & ESTATE L.J.
419 (2010) (setting forth problems presented by private transfer fee covenants and evaluating
and proposing solutions).
185. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1928);
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels,
69 HARV. L. REV. 1250 (1956) (commenting on a decision departing from the general
understanding).
186. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008).
187. See Christopher Newman, Using Things, Defining Property, in PROPERTY THEORY:LEGAL
AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 69 (James Penner & Michael Otsuka eds., 2018); Matt Corriel, Up
for Grabs: A Workable System for the Unilateral Acquisition of Chattels, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 807
(2013); see also Robert C. Ellickson, The Inevitable Trend Toward Universally Recognizable
Signals of Property Claims: An Essay for Carol Rose, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1015 (2011).
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loosely connected set of sometimes formal, sometimes contextualist
legal concepts is likely to be a big part of the picture.188
CONCLUSION
We live in a reductionist age. In property theory, our discourse is
so all-encompassing that its flatness itself has been obscured. We
can wind up explaining our theoretical intuitions instead of coming
to grips with the real world.
The world is not flat and neither should be property theory. The
unfortunate current flatness of property theory shows up in its assumptions about complexity and leads us to expect more homogeneity and less structure in the law than we find—and should expect to
find. This flattening and dichotomous approach characterizes the
bundle of rights as usually conceived; the allergy to system in property
and private law generally; assumptions about all or no (and preferably no) formalism; mistaking the architectural theory as exclusively
focused on information costs; and expectations that property law will
mirror the complex world directly. Instead of passively reflecting the
world’s complexity, property law employs devices familiar from complex systems theory to manage complexity in order to attain favorable combinations of information costs and benefits. These include the
spectrum of delineation devices running from exclusion to governance; hybrids of private, common, and public property; differential
formalism and law versus equity; degrees of modularity; combinations
of spontaneous and directed evolution of property law and institutions; and reliance on both common law and legislation. Property is
more than the sum of its parts.
We need to leave Flatland. And the first step is to put more—not
all—of the complexity of the world back into our theories. Especially
now that complex systems theory, network analysis, and complexity
economics give us more tools, we have less excuse for the extreme reductionism of the flattest versions of the bundle of rights, mishmashes
of property and contract, equity-less law, and the like. Property
needs architecture.
188. See Deakin, supra note 23; Lawson, supra note 23; Smith, supra note 23. This view
of property law thus has close affinities with comparative institutional analysis and the New
Private Law. See Barak Richman, New Institutional Economics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF THE NEW PRIVATE LAW, supra note 22, at 103 (comparing the New Insitutional Economics
and the New Private Law).

CAN AN APARTMENT BUILDING BE A NUISANCE?
AN ESSAY FOR HENRY SMITH

ROBERT C. ELLICKSON*
In 1926, Justice Sutherland asserted in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. that, in a single-family neighborhood, “apartment
houses . . . come very near to being nuisances.”1 The legal issue remains alive. In 2014, a jury in Houston, Texas, awarded damages to
homeowners challenging a proposed high-rise condominium tower
near Rice University. The issue serves to illuminate the views of
Henry Smith, the much-deserved recipient of the Brigham-Kanner
Property Rights Prize. In his writings, Henry has addressed many
topics, nuisance law among them.2
As it happens, my first major article also dealt with nuisance law.3
There I compared that body of precedent to other systems of land
use control, especially municipal zoning. The zoning ordinances of
the 1920s, in my view, addressed a genuine problem. A landowner’s
decision on the use of urban land typically affects the value of adjacent properties. Although private bargaining may internalize some of
these externalities, in many cases it will fail to do so.4 Zoning regulations, if wisely crafted, therefore can raise aggregate property values. A zoning government, however, also can inflict damage on the
urban landscape. By the 1930s, local governments increasingly had
begun to use zoning as an exclusionary device. Exclusionary zoning
segregates urban neighborhoods by social class, and raises the cost
of housing.5 Economists assert that municipal zoning, as actually
* Walter E. Meyer Professor Emeritus of Property and Urban Law and Professorial
Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School.
1. 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
2. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV.
965 (2004).
3. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973).
4. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (discussing the
possibility of bargaining).
5. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Zoning Straitjacket: The Freezing of American Neighborhoods of Single-Family Houses, 96 IND. L.J. 395 (2021). I plan to incorporate that article into
AMERICA’S FROZEN NEIGHBORHOODS, a book that Yale University Press will publish in 2022.
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practiced today in the United States, massively damages the national
economy.6 This Essay reveals my disagreement with Henry about how
the Texas courts should have decided the recent Houston nuisance
case. My pessimism about how local governments actually zone cities
may underlie our disagreement.
Henry Smith is a phenom, more than the equal of one of his apparent heroes, the short-lived Wesley Hohfeld.7 Henry’s writings have
repeatedly jolted the field of property law. One of his earliest articles,
on property rights in medieval open-field villages, shows his strengths
as an historian and institutional analyst.8 Especially early in the
twenty-first century, Henry often collaborated with Tom Merrill, then
a colleague at Northwestern University School of Law. Their opening
salvo, the Numerus Clausus, dazzled with its many innovations.9
Their collaboration includes the brilliantly conceived, and impressively conceptual, Merrill and Smith casebook, now in its third edition.10 Smith’s work apart from Merrill has been prizeworthy in itself.
Henry’s 2012 manifesto, Property as the Law of Things, continues
his unrelenting challenge to various intellectual adversaries: the legal
realists, Ronald Coase’s conception of causation, and proponents of
conventional law-and-economics.11 The American Law Institute’s appointment of Smith as the Reporter of the new Restatement of Property positions him to be, flat out, the most influential property law
scholar of our time.
6. See Kyle F. Herkenhoff et al., Tarnishing the Golden and Empire States: Land-Use
Restrictions and the U.S. Economic Slowdown, 93 J. MONETARY ECON. 89 (2018); Chang-Tai
Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation, 11 AM. ECON. J.:
MACROECONOMICS 1 (2019); Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why Has Regional Income
Convergence in the U.S. Declined? 102 J. URB. ECON. 76 (2017). For a summary of the various
findings, see David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127
YALE L.J. 78, 102–03 (2017).
7. Smith’s references to Hohfeld include, for example, Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 780–89 (2001) and Thomas
W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Why Restate the Bundle? The Disintegration of the Restatement
of Property, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 681 (2014).
8. Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29
J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000).
9. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 119 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
10. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (3d ed.
2017).
11. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012).

2021]

CAN AN APARTMENT BUILDING BE A NUISANCE?

59

I. THE APARTMENT BUILDING AS NUISANCE
Prior to its Euclid decision in 1926, the Supreme Court had sustained, against constitutional challenge, limits on the height of buildings and the location of industrial uses.12 A frontier issue in Euclid
was whether the village could set aside zones that banned the
construction of apartment buildings. Justice Sutherland held that
it could, rebuffing a substantive due process challenge. His opinion
identified some possible negative spillover effects of multifamily
housing. According to Sutherland, in a neighborhood where detached
houses are predominant,
the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to
take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings
created by the residential character of the district. Moreover, the
coming of one apartment house is followed by others, interfering
by their height and bulk with the free circulation of air and monopolizing the rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon the
smaller homes . . . until, finally, the residential character of the
neighborhood and its desirability as a place of detached residences are utterly destroyed. Under these circumstances, apartment houses, which in a different environment would be not only
entirely unobjectionable but highly desirable, come very near to
being nuisances.13

Come close, but still fail to win a cigar. Prior to Euclid, no U.S. case
had ever held that an apartment building, as such, constituted a nuisance.14 Absent extreme facts, such as those in the Houston case that
I describe below, U.S. courts continue to remain reluctant to so rule.15
12. Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (sustaining height limit, of perhaps as little as
eighty feet); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (sustaining prohibition of
brickmaking facility).
13. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (1926).
14. See Nadav Shoked, The Reinvention of Ownership: The Embrace of Residential Zoning
and the Modern Populist Reading of Property, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 110 (2011); Michael E.
Lewyn, Yes to Infill, No to Nuisance, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 841, 842, 846 (2015); City of
Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 148 N.E. 842, 845 (Ohio 1925) (dictum).
15. After much searching, I have found no U.S. case, other than Loughhead, holding that
an apartment building constitutes a private nuisance. As Henry has surmised, plaintiffs are
more likely to succeed if they assert some sort of physical invasion, perhaps of noise and
fumes, across a boundary. See, e.g., Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz, 500 S.W. 2d 217 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1973) (affirming injunction against apartment complex’s noisy air conditioner). But
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In Euclid, Justice Sutherland’s analysis would have supported the
Village of Euclid’s requirement of mandatory setbacks for an apartment building but not the total exclusion of apartments from almost
three-fourths of the area of the city.16 By demonizing the apartment
building, Justice Sutherland may have encouraged cities to engage
in harmful exclusionary zoning.
A central issue in nuisance cases is remedy. Should the neighbor of an obnoxious land use be entitled, for example, to enjoin the nuisance, or be limited to the remedy of damages?17 In one of the classic
articles of American property law, Calabresi and Melamed explored
these, and other, remedial options.18 Issues of remedy were central
in Loughhead, the Houston case that newly poses the possibility that
courts might deem an apartment building a nuisance.19 Houston is
famous among property scholars as the only major U.S. city that has
declined to enact a zoning ordinance.20 A zoning ordinance typically
includes, among other constraints, a limit on the height of structures. Houston’s lack of zoning gave birth to Loughhead.
II. THE ASHBY HIGH-RISE CONTROVERSY IN HOUSTON
Locals refer to Loughhead as the Ashby high-rise controversy,
invoking the name of a street abutting the proposed construction
site.21 The essential facts are these. In 2006, a developer purchased
a 1.6-acre lot three miles southwest of downtown Houston and five
blocks north of the campus of Rice University. The following year,
the developer proposed replacing the two-story apartment building
cf. Puritan Holding Co. v. Holloschitz, 372 N.Y.S.2d 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (holding owner
of abandoned apartment building liable for nuisance damages to neighbor).
16. Euclid’s 1922 zoning ordinance placed 72.6 percent of the area of the village in either
U1 or U2, zones that forbade the construction of an apartment building. Author’s calculation,
part of research for Ellickson, supra note 5.
17. The seminal U.S. decision is Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y.
1970) (awarding permanent damages, but refusing to enjoin).
18. Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
19. The brothers who established the Lockheed aircraft company were originally named
Loughead, with a single h. The lead plaintiff in Loughhead probably pronounces her name as
the two brothers did.
20. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS 643–46 (4th ed. 2013).
21. See STOP THE ASHBY HIGH RISE, https://stopashbyhighrise.org/. Discussions of Loughhead
include Lewyn, supra note 14, and John Mixon, Four Land Use Vignettes from Unzoned(?)
Houston, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 159, 166–72 (2010).
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on the site with a twenty-three-story mixed-use condominium structure.22 The proposed project would have roughly quadrupled the
number of dwelling units on the site. No building within a half-mile
of the site is more than six stories in height, and the great majority
are detached houses of three-stories or less.23 In 2021, the median
value of these houses was about $1.6 million.24 The Boulevard Oaks
Historic District lies just to the north. Homeowners near the proposed
high-rise mobilized to block the project, and persuaded Houston’s
mayor to join the opposition.25 When the City of Houston refused to
approve the project, the developer sued the city. In a 2012 settlement,
Houston agreed to permit construction of a twenty-one-story multifamily building with restaurants on the ground floor.
In 2013, before construction had begun, Loughhead and
twenty-nine other nearby homeowners filed a nuisance action against
the developer. They sought both damages and a permanent injunction. The plaintiffs’ attorneys introduced evidence that the proposed
development would diminish the value of their houses. They claimed
that the high-rise would violate the traditional scale of buildings in
the neighborhood, increase traffic, cast shadows, and lessen backyard
privacy. The trial judge refused to grant a permanent injunction,
but submitted the issue of damages to a jury. The jury found that
the proposed building would be a nuisance to twenty of the thirty
plaintiffs. The judge entered a judgment awarding a total of $1.2
million to the successful plaintiffs.26 This award, at the time, likely
was less than 10% of the market value of their dwellings.27 In 2016,
22. Mixon, supra note 21, at 168 (asserting that the developer intended condominium units).
23. The primary multifamily buildings nearby are two three-story developments immediately east on Bissonnet Street, and a six-story condominium complex, the Chateau Ten on
Sunset, two blocks south.
24. On June 11, 2021, the Zillow website, https://www.zillow.com [https://perma.cc/K8P4
-7YGZ], reported that the dozen houses closest to the project site had a median asking price
of $1.6 million.
25. Mixon, supra note 21, at 169 n.53.
26. Loughhead v. 1717 Bissonnet, LLC., 2014 WL 8774079 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 2014).
27. The damage awards averaged $60,000 per plaintiff in 2014. Twelve of the successful
plaintiffs owned detached houses, likely worth well over $1 million each in 2020. The remaining
eight owned one of the twelve condominium units in Southampton Estates, a three-story structure built in 1993 on a site just east of the proposed Ashby high-rise. In 2020, the market
value of a unit in Southampton Estates was around $700,000–$800,000. See, e.g., 5310 Southampton Estates Houston, TX 77005, HAR.COM, https://www.har.com/homedetail/5310-south
ampton-est-houston-tx-77005/3599940?sid=4740958; 5300 Southampton Estates, Houston, TX
77005, GREENWOOD KING, https://www.greenwoodking.com/real-estate/5300-southampton
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the Texas Court of Appeals reversed. The appellate court emphasized
that the nuisance in this instance was prospective.28 It affirmed the
trial court’s denial of a permanent injunction but held that, because
the developer had not built the structure, the damage award had been
premature. The appellate court stated that its ruling was “without
prejudice to [the plaintiffs’] right to seek damages once a cause of
action for an existing nuisance accrues.”29 By July 2020, the developer
had razed the two-story apartment building on the site, but had not
begun to construct the high-rise.
Henry and I have discussed Loughhead. He finds the case
intriguing and perhaps worthy of a future mention in his casebook
with Merrill. In the end, Henry, unlike me, would not hold the
proposed Ashby high-rise to be a nuisance. He and I do agree, however, on many remedial issues. We both think that the Texas courts
had rightly denied a permanent injunction, and that the appellate
court had been right to hold that the trial court’s award of damages
had been premature. Nonetheless, I favor, as Henry does not, making
the high-rise developer liable for nuisance damages to internalize
some of the negative externalities that the Ashby high-rise building
ultimately would inflict.30 Allowing this common law remedy would
reduce pressure on Houston to adopt a zoning ordinance. Although
a zoning measure may be beneficial, many, as I have noted, in fact
worsen the urban landscape.
III. CONTRASTING THEMES IN SMITH’S ANALYSIS OF NUISANCE LAW
Portions of Henry’s primary article on nuisance law emphasize
the connection between nuisance law and an owner’s right to exclude.31 Its final sentence is, “Nuisance is a governance regime resting
on a foundation of exclusion.”32 Many classic nuisances do entail the
entry of, for example, sound waves or fumes, into a neighboring
-estates-houston-tx-77005/92021441/31442704. On trends in house prices in the Boulevard
Oaks neighborhood, see Boulevard Oaks Real Estate Trends, HOUSTONPROPERTIES .COM,
https://www.houstonproperties.com/houston-neighborhoods/boulevard-oaks/real-estate-trends.
28. 1717 Bissonnet, LLC v. Loughhead, 500 S.W.3d 488, 496–500 (Tex. Civ. App. 2016).
29. Id. at 492.
30. Cf. Ellickson, supra note 3, at 761–72, 777 (recommending monetary liability to internalize the external costs of unneighborly land uses, including tall buildings).
31. Smith, supra note 2, at 970.
32. Smith, supra note 2, at 1049.
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property.33 The advantage of an exclusion rule, and a recurring theme
in Henry’s work, is reduction of information costs when people interact.34 In the Ashby high-rise dispute, none of the negative externalities that troubled the homeowners would have constituted a
physical invasion. Construction of a tower visible to outsiders does
not entail the crossing of a private boundary. Nor does an increase
in traffic on public streets. Nor does loss of privacy or disruption of
community character. Henry’s assertion that nuisance is intimately
related to the right to exclude undoubtedly inclines him to oppose
nuisance liability in Loughhead.
Henry has affirmed, however, that property law is not entirely
about exclusion.35 In his article on nuisance and other work, he asserts
that property law at times adopts a governance regime to supplement
the exclusion strategy.36 Governance rules, according to Henry, “pick
out uses and users in more detail, imposing a more intense informational burden on a smaller audience of duty holders.”37 In the Ashby
high-rise case, in my view, nuisance liability, but not injunctive relief,
would have been cost-justified. A damage award, if properly calculated, would have internalized the negative externalities that the
structure would have inflicted. Nuisance liability in Loughhead would
certainly add to the informational burdens of Houston homeowners,
developers, and judges. A benefit-cost analyst nevertheless might
33. See Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law, Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian
Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 57 (1979) (linking nuisances to physical invasions).
34. After Ronald Coase published The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 4, legal analysts
typically used the phrase transaction cost, not information cost, to describe a barrier to
negotiation. Remarkably, thirty-five of Henry’s articles include both phrases. Information
costs has the advantage of being less technocratic, but the disadvantage of being less complete. Outlays that negotiators make to travel to a joint meeting place are hardly information
costs. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against ‘Coaseanism,’ 99 YALE L.J. 611,
615–16 (1989). On July 17, 2020, I conducted a WestLaw search of secondary sources. Prior to
the year 2000, transaction cost appeared over thirty times more frequently than information
cost. After 2010, the ratio had decreased to four to one. Henry’s efforts to promote information
costs may have had some success.
35. He has stated that “Exclusion is not the most important or ‘core’ value because it is not
a value at all.” Smith, supra note 11, at 1705 (emphasis in original). Instead, the virtue of
entitling an owner to exclude is to reduce the information costs of interpersonal interactions.
36. Smith, supra note 2, at 975–76, 990–91, 993, 996; see also Henry E. Smith, Exclusion
and Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453
(2002); MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 10, at 31–32. Tom Merrill, in his many previous writings,
had never drawn this distinction. The idea seems to have been Smith’s. The first reference to
it appears in 2001 in Merrill & Smith, supra note 7, at 791.
37. Smith, supra note 36, at S455.
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conclude that nuisance liability in this instance would generate net
gains. The benefits of internalizing the high-rise’s externalities might
exceed any resulting increase in information costs.
Katrina Wyman has analyzed the writings of the “New Essentialist” property theorists, a group in which she places Henry Smith,
Tom Merrill, and James Penner.38 Wyman’s central claim is that the
New Essentialism is more malleable than its proponents admit,
and, in practice, commonly fails to offer hard-edged rules of property
rights. Instead, according to Wyman, Smith and the others turn to
“an informal, intuitive cost-benefit analysis” to resolve complex
questions.39 The federal government uses benefit-cost analysis as one
of its primary methods of policy analysis.40 Philosophers describe the
approach as rule utilitarianism.41 Many practitioners of law-andeconomics are utilitarians. A staple in the teaching of Property is the
famous Harold Demsetz article that explicitly assumes that property rights evolve to internalize externalities, generally in a costeffective manner.42
My analysis of Loughhead is essentially utilitarian. Henry
is less of a utilitarian than I am, and less than Wyman has asserted.
He claims that judges in nuisance cases seldom engage in an explicit
benefit-cost calculus.43 Henry has criticized the balance-of-utilities
approach to defining a nuisance.44 He also has written skeptically
about recognition of aesthetic nuisances.45
As a judge in a retrial of Loughhead, I would rule that a sixstory building would not have constituted a nuisance. The city is
Houston, after all, and two or three blocks south of the Ashby site
are two existing six-story structures.46 The developer, however,
38. Katrina M. Wyman, The New Essentialism in Property, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 183 (2017).
39. Id. at 186; see also id. at 202.
40. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1 (1993), 3 C.F.R. 638–40 (1994).
41. See Wyman, supra note 38, at 212 n.83.
42. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS &
PROC. 347 (1967).
43. Smith, supra note 11, at 1716.
44. Smith, supra note 2, at 984. See also J.E. Penner, Nuisance and the Character of the
Neighbourhood, 5 J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1993) (criticizing balancing utilities in nuisance cases).
45. Smith, supra note 2, at 1000.
46. The two are a medical clinic and Chateau Ten on Sunset, a condominium building. A
height of six stories may be emerging as a focal point. New Zealand has enacted a statute that
requires its largest cities to allow buildings of up to six stories in their central areas and near
mass transit. Michael Hayward, Christchurch Skyline Could be Transformed as Building
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ultimately proposed a twenty-one-story building, utterly out of scale
in a neighborhood of houses.47 Texas courts properly could impose
nuisance liability for the incremental damage that a building of more
than six stories would have inflicted. I suspect that the benefits of
internalizing the tower’s negative externalities likely would exceed the
increase in information costs that this expansion of Texas nuisance
liability would cause. In Loughhead, the risk of nuisance liability ex
post would have encouraged the parties to agree to a compromise on
height ex ante. Imposing liability for damages also would have reduced the pressure on Houston to adopt a zoning ordinance, a path
that has commonly led to government overregulation.
IV. NON-UTILITARIAN VALUES
In an important article in the William & Mary Law Review,
Merrill and Smith emphasize that a legal system must base its property rules, if they are to function successfully, on a morality that most
individuals accept.48 The authors state that they doubt that utilitarianism underlies that morality.49 Loughhead poses the possible relevance of a particular non-utilitarian value: distributive justice. A
ruling that an apartment building might be a nuisance would hand
yet another weapon into the hands of NIMBY (Not In My Backyard)
forces, such as the homeowners near the proposed Ashby tower.
Michael Lewyn has invoked this reasoning to criticize the trial court’s
handling of Loughhead. Lewyn worries that holding a multifamily
project to be a nuisance will boost housing prices, especially for
poorer households.50

Rules Relaxed, STUFF.COM (July 24, 2020, 7:30 PM), https://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news
/122241812/christchurch-skyline-could-be-transformed-as-building-rules-relaxed.
47. Daniel Herriges is a skeptic of criticizing structures based on their scale. See Daniel
Herriges, Is This Development “Out of Scale”?, STRONG TOWNS.ORG (July 22, 2020), https://www
.strongtowns.org/journal/2020/7/21/is-this-development-out-of-scale. The height of the Ashby
high-rise, however, definitely helped trigger neighborhood opposition, and likely influenced
the jury’s damage awards.
48. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1849 (2007).
49. Id. at 1850–51; see also Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between
Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 974 (2009).
50. Lewyn, supra note 14, at 864–66. Even in a locality with zoning, compliance with
zoning is not an ironclad defense in a nuisance case. Id. at 842 n.4.
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Henry might regard distributive justice to be a relevant consideration in Loughhead.51 In several of his writings, however, he has
defended “modular,” or specialized, approaches to legal problems.
This avoids what he calls the fallacy of division, the notion that all
parts of a complex system have to promote the same values.52 Distributive justice issues centrally concern legislators when they engage
in designing both tax systems and the welfare state. A modular
analyst possibly might conclude that distributive justice considerations therefore should not influence most rules of property law,
including nuisance cases such as Loughhead.53
CONCLUSION
Prior to again praising our deserving honoree, I note another
minor disagreement. The title of Property as the Law of Things
implies that the ownership of human capital falls outside the field
of property.54 Henry took my introductory property course in the
spring of 1995. I included in the course materials Commonwealth v.
Aves, a leading case on the legality of slavery. In 1836, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the bringing of a slave
child from Louisiana to Massachusetts had emancipated the child.55
In conjunction with Aves, I observed in class that human capital
represents 70 percent or more of American wealth—vastly more
than real estate, personal property, intellectual property, and financial capital in combination. Although slavery thankfully is in deep
decline around the world, property scholars, in my view, should feel
free to use their analytic tools to point out the numerous advantages
of self-ownership of labor.56
51. See Smith, supra note 49, at 973 (stating that “it is an open question whether the
amount of redistribution we’d collectively like would be best handled in some modules than
others . . . .”). Wyman notes that none of the new essentialists is reflexively opposed to
redistribution. Wyman, supra note 38, at 204–05, 215–17.
52. Smith, supra note 49, at 968–73; Smith, supra note 11, at 1701–02, 1719.
53. On this contested issue, see, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal
System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667
(1994); Smith, supra note 49, at 973 n.71.
54. But cf. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 10, at 210–38 (on body parts and the “right of
publicity,” aspects of human capital).
55. 35 Mass. 193 (18 Pick.) (1836) (Lemuel Shaw, J.).
56. See also Robert C. Ellickson, Two Cheers for the Bundle-of-Sticks Metaphor, Three
Cheers for Merrill and Smith, 8 ECON J. WATCH 215, 219 (2011).
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Despite occasional differences, I salute Henry’s many contributions. He has done as much as anyone to show the influence of
information costs on the shape of property institutions.57 The fee
simple, the principal form of U.S. land tenure, is, as its name implies,
simple. Henry has repeatedly shown why this is a huge advantage.

57. This is one of Henry’s recurring themes. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 11, at 1691.

MODULARITY, MODERNIST PROPERTY, AND THE MODERN
ARCHITECTURE OF PROPERTY

CAROL M. ROSE*
ABSTRACT
Henry Smith’s theory of property revolves around the human
need for informational shortcuts in dealing with the claims of others.
Property law treats property as things, or as he often says, modules—
objects whose boundaries people may see and understand as belonging to themselves or others, without having to know the details of
their interior interrelationships. Such “things” are protected by exclusion rules with some more fine-tuned governance rules for boundary issues.
Smith’s theory is a welcome relief from the unproductive theory of
property as “bundles of sticks,” but it does raise some questions. Some
are these: can property “modules” really be combined like LEGOs, or
are some combinations messier, as in unsuccessful corporate takeovers? What, actually, is a “thing”—is it something natural, or is it
(also) something like a farm or a condominium, an artifact of property
law itself? How stable are the relationships between exclusion rules
and governance rules? Can the information-economizing theory of
property take more lessons from law and economics? Finally, aside
from economizing on information, should a theory of property also
leverage other purposes of property, such as the enhancement of
effort and wealth, autonomy, and democratic self-government?
INTRODUCTION
Henry Smith is one of the great property law theorists of his
generation, perhaps of the entire twenty-first century. At the center
of his theory is a vision of property law as architecture. Henry has
spent much of his scholarly output in elaborating the ways in which
* Ashby Lohse Professor of Water and Natural Resource Law, University of Arizona
Rogers College of Law (emer.); Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor of Law and Organization
(emer.), Yale Law School; JD Univ. of Chicago, 1977; PhD Cornell Univ., 1970. I wrote this
commentary without the benefit of Henry’s final version of his symposium contribution, in
which he has undoubtedly answered all my questions!
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the architectural vision of property law can explain many of property
law’s features, and indeed can reach out into other parts of private
law more generally—including torts, contracts, and even customary
law. I will not even attempt a comprehensive view of all those ramifications, but instead I will try to explain how powerful the architectural theory is, but also how, in a very few instances, I find myself
puzzled or even demurring. (But not many!) I am one of many who
think that Henry’s vision of property will be at the center of property scholarship for a long time to come.
I. SMITH ON THE MODULAR ARCHITECTURE OF PROPERTY
Henry starts many of his articles with a quick primer on his theory
of property law’s basic architecture, and so I will do that, too. The
driving force of his theory is the fact that human beings have only
limited cognitive abilities to grasp the myriad details of reality.1
People simply cannot know every feature of the world in which they
are navigating, and for that reason they need information shortcuts.
The institution of property acts as a system to provide those shortcuts, and indeed an exceedingly important and all pervasive one.2
But Henry asserts that property has an architecture: the basic building blocks of property law are what Henry calls “things,” which may,
but need not, overlap with physical things.3 Each “thing” includes
a more or less bounded center that can include intensely interacting
features, but a boundary or periphery in which each “thing” has very
limited interactions with other “things.”4 Property law solidifies this
boundary by allocating to the owner the right to exclude, subject to
a few exceptions which I will get to in a minute.
But for now, this architecture saves all of us from spending a
great deal of time figuring out what we can and cannot do vis-à-vis
all kinds of resources.5 To be sure, and by comparison, contracting
1. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 773, 793–95 (2001); Henry E. Smith, The Persistence of System in Property Law, 163
U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2057–58 (2015) [hereinafter Smith, Persistence of System].
2. Smith, Persistence of System, supra note 1, at 2057.
3. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1700 (2012)
[hereinafter Smith, Law of Things].
4. Id. at 1700–91.
5. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 2083, 2087–90 (2009).
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parties can make their arrangements in a fine-tuned manner, since
they themselves negotiate the elements. Somewhat similarly, members of close communities can also understand their mutual rights
and obligations in some detail, since everyone knows everyone else
and their respective positions.6 But in the looser and wider social
organization of strangers, property’s simplified structure permits
ordinary activities to proceed without detailed contemplation of every
item. Henry frequently uses the example given by the philosopher
James Penner: a car is parked in a lot.7 A passerby need not know
anything about the owner or the uses that the owner makes of the car,
but simply that it belongs to someone else, and that she, the passerby,
is expected and indeed required to keep off. Thus, property law’s
exclusion rule for “things”—“in rem,” good against the world—may
be crude, but it creates a powerful simplification of information for
all of us.
Now, to the exceptions: the periphery around things (I will henceforth stop putting scare quotes around things) sometimes grows fuzzy
and conflicted. Neighbors may disagree about, say, loud noises coming
from next door; the public may be threatened by owners’ claims to
pour poisonous materials into nearby streams; someone in an emergency may be endangered by the owner’s refusal to permit even the
slightest intrusion over the property line. In that fuzzy zone of occasional conflict, overreach, or misunderstanding, property law may
adopt what Henry calls a governance strategy as opposed to the
normal exclusion strategy—basically a more fine-toothed refinement
of what the owner may and may not do on his or her property.8
Henry’s work stands in opposition to another view of property, a
view that is older and quite widely known: property as a “bundle of
sticks,” a view that he associates particularly with the Legal Realists,
although to some degree with law and economics as well.9 Henry
6. See Henry E. Smith, Custom in American Property Law: A Vanishing Act, 48 TEX. INT’L.
L. J. 507, 514–16 (2013) (observing that particular communities can generate customs understandable among the members but not others); Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 THEOR. INQ. L. 5, 21–22, 41 (2009) [hereinafter Smith, Community and Custom] (same).
7. See, e.g., Smith, Law of Things, supra note 3, at 1703 n.47.
8. Id. at 1710.
9. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation between Ends and
Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 962–63 (2009) [hereinafter Smith,
Mind the Gap] (observing the Realists’ failure to recognize indirect contribution of property
and flawed assessment of property doctrines as if applied directly to welfare); Henry E. Smith

72

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:069

regards the “bundle” version as defective in a number of ways, and
he frequently tells his readers what those defects are. Among other
matters, he thinks both the Realists and the law and economics writers make a fatal error in treating all the rights and duties engaged
by property as matters of equal weight in the so-called bundle. In
making this equation, they fail to recognize the special role of exclusion as a “first cut,” curtailing the voluminous information costs that
would be required to learn all those rights and duties before acting.
Similarly, he accuses the Legal Realists in particular of mischaracterizing the right to exclude as a goal in itself. No one but a fetishist,
he says, would want to exclude for its own sake.10 According to Henry,
the central right in property is use, whereas the right to exclude,
while critically important, is so because it acts as an indirect assurance that allows the owner to proceed undisturbed with his or her
various uses—while, of course, reducing the need of non-owners to
decipher every element of the owner’s claims and their own duties.
Perhaps most important, Henry argues, the bundle of sticks view
gives no theoretical leverage.11 In its bland addition of stick after
stick, it effectively goes nowhere in explaining how the different
parts of property are constructed. On the other hand, the architectural, center/periphery picture of property as things, Henry argues,
lets us understand the modular architecture of property and shows
how different modules can be stacked, mixed, and matched.12
Essential to the modular architecture of property things is the
modular character of property law itself. Property law economizes
on information costs by constraining the number of recognizably
standardized legal blocks that will count as property interests. In
the common law, the best known are the estates in land, along with
a limited number of servitudes like easements and mortgages; in the
civil law, constraints on the numbers and types of property forms
are collectively known as the numerus clausus, closed number, a
& Thomas W. Merrill, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J. L. & ECON. 77, 90–91
(2011) (criticizing law and economics literature for failure to see unique character of property,
among other matters).
10. See Smith, Mind the Gap, supra note 9, at 964 (asserting that the right to exclude
would only be valuable for its own sake to a fetishist); Smith, Law of Things, supra note 3, at
1693 (same).
11. See Smith, Law of Things, supra note 3, at 1696–98 (describing bundle of sticks view
of property as descriptive but not a theory).
12. Id. at 1701–05.
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term now famously revived for property law of all kinds by Henry’s
article with Tom Merrill in 2000, analyzing what they call optimal
standardization in property law.13 Using these modular forms, those
dealing with property can create multiple different combinations by
buying and selling, adding and subtracting, mixing and matching to
form complex wholes, all without unduly taxing the informationprocessing ability of human owners—and non-owners as well.
To be sure, the very short-cutting nature of property’s modules
means that property modules may not always match reality exactly
or may be too lumpy to fit together precisely. According to Henry, that
is where governance rules come in to manage the peripheral problems:
externality, overreach, misunderstanding at modular interfaces, and
so forth. Nuisance law, unconscionability, and other equitable modifications serve these governance purposes, as in the frequently cited
relaxation of ad coelum rules in order to permit airplane overflight—
all these oversight strategies permit a modicum of relaxation in
cases where the crudeness of modularity becomes problematic.14 But
in Henry’s view, even governance has a certain formality, most notable
in what used to be called the maxims of equity. Yes, he says, equity
does pass the laugh test,15 and its older formal rules deserve more
respect than they sometimes get.16
II. A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT MODULARITY IN PROPERTY
At this point, I should turn to some of the issues that I see lurking
in Henry’s very impressive theory of property law. Henry’s analysis
of the architecture of property law has influenced thinking in areas of
private law far beyond property itself. That wider influence motivates my first issue, concerning the functionality of the modular view
13. Henry E. Smith & Thomas W. Merrill, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
14. Smith, Law of Things, supra note 3, at 1713–16, 1719.
15. Henry E. Smith, Does Equity Pass the Laugh Test? A Review of Oliar and Sprigman,
95 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 9 (2009–2010).
16. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for
Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 232–37 (2012) (criticizing Supreme Court’s
deviation from traditional equity in context of patent case). For Henry’s latest discussion of
equity, see Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, 130 YALE L.J. 1050 (2021) [hereinafter
Smith, Equity as Meta-Law] (defending and describing the proper understanding of equity as
a domain separate from basic law).
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of property, or by extension of a modular view of other private law
topics, when the modules really are put together in some architectural form. By chance, this issue occurred to me in connection with two
recent experiences, both rather prosaic. One was attendance via
Zoom at a job talk by an entry-level law school faculty candidate, in
which the candidate’s paper discussed modularity at length in the
management of complex corporate contracts.
The author of this paper cited Henry profusely as a theorist of
modularity, albeit focusing on potential problems. I will not elaborate those here, but most could be summed up by saying that the left
hand knew not what the right hand was doing when a complex contractual drafting problem was divided into modular parts. According
to the presenter, the result was confusion as to which part governed
the other parts in later disputes with contractual partners. The other
chance experience came when I listened to a broadcast of the National Public Radio program “Planet Money,” in which the travails
of the Hertz Corporation were a prominent example. According to
the interviewee, although it was not Hertz’s only problem, the company’s fatal mistake lay in acquiring two other car rental firms,
Dollar and Thrifty, whose corporate cultures were far out of alignment
with Hertz’s own. Thereafter, apparently nothing jelled as Hertz and
its acquisitions slipped into a corporate morass.17
Now, this sounded to me like modularity in action: Module A acquires Module B and Module C. Should it now become Module ABC,
or should the whole remain in separate modules, and if the latter,
what exactly was the point of the acquisition in the first place? If
there was some intermediate mix-and-match, how and why did Hertz
botch the interface/governance issues? More generally, the issue in
both these examples seemed to me to be this: does the language of
modularity suggest an underlying likeness or compatibility among
different “things,” as if they really are LEGOs, while perhaps understating their potential incompatibilities—or alternatively, understating the need to intervene into the internal character of one or
the other or both, in order to create compatibility?18 Does the idea
17. Planet Money from NPR, Owner of a Broken Hertz, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (June 24,
2020), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/883047437 (Host Kenny Malone interviewing Alexxus
Harris).
18. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein & Brad Peterson, Managerial Contracting: A Preliminary
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of modular building blocks create a false hope of avoiding the problems of managing complexity in social institutions?
Turning to a somewhat more philosophical second issue: what
makes any subject a thing, a.k.a. module, anyway? Physical objects
certainly seem thing-y enough. But if a thing is defined as something with intense interactions at the center, with few or no interactions with other intense centers/things at the boundary, why are the
boundaries where they are? I can see an apple as a thing by nature.
An apple tree too. Maybe even an orchard. But what about a farm?
True, the farmer plans the details of a farm’s management and carries out those plans, doing so without a great deal of interference
from the outside. But then, does not property law itself create the
possibility for that undisturbed central activity defining the farm?
That appears to be the point of Henry’s remark in a 2015 article
that “legal things are not actual things.”19 Is the legal recognition of
property as things then a self-referential system? That is, if as Henry
formulated the matter a year later, “a legal thing is similar to, but
not different from, a physical thing,”20 is the physical thing something
like a natural kind, while the legal thing is an artifact of property law?
But if so, why does property law recognize some subjects, whether
physical things or not, as legal things or modules but not others?
Henry grapples with this topic in a 2016 article on what he calls
fluid resources—water, of course, but also intellectual property.21 The
analogy between physical things and legal things revolves around
separability: just as some physical things (like water) are hard to
separate into exclusive parts, so some legal things are not easily
separated either; a main example is copyright, which leaks (so to
speak) into common usage in concepts like “fair use.”22 Henry makes
a rather dismissive reference to an umbrella as presenting a trivial
difference between physical and legal thinghood,23 but an umbrella
Study (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (workshop paper given to University of
Arizona Law College Feb. 4, 2021) (describing emergent managerial strategy whereby
suppliers agree to purchasing firm’s highly detailed interventions into suppliers’ operations).
19. Smith, Persistence of System, supra note 1, at 2057.
20. Henry E. Smith, Semicommons in Fluid Resources, 20 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
195, 197 (2016) [hereinafter Smith, Fluid Resources].
21. Id.
22. Id. at 197; Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements
in Information, 117 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 87, 91 (2007).
23. Smith, Fluid Resources, supra note 20, at 200.
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is actually more interesting than that. Clearly an umbrella is a
physical thing, but what kind of a legal thing is it? In someone’s hand,
an umbrella looks like property. Hanging in a restaurant’s coat closet
it looks like property too, even though we don’t know whose. In a
street corner wastebasket, it looks as if it is not anyone’s property
anymore, but rather up for grabs. That is to say, what kind of legal
thing it is depends on what it looks like, and what it looks like depends on a number of surrounding circumstances.
It is easier to make some subjects look like legal things than
others. A farm is a good example: a farm is not a natural thing like
an apple, but the claimant may deploy physical characteristics to
make it look like a legal thing. If the farmer can surround the
claimed land with a fence and then plow the fields, others are likely
to understand that at a minimum it is someone’s landed property,
and more specifically that it is a farm. But the farm may also rely
on more subtle forms of “fencing” that let others recognize it as a
legal thing, and those may not be physical at all, or only peripherally
physical, like a symbol (a “Jones Farm” sign); or a real estate title.
Recording the title requires a whole regime of property titles, and
more complex forms of property—say, trademarks or stocks—may
only claim recognition as legal things through these kinds of collective property regimes.
I do not think that Henry would disagree with any of the above.
But these differing modes of signaling legal thinghood have differences
in costs, and that is where it seems to me that Henry might have
made more explicit use of some insights drawn from law and economics. I am thinking especially of those pieces that point out that
property regimes, while potentially very beneficial, are themselves
costly; and that property regimes for different kinds of subjects have
different cost and benefit profiles. Harold Demsetz set off a good deal
of thought in this direction.24 Terry Anderson and P.J. Hill colorfully
illustrated Demsetz’s arguments through their description of evolving property rights in the American West.25 James Krier observed
24. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON REV. PAPERS &
PROC. 347 (1967). Henry is of course well aware of Demsetz’s contribution and cites him
frequently, though often for other points; see, e.g., Henry E. Smith & Thomas W. Merrill,
Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J. L. & ECON. S77, 78–79 (2011) (citing Demsetz
on point that property rights internalize externalities and affect valuation of resources).
25. Terry Anderson & P. J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American
West, 18 J. L. & ECON. 163 (1975).
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the widely overlooked element of collective action necessary to create
property rights regimes.26 Gary Libecap analyzed the political stickiness that can impede changes in property regimes once some group
of constituents has dug in.27
Henry certainly understands the costs of defining and defending
property rights in different kinds of resources, as in his observations
about the difficulty of creating a simulacrum of thingy-ness in water
or intellectual property, and the consequent need for greater predominance of what he calls governance strategies in the legal delineation of these subjects.28 But I believe his theory, with its stress on
information costs and cognitive limitations, leads him to focus more
on the costs to the observer or duty-holder when trying to comprehend the rights of others, and less on the costs to the claimant of
communicating rights claims—or the costs to the public of creating
any kind of overall regime for claiming property rights.29 I am the
last person to criticize an emphasis on the duty-holder in property
relations, because my own view is that the duty-holder or non-owner
is critical to making property regimes function.30 Nevertheless, it is
costly for individuals to communicate claims, and even costlier for
the public to institute collective regimes for communicating claims,
and all those costs are relevant to an understanding of what the law
recognizes as a property thing. Law and economics scholars have
been in the forefront of examining costs of this sort.
My third issue concerns another aspect of Henry’s theory, although
it harks back to my first issue about modularity. This issue concerns
the deployment of exclusion—essential for modularity—as the dominating principle for the center of property things, and governance as
the dominating principle at the periphery, the latter principle coming into play primarily in what Henry refers to as “high stakes”
26. James E. Krier, Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 325,
332–39 (1992).
27. GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 11–12, 21–26 (1989).
28. Smith, Fluid Resources, supra note 20, at 206–10.
29. I believe Henry has put the costs of creating and operating a property regime under
the rubric of “measurement costs,” but this phrase has generally left me uncertain about who
is measuring what. See, e.g., Smith & Merrill, supra note 24, at 94 (using term “measurement
costs” in connection with defining and defending rights).
30. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Psychologies of Property (and Why Property is Not a Hawk/Dove
Game), in JAMES PENNER & HENRY E. SMITH, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW
272, 282–83 (2013) (stressing the importance of non-owner recognition of property of others).
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situations.31 My question here is this: how stable is the center/
periphery relationship between these management strategies? To
begin with, there may be a more even distribution between these
strategies than one might conclude from Henry’s concentration on
exclusion as the dominating strategy for property as the law of things,
a.k.a. modules.32
Environmental law governs a lot of physical/legal “things” like factories, oil rigs, and autos, but environmental law has quite a trove
of both exclusion and governance. If anything, if one understands
governance to include detailed governmental supervision of owners’
actions, governance strategies have predominated in environmental
law to date, as in nuisance law in small-scale disturbances, or as in
the very detailed command-and-control regulation of hazardous
materials in more complex statutes. Moreover, it is precisely in “high
stakes” situations, when environmental damage becomes acute, that
commentators and legislators are most apt to turn to modular strategies. Those high stakes prod legislators to experiment with highercost but potentially more effective regimes of exclusive property.33
An important example was the reaction to the damage caused by
acid rain; this problem led to the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air
Act, which introduced tradable property-like emission rights in
sulfur dioxide.34 Similar exclusion strategies have been proposed or
enacted to deal with other environmental issues when threats have
become more apparent—among them species decimation, overfishing,
and wetlands loss.35 Perhaps most notably, proposals to diminish
31. See, e.g., Smith, Law of Things, supra note 3, at 1693–94, 1702–03. Henry is careful
to note, however, that exclusion is not the “ontological” basis of property; see Henry E. Smith,
The Thing About Exclusion, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 95 (2014). Henry often
refers to governance strategies as those applying at the periphery in “high stakes” situations;
see, e.g., Smith, Community and Custom, supra note 6, at 16.
32. In his more recent work, however, Henry has concentrated more on governance strategies, particularly equity. See Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, supra note 16, at 73–75 (arguing
that both formal law and contextual equitable modifications are essential to legal system).
33. Carol M. Rose, Big Roads, Big Rights: Varieties of Public Infrastructure and Their
Impact on Environmental Resources, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 409, 409–11 (2008) [hereinafter Rose,
Big Roads, Big Rights]; Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management
Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 16–24, 28–29 (1991).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2000).
35. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Trading Species: A New Direction for Habitat Trading
Programs, 38 ENV’T L. REP. 10539 (2008) (species conservation); Jonathan Adler & Nathaniel
Stewart, Learning How to Fish: Catch Shares and the Future of Fisheries Management, 31

2021]

THE MODERN ARCHITECTURE OF PROPERTY

79

greenhouse gases include both detailed governance proposals on the
one hand, but also and increasingly frequently exclusion strategies
like carbon taxes or trades.36 At the far end of the complexity scale,
one might consider ecosystems, the ultimate polycentric resources.
“Ecosystems” can designate anything from a mud puddle to the
Amazon basin, and they would seem to be particularly resistant to
modular approaches. Nevertheless, putting the mud puddle to one
side, Amazon forest conservation too has elicited calls both for
governance and for exclusion strategies.37
Henry does not dispute that governance strategies are important—far from it—but he nevertheless argues there is a “gravitational” pull toward exclusion/modular strategies in property law.38
I would agree in many cases, but my own view is that the relationship is not so heavily weighted on one side as Henry implies.
Henry’s theory centers on property in a modern commercial society.
Smaller and less commercial economies may well generally lean
toward governance strategies for resource management, as in the
numerous eighteenth-century Pacific island societies so beautifully
described by Stuart Banner, where individual claims were subject
to revision through decision by the indigenous community or its
leaders.39 Moreover, even in a modern economy, Henry himself has
argued that ‘fluid” resources like water and intellectual property do
not lend themselves easily to pure exclusion strategies. Even though
there are indeed more or less exclusive property rights in water in
the American West, the gravitational pull of the law of surface
UCLA J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 150 (2013) (fishing quota); James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies
and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000) (wetlands and
other environmental resources).
36. See, e.g., Greg Dotson, The Carbon Tax Vote You’ve Never Heard of and What It
Portends, 36 UCLA J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 167, 179–85 (2018) (describing conservative support
for carbon pricing, although blocked in Congress).
37. See, e.g., Howard A. Latin, Climate Change Mitigation and Decarbonization, 25 VILL.
ENV’T L. J. 1 (2014) (describing and criticizing current mix of regulatory and incentive-based
systems, proposing more far-reaching decarbonization).
38. See, e.g., Smith, Community and Custom, supra note 6, at 27 (describing exclusion
measures as having “gravitational” force in property); Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The
Indirect Relation between Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
959, 965 (2009) (same).
39. See, e.g., STUART BANNER, POSSESSING THE PACIFIC: LAND, SETTLERS, AND INDIGENOUS
PEOPLE FROM AUSTRALIA TO ALASKA 52–53 (2007) (describing Maori methods of land allocation
prior to British settlement).
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water is toward governance, given the interactions of upstream and
downstream claims.
Water, like many resources, is one for which exclusion strategies
are costly, as the law and economics scholars remind us. But these
scholars also remind us that matters can change: growing (or diminishing) resource demand, new technology, and even politics may push
property regimes in one direction or the other.40 Such changes alter
the cost/benefit calculations of different regimes, and they can drive recalibrations in the relationships between exclusion and governance.
If I may indulge in a personal quibble, some time ago, I made the
claim that there was another such driver in at least some property
relationships, located in an endogenous relationship between exclusion and governance (or rules and standards). I borrowed this idea
from Albert Hirschman’s 1982 book, Shifting Involvements.41 The
gist of it was that as one management strategy grows more dominant,
its limitations may become more salient, inducing various players
to try the other—but then later, those players or others start to chafe
under the second strategy and return to some version of the first,
and so on. Several years ago, when I was the recipient of this wonderful Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Prize, Henry gently argued
that instead of cycling between what I called “Crystals and Mud,”
any such patterns in property law might be envisioned as sedimentation of rules and structured governance.42 I have to confess that I
see cycling and sedimentation as rather similar, if one sees each
layer of sediment as a variant on the one-before-last.
In another metaphor in the same piece, Henry suggested that my
view was rather like the thermostat that is first set too high, then too
cool, then too high again, ad infinitum.43 To this I would say, “Well, so
what?” We never get some thermostats set just right—even in nature,
40. E.g., Anderson & Hill, supra note 25, at 169–72 (describing changes in property rights
in grazing land in Great Plains in response to greater competition, cattlemen’s organization,
introduction of barbed wire, and legislative action).
41. ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS 11, 21, 62, 120 (1982).
42. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988)
[hereinafter Rose, Crystals and Mud]; Henry E. Smith, Rose’s Human Nature of Property, 19
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1047, 1052 (2010) [hereinafter Smith, Rose’s Human Nature of
Property]. Some years earlier, Randy Barnette suggested to me that the appropriate metaphor
might not be crystals and mud but rather bricks and mortar, which strikes me as a closer
metaphor to a modular form.
43. Smith, Rose’s Human Nature of Property, supra note 42, at 1052–53.
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as in predator/prey cycles. Voles and snowy owls never seem to get
their thermostat set just right either.44 In any event, I was not making
a universal claim, but I do think that in some subjects in property, we
do not get the thermostat just right, at least for a time. One of my
examples was the title theory of mortgages, reined in by the equity
judges’ lien theory as strict rules resulted in undue losses to borrowers, to be subverted anew by the installment land contract as parties
looked for more rapid and predictable rules, then re-regulated into the
lien theory once again45—and in recent years re-subverted into the
title approach by the rent-to-own signs that I have seen all over
Tucson, Arizona. But as Hirschman’s Shifting Involvements argues,
cycling is a feature of many aspects of life.46 It would be unseemly of
me to carry this debate further here, but if my Crystals and Mud
view holds any water (so to speak), endogenous cycling may be another
driver of a changing relation between exclusion and governance.47
Let me sum up this issue about the stability of the mix between
exclusion versus governance in property. One might think property
law itself has a center and periphery. The modular model may
dominate the central resources, like land, but the governance strategies seep in more and more as one approaches the nether poles of
what we consider to be property: think water.48 Moreover, it does
seem that the proportions between the two strategies can change. The
law and economics scholars link this kind of change to cost/benefit
fluctuations that are driven by resource demand, technology, and
patterns of entrenchment: all can lead to different mixes of governance and exclusion with respect to property. And of course, I would
add that cycling is another driver at least some of the time: an
increasingly frustrating experience with one strategy may lead the
relevant actors to turn to the other—and then vice versa.
44. See “Snowy Owl,” THE PEREGRINE FUND, available at https://peregrinefund.org/ex
plore-raptors-species/owls/snowy-owl (linking snowy owl population to populations of voles
and lemmings and vice versa).
45. Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note 42, at 583–85.
46. E.g., HIRSCHMAN, supra note 41, at 11, 21, 62, and 120 (describing cycling political
involvements).
47. I am happy to see Henry may agree; see Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, supra note 16,
at 49 (noting that law and equity may cycle).
48. See Carol M. Rose, From H2O to CO2: Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon Trading,
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 91 (2008) (describing impediments to exclusive property rights regimes in
water and air pollutants).
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My last issue shifts to the goals of property regimes. In theorizing
an architecture of property, Henry’s overwhelmingly dominant concern
is information cost, and he argues that its reduction through property’s exclusion rules (modified by structured governance strategies
at the periphery) make interactions possible. To this I would again
say, “Well, yes and no.” Once again, those smaller traditionalist societies offer a contrast in which more fine-grained governance dominates; people in these societies know a lot about one another, so that
information is not so costly; and they manage to get along, even
though they do so without great accumulations of wealth. The
Smithean architecture of property, on the other hand, generally presumes what I have called a “modernist” economy, characterized by
frequent interactions among strangers, widespread commerce, and the
vastly increased “wealth of nations” that accompanies commerce. A
modernist economy like this requires modernist property forms:
simple, modular, standardized forms that reduce otherwise overwhelming information costs among far-flung market participants.49
But then the question becomes, which economic form is better?
For some thinkers, the traditionalist small-scale economy of an intimate community certainly has a romantic appeal.50 (But see Marx,
the author of the telling phrase, “the idiocy of rural life.”)51 The even
less regimented life of nomadic herders or hunter/gatherers appeals
as well, to the point that some persons initially taken by force into
such communities later have not wished to leave.52 Yes, information
cost reduction is essential to the modernist economy, but by what
measures is the modernist economy superior to the traditionalist one?
To be sure, the modernist economy has proved to be evolutionarily
more powerful and in that sense perhaps inevitable; traditionalist
economies often fail to survive the encroachments of widespread
49. Rose, Big Roads, Big Rights, supra note 33, at 410–11.
50. See, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER, THINK LIKE A COMMONER 147–59 (2014) (describing commons
as a new life form replacing capitalism and the liberal state); but see Carol M. Rose, Commons
and Cognition, 19 THEOR. INQ. L. 587, 601–02 (2018) (noting criticism of a romantic view of
commons).
51. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY ch. 1 (1848),
available at https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch01
.htm#:~:text=The%20bourgeoisie%20has%20subjected%20the,the%20idiocy%20of%20rural
%20life.
52. James Axtell, The White Indians of Colonial America, 32 WM. & MARY Q. 55, 55–58
(1975).
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commerce, and even if they do, their generally modest ability to generate wealth puts them behind in any kind of arms race.53
But is superior strength the only point of a modernist, modular
property regime? Is that why we want it to be easy for anyone in the
whole world to understand the basic message: Thing X may belong
to me, but all those Thing Ys out there belong to someone else? It is
slightly surprising to me that Henry, in his heavy focus on property’s information-cost advantages, says only a little about other
reasons why we might prefer a modernist regime to a traditionalist
one. The most obvious reason is wealth itself, through property’s
encouragement of industry and effort, mightily enhanced by trade;
Henry does mention this occasionally. But in Henry’s work I see
little mention of the libertarians’ emphasis on property’s role in
according independence and autonomy to individuals.54
The same goes for other aspects of property rights that seem to me
exceedingly important. Henry and I are on the same page in thinking that the person whose perspective to be accounted for is not the
owner, but rather the non-owner, or as Henry calls her, the dutyholder. Those persons’ respect for the property of others makes the
entire property regime function. Henry’s goal is to structure property
law so that any one of these persons can recognize that X is a Thing,
and Thing X belongs to someone else. I would go on to suggest that
there is a reason beyond commerce for encouraging this kind of
recognition, even agreeing that commerce and its wealth production
are important. Another hugely important reason is that property
gives lessons for conducting one’s self in a democratic regime: if a
person can recognize the property of others, she can learn to respect
the rights of others more generally. In that sense, property is a vivid
educator about what it means to have and to recognize rights.55 Moreover, property and trade can induce habits whereby people are willing to try out relationships with others who differ from themselves;
53. See, e.g., BANNER,supra note 39, at 53 (describing traditional Maori practices as generating little tradable wealth); Carol M. Rose, Property’s Relation to Human Rights, in ECONOMIC
LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 80–81 (Jahel Queralt & Bas van der Vossen eds., 2019)
[hereinafter Rose, Property’s Relation to Human Rights] (observing traditional communities’
products as generally low economic value compared to those of a modernist economy).
54. Cf. Smith, Law of Things, supra note 3, at 1693 (briefly mentioning interest in
autonomy in property).
55. Rose, Property’s Relation to Human Rights, supra note 53, at 69–70, 88.
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whereby they put force to one side and instead appeal to the voluntary agreement of others; whereby they learn to downplay irrelevant
disagreements and instead concentrate on coming to terms on matters
of mutual benefit. In these ways, as I have argued elsewhere, open
regimes of property and trade help to produce a culture that supports democratic self-government.56
Henry is undoubtedly right that property’s reduction of information
cost is a sine qua non of modernist economies. More than anyone so
far, he has induced scholars to take information costs seriously in the
institutional construction of private law. But beyond all that, it would
be gratifying to hear, at least from time to time, why the flourishing
of a modernist private law matters to our public life as well.

56. Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 363–64
(1996).

SHELTER, MOBILITY, AND THE VOUCHER PROGRAM

EZRA ROSSER*
INTRODUCTION
What is to be done about the poor and about poor neighborhoods?
When it comes to housing policy, the current hope is that the Housing Choice Voucher Program (formerly the Section 8 Voucher Program) can provide an—or ambitiously—the answer to this perennial
societal question. By piggybacking on the private rental market, the
voucher program supposedly has numerous advantages over traditional, project-based, public housing. Not only is it less costly to house
poor people in privately owned units compared to the cost of constructing and maintaining public housing,1 but the voucher program
also offers the possibility of deconcentrating the poor. Because vouchers can theoretically be placed anywhere, the poor can use them to
move out of impoverished areas and into higher opportunity neighborhoods. At least in theory, vouchers thus offer a two-for-one punch:
a more efficient way of providing housing support and a way to offer
families a chance at economic mobility. A new book by Professor Eva
Rosen offers a more nuanced appraisal of the ability of vouchers and
voucher holders to live up to the multiple expectations placed upon
them. The Voucher Promise: “Section 8” and the Fate of an American
Neighborhood pulls back the curtain on the voucher program, letting
readers into the lives of poor families and landlords whose lives are
shaped by the program.2 “Section 8” remains the popular name for
the program in much the same way that people still refer to “food
stamps” instead of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program.
As Rosen shows, even though the voucher program may fail to deliver
* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. Thanks to Susan
Bennett and Brandon Weiss for providing feedback on an earlier draft. And thanks to Lynda
Butler and the other organizers of the Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference for
inviting me to participate in a great event.
1. For discussion of the high cost of building and maintaining housing projects, see
Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 UCLA L. REV.
983, 995–1001 (2010).
2. EVA ROSEN, THE VOUCHER PROMISE: “SECTION 8” AND THE FATE OF AN AMERICAN
NEIGHBORHOOD 1–27 (2020).
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on all of the mobility expectations associated with it, vouchers considerably improve the lives of recipients. Even as the stature of
economic mobility within poverty law solidifies and the consequent
need to include mobility appraisal in the evaluation of anti-poverty
programs evolves, scholars and policymakers should not lose sight
of welfare gains associated with programs, even if the same programs cannot support the weight of mobility-tied expectations.
Before going into details, it is worth providing, just as The Voucher
Promise does in the introductory chapter, a summary of the voucher
program and the forces that led to its ascendency. Vouchers are a form
of rental subsidy. Poor people lucky enough to get a voucher and
find a private landlord willing to accept the voucher end up paying
only a small fraction of their rent out of pocket, and the vast majority
is paid for out of government funds.3 However, unlike food stamps,
no one has a right to a voucher; instead they are allocated by local
housing authorities through complicated formulas that take into
account applicant’s personal characteristics (his or her need) as well
as how long he or she has been waiting for assistance.4 Indeed, across
the country, one of the defining features of the voucher program is
the wait-list. In some cities, the wait-list for a voucher is closed and
has been for years.5 The opening of the wait-lists, often for only brief
periods of time, generates a flood of new applicants.6 It can take
years to get off the wait-list. Once someone gets off the wait-list,
they have a limited amount of time to place the voucher—to find a
landlord willing to have the recipient as a tenant and accept the
voucher.7 If they fail to place the voucher, it can be lost, given to the
next person on the wait-list. Though comparisons across welfare
programs are fraught with impossible value judgments (how can one
compare food assistance to housing assistance), given the cost of even
modest housing and the nature of the voucher subsidy, the voucher
program provides a uniquely deep benefit. Though it reaches only
a tiny fraction of those who need such support, getting off the waitlist can be truly transformative for poor individuals and families.8
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 14–16.
See id. at 102–03.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 115.
Only one-quarter of very low-income households receive any form of housing assistance.
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Today, the voucher program is the largest housing assistance program serving poor people in the United States. (The largest housing
assistance program in terms of overall expense, the mortgage interest deduction, primarily benefits the upper-middle class and the
wealthy.9) The current iteration of the voucher program, the Housing
Choice Voucher (“HCV”) Program, replaced the Section 8 Voucher
Program, which began with the Housing Act of 1974 but took on
added importance as the United States moved away from public
housing.10 The United States embarked on an ambitious effort to
build public housing starting just before World War II and continuing beyond President Johnson’ s War on Poverty.11 The Housing Act
of 1949 declared the federal goal as “a decent home and suitable
living environment for every American family.”12 But these efforts
were beset with problems. Inadequate funding left local housing
authorities unable to keep up with maintenance expenses.13 Tenant
selection at the time favored the neediest, which meant both that it
was impossible to charge tenants to cover those expenses and that
housing projects became sites of concentrated poverty.14 Tall and
dense concrete apartment buildings were not the only type of public
housing built, but such complexes, including their very names—Robert
Taylor Homes, Pruitt-Igoe, and Cabrini-Green—came to symbolize
all public housing. Popular awareness of some of the problems prevalent in these large complexes, including gang and drug activity, together with academic research emphasizing the economic and cultural
effects of concentrated poverty, pushed policymakers to look for ways
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2020
6 (2020). See also Abraham Gutman et al., Health, Housing, and the Law, 11 N.E. U. L. REV.
251, 298 (2019) (praising the program and noting, “the most obvious defect in the program is
that it is chronically, and substantially, underfunded”).
9. For an excellent article on the inequities of the mortgage interest deduction (written
before the Trump tax reform changed the calculus to lessen the overall reach of the deduction
while also making it even more skewed towards the wealthy), see Matthew Desmond, How
Homeownership Became the Engine of American Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/magazine/how-homeownership-became-the-engine-of-american
-inequality.html.
10. ROSEN, supra note 2, at 14.
11. Ellickson, supra note 1, at 989.
12. Congressional Declaration of National Housing Policy, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1441 (2020).
13. See Cara Hendrickson, Racial Desegregation and Income Deconcentration in Public
Housing, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 35, 38–39 (2002) (discussing the problems caused
by inadequate funding).
14. Id. at 40.
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to fix public housing.15 One solution, which began under President
George H.W. Bush and became a central feature of housing policy
under President Clinton, was to demolish existing housing projects
and replace them with less dense projects built on the same sites.16
Not only were these Hope VI projects nicer than stereotypical public
housing, but housing authorities also moved away from populating
these new units based on greatest need and instead prioritized a
mixed-income approach when selecting tenants. The other reaction
to problems, real and perceived, in public housing was to move away
from government funding of brick-and-mortar construction and toward
rental subsidies, i.e., vouchers.
Vouchers allow the government to get out of both the landlord
business and the business of telling poor people where they must
live. At least in theory, vouchers leverage the power of the private
rental market, allowing poor people to look for housing within their
budget (which in this case is determined by their budget and the
applicable caps on the per month voucher payment) across the area
serviced by the local housing authority and potentially across an
even wider area. Studies demonstrate that on a per unit basis,
vouchers are cheaper than public housing units over the same time
period.17 The economic attractiveness of vouchers is but part of the
explanation for their rise. The other major factor was the belief that
the ability to move to better neighborhoods would provide the poor
15. The scholar whose work most advanced the idea that concentrated poverty is especially harmful is William J. Wilson. See WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED:
THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed. 1987); WILLIAM J. WILSON,
WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996). For a short retrospective that highlights the troubled nature of these projects and looks at what happened after
they were torn down, see Susan J. Popkin, Hard Lessons from Chicago’s Public Housing Reform,
BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Feb. 7, 2017, 5:23 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017
-02-07/lessons-from-chicago-s-public-housing-reform.
16. As Susan Bennett observed when discussing Hope VI, “Few raise their hands in
support of public housing. People even like to blow it up.” Susan Bennett, “The Possibility of
a Beloved Place”: Residents and Placemaking in Public Housing Communities, 19 ST. LOUIS
UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 259, 264 (2000). For a critique of the Hope VI program, see NAT’L HOUS.
L. PROJECT ET AL., FALSE HOPE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE HOPE VI PUBLIC HOUSING
REDEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (2002), https://www.nhlp.org/files/FalseHOPE.pdf.
17. Ellickson, supra note 1, at 997–98 (comparing the cost of public housing projects with
the cost of vouchers). See also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE: COMPARING THE CHARACTERISTICS AND COSTS OF HOUSING PROGRAMS, GAO-02-76
(2002) (finding vouchers are cheaper over a thirty-year period but noting that construction of
larger complexes can lessen the gap between voucher costs and public housing costs).
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with access to the sorts of benefits—in terms of everything from
employment opportunities and quality education to reduced exposure to crime and increased social capital—that were and often are
(rightly or wrong) associated with living in those wealthier areas.18
The widely touted success of the Gautreaux settlement, which
provided vouchers and support for poor, predominantly AfricanAmerican recipients to move to lower-poverty neighborhoods, provided the push needed for the federal government to roll out the
Moving to Opportunity (“MTO”) voucher experiment, which looked
at the effect of mobility on recipient well-being.19 At least since the
MTO study, the rhetoric around vouchers embraces a dual purpose
for these subsidies: a means of providing direct assistance in order
to shelter the poor and a tool to enable the poor to relocate to higherincome neighborhoods.20
The Voucher Promise shows that though voucher programs provide invaluable support for families in need, recipients often place
their vouchers in the type of low-income neighborhoods that theoretically vouchers should help recipients escape.21 By focusing on a poor
part of Baltimore with a relatively high portion of voucher-supported
18. See Stacey Seicshnaydre, Missed Opportunity: Furthering Fair Housing in the Housing
Choice Voucher Program, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 175 (2016) (“The HCV Program, as the
current name suggests, provides the potential for greater housing choice and socioeconomic
mobility for low-income families that participate. Vouchers create the possibility that families,
armed with data and information, can exercise choices about where to live. By extension, such
choices might open up areas of greater opportunity for families than traditionally available
to them, such as neighborhoods with fewer environmental and health hazards, higher quality
schools, and job growth.”).
19. See Jamie Alison Lee, Poverty, Dignity, and Public Housing, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 97, 143–48 (2015) (providing an overview of these voucher experiments and related research findings); David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127
YALE L.J. 78, 104–05 (2017) (summarizing these voucher experiments and collecting sources).
20. Tellingly, one summary of the Obama administration’s approach to urban poverty
argues that it was founded on two principles: “first, that concentrated poverty—particularly
racially concentrated poverty—is unacceptable and demands an affirmative response from the
federal government; and second, that individuals living in ghettos deserve both an adequate
physical place to live and the ability to live in a community of opportunity.” Sara Aronchick
Solow, Racial Justice at Home: The Case for Opportunity-Housing Vouchers, 28 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 481, 482 (2010). However, when it comes to the vouchers and mobility, “the HSV
program has never fulfilled its promise of expanding housing choice for low-income families.”
Sara Pratt, Civil Rights Strategies to Increase Mobility, 127 YALE L.J. F. 498, 513 (2017).
21. See also Gutman et al., supra note 8, at 299 (“while it is clear that the program
achieves the goal of helping voucher holders pay rent, it is unclear whether the program
allows for mobility”).
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households, Rosen lets readers glimpse some of the messiness that
complicates rosy predictions regarding the transformative potential
of vouchers. Landlords whose business relies on voucher tenants
steer recipients to poorer areas with high profit margins.22 Legal
and logistical barriers also keep recipients from fully exploring the
possibility of moving to higher-income areas. But these areas, for all
their faults, can also provide a sense of community. Rosen describes
the bonds that can exist between tenants, as well as the ways homeowners sometimes exclude voucher holders from a community of
long-term residents.23 By bringing readers into the lives of those most
impacted, tenants and landlords alike, The Voucher Promise contributes to a vibrant literature on vouchers and on the role neighborhood characteristics play on resident welfare and economic mobility.
Part I of this Article is devoted to The Voucher Promise. It brings
out the major lessons Rosen drew from her field work and highlights
a few areas left uncertain. As Part I’s coverage hopefully makes clear,
The Voucher Promise is worthy of careful consideration by anyone interested in housing policy and in the importance of place. Zooming
out from Rosen’s study of a Baltimore neighborhood to a more general
perspective, Part II explores the relationship between location and
opportunity. Drawing on the work of Raj Chetty and others, Part II
discusses what is known and what remains unknown about this
relationship, especially when it comes to moves by poor people. As
will be shown, a growing pile of evidence supports the idea that location matters when it comes to economic opportunity. The Article
ends by connecting this opportunity research with the question of
whether the voucher program should have to bear the weight of both
providing necessary public housing assistance and leading the poor
to move to high-income areas. Ultimately, the voucher program
should be recognized as a success and (massively) expanded, even
if it does not meet the secondary mobility goal, because of the tremendous need among the poor for subsidized housing.
I. LIVING WITH VOUCHERS
The Voucher Promise is a portrait of both people and a community.
Rosen, now a professor at Georgetown, did the field work leading up
22. ROSEN, supra note 2, at 140.
23. Id. at 170–74.
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to the book as part of her PhD in Sociology from Harvard and it shows,
in a good way. Following the introductory chapter’s tightly written
and thoughtful summary of how housing policy has changed over time,
Chapter 1 provides a rich description of the Park Heights neighborhood that is reminiscent of past work by William J. Wilson and
Richard B. Taub.24 Told through a mix of quotes from neighborhood
residents as well as statistics and the author’s own observations, the
reader is allowed entrance into the Park Heights community.25
Many of the long-term homeowners arrived when the neighborhood
was first opened up to African Americans.26 Though some Jewish
residents did not move out, real estate agents used blockbusting
tactics to generate turnover and whites left the area for better-off
areas in the Baltimore metropolitan region.27 The neighborhood
changed from white to black and has “stabilized as a black homeowning community with a newer renter population.”28 Long-term
residents recall the Park Heights of the 1970s with fondness and
nostalgia, but as time passed many of the businesses and community
institutions disappeared.29 Residents who introduced Park Heights
to Rosen could point to visible reminders, such as dirt-filled swimming pools,30 row homes now standing vacant,31 and sites where
schools once stood,32 of what the community once was.
Residents in Park Heights experience the community differently.
“[T]he feel of the neighborhood changed block by block,” Rosen observed, with “three distinct ecological areas or ‘microneighborhoods,’
characterized by different patterns of residential status, length of
residency, and geographic boundaries.”33 According to Rosen, Park
Heights can be divided into homeowner havens, transitional areas,
and voucher enclaves, and each type of neighborhood has distinct
24. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON & RICHARD B. TAUB, THERE GOES THE NEIGHBORHOOD:
RACIAL, ETHNIC, AND CLASS TENSIONS IN FOUR CHICAGO NEIGHBORHOODS AND THEIR MEANING
FOR AMERICA 3–13 (2006).
25. Id.
26. ROSEN, supra note 2, at 30.
27. Id. at 30.
28. Id. at 237.
29. Id. at 34–36.
30. Id. at 54–56.
31. Id. at 38.
32. ROSEN, supra note 2, at 45.
33. Id. at 57.
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characteristics.34 For residents, differences across these neighborhood
types matter because “social capital operates differently in different
part of the [Park Heights] neighborhood,” as do “[m]echanisms of
social control.”35 The first of these, homeowner havens, are areas
sheltered from other parts of the community, with “strict norms
around trash collection, litter, loitering, and drug selling.”36 Long-term
homeowners, often older residents who bought into the neighborhood decades earlier, have tight relationships among themselves but
“stigmatiz[e] voucher holders and blam[e] them” for negative changes
in the neighborhood.37 This “us versus them” dynamic is even more
pronounced in transitional areas where homeowners believe “that
these ‘Section eights’ are responsible for trashing the homes on
[their] street” in ways that hurt property values.38 As the name
implies, transitional areas have “older homeowners, newer homeowners . . ., newer renters, and some vacant property,” and residents
can have different levels of commitment to the neighborhood.39 As
Rosen notes, in transitional areas, “voucher status—or the perception of it—becomes a symbolic boundary that serves as a more distinction,” excluding voucher holders from full participation in the
existing community.40
It is the third neighborhood category, voucher enclaves, that has
an especially high concentration of voucher-supported households. The
voucher enclave archetype is a low-income apartment complex owned
by a landlord who actively seeks voucher holders as tenants. Lacking
long-term homeowners to exercise informal community control over
such areas, voucher enclaves rely on video surveillance and property
managers to deal with everything from trash to the maintenance of
safety.41 In these apartment complexes, technology, professional
management, and the police provide institutionalized oversight, but
reliance on these “formal mechanisms of control . . . [works] to the
34. Id. at 57–59.
35. Id. at 173.
36. Id. at 173.
37. Id. at 176. See also id. at 241 (“There is a widely pervasive myth that voucher holders
bring with them crime and disorderliness. The stigma and myth surrounding housing vouchers
is woven through our popular and even intellectual discourse.”).
38. ROSEN, supra note 2, at 177.
39. Id. at 177.
40. Id. at 180.
41. Id. at 198–200.
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detriment of informal, ground-up forms of social control.”42 In the
apartment complex that Rosen studied in depth, Oakland Terrace,
residents reported that while the surveillance cameras “made the
complex safer overall, they have not promoted a sense of trust
among residents.”43 The sort of monitoring and correction that takes
place in homeowner havens depends on social capital among residents, and in transitional areas as well as voucher enclaves, such
informal policing is not available so colder alternatives act as substitutes.44 Within this sliding scale of resident permanence, “division
within the neighborhood is reinforced from the top down by neighborhood institutions and organizations” that serve homeowners and
long-term residents but not voucher holders.45
But The Voucher Promise is not a detached theoretical work.
Rosen brings readers along to meet the tenants who live in Park
Heights. Destiny Stevens, for example, lives “in a modern-day rooming house,” with her fiancé and her boys, a five-year-old and a fivemonth-old.46 Though the demise of the single room occupancy (“SRO”),
especially YMCA housing, is a recurring observation among academics, Stevens’s family pays $600 per month for a room in a singlefamily home that she shares with three other tenants.47 As Rosen
observes, by renting the house by the room, Stevens’ “landlord is
bringing in $1,800 a month for a house that . . . he would be hardpressed to rent for more than $1,000 to a single family.”48 To further
illustrate the hardships of insecure housing, Rosen introduces readers
to Derrick Thomas and Marilyn No-Last-Name-Given. Thomas, his
girlfriend Marlena, and their seven-week-old baby, Rose, rented an
upstairs apartment from a known Baltimore drug kingpin who lived
downstairs.49 The couple made do through a combination of SSI, food
stamps, odd jobs, and sex work; they tolerated periods without heat in
their unit because the landlord was “lenient when they are late on
rent” and because they did not have better options.50 Marilyn’s housing
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 206.
Id. at 207.
ROSEN, supra note 2, at 168–69.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 62–63.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 70–74.
ROSEN, supra note 2, at 78–79.
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situation—a heavily subsidized apartment in a Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (“LIHTC”) complex—was considerably better than
Thomas’s, but her life had not been easy. Marilyn went from using
drugs to spending three years in prison after she attempted to transport drugs taped to her body on a flight from Columbia.51 After her
release, she got a job at a clothing store in West Baltimore but then
“tragedy struck . . . someone shot and killed her younger son.”52
Drug use and rehabilitation followed, and Marilyn got off a wait-list
for LIHTC apartments (her conviction disqualified her from vouchers
but not from the LIHTC unit); ever since she moved into the subsidized space, “[t]hings have been very stable for Marilyn.”53 Like most
writing about poor people, the stories are not clean; there are messy
parts.54 But the humanity of the people Rosen got to know shines
through, as does the tremendous impact affordable housing could
have on their lives.
Housing vouchers can make a tremendous difference in the lives
of the poor. Rosen notes, “[t]he receipt of a housing voucher can be
transformative. Like a winning lottery ticket, a housing voucher
radically changes lives, solving problems that can be intractable for
unassisted renters.”55 For some recipients, a voucher means the
difference between being sheltered or not, but its meaning can take
other forms as well: the ability to buy better food or cut back on
double shifts.56 For some parents, a voucher can allow family reunification by demonstrating that parents have “a suitable place for
[their] children to live.”57 Vouchers allow parents “to create a real
home” for their kids, an invaluable improvement over couch surfing
and doubling up with friends and relatives.58 Studies of voucher
recipients show that, not surprisingly, vouchers improve housing
conditions and free up money so families can “avoid skipping meals”
51. Id. at 82–87.
52. Id. at 87.
53. Id. at 88.
54. For one of the best books illustrating the structural as well as personal aspects of
poverty, see generally JASON DEPARLE, AMERICAN DREAM: THREE WOMEN, TEN KIDS, AND A
NATION’S DRIVE TO END WELFARE (2004).
55. ROSEN, supra note 2, at 94.
56. Id. at 94.
57. Id. at 97. See also Gutman et al., supra note 8, at 298 (“Children in homeless families
that receive vouchers are 42% less likely to be placed into foster care.”).
58. ROSEN, supra note 2, at 108.
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and “eat healthier food.”59 Receipt of a voucher does not suddenly
catapult families into the middle class but does provide stability,
validation, and “a place to call home.”60
The positive impact vouchers have for poor recipients is only part
of the story and The Voucher Promise dedicates equal space to some
of the challenges. Following the model that helped lift Matthew
Desmond’s Evicted from academic obscurity to a must-read book,61
Rosen spent time not only with tenants but with their landlords,
trying to understand the motivations and practices of those on the
opposite side of the voucher relationship. As Rosen notes, although
some cities have passed laws prohibiting sources of income discrimination, across much of the country. it is perfectly legal for a landlord
to reject a tenant simply because the landlord does not want to accept
a voucher.62 Although there have been some programmatic changes
to permit the maximum value of a voucher to vary by location so that
they can be placed in areas with higher rents, in general, vouchers
only cover 40 or 50 percent of the city’s fair market rent.63 Landlords
renting at the bottom of the market sometimes avoid vouchers because of the minimum quality standards and ongoing inspections tied
to acceptance of voucher-holding tenants. But “cumbersome inspections” are not the only reason landlords discriminate against voucher
holders; “others turn down vouchers for more insidious reasons.”64
As Rosen observes, in areas where the majority of voucher holders
are African-American, “race and voucher status often become conflated, and a landlord’s refusal to accept housing vouchers is effectively racial discrimination.”65 Rental rates set below the average
fair market rent, program inspections, landlord reticence about participating in the voucher program, and racism combine to limit the
reach of vouchers into the private rental market and make it hard
for recipients to place their vouchers.
59. Id. at 111.
60. Id. at 113.
61. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY (2016).
62. See ROSEN, supra note 2, at 118–19 (discussing source of income discrimination in the
Baltimore and Washington, D.C. area). For an extended treatment of source of income discrimination and the voucher program, see Robert G. Schwemm, Source-of-Income Discrimination
and the Fair Housing Act, 70 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 573, 584–616 (2020).
63. ROSEN, supra note 2, at 138–40.
64. Id. at 118.
65. Id. at 119.
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Vouchers are government subsidies for both sides of the landlordtenant relationship, so it is not surprising that some landlords build
their business around vouchers. Although 40 percent of an area’s fair
market rent is not enough to afford a unit in a high-end part of town,66
in poorer parts of town, such a government-guaranteed monthly payment is quite attractive for landlords who otherwise would have to
settle for a lower monthly amount and greater payment uncertainty.67
The Voucher Promise contributes to the public housing literature in
part by highlighting the ways “landlords select tenants in—how
they make decisions about desirable tenant characteristics and sort
renters into neighborhoods across the city.”68 A recurring question
when it comes to vouchers is why is it that “housing voucher recipients
do not, by and large, move to the mixed-income, diverse communities
that policymakers envisioned as a key outcome of the program”?69
A partial answer is that landlords actively recruit tenants—going so
far as to pass out fliers and offer drives to people after they leave
the “Section 8” office—into vacant units in higher-poverty areas.70
Those landlords who specialize in the voucher program buy up cheap
properties, fix them up enough to pass inspections, and seek out
voucher holders to fill their units.71 Sometimes such units are scattered throughout a poor community; other times they take the form
of an underperforming apartment complex.72 Enticements, whether
in the form of waived security deposits or cosmetic improvements
such as upscale amenities, help persuade perspective tenants to
move to poorer parts of town even though theoretically their voucher
could take them to better-off areas.73
66. Pratt, supra note 20, at 514 (“[A] voucher often does not cover enough of the high rents
in many localities to provide meaningful assistance. Even with recent increases in payment
standards, or Fair Market Rent calculations, individuals with vouchers are often priced out
of markets other than those located in segregated and poor neighborhoods.”).
67. ROSEN, supra note 2, at 134.
68. Id. at 132–33.
69. Id. at 126.
70. Id. at 130.
71. Id. at 135–36, 145–48. Notably the structure of the voucher program “theoretically
enables overcharging,” which means that in some markets a landlord can make more money
renting to a voucher holder than to a tenant without a voucher. Gutman et al., supra note 8,
at 302.
72. ROSEN, supra note 2, at 142–45.
73. See id. at 151–53.
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Rosen’s account of the role of landlords in the voucher program
sheds new light on the program’s limited success when it comes to
mobility. Though vouchers theoretically enable recipients to move
to lower-poverty areas and can help reduce concentrated poverty, in
practice, holders often end up placing their vouchers in poor communities. Moreover, “[t]he voucher program’s failure to move families
to better neighborhoods is especially stark for minority renters.”74
This “failure” is relatively well-known. Less well-known is the role
landlords play in preventing voucher holders from moving. Rosen
shows how some landlords used tenants’ unpaid debt as a way to
“maintain control over their tenants” and, indirectly, over the voucher
program.75 While Desmond’s work highlights the devastating consequences of eviction, Rosen found that “much of the time, landlords
are not scheming of ways to rid themselves of tenants, but rather of
ways to hold on to tenants.”76 Landlord recruitment and retention
tactics, Rosen argues, often amount to discriminatory racial steering
which “reinforces segregation across neighborhoods.”77 Although the
voucher program is often celebrated as a way for recipients to get
the advantages of the private market, “rather than tenants selecting
homes and neighborhoods, landlords are selecting tenants.”78 It is
this observation and argument that is perhaps the greatest contribution of The Voucher Promise.
What does it mean that voucher holders are not moving to dramatically higher-income communities? Poverty scholars have long
struggled with the tension between simply identifying problems in
a neighborhood and applying an overly broad label to a place where
poor people live. Thus, even as poverty scholars highlighted the downsides of concentrated poverty, some public housing residents bristled
at accounts that undervalued those same communities or that failed
to appreciate the bonds between people even in, or especially in,
74. Id. at 126.
75. Id. at 153. See also id. at 157–60 (describing how landlords use debt to trap tenants
in place).
76. Id. at 155.
77. Id. at 162.
78. ROSEN, supra note 2, at 160. See also Emily Rees Brown, Public-Private Partnerships:
HUD’s Lost Opportunities to Further Fair Housing, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 735, 767 (2017)
(critiquing the voucher program because it fails to “do anything to prevent exploitive landlords
from luring voucher holders to properties where the HCV subsidy meets or exceeds the fair
market rent of the unit.”).
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poor areas. At one point, Rosen tackles this tension directly, asking
one of the residents, “what makes a neighborhood a good neighborhood versus a bad neighborhood?”79 The answer Roland, an interview subject, gives her is, “people,” adding that Park Heights is “in
between.”80 Rosen interprets this answer in a way that most academics
do these days but resists the urge to apply a single label to neighborhoods.81 Indeed, the poverty literature is full of “lower-income,”
“high-crime,” and “disadvantaged” neighborhoods, but generally eschews value judgment words like “good” or “bad.” But The Voucher
Promise itself gives reasons to question such scholarly hesitation.
Rosen dedicates a long section of the book to describing the coping
strategies that voucher holders use to navigate the violence they
encounter in Park Heights. As Rosen explains, even though crime
has been on the decline nationwide and across Baltimore, Park
Heights residents “bore indelible markers of the physical and symbolic violence that they witnessed or were victims of over their years
in high-crime neighborhoods.”82 During her field work, Rosen met a
young man with a bullet in his brain and parents with long term
drug addictions, people who lost siblings to gang violence and ugly
encounters with the police.83 The coping strategies residents employ
vary from “complete social and physical withdrawal from the neighborhood” to reliance on knowing others in the community.84 Roland,
the resident who described Park Heights as “in between,” told Rosen,
that he would feel safe if he or his wife was out and about in the
neighborhood because “[i]t’s not that treacherous out there.”85 But,
if it is possible to put a value-laden label on the neighborhood—
something Rosen never does—the stories of two of the residents suggest it would not be a “good” label. One resident, Raven, who put her
faith in her neighbors to protect her, later decided to move after an
intruder entered her apartment with her neighbors’ knowledge.86
More tragically, Roland, despite his view of the neighborhood’s safety,
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

ROSEN, supra note 2, at 225.
Id.
Id. at 225–26.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 213–14.
Id. at 217.
ROSEN, supra note 2, at 217.
Id. at 220–23.
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was shot and killed by a robber with a gun as he walked his wife,
Vivian, home from visiting a friend a few blocks from where they
lived.87 As Rosen reports, “Vivian, who believed that violence in the
neighborhood was rare if she played her cards right, was confronted
with an undeniable moment of truth in her husband’s death.”88
The Voucher Promise shows the need to be careful about how much
is demanded of a single program when evaluating its effectiveness.
Even after the most tragic of events, it was a voucher that gave
Vivian the ability to move to a new home, and that move, even though
it did not end up being to a better neighborhood and was, therefore,
not a move as far as policymakers interested in deconcentrating
poverty might have hoped for, was still valuable.89 Voucher holders,
unlike many poor people without such support, have “the chance to
pick up and start fresh.”90 Ultimately, vouchers can and should be
supported (and their funding expanded dramatically) even if they do
not accomplish every policy objective that they ideally would. As
Rosen observes, “[w]hile policymakers discuss a number of potential
benefits from vouchers, it is difficult to overstate the simple power
of providing a home.”91
II. LOCATION MATTERS
Arguably, the most important branch of poverty research today
centers around the relationship between location and economic
mobility. Desmond’s Evicted, along with other works such as H.
Luke Shaefer and Kathryn Edin’s $2.00 a Day and Andrea Elliott’s
epic reporting about homelessness for the New York Times series
Invisible Child,92 helped raise popular consciousness of the hardships faced by the poor in the second half of the Obama administration. Since then, Raj Chetty and his co-authors have probably done
the heavy lifting in pushing the academic and public policy needle
87. Id. at 226.
88. Id. at 230.
89. See id. at 231.
90. Id. at 233. See also id. at 239 (“voucher holders are the only group with the ability—in
theory, at least—to get unstuck . . . with the flexibility to respond to life events and crises”).
91. ROSEN, supra note 2, at 109.
92. KATHRYN EDIN & H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST NOTHING IN
AMERICA (2015); Andrea Elliott, Invisible Child, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2013), https://www.ny
times.com/projects/2013/invisible-child/index.html#/?chapt=1.
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when it comes to poverty. Though Chetty, a professor of economics
at Harvard, is not well known outside of academic circles, his team
is on the cutting edge of poverty-related research. They have shown
the ways in which economic mobility differs across neighborhoods
and have applied their empirical and data-heavy approach to everything from racial disparities to housing policy.93 Though legal academics have started to take note of Chetty’s work, the richness of
the data on the significance of location is such that its significance
in the poverty law space could, and should, increase.
In 2015, Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, and Lawrence Katz released
the results of a study of the Moving to Opportunity (“MTO”) program which found that younger children who move to lower-poverty
areas as a result of a housing voucher have higher earnings as
adults.94 A randomized housing mobility experiment, MTO involved
three recipient groups: “a group offered a housing voucher that could
only be used to move to a low-poverty neighborhood, a group offered
a traditional Section 8 housing voucher, and a control group.”95 By
studying how participants in each group fared, researchers could
use statistical methods to calculate the effects of moving on participant outcomes compared to the control group. Most of the MTO studies showed that moving to a better neighborhood was associated
with health improvements and a greater sense of security, but the
effects on children were more neutral. Some studies even showed a
difference between boys and girls, with girls showing academic improvements in the new environment but boys not.96 Chetty, Hendren,
and Katz revisited the MTO data and showed that while “the gains
from moving to lower-poverty areas decline steadily with the age of
the child at the time of the move,” for younger children the benefits
of such moves could be substantial.97 The three Harvard economists
93. Important works by Raj Chetty’s team, including papers and data visualizations, can
be found on Chetty’s personal website. See generally RAJ CHETTY, http://www.rajchetty.com/
(last visited Sept. 22, 2021).
94. Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren & Lawrence Katz, The Effects of Exposure to Better
Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 106
AM. ECON. REV. 855, 855–56 (2016).
95. NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON.RSCH., Moving to Opportunity, https://www.nber.org/programs
-projects/projects-and-centers/moving-opportunity?page=1&perPage=50.
96. Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1014.
97. Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren & Lawrence Katz, The Effects of Exposure to Better
Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, OPPORTUNITY INSIGHTS (May 2015), https://opportunityinsights.org/paper/newmto/.
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estimated that “moving a child out of public housing to a low-poverty
area when young (at age 8 on average) using a subsidized voucher
like the MTO experimental voucher will increase the child’s total
lifetime earnings by about $302,000.”98 The beauty of the MTO experiment was that the policy intervention was deliberately designed
so that academic conclusions about location and outcomes could be
reached. A summary of the outcome study research is that “[c]hildren
in families who willingly move from extremely poor neighborhoods
to low-poverty neighborhoods fare better over time—both economically and academically—thus slowing, reducing, or eliminating the
compounding effects of intergenerational poverty.”99
Moving beyond the MTO experiment, the Census Bureau’s Center
for Economic studies, working with Chetty, Hendren, and Brown University economist John Friedman, created an “Opportunity Atlas” to
explore the effect of location on economic mobility.100 Drawing on
2000 and 2010 census data, federal tax returns, and American
Community Surveys from 2005–2015, the team looked at the life
trajectories of children born between 1978–1983.101 While it is not
surprising that their work confirmed that “neighborhoods play a key
role in shaping children’s outcomes,”102 quite a few of their findings
were surprising. For example, they found, “substantial variance
across tracts even within the same school catchment areas.”103 This
does not mean that schools are unimportant, only that neighborhood
traits are as well. The study found “a positive correlation between
the employment rates of adults who live in a tract and rates of upward mobility for children who grow up there,” leading the researchers to conclude, “what predicts upward mobility is not proximity to
jobs, but growing up around people who have jobs.”104 Not shying
away from the cultural wars, the team also found “even stronger
correlations between children’s outcomes and other socioeconomic
98. Id.
99. Brown, supra note 78, at 747.
100. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Opportunity Atlas, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys
/ces/data/analysis-visualization-tools/opportunity-atlas.html (last updated Oct. 26, 2020).
101. Id.
102. Raj Chetty et al., The Opportunity Atlas: Mapping the Childhood Roots of Social Mobility,
1 (U.S. Census Bureau, Ctr. for Econ. Stud., CES 18-42R, Jan. 2020), available at https://
www2.census.gov/ces/wp/2018/CES-WP-18-42R.pdf.
103. Id. at 3.
104. Id. at 3–4.
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characteristics of adults in an area, such as mean incomes and the
share of single-parent households.”105 Indeed, in a related paper on
intergenerational mobility and racial disparities that is based on the
same data set, Chetty, Hendren, and two researchers with the
Census Bureau, Maggie R. Jones and Sonya R. Porter, found, somewhat counter-intuitively, that “[b]lack father presence at the neighborhood level strongly predicts black boys’ outcomes irrespective of
whether their own father is present or not.”106 The presence or absence
of fathers is not the whole story; as the authors conclude, “[b]lack
boys do especially well in low-poverty neighborhoods with a large
fraction of fathers at home in black families and low levels of racial
bias among whites.”107 Though the focus here is on neighborhood effects, it is worth pausing to highlight the significant role race and
racism play in the economic trajectory of African-American boys born
into wealthy households. As New York Times coverage of the team’s
work noted, “[w]hite boys who grow up rich are likely to remain that
way. Black boys raised at the top, however, are more likely to become poor than to stay wealthy in their own adult households.”108
The story’s visualization of the differential rate of downward mobility by race is damning and underlines the fact that racial identity
continues to play a major role in shaping economic mobility in ways
that cannot be explained simply by isolating other factors.
What these two major studies demonstrate is that race and location
matter. While such conclusions risk being dismissed as trivial—akin
to a weather reporter saying it is raining outside right now—they offer
real promise when it comes to housing policy. If small differences
across neighborhoods, even geographically proximate areas, lead to
different outcomes, then targeted interventions can potentially have
105. Id. at 4.
106. Raj Chetty et al., Race and Economic Opportunity in the United States: An Intergenerational Perspective, 135 Q. J. ECON. 711, 717 (2020). Note that this quote is drawn from
the version of the paper hosted on the Opportunity Insights website, which varies slightly
from the published version, presumably due to updating. See Raj Chetty et al., Race and Economic Opportunity in the United States: An Intergenerational Perspective, OPPORTUNITY INSIGHTS
(Dec. 2019) (manuscript at 5) [hereinafter Chetty et al., Race and Economic Opportunity],
available at https://opportunityinsights.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/race_paper.pdf.
107. Chetty et al., Race and Economic Opportunity, supra note 106, at 776.
108. Emily Badger et al., Extensive Data Shows Punishing Reach of Racism for Black Boys,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/19/upshot/race
-class-white-and-black-men.html.
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significant payoffs.109 Continuing in the same vein as the MTO experiment, the Opportunity Insights team partnered with the Seattle
and neighboring King County housing authorities to see if intervening right when voucher recipients start looking for where to place
their voucher could make a difference in where recipients ultimately
live.110 Voucher recipients were randomly assigned to either a group
that got standard briefings on how to use their voucher or to a group
that got specialized assistance and information that focused on
“high-opportunity areas.”111 One way to think of this intervention is
that half of the recipients were given assistance so that they did not
have to rely upon those landlords, described by Rosen, standing outside of the housing authority office whose business involved matching new voucher holders with vacant units in poorer parts of town.
The study was informed by research showing that “children who
grow up in low-income (25th percentile) families in the areas [study
designers] designated as ‘high opportunity’ earn about 13.9% ($6,800
per year) more as adults than those who grow up in low-opportunity
areas in families with comparable incomes.”112 Recipients could still
place their vouchers anywhere—they didn’t have to move to a highopportunity area—but the counseling and assistance such recipients
received increased the percentage of families who placed their vouchers in high-opportunity neighborhoods by “37.9 percent, from 15.1%
in the control group to 53.0% in the treatment group.”113 These are
significant results.114 One possible explanation for why vouchers do
not lead families to move to better areas is that recipients prefer
what they know and their existing community, which would reduce
109. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 18, at 181 (“The mobility research confirms what many
already know about housing opportunity: it is linked to many other kinds of transformative
life opportunities.”).
110. Dylan Matthews, America Has a Housing Segregation Problem. Seattle May Just Have
the Solution., VOX (Aug. 4, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/8/4/207
26427/raj-chetty-segregation-moving-opportunity-seattle-experiment.
111. Peter Bergman et al., Creating Moves to Opportunity: Experimental Evidence on Barriers
to Neighborhood Choice 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26164, 2020),
available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w26164.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2–3.
114. Similarly, “movers under a court-approved mobility program in Baltimore” who were
given “specialized and supportive counseling” moved away from “deeply segregated and poor
areas” and remained in their new communities after the initial move. Pratt, supra note 20,
at 504.
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mobility.115 But the Seattle/King County results “imply that most
low-income families do not have a strong preference to stay in lowopportunity areas; rather, barriers to moving to high-opportunity
areas play a central role in explaining neighborhood choice and residential sorting patterns.”116 Equally significant, the barriers are not
all that high. The study involved providing the randomly selected
group with additional information and limited supplemental financial
assistance to cover security deposits and supplemental insurance to
convince landlords to participate in the program.117 The total additional cost of the supplemental services “was approximately $2,660
per family: $1,043 of financial assistance, $1,500 of labor costs for
the services, and $118 in additional PHA expenses to administer the
program.”118 As The Voucher Promise emphasizes, vouchers do a
good job on their first objective—providing housing assistance—but
often fall short when it comes to mobility, in part because landlords
are selecting tenants rather than tenants selecting neighborhoods.
But if the mobility goal can be accomplished for less than $3,000 per
recipient, a relatively small supplemental expense for a program
that covers the majority of each recipient’s monthly rent, it is worth
scaling up this program nationwide so that all those who get off the
wait-list receive such assistance.119 Without such assistance and
targeted counseling of the sort done in the Seattle/King County
115. See Brown, supra note 78, at 776 (noting voucher holders considering moving to a new
neighborhood “may have deep concerns about leaving their social and family networks behind
for a new neighborhood where they may face discrimination, loneliness, and isolation and fears
about higher costs of transportation, childcare, and groceries”). But see Seicshnaydre, supra
note 18, at 184 (responding to this argument by noting that many minority poor will choose
to live in better neighborhoods if given the choice, adding: “Expanding fair housing choice is
aimed at reducing economic, racial, and social isolation; increasing freedom of movement; and
creating a more balanced menu of housing options for all families. Fair housing is informed
choice; it is not presumptive of any particular choice.”).
116. Bergman et al., supra note 111, at 4.
117. Id. at 14. This is exactly the sort of support, a “robust counseling program,” that Stacey
Seicshnaydre includes as her first suggestion on how to reform the HCV program. Seicshnaydre,
supra note 18, at 195.
118. Bergman et al., supra note 111, at 14.
119. See Kriston Capps, How a Section 8 Experiment Could Reveal a Better Way to Escape
Poverty, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Aug. 4, 2019, 6:08 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti
cles/2019-08-04/a-cheap-powerful-tool-to-beat-housing-segregation (“The program cost is low—
$2,600 per family per voucher issued, on average. That’s just a fraction of the cost of the voucher
itself. Given an average voucher tenure of 7 years for families with children, the cost of the
program as a share of the overall lifetime cost of a voucher is 2.2 percent—a bargain, especially if you consider the massive benefit that families receive.”).
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experiment, voucher programs are unlikely to lead to racial and
economic integration.120
Although The Voucher Promise and the empirical work on voucher
placement give strong support that counseling can further the mobility goal of the voucher program, it is important to address whether
it should be a goal of the voucher program to deconcentrate poverty.
Put differently, maybe the landlord-tenant matching that leads to
vouchers being placed in poor communities is a good thing. Not only
is such placement reflective of market forces responding efficiently to
the voucher payment guidelines and perhaps to tenant preferences,
but efforts to assist tenants in placing vouchers in higher-income
areas will also exacerbate the disinvestment of the communities
where vouchers are ordinarily placed absent government interference.
While the celebration of market-force take is more of a conservative
straw-man argument, the same cannot be said of the left-leaning
concern that programs that prioritize neighborhoods that provide
more opportunity and economic mobility are simply doubling down
on tired views of minority poor communities.121
For example, after Minneapolis and St. Paul released a regional
planning document that identified “opportunity areas” as well as
“racially/ethnically concentrated areas of poverty,” a coalition organized under the “Equity in Place” banner pushed back.122 The coalition argued that the cities were wrongly labeling “the region’s most
diverse communities as problematic areas requiring improvement.”123
As one unnamed activist told a reporter, “[t]he narratives about these
neighborhoods usually focus on the negative: their poverty, lowperforming schools, etc. Through our work and experience, however,
we know that the people who live in these communities benefit from
120. Hendrickson, supra note 13, at 63 (“Studies of the Section 8 program have repeatedly
confirmed that housing assistance without counseling and support services does not improve
racial and economic integration.”).
121. See generally Edward G. Goetz et al., Changing the Narrative and Playbook on Racially
Concentrated Areas of Poverty, in WHAT WORKS TO PROMOTE INCLUSIVE, EQUITABLE MIXEDINCOME COMMUNITIES (Mark L. Joseph & Amy T. Khare eds., 2020), https://case.edu/social
work/nimc/resources/what-works-volume (critiquing opportunity-based anti-poverty efforts
as reliant on a proximity to whiteness model and presenting a community-based alternative).
122. Edward G. Goetz et al., ‘Opportunity Areas’ Shouldn’t Just Be Places With A Lot of
White People, SHELTERFORCE (Jan. 4, 2021) https://shelterforce.org/2021/01/04/opportunity
-areas-shouldnt-just-be-places-with-a-lot-of-white-people/.
123. Id.
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the cultural connections and social networks they create.”124 Among
Equity in Place’s beliefs are: “We must create genuine, authentic
access to all forms of opportunity in every geography and with/for
every cultural community in our region,” “Proximity does not equal
access,” and “The inequities in our communities are not the result
of the presence or concentration of people of color and low-wealth
people, but rather due to structural and institutional racism and
decades of disinvestment.”125 Given such beliefs, it is perhaps not
surprising that Equity in Place was initially founded to challenge a
Fair Housing complaint which alleged that the “Twin Cities region
was using federal housing funding to concentrate affordable housing
in high-poverty communities” that had been filed by other faithbased and neighborhood organizations.126 While superficially a desire
to challenge one group of progressives fighting against concentrated
poverty seems like an odd reason for a new progressive organization
to spring up, the name, “Equity in Place,” helps explain this odd
posture. Deconcentration and mobility efforts are a threat to the
myriad place-based programs and organizations that serve minority
poor communities.127
Moving beyond this one example, the anti-poverty community
includes divergent views when it comes to people versus place. The
panglossian view does not take scarcity or, more accurately, political
opposition seriously. In an ideal world, government funds would
ensure that all neighborhoods had the resources and support necessary to have strong schools, vibrant community centers, and good
job opportunities. In such a world, there would be no need to deconcentrate poverty nor to encourage mobility—all neighborhoods would
be opportunity areas. We do not live in such a world, so it is not surprising that conflict can arise between those who prioritize place
(rebuilding communities, doing community economic development,
124. Id.
125. EQUITY IN PLACE, Our Beliefs and Narratives, THE ALLIANCE, http://thealliancetc.org
/our-work/equity-in-place/#1578514718981-41dd8a91-b4fe.
126. EQUITY IN PLACE, Why Communities of Color Challenged a Fair Housing Complaint
and What We Learned 1, 1 (2016), http://thealliancetc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/FHAC
-Story-Final.pdf.
127. For an overview of place-based anti-poverty programs and strategies, see Edward W.
De Barbieri, Opportunism Zones 97-125 (unpublished manuscript) (forthcoming YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3548210.
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and strengthening place-based organizations) and those who emphasize people. Though it is possible to overstate this conflict, it is unrealistic to imagine that such a conflict does not exist. So how should
voucher programs respond to this conflict? The answer that comes
from Rosen and Chetty’s work arguably is that this conflict should
be resolved not by bureaucrats but by voucher recipients. Though
additional counseling and support did lead to a significant increase
in the percentage of voucher holders who moved to high-opportunity
areas, some recipients, even with such counseling, chose to live in
poorer neighborhoods. That seems appropriate; a voucher program
that insisted that rental assistance depended on leaving behind one’s
community would impinge too far on the freedom recipients should
have to choose the best option for themselves and their family. Inserting counseling assistance between recipients and landlords
serves a corrective function. While a bit paternalistic, it is, to use a
loaded term, a nudge, not a mandate and as such allows recipients
to decide for themselves where to live.128 Some residents will decide
to stay in parts of town with people and resources (bus routes, jobs,
etc.) that they know. Others, after learning about how location relates to economic mobility, will chose to move. But what is important
is that the choice is being made by voucher recipients, not by landlords, place-based organizations, or social scientists.
CONCLUSION
There is ample room to improve the voucher program. Source of
income discrimination, although illegal in a select number of localities,
continues to limit the ability of recipients to place their vouchers,
making it harder for them to move to higher-opportunity neighborhoods.129 Voucher portability exists in theory but moves require passing through bureaucratic hoops in order to move the voucher from
one housing authority to the next, in practice limiting the areas
recipients search when looking for housing. Payment tinkering has
128. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (arguing that policy should often “nudge”
people towards particular decisions but not impose them).
129. Heather R. Abraham, Fair Housing’s Third Act: American Tragedy or Triumph?, 39
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 65–66), available at https://digitalcom
mons.law.yale.edu/ylpr/vol39/iss1/1/.
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selectively responded to the need to offer enhanced vouchers if they
are to be used to access lower-poverty areas, but the vouchers continue to offer the biggest subsidy to landlords with units in poorer
areas where voucher payments can exceed market rents. There are
ways to improve the voucher program in these and other areas,130 but
the biggest problems are political and societal. The rhetoric surrounding the voucher program emphasizes that its reliance on the
private rental market will help provide both cost-effective shelter for
those in need and flexible support for the physical and economic
mobility of recipient families. But, as Eva Rosen’s The Voucher
Promise and the work done by Raj Chetty and his co-authors show,
mobility cannot be taken as a given. Absent counseling programs and
other forms of support that help open up areas associated with greater
economic mobility, vouchers are often placed in low-income areas.
How to judge a program that largely fails in one of its two goals?
The Voucher Promise makes a compelling case that, regardless of
where they are placed, vouchers are transformative in the lives of
those poor people lucky enough to get off the wait-list. They enable
people to create homes, to better take care of their families, and, if
necessary, to move away from bad circumstances. The tragedy with
the voucher program is not that it does not accomplish all the goals
layered upon it, but that our safety net is so frayed and our commitment to improve poor areas so shallow, that we place unreasonably
high expectations on a single underfunded program. The work being
done by Chetty and others shows that relatively small investments
put toward helping recipients after they receive a voucher can open
up higher-opportunity areas to poor families who want to live there.131
The promising results from the Seattle/King County experiment
should be celebrated by everyone, including people who tend to prioritize place over people, and, if extended nationwide, appear to
offer a path towards greater mobility for many recipient families.
Chetty’s work is at the cutting edge of anti-poverty efforts. But such
130. For a great overview and list of suggestions, see generally Philip Tegeler, Housing
Choice Voucher Reform: A Primer for 2021 and Beyond, POVERTY & RACE RSCH. ACTION COUNCIL POL’Y BRIEF (Aug. 2020), https://prrac.org/pdf/housing-choice-voucher-reform-agenda.pdf.
131. See also URB. INST. & POVERTY & RACE RSCH. ACTION COUNCIL, EXPANDING CHOICE:
PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING A SUCCESSFUL HOUSING MOBILITY PROGRAM (2013),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/23301/412745-Expanding-Choice-Prac
tical-Strategies-for-Building-a-Successful-Housing-Mobility-Program.PDF.
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successes cannot overshadow the larger story which is that vouchers
are only given to a small subset of those in need of such assistance.
The larger story—which comes through in the hardships endured by
many of those presented in The Voucher Promise—is our society’s
indifference to the harms of poverty and our continued unwillingness to recognize housing as a right. Work on mobility matters, but
the most important way of improving the voucher program is to
massively ramp up funding so that it switches from being a lottery
program to support that is provided as a matter of right.

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE MODERN
RESURGENCE OF RENT CONTROL

JAMES BURLING*
The Americans couldn’t destroy Hanoi, but we have destroyed
our city by very low rents. We realized it was stupid and that we
must change policy.1
INTRODUCTION
In a 1990 survey of professional economists, 93% agreed with the
statement that “a ceiling on rents reduces the quantity and quality
of housing availability.”2 In a more recent survey of 41 economists,
only 2% agreed with the statement: “Local ordinances that limit rent
increases for some rental housing units, such as in New York and
San Francisco, have had a positive impact over the past three decades
on the amount and quality of broadly affordable rental housing in
cities that have used them.”3 And yet, in a 2018 survey of Californians
asked to identify why housing in California is unaffordable, 28%—
more than any other answer—responded that it was the lack of rent
control.4 It is not hard to understand why. Renters naturally think
their rents are too high when they are too high. And in a world where
nuance is often overshadowed by one-dimensional populist answers
to complex questions, rent control is an obvious answer to high rents.
* James Burling is the Vice President for Legal Affairs at Pacific Legal Foundation.
1. Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, Journal of Commerce, quoted in Dan Seligman,
Keeping Up, FORTUNE, Feb. 27, 1989 (excerpt from Walter Block, Rent Control, THE CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org
/library/Enc/RentControl.html).
2. Richard M. Alston, J.R. Kearl & Michael B. Vaughan, Is There a Consensus Among
Economists in the 1990 ‘s?, AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS, 201, 204 (May 1992).
3. Rent Control, IGM FORUM (Feb. 7, 2012), https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/rent-con
trol/?mod=article_inline.
4. Liam Dillon, Experts say California needs to build a lot more housing. But the public
disagrees, L.A.TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-residents-housing
-polling-20181021-story.html. The USC Dornsife/Los Angeles Times survey asked respondents,
“Why is California housing unaffordable?” The answers, with weight given for second answers,
were: lack of rent control, 28%, lack of funding for low-income housing, 24%, environmental
regulation, 17%, foreign buyers, 16%, influence of tech industry, 15%, too little homebuilding,
13%, Wall Street buyers, 10%, restrictive zoning rules, 9%. The margin of error was 3%.
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But just as civilian casualties can be collateral damage of wartime
bombing, so too the loss of housing stock can be a casualty of rent
control. Indeed, as economist Assar Lindbeck drolly noted, “In many
cases rent control appears to be the most efficient technique so far
known for destroying cities—except for bombing.”5 Not only can rent
control take away the incentives for developers to build new apartments that might be subject to rent control, if the rent control is
draconian enough it can destroy the ability of landlords to maintain
their apartments, leading to decay, abandonment, and eventual
destruction. In a 1981 book by the Fraser Institute, there is a series
of 15 black and white photographs of post-apocalyptic urban landscapes with the caption: Bomb Damage or Rent Control?6 One must
go to the index for the answer because it is otherwise impossible to
tell. Comparing a block in the South Bronx to one in Nagasaki or
Hiroshima may seem fatuous, but photographs (at least back then)
don’t lie: rent control can be terribly destructive.
I. RENT CONTROL IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
A little over a century ago, rent control was first imposed as an
emergency wartime measure to combat the influx of workers into the
Washington, D.C., war machine. Too many apartment seekers and too
few apartments led to a call for the government to do something.
Rather than building more housing itself, or paying others to do the
building, the federal government instead imposed rent control tucked
inside a larger statute, the “Food Control and District of Columbia
Rents Act.”7 According to the statute, its provisions were “made necessary by emergencies growing out of the war with the Imperial
German Government, resulting in rental conditions in the District
of Columbia dangerous to public health and burdensome to public
officers and employees.” It had a two-year expiration date.
A similar situation arose after the first World War in New York
City, where many returning soldiers landed and decided to stay. The
5. ASSAR LINDBECK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW LEFT (Harper & Row eds., 1st
ed. 1972), cited in RENT CONTROL: MYTHS AND REALITIES 213, 230 (Walter Block & Edgar
Olsen eds., 1981).
6. RENT CONTROL: MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 5, at 3, 35, 53, 85, 105, 123, 149,
161, 169, 187, 199, 231, 247, 265, 283.
7. Ch. 20, 41 Stat. 297 (Oct. 22, 1919).
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city imposed rent control in 1920. Landlords in both cities sued, and
their cases reached the Supreme Court in two cases, Block v. Hirsh8
and Edgar A. Levy Leasing Company v. New York.9 While the lower
court in Block had rejected the law because it purported to imbue the
private activity of leasing private property with the public interest,
Justice Holmes rejected that concern. Writing for the Court, and
without much of any supporting argument, he wrote that “[h]ousing
is a necessary of life. All the elements of a public interest justifying
some degree of public control are present.”10 Because housing involved a public interest, it was appropriate that the government could
regulate lease terms through rent control. As for the Court’s role, it
was limited when the government was regulating in the public interest: “The only matter that seems to us open to debate is whether
the statute goes too far. For . . . it may be conceded that regulations
of the present sort pressed to a certain degree might amount to a
taking without due process of law.”11
Four Justices, led by Justice McKenna, dissented. The dissent was
unimpressed by Justice Holmes’s argument: “Houses are a necessary
of life but other things are as necessary. May they, too, be taken from
the direction of their owners and disposed of by the government?” As
for the justification that the war made the restrictions on liberty
necessary, Justice McKenna quoted from a Civil War era case where
a civilian from Indiana was sentenced to death by a military tribunal:
“‘[T]he Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace’” and it’s wrong to suggest that “‘any
of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies
of government.’”12
A year after Block v. Hirsh was decided, the Court was confronted
with New York City’s wartime emergency rent control law. In Edgar
A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, Jerome Siegel signed a two-year lease
starting October 1, 1918, for an apartment at $1,450 per year, payable
in monthly installments. In June of 1920, Siegel signed a new lease
8. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
9. 258 U.S. 242 (1922).
10. Block, 256 U.S. at 156.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 165–66 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120–21 (1866)). In Milligan, the
Court found that the non-combatant civilian living in a non-rebel state was entitled to a trial
by jury in a civilian court.
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for two more years, this time at $2,160 per year, an increase of nearly
$60 per month. When it came time to paying the higher rent in
October, Siegel refused. Levy Leasing sued to evict Siegel. But Siegel
claimed that he was coerced into signing the lease under threat of
eviction. Moreover, he argued that the higher rent was unfair and
violated New York City’s emergency rent control law that had just
been adopted that year.
Levy Leasing responded by arguing that the rent control law was
“unconstitutional, in that it impairs the obligation of the contract of
lease . . . deprives the plaintiff of its property without due process
of law; denies to it the equal protection of the law . . . and takes
private property for a private use without compensation.”13 A month
before Block v. Hirsh was decided, the New York Court of Appeals
upheld the law.14 Unsurprisingly, on appeal and a year after Block
v. Hirsh was decided, the owner lost again. The Supreme Court of
the United States found that the public interest in alleviating the
problems and abuses caused by the city’s housing shortage outweighed any constitutional objections:
[A]ll agree: That there was a very great shortage in dwelling house
accommodations in the cities of the state to which the acts apply;
that this condition was causing widespread distress; that extortion in most oppressive forms was flagrant in rent profiteering;
that, for the purpose of increasing rents, legal process was being
abused and eviction was being resorted to as never before; and
that unreasonable and extortionate increases of rent had frequently resulted in two or more families being obliged to occupy
an apartment adequate only for one family, with a consequent
overcrowding, which was resulting in insanitary conditions, disease, immorality, discomfort, and widespread social discontent.15

The Court never considered whether rent control would remedy
any of these problems because it didn’t think that was its job. As in
Block v. Hirsh, the Court just accepted at face value the government’s
justifications for rent control. But there was not then (nor today) any
evidence that rent control cures in any way “insanitary conditions,
13. Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 230 N.Y. 634, 638, 130 N.E. 923, 925 (N.Y. 1921),
aff’d, 258 U.S. 242, 42 S. Ct. 289 (1922).
14. Id.
15. Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co., 258 U.S. at 246.
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disease, immorality, discomfort, and widespread social discontent.”16
If a legislative body wishes to tax its citizens to try to solve these
problems, so be it. Likewise, if a city wishes to establish health and
safety standards, that too can help. In fact, there had already been
housing regulations imposed in New York City to put a stop to the
construction of lightless and ventilation-free tenements that had
proliferated during the 19th century.17
The voters can decide easily enough whether the money has been
well-spent. But when the costs of such programs are borne not by
the general public, but by the distinct minority of people that own
rental housing, then it behooves a court to take a careful look at
whether impact on the rights of that minority comports with the
constitutional standards.
The Framers of our Constitution were acutely aware of the potential for majoritarian overreach and the danger that a democracy could
turn on those with more wealth than the majority. As James Madison
warned in The Federalist Papers, an unchecked democracy can lead
to “[a] rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal
division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project.”18
For many years following the ratification of the Constitution, judges
understood their role to render unconstitutional laws unenforceable.
But there were, at least in the early part of the 20th Century,
some limits to the Supreme Court’s deference to the wartime justification for rent control. After the two-year emergency law ended in
Washington, D.C., the act was extended again in October of 1919
and then again in May of 1922. By this time, the great war had joined
all prior wars between the pages of history books. Its effects on the
lives of Washingtonians had faded. Nevertheless, tenants in an apartment building successfully petitioned the rent board for a rollback
of a post-war increase in rents. The apartment owner sued, and when
the Supreme Court got the case, it held that with the emergency
clearly over, the time for deference had expired. Justice Holmes’s
opinion began by noting that “a Court is not at liberty to shut its eyes
to an obvious mistake, when the validity of the law depends upon
16. Id.
17. See RICHARD PLUNZ, A HISTORY OF HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY (1st ed. 1990) (describing the early tenements).
18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). A “rage for paper money” refers to popular
pressure for governments to print enough paper money to cause inflation which, in turn,
would reduce debts.
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the truth of what is declared.” The opinion continued saying that
“[a] law depending upon the existence of an emergency or other
certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change even though valid when passed.”19
The Court sent the case back down to the district court for a factual
determination of whether there was still an emergency.
The New York rent control laws died a slower but natural death
by economic causation. To alleviate the lack of housing, New York
City declared a decade-long tax holiday for new housing construction
and exempted new units from rent control. Construction ensued. By
1929, vacancy rates approached 8%. Rent control in New York was
abolished. It wasn’t necessary or useful anymore.20
When the World War I rent controls were removed in New York,
there was a massive increase in the construction of new housing:
The 1920s produced a volume of new housing which has never
again been equaled, quantitatively or qualitatively. Between 1921
and 1929, 420,734 new apartments, 106,384 one-family houses,
and 111,662 two-family houses were constructed. The total of
658,780 new dwellings averaged 73,198 units per year, a figure unmatched even in the 1960s, also a period of substantial growth. In
the most prolific year, 1927, 94,367 dwellings were built, compared
with 60,031 in 1963, the peak year since.21

The lesson is simple: Removal of government disincentives to building housing will result in more housing and more affordable prices.
Free markets work.
It took another world war to forget the lesson and for rent control
to be resurrected from its peacetime crypt.
***
World War II threw the economy into high gear, and the federal
government’s New Deal era penchant for planning was put on a diet
of steroids. In 1943, the federal government adopted price controls—
including controls on rents because it anticipated housing shortages.
19. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547–48 (1924).
20. TIMOTHY COLLINS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW YORK CITY RENT GUIDELINES BOARD
AND THE RENT STABILIZATION SYSTEM, NEW YORK RENT GUIDELINES BOARD 20 (2020), https://
rentguidelinesboard.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/intro2020.pdf.
21. PLUNZ, supra note 17, at 122.
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With sixteen million Americans serving the war effort, and with
millions of those overseas, the war probably did not itself cause a
housing shortage, except in those local areas in the states serving
the war effort. But by the end of 1946, over 7 million soldiers had
returned to civilian life.22 Yet whatever crisis there may have been,
it had dissipated enough that Congress let the 1943 Emergency Price
Control Act expire, replacing it with the Federal Housing and Rent
Act, which kept price controls only on buildings built before 1947. In
1950, the federal act expired, but rent control proved to be incredibly sticky in New York.
Rather than consign rent control to the dustbin of history, New
York City carried on the federal program with its own local legislation. As a result, unless they have been converted, many non-luxury
apartments built in New York before 1947 have remained under some
sort of rent control ever since.23 Newer buildings had to wait until
1969 before they were to fall under a kinder and gentler form of rent
control: so-called rent stabilization.24 This form of rent control refers
to a more recent approach which has some flexibility to allow for
inflation-based rent increases. In theory, this less drastic type of rent
control is less likely to result in abandoned and derelict rental apartments. In New York City, “rent stabilization” covers those regulated
rental units built before 1974 in buildings with six or more units.
Rents may increase only in accordance with city guidelines. However, as described in the next section, new legislation adopted in
2019 by the State of New York severely limits the ability of landlords to recoup improvements, and then only for thirty years after
the improvement. These and other changes bring rent stabilization
a lot closer to the rent control of old and highlight the danger of
adopting any form of “rent control lite” because it is only a gateway
to the harder drug of punitive rent control.
Rent stabilization in New York was adopted in 1969 under the
premise that the low-vacancy rates had created a housing “emergency.”25 Year after year, the city has since renewed its declaration of
an emergency—until deciding to end the charade in 2019 by passing
22. ARMY SERVICE FORCES, LOGISTICS IN WORLD WAR II: FINAL REPORT OF THE ARMY
SERVICE FORCES, CENTER FOR MILITARY HISTORY 218 (Chart 37, Returns to Civilian Life)
(1993), https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-29/CMH_Pub_70-29.pdf.
23. COLLINS, supra note 20, at 23 n.42.
24. Id. at 27.
25. Id. at 26–27. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 26-501 to 26-520.
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straight-up punitive rent control. But what is an emergency? A flood
in the process of inundating a city is an emergency. But water that
covers a city for 50 years is no longer an emergency; it is a lake. As
shown next, this lake is drowning an increasing number of cities
and states.
II. THE MODERN REVIVAL OF THE OLD RENT CONTROL
Starting in the late 1960s and 1970s there was a resurgence of
rent control across the nation. Recognizing that old-style rent controls
too often led to problems ranging from an absence of new construction to entire buildings being abandoned, the advocates of new rent
control tried to repackage their schemes to make them more flexible
and palatable. New York calls its program “rent stabilization” and
California guarantees a “fair rate of return.” Are these differences
in semantics or substance? Perhaps, before describing the developments in the various states, a few definitions are in order.
A. Definitions
Rent control. Rent control is the more traditional, and somewhat
outdated, approach to rent regulation. In New York City, for example, “rent control” has a precise meaning: limits on rent increases for
tenants in rent-controlled buildings constructed before 1947 in which
a tenant (or the tenant’s family successors) have lived in continuously since 1971.26 There are very minor adjustments allowed, but
rents remain essentially where they were almost fifty years ago.
When a unit becomes vacant, it is either deregulated (for apartments with less than six units) or subject to rent stabilization. About
1% of New York City housing is subject to old-style traditional rent
control. Being able to benefit from rent control in New York City has
much more to do with luck than circumstances. It is a small enough
number that many landlords can swallow their losses by requiring
their other tenants to pay enough rent to help subsidize the 1%.
26. Directory of NYC Housing Programs, Rent Control, NYU FURMAN CENTER, https://fur
mancenter.org/coredata/directory/entry/rent-control (last visited Sept.22, 2021); NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY FURMAN CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POLICY, FACT BRIEF, RENT STABILIZATION IN NEW YORK CITY 1 (2011) https://furmancenter.org/files/HVS_Rent_Stabilization
_fact_sheet_FINAL_4.pdf.
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Rent stabilization. Rent stabilization was the term given to the
type of rent control imposed by New York City starting in the 1970s.
In theory, it allowed amortization and recoupment of capital improvements, modest yearly rent increases, owner move-in rights, market
readjustments with tenant turnover, and tenant income ceilings—
above which rent controls would not apply.27 As discussed below,
these rent control “reforms” were largely phased out with amendments in 2019.
Fair return: In some jurisdictions, like California, landlords are
guaranteed a “fair rate of return,” a term borrowed from the regulation
of utility rates.28 The devil is in the details—such as which costs can
be included, who decides which costs are allowable and which are not,
and what, exactly, is a “fair rate of return?” A veritable cottage industry has sprung up in California’s legal profession where some attorneys specialize in fighting with rent boards over when an investment
or improvement cost can be factored into a fair rate of return.
California law also requires a due process mechanism for those
seeking a rent increase so a landlord can achieve a fair rate of return.29 However, if a rent board denies an increase, and if a landlord
successfully appeals a denial of a rent increase in court, the rent board
is not responsible for any losses; only future rents may be adjusted
to recoup the deficiency.30 If this means the only way to make up for
the denied increase is to raise rents above market rates, so be it.
The owner has no other recourse.
In New York, one case made it clear that just because an owner
was denied a “reasonable return” that didn’t necessarily mean that
the regulation effected a regulatory taking by denying the “owner’s
27. Id.; see also COLLINS, supra note 20, at 26–37 (discussion of rent stabilization and
subsequent amendments).
28. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d, 129, 165, 550 P. 2d 1001, 1027 (Cal. 1976)
(requiring a “just and reasonable return on their property.”); id. at 156, 1021 (no exigent
circumstances required to justify “price control outside the traditional public utility areas.”).
See also Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944) (“‘[F]air value’
is the end product of the process of rate-making.”); MICHAEL ST. JOHN, FAIR RETURN AND THE
CALIFORNIA COURTS 15–16, https://www.stjohnandassociates.net/propertyManagementArti
cles/FRATCC.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2021) (discussion of fair return principles in other
regulated industries such as public utilities).
29. Birkenfeld, 17 Cal. 3d (requiring a “just and reasonable return on their property”);
Vega v. City of W. Hollywood, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1342, 1349 (1990).
30. Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 16 Cal. 4th 761 (1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 856 (1998).
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economically viable use of his land” because the proper standard is
“whether the owner is precluded ‘from realizing any profit whatsoever.’”31 And in a recent California case alleging a denial of fair return,
a court of appeals rejected consideration of borrowing costs used to
acquire the property.32 Without being able to account for capital
costs in the acquisition of property, the market in rental housing will
diminish and may result in a reduction of new building.
Vacancy control: Vacancy control means that a new tenant takes
the rental unit at the same controlled rent as the prior tenant.33 When
a tenant leaves a rent-controlled apartment, landlords will naturally
want to adjust rents to market rates. But tenant advocates often argue that the new tenants should also enjoy the below-market rentcontrolled rates as the prior tenants did.
Vacancy control protects tenants from constructive evictions, but
it also disincentivizes new rental housing construction or even maintaining existing rental housing stock. The political capital for vacancy controls is also somewhat muted because the strongest support
for rent control comes from existing renters, not those who have not
yet replaced them.
In jurisdictions with vacancy decontrol in place, the rents of new
tenants may be adjusted to market rates. After that, increases are
limited by the community’s rent control laws.
B. Rent Regulation by State34
States either (1) mandate some form of rent regulation on a
statewide basis, (2) permit localities to impose rent regulation (with
or without statewide rules), (3) prohibit localities from adopting rent
31. Rent Stabilization Ass’n v. Dinkins, 805 F. Supp. 159, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d on
procedural grounds at 5 F. 3d 591 (2d Cir. 1993) (lack of standing).
32. Colony Cove Properties, LLC v. City of Carson, 888 F.3d 445, 453–54 (9th Cir. 2018).
33. COLLINS, supra note 20, at 26 (defining “vacancy decontrol”). See also Werner Z.
Hirsch & Joel G. Hirsch, Legal-Economic Analysis of Rent Controls in a Mobile Home Context:
Placement Values and Vacancy Decontrol, 35 UCLA L. REV. 399, 449 (1988) (“Under vacancy
decontrol, a landlord is allowed, to some extent, to raise rents when a vacancy occurs”).
34. A good graphic summary of rent regulations in the 50 states, with links to the relevant
state and local laws, has been prepared by the National Multifamily Housing Council. See
Rent Control Laws by State, NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUSING COUNCIL (Sept. 2, 2020), https://
www.nmhc.org/research-insight/analysis-and-guidance/rent-control-laws-by-state/.
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regulation, or (4) have no rules mandating or prohibiting rent regulation.
1. States with Statewide Rent Control
Three states have sweeping statewide rent regulations: New York,
California, and Oregon. Of these, New York has the oldest, with their
beginnings rooted in the world wars, but was recently made much
more tenant-friendly in 2019. California’s rent control started out as
a city-by-city project of the activists of the 1970s.35 In 2019 the legislature adopted a statewide measure. Oregon’s rent control law is the
most recent, having been adopted in 2019. These will be looked at in
more detail.

a. California
Following his anti-war-hero days, Tom Hayden of Chicago 7 fame
spearheaded a tenants’ rights movement in California which led to
rent control being adopted by a number of cities, including Los
Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, and Hayden’s political base, Santa
Monica. In total, 21 California jurisdictions adopted some form of rent
control. Their terms varied widely.36 Some of the existing ordinances,
for example, limit rent increases to a fraction of the CPI,37 some
regulate apartments only, and others mobile homes only. Landlords
complained loudly that their investments were being destroyed—
especially in those jurisdictions where rent increases could not keep
up with expenses or inflation. They brought a number of lawsuits
and had only a mixed record of success. Some of the court failures
led to legislative relief. Some of the key developments follow.
Is there a right to exit the rental market?
In Nash v. Santa Monica,38 a landlord tried to exit the regulated
rental market by converting his apartment building to condominium
35. Los Angeles adopted rent regulations in 1978, San Francisco in 1979.
36. See Rent Control Laws by State, supra note 34.
37. Under California law this is okay, even if the rents decline year after year, so long as
the landlord receives a fair return—as calculated by the local rent board.
38. Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97 (1984).
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ownership. He claimed a property right to put his apartment building
to some use other than rental. But, the state supreme court held that
there is no right to exit the rental business. Once a building is rented
out, a city can require it to always be rented out subject, of course,
to rent control. In response, the California legislature passed the
Ellis Act.39 The Ellis Act gives landlords the right to exit the rental
business, provided tenants are paid “reasonable relocation costs.”40
These relocation costs have ranged from the payment of a tenant’s
moving expenses to a forced payment to the tenant of several years’
worth of the difference between rent-controlled rents and free-market
rents. In San Francisco, an elderly couple owned a small two-story
home with a one-bedroom apartment on each floor. In 2014, they
sought to move from the upstairs unit to the downstairs apartment
so they would no longer have to climb the stairs. San Francisco demanded that they pay the downstairs tenant two years of the difference between rent-controlled apartments and the actual market
price—a sum of $118,000. Represented pro bono by attorneys with
Pacific Legal Foundation, they sued in Levin v. City and County of
San Francisco.41 A federal district court struck down the requirement,
holding that it violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution.
A similar challenge is underway in Oakland. There, Lyndsey and
Sharon Ballinger rented out their small house while on a temporary
military assignment to Washington, D.C. Upon their return, however, they were told that a new ordinance required them to pay
$6,500 to their tenant before they could move in. Here, in Ballinger
v. Oakland, where the owners are also represented by attorneys
with the nonprofit Pacific Legal Foundation, the district court
declined to follow the Levin case out of San Francisco and upheld
the payment scheme.42 An appeal is pending.
39. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7060.7, et seq. (West 1985).
40. See Press Release, Assemblyman Richard Bloom, Governor signs measure closing
abusive loopholes in the Ellis Act, along with other Tenant protection measures (Oct. 8, 2019)
(available at https://a50.asmdc.org/press-releases/20191008-governor-signs-measure-closing
-abusive-loopholes-ellis-act-along-other).
41. See Levin v. San Francisco, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (lump sum
payment to displaced tenants for relocation costs due under prior ordinance or new enhanced
amount that was 24 times the difference between apartments’ current monthly rental rate
and alleged fair market value of comparable apartments, whichever was greater, effected an
unconstitutional monetary exaction).
42. Ballinger v. Oakland, 398 F. Supp. 3d 560 (2019) (appeal pending in 9th Circuit, Case
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Newer units are exempt from rent control—for the time being
With rent control ascendant in major California cities, developers
avoided apartment house projects in those cities. It soon became
apparent that there was a supply problem. In response, the legislature passed the Costa-Hawkins Act.43 It prohibits local rent-control
on single-family homes, condominiums, and units built after 1995.44
For units subject to rent regulation, the act established vacancy
decontrol, allowing a landlord to increase rents as when one set of
tenants is replaced by new tenants. Until recently, this law gave
developers the assurance that they could recoup their investments
in rent-controlled cities. However, in 2018, tenant advocates led by
the Aids Healthcare Foundation put Proposition 10 on the ballot. If
passed, it would have repealed Costa-Hawkins. It failed by a 20point margin after $97 million was spent by both sides. The same
proponents tried and lost again in 2020 by nearly the same margin.
These two propositions proved to be the two most costly ballot fights
in the state’s history.
Landlords, like utilities, have a right to a reasonable rate of return
In the early days of rent control in California, landlords sued the
City of Berkeley, arguing that the city had no right under California
law to impose rent control. They failed. In Birkenfeld v. City of
Berkeley,45 the California Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the
right of cities to impose rent control. However, the court also held
that under due process requirements, landlords are entitled to a
“just and reasonable return” and the procedures for adjusting rents
must likewise provide a meaningful opportunity to ensure such a
return. The “fair return” rubric is borrowed directly from the law of
utility rate regulations. In other words, owners of apartment buildings are to some degree functionally equivalent to the electric company or other regulated utilities.
No. 19-16550, and argued October 20, 2020). Information about the case can be found here:
https://pacificlegal.org/case/ballinger-v-city-of-oakland/.
43. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1954.50, et seq. (West 1995).
44. In localities that already had rent regulations, rent regulations apply only to units
built before that locality’s rent regulation ordinance.
45. 17 Cal. 3d 129 (1976).
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There is no meaningful remedy for an unlawfully denied rent increase
In order to raise rents, a landlord must seek permission from a
city’s rent control board. During proceedings before the board, the
landlord must demonstrate that the increase is necessary to ensure
a fair rate of return based on the landlord’s expenses. If a landlord
is wrongly denied a rent increase, he/she may sue. The legal process
and appeals, however, can take years. During that time, the lost rents
may total substantial sums of money. In Kavanau v. Santa Monica
Rent Control Board,46 a landlord, after proving that the rent board
had wrongfully denied an adequate rent increase, sought to force the
board to pay the lost rents—since seeking the back rents from the
tenants would have been a largely futile gesture. The state supreme
court disagreed and held that the only remedy was to make up the
difference in future rentals. In other words, the landlord might have
to charge future tenants for rent not paid by past tenants—even if
the rents would exceed the market. The problem is, however, that
existing tenants may not have been the ones benefitting from the
low rents. Moreover, recoupment might not be possible if it would
cause the total rent to exceed the market rents.
Does rent control advance any legitimate governmental purpose?
In the standard rent control ordinance in California and elsewhere, cities usually provide a list of reasons for rent control. The
ordinances generally claim that rent control will help the poor, minorities, disabled, elderly, less educated, and those otherwise economically and socially disadvantaged. Protecting the interests of such
people falls well within the scope of a community’s police power. But
that begs the question: does rent control meaningfully accomplish
any of those goals?
In Santa Monica Beach v. Superior Court,47 a property owner (represented by Pacific Legal Foundation attorneys) contracted for an
economic study that compared the demographics of renters in selected
rent-regulated jurisdictions with those in neighboring free market
jurisdictions.48 As predicted by economic theory, in every comparison,
46. 16 Cal. 4th 761 (1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 856 (1998).
47. Santa Monica Beach v. Superior Court (Santa Monica Rent Control Board), 19 Cal.
4th 952 (1999).
48. The study is available from the author.
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the populations living in rent-regulated jurisdictions were whiter,
richer, better educated, and less disadvantaged in all respects. That
follows theory because those people with greater stability in their
lives—those who are whiter, richer, etc.—are able to stay in a single
place for a long enough time to fully reap the benefits of rent control.
They are also more adept at working the market to find rent-controlled
units when they become available, leaving the poor and less stable
populations less able to profit from rent control. In other words, the
rent control laws were harming, not helping, the vulnerable populations that were supposed to benefit from rent regulation.
Armed with this evidence, an apartment owner in Santa Monica
sued and claimed that the city’s rent regulation ordinance “failed to
substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest,” a test for
a regulatory taking at that time.49 While the court of appeal agreed
and ruled the ordinance violated the Takings Clause, the California
Supreme Court reversed. That court found that rent regulations are
subject to a deferential standard of review and that legislative bodies,
not the courts, should determine whether a law is working. Moreover,
according to the court, the ordinance advanced the general legislative goal of keeping rents low.
Is rent control for mobile homes a special case?
Mobile homes present a unique rent regulation challenge. Tenants
own their own homes but lease the space under their homes. Mobile
homes, however, are not particularly mobile. Once a home is moved
onto a pad with utility hookups in a park, homeowner-tenants cannot
easily move their homes, making them more susceptible to marketindifferent rent hikes. But when rent regulation is combined with
vacancy control,50 existing tenants enjoy a windfall premium when
selling their homes.

49. Later, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that this test was, in fact, a due process test, not
a takings test. The distinction is important because the government gets a more deferential standard of review in due process cases than takings cases. See infra text accompanying note 58.
50. Vacancy control means that a new tenant takes the rental unit at the same controlled
rent as the prior tenant. This protects tenants from constructive evictions, but it also disincentivizes new rental housing construction or even maintaining existing rental housing stock.
The political capital for vacancy controls is also somewhat muted because the strongest support
for rent control comes from existing renters, not those who have not yet replaced them.
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Existing tenants sell not only their mobile homes but also the right
to live in a rent-regulated park where the pad leases will be forever
below market value. In regulated apartment buildings this is equivalent to “key money” which is often illegally paid to existing tenants
by new tenants in a vacancy-controlled apartment. Because the new
mobile-home-owning tenants pay more, often much more, for a used
mobile home in a rent-controlled park, the buyers of the used home
do not enjoy the same economic rewards of rent regulation that the
original tenant enjoyed. Instead, the original tenant often realizes
a five or six figure premium when selling a used mobile home coach.
For example, if a used mobile home is worth $50,000 on the open
market, the owner may be able to sell it for $150,000 if the coach is
located in a rent-controlled park with vacancy control. The extra
$100,000 goes directly into the pocket of the mobile homeowner.51
This premium is essentially the amortized value of the below-market
pad rental compared to the same pad in a non-rent-regulated park.
In other words, a buyer will be willing to pay a lot more for a coach
if he/she understands that the rent payments for the pad space will
be forever lower than market value because of rent control. The
park owner, who leases out his/her land to the mobile homeowners,
does not realize any of these tangible economic benefits realized by
the original tenant upon the adoption of rent control. Instead, these
benefits come out of the pocket of the park owner. Nor will the home
buyer realize any of the economic benefits enjoyed by the owner of
the coach when rent control was instituted. Instead, the buyer paid
all these benefits in the form of the inflated cost of the coach. These
facts have led to some unique takings claims against mobile home
rent regulation.
In Yee v. City of Escondido,52 the owners of a mobile home park
argued that the rent control constituted a “physical taking.” As
described by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the owners alleged that
the rent control ordinance has transferred a discrete interest in
land—the right to occupy the land indefinitely at a submarket
rent—from the park owner to the mobile home owner. Petitioners
contend that what has been transferred from park owner to mobile
51. For a discussion of the economics of vacancy decontrol in mobile home parks, see
Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 33, at 423.
52. 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
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home owner is no less than a right of physical occupation of the
park owner’s land.53

The Court did not agree. First, it held that there was no physical
invasion because the park owners could choose to remove the tenants and exit the business. As the Court wrote, “A different case
would be presented were the statute, on its face or as applied, to
compel a landowner over objection to rent his property or to refrain
in perpetuity from terminating a tenancy.”54
Second, to the argument that the premium garnered by the home
owner was the equivalent of the taking of the park owners’ cash, the
Court likewise was unmoved: “The mobile home owner’s ability to
sell the mobile home at a premium may make this wealth transfer
more visible than in the ordinary case . . . but the existence of the
transfer in itself does not convert regulation into physical invasion.”55
Instead, the Court suggested that the transfer might be relevant to
the existence of a regulatory taking—the sort of taking that occurs
when a regulation takes away the use and value of property.
But the Court was not about to opine on the possibility of a regulatory taking. When the owners asked the Court to review the case,
they asked only that the Court review the question whether there
had been a physical invasion type taking. They did not ask whether
the regulation and premium might constitute a regulatory taking.
For that reason, the Court refused to rule on that issue, leaving it
for later courts to decide. That would come a decade later in the
Ninth Circuit in a case out of Cotati, California, a small city an hour
north of San Francisco.
In Cashman v. City of Cotati,56 the owner of a mobile home park
argued that allowing the original coach owner to capture a premium
upon sale of a mobile home took money from the park owner while
doing nothing to alleviate the problem of high rental costs for subsequent tenants. In other words, the ordinance “failed to substantially
advance a legitimate governmental interest.” That’s significant because in an earlier 1979 case, the Supreme Court held in Agins v.
53. Id. at 527.
54. Id. at 528.
55. Id. at 529–30.
56. 374 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g granted and opinion withdrawn, 415 F.3d 1027 (9th
Cir. 2005). Cashman was represented by attorneys from Pacific Legal Foundation.
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Tiburon that if a regulation “failed to advance a legitimate governmental interest” it would be considered a regulatory taking—for
which compensation had to be paid.57 Moreover, the onus was on the
government to prove that its regulation made sense.
In Cashman, the owners argued that the mobile home rent control law did nothing to alleviate a lack of affordable housing; all it
accomplished was to give a windfall to current coach owners who
could pocket the premium by charging coach buyers much more
money than the coach was worth. The net result was that housing
was no less expensive with rent control and therefore, it failed to
accomplish its purpose. The Ninth Circuit initially agreed, holding
that because the ordinance did not provide a mechanism to prevent
the capture of that premium, the law failed to substantially advance
a legitimate governmental interest. In other words, under the Agins
test there was a regulatory taking. But the victory didn’t last.
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit decided in favor of the park owners, the Supreme Court took up another takings case involving gas
station leases in Hawaii, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.58 Among other
things, the high Court there held that it had made a mistake with
its earlier “failure to substantially advance” test of Agins. It now held
that the test was irrelevant to takings cases. It might be a violation
of the Constitution’s due process clause, but the challengers would
have a much heavier burden of proof. As a result, the Ninth Circuit
withdrew its original opinion and upheld the ordinance.
More challenges, mostly technical, to rent control in California
have come and gone, but rent control remains firmly entrenched in
the Golden State. Recently, a panel from the Ninth Circuit scathingly dismissed a rent control challenge by saying: “Simply put,
when buying a piece of property, one cannot reasonably expect that
property to be free of government regulation such as zoning, tax
assessments, or, as here, rent control.”59 The court continued that,
“those who buy into a regulated field such as the mobile home park
industry cannot object when regulation is later imposed.”60 There is
only a reasonable expectation of being paid some rent, not a “starry
eyed hope of winning the jackpot.”
57.
58.
59.
60.

Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
Rancho de Calistoga v. City of Calistoga, 800 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id. (quoting Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1120 (2010)).
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If anything, it’s getting only more difficult for landowners with
the expansion of rent control by the legislature in 2019.
2019 legislation, AB 1482 61
In 2018, California voters soundly defeated by 20 points Proposition 10, which would have repealed statutory limitations on rent and
vacancy control on apartments built after 1995. Less than a year
later, the legislature gave its collective middle finger to the voters
by imposing statewide rent and vacancy controls for buildings more
than 15 years old. In other words, while most local jurisdictions had
never adopted rent regulations, they all now will have state-imposed
rent regulations.
AB 1482 prohibits landlords from increasing rents in a 12-month
period by more than 10% or 5% + CPI, whichever is less. This bill
was not opposed by some players in the rental industry, who feared
that worse could be passed. The bill prohibits no-cause evictions. For
certain no-fault just cause evictions (e.g., landlord move-ins), the
landlord must refund the last month’s rent. There are exceptions for
units less than 15 years old: hospitals, residential care facilities,
dormitories, hotels, and single-family homes owned by individuals. No
mechanism is provided to increase rents beyond the stated amount,
even to reach a fair rate of return or to establish reasonable base
rents. The new law went into effect January 1, 2020.
COVID-19
But, just in case landlords thought they could weather AB 1482,
COVID-19 has increased their difficulties. The state court Judicial
Council first adopted a rule not to hold eviction hearings, thus forcing
landlords to allow an increasing number of non-paying tenants to
occupy apartments rent-free—without having to even prove a COVID19 related hardship. Landlords, represented by attorneys from Pacific
Legal Foundation, sued the Judicial Council arguing that the courts
did not have the power to unilaterally abrogate state statutes.62 The
Judicial Council relented, and rescinded its regulation—effective
61. The California Tenant Protection Act of 2019, AB-1482 (available at https://leginfo.leg
islature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB1482).
62. Christensen v. California Judicial Council, No. BCV-20-101361 (Kern County Superior
Court) (filed June 15, 2020).
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only after the state legislature adopted AB 3088 which imposes a
statewide ban on evictions on tenants with COVID-related hardships. Moreover, there are proposals to extend the no-eviction rules
to well beyond the end of the crisis while giving tenants over a year
to pay their back rent.

b. New York
For many years, New York state law has permitted larger cities,
like New York City, to adopt rent regulations when certain conditions
existed, such as low-vacancy rates and pro-forma declarations of
emergency. As noted above, New York City has had dual programs of
rent control and rent stabilization. Currently, sixty-six jurisdictions
in New York state have some form of rent regulation.
New York City began its modern rent stabilization regime in 1969.
It established a Rent Guidelines Board and covered units constructed
after 1947 (with many of those before 1947 under the older rent
control scheme). In 1971, vacancy decontrol was adopted, only to have
many of these units re-regulated in 1974. Over the following decades, various laws and political jockeying changed, amended, and
changed back various facets of the rent stabilization regime. The city
passed new “emergency” ordinances every few years, claiming that
low vacancy rates necessitate more of the policies that have been
failing for years.
In 2019, everything changed again when the state legislature
passed, and governor signed, the Housing Stability and Protection Act
of 2019.63 It is very comprehensive and makes significant changes
to the law, including the following.
• Localities with less than 5% vacancy rates may enact rent
regulations.
• Rent regulations were made permanent in the sense that no
more emergency declarations are necessary. In other words,
the continuing fiction of an emergency that had its roots in
the wartime emergencies has been set aside.
63. Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act, 2019 N.Y. ALS 36, 2019 N.Y. Laws 36,
2019 N.Y. SB 6458 (McKinney’s 2019) (available at https://legislation.nysenate.gov/pdf/bills
/2019/S64580).
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• The law expands the possibility of rent regulation across New
York State.
• Vacancy controls were adopted.
• The new law eliminates the ability to raise “preferential”
rents. Those are rents that were set by the landlord at below
market but for which the landlord had the option of increasing to market when new tenants moved into the unit or upon
a lease renewal. Now, if a tenant vacates voluntarily, rents
can be increased only to a regulated maximum.
• The ability to remove units from rent stabilization if the
rents were high enough (over $2,775) or if the tenant earned
enough (over $200,000) has been eliminated. This removes
any pretense that rent regulation is designed to help only financially insecure populations.
• The statute of limitations for challenging overcharges increased from one to six years.
• Deposits are limited to one month’s rent.
• “Hardship” extensions may delay evictions for up to one year.
• Fuel pass-alongs are disallowed.
• In New York City, for rent stabilized apartments, rents may
be raised only by the lesser of 7.5% or the five-year average
approved rent increases as established by the rent board.
• For all nonregulated tenancies, there are requirements for
tenant notice if rent increases more than 5%.
• There are limits on eviction fees, despite what a lease may
provide (i.e., no attorneys’ fees in default judgments).
• No “owner-use” evictions for tenancies over 15 years are
permitted.
• The maximum capital improvement for individual apartments for which rent can be recouped is limited to $15,000
over 15 years.
• Rent increases for individual apartment capital improvements
must be spread over thirty years after which the increase
ends; amortization increases are capped at 1/168 (<35 units)
or 1/180 (>35 units); this maxes out capital improvement increases to $89 or $83/month, respectively.
• There is a 2% cap on major apartment building capital improvements with the amortization set at 12/12.5 years (+/- 35
units).
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• Tenant “blacklists” are banned.
• Condominium conversions require 51% of tenants to agree
(up from 15%).
• Late fees capped at $50 or 5% of total rent.
• Manufactured home rent increases capped at 3% plus expenses.
On July 15, 2019, a coalition of apartment owners filed a complaint
in federal district court challenging New York’s rent stabilization
law plus the new state law. The 121-page complaint in Community
Housing Improvement Program v. City of New York64 alleges that the
law violates the Due Process Clause and affects both physical and
regulatory takings. It doesn’t call for compensation for past takings
but for an injunction to stop the “application and enforcement” of
the rent regulations. The defendants include the city and its agencies, plus state officials responsible for enforcing the state law.
The decision not to ask for damages may have been a political
calculation. Because of the magnitude of the economic impacts of
rent regulation, and because the primary interest of plaintiffs is to
overturn the law, there may have been a fear that some judges would
be reluctant to find takings liability if that would involve potential
monetary costs to the city.
Another group of landlords filed a second lawsuit, 74 Pinehurst
LLC v. State of New York65 on November 14, 2019. The 97-page
complaint challenges the existing rent stabilization laws as well as
the 2019 state legislation on theories of physical and regulatory
takings, both facial and as-applied, the Contract Clause, and the Due
Process Clause. It seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as
just compensation.
The federal district court in New York rejected the landlords’
claims in both suits. It held that there was no taking because, among
other reasons, landlords did not lose all use and value of their properties and they had no reasonable investment-backed expectations
that New York wouldn’t alter its rent control regulations because most
of them had acquired their rental properties when there was some
64. Complaint, Community Housing Improvement Program v. City of New York (No. 19cv-4087) (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
65. Complaint, 74 Pinehurst LLC v. State of New York (No. 19-cv-6447) (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
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form of rent regulation in place. These cases have been appealed to
the Second Circuit and briefing was underway in early 2021.
According to the Wall Street Journal, there have been drastic devaluations of rental property in New York City because of the new
laws. Two months after passage of the new law in 2019, the Journal
reported, “Two New York landlords with large portfolios of rentregulated apartments are behind on payments on more than $200
million in real estate loans, a sign that new state rent laws are
starting to hurt investors.”66
Likewise, the Journal also reported that with the advent of increased rent control in New York, rental apartment building sales
fell by 51% in late 2019.67 Instead of dealing with rent control,
“investors are shifting to parts of the country that face little or no
restrictions on rising rents.”68 By reducing investments, this will
only make supply shortages worse. As the head of one investment
firm put it, “We’re not producing enough housing in this country . . .
[t]hat continues to drive up rent levels.”
What’s more, while the value of rent-controlled units has plummeted, the value of buildings free from rent control has risen. Six
months into the new law, the Wall Street Journal reported, “The near
collapse of rent-regulated-building sales also produced some anomalies in residential sales. . . . because of the decline in regulatedbuilding sales, sales of more valuable buildings with market-rate
units predominated . . . driving up the average price per square foot
tabulated in market reports.”69 In other words, some prices (and
66. Will Parker & Konrad Putzier, After New York Rent Reform, Some Landlords Are Falling
Behind, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-new-york-rent-reform
-some-landlords-are-falling-behind-11572098400. See also Josh Barbanel, New York Landlords
Slow Apartment Upgrades, Blame New Rent Law, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www
.wsj.com/articles/new-york-landlords-slow-apartment-upgrades-blame-new-rent-law-115
76756800?mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=9 (noting that landlords can no longer fully pass
on upgrade costs to tenants); Daniel Geiger, Blackstone halts Stuy Town upgrades in wake of
rent-regs overhaul, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (July 12, 2019), https://www.crainsnewyork.com/real-es
tate/blackstone-halts-stuy-town-upgrades-wake-rent-regs-overhaul?mod=article_inline.
67. Peter Grant & Will Parker, Investors Aim to Avoid Rent Control in New Apartment
Deals, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-aim-to-avoid-rent
-control-in-new-apartment-deals-11579630224.
68. Id.
69. Josh Barbanel, Sales of New York City Rent-Regulated Buildings Plummet After New
Law, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/sales-of-new-york-city
-rent-regulated-buildings-plummet-after-new-law-11582754189.
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rents) are increasing more than they otherwise would, making the
overall merit of rent control on steroids elusive.

c. Oregon
At one time Oregon, with limited exceptions, prohibited rent regulation, noting “that the imposition of general restrictions on housing
rents will disrupt an orderly housing market, increase deferred
maintenance of existing housing stock, lead to abandonment of existing rental units and create a property tax shift from rental-owned
to owner-occupied housing.”70 But in 2019, Oregon adopted 2019 OR
S.B. 608.71 It applies to buildings fifteen years and older. Key provisions of the law include:
• No-cause evictions are eliminated after the first year of
occupancy. Cause for evictions can include owner move-in,
major rehab, and removal of unit from rental market. Nocause eviction is allowed when an owner lives on a property
with two units or less. One month’s rent relocation fee must
be paid to tenant, except where there are four or fewer units.
Notice requirements vary according to circumstances.
• Rent caps: A landlord may not increase the rent by more
than 7% plus CPI in a 12-month period. No increases are
permitted in the first year. A 90-day notice of increase is required.
• Local rent regulation is preempted.
• Impacts: According to MultiFamily NW, multifamily investment has dropped 38% in the wake of that state’s adoption
of rent regulations.72 There is additional concern over a potential legislative push to tighten Oregon’s rent regulation
provisions even further.73

70. OR. REV. STAT. § 91.225 (2020).
71. OR. REV. STAT. § 90.323 (2020).
72. Emily Anderer, Following Statewide Rent Cap Oregon Multifamily Investment Drops
38%, MULTIFAMILY NW (June 18, 2019), https://www.multifamilynw.org/news/following-state
wide-rent-cap-oregon-multifamily-investment-drops-38.
73. Id.
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2. States that Lack Statewide Rent Regulations but Permit
Local Jurisdictions to Adopt Rent Regulation74
Two states, New Jersey and Maryland,75 as well as the District of
Columbia,76 have rent control on a local basis. New Jersey’s history
is particularly interesting.

a. New Jersey
In 1957, the state supreme court held in Wagner v. Newark that
local governments were preempted by state law from adopting rent
control.77
But when rents in New Jersey began increasing faster than
inflation, tenants took notice and a strong tenants’ rights movement
surfaced in the early 1970s, which agitated for statewide rent control.78 In this era, Martin Aranow led the tenants’ rights movement
in New Jersey.79 He was an unlikely tenants’ rights hero: a 33-yearold politically inexperienced “business machine company president
who lived in a luxury high-rise in Fort Lee.”80 The tenants’ rights
movement that he led (until succeeded by his wife after he died an
early death) engaged in intense lobbying at state and local levels.
While it never resulted in statewide legislation, in time, over 100
local jurisdictions adopted rent control in New Jersey.
While the interests of low-income tenants were not the motivating
force behind the movement, the tenants did use the movement to
advance their own interests—especially the interests of those living in
the public housing projects in Newark.81 Apparently, one government
74. This is apart from the standard landlord-tenant law that all states have per their
common and statutory law. Such laws do not traditionally impose limitations on the rent a
landlord may ask of a tenant outside narrow contexts, such as tortious retaliation and unlawful discrimination.
75. For details, see Rent Stabilization, TAKOMAPARKMD.GOV, https://takomaparkmd.gov
/government/housing-and-community-development/rental-housing/rent-stabilization/.
76. For details, see D.C. CODE § 42-3502, available at https://code.dccouncil.us/dc/council
/code/titles/42/chapters/35/subchapters/II/.
77. Wagner v. Newark, 24 N.J. 467, 132 A.2d 794 (1957).
78. Kenneth K. Baar, Rent Control in the 1970’s: The Case of the New Jersey Tenants’
Movement, 28 HASTINGS L J. 631 (1977). Some of the impetus for statewide controls came in
the wake of President Nixon’s imposition of wage and price controls, which ended in 1973.
79. Id. at 645.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 644 n.83.
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solution to low-income housing, public projects, had become an abject
failure with “deplorable” conditions.82 One politician and leader of
low-income tenants said his tenant organization fully backed Aranow’s
group and “thanked landlords for exploiting highrise residents along
with slum dwellers.”83
This push for rent control took on urgency after President Nixon’s
imposition of wage and price controls expired in 1973. While the
state legislature never adopted a state law, a number of municipalities
did, 18 of them, in months following the lifting of President Nixon’s
order.84 When challenged, a superior court judge in Iganmort v. Fort
Lee distinguished the prior Supreme Court decision in Wagner and,
dispensing with any pretense of judicial neutrality, went on to pontificate that,
[e]very human being has a right to be housed. And to some degree,
he has a continuing right not to be uprooted annually.
....
Statements that rent control will hurt tenants, landlords, builders
and homeowners are a myth.
....
Food, clothing and shelter are perhaps more fundamental to life
than free speech, freedom of worship and other inalienable
rights. . . . [T]he right to food, clothing and shelter are not only
inalienable rights, but rights that are essential to life itself. They
do not, therefore, require constitutional affirmation.
....
But someone must speak for a membership [i.e., tenants] inarticulate in the law.
82. Id. The failure of public projects to provide safe housing is beyond the scope of this
Article. But the problem continues to this day. See Jenna Wang, New York City Housing
Authority Agrees to $2B Settlement Over Massive Health Violations, FORBES (June 14, 2008),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jennawang/2018/06/14/new-york-city-housing-authority-culpable
-for-massive-health-violations-lead-poisoning/?sh=6247bd8822ad.
83. Baar, supra note 78, at 644 (quoting THE RECORD (Hackensack, N.J.) Oct. 22, 1969,
at B-16, col. 3).
84. Id. at 653.
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The judicial imagination, the police power, and the right to shelter
should go to greater lengths than ever before in extending the
constitutional umbrella over the dignity of a regulated landlordtenant relationship.85

The decision is extraordinary in its willingness to depart from the
law and embark on a dissertation of progressive political philosophy.
That rent control’s potential to cause harm is a “myth” is not a judicially determined fact; it is a political statement that is contradicted by economists of all political persuasions.86 And the notion
that material rights are more important than speech and religious
rights is contrary to the fundamentals of Western political thought
and classical liberalism.87 It is the duty of government to allow “life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness” (as stated in the Declaration
of Independence). To do that, government provides courts, security,
and an environment where people may worship, speak, and pursue
an honest living without interference from a tyrannical government—
but not free food, free shelter, and free internet.
As Judge Posner put it in a case denying a “right” to public safety,
The modern expansion of government has led to proposals for
reinterpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee the provision of basic services such as education, poor relief, and, presumably, police protection, even if they are not being withheld
discriminatorily. . . . To adopt these proposals, however, would
be more than an extension of traditional conceptions of the due
process clause. It would turn the clause on its head. It would
change it from a protection against coercion by state government
to a command that the state use its taxing power to coerce some
of its citizens to provide services to others.88

85. Inganamort v. Fort Lee, 293 A.2d 720, 742, 744 (N.J. L. Div. 1972). The decision was
upheld on appeal, albeit without the extreme rhetoric, at 303 A. 2d 298 (NJ 1973).
86. Alston, Kearl & Vaughan, supra note 2.
87. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 11 (Hackett Publ’g 1978) (1859) (“the appropriate region of human liberty [includes] “liberty of conscience . . . liberty of thought and feeling,
absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects . . .”); see also Judge Posner’s
discussion in Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The men who
wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do too little for the people
but that it might do too much to them.”).
88. Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1203–04 (citation omitted).
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While the New Jersey Supreme Court was right when it later
tried to stop exclusionary zoning rules that prevented people from
obtaining decent housing,89 this trial court was quite wrong to suggest here that it should take over the free market in housing. This
ruling is far more an exposition of a half-baked Marxist construct
than it is a judicial opinion. Nonetheless, this excursion in leftist
ideology is in the New Jersey case law.
Several months after the federal wage and price controls were
lifted, the state supreme court affirmed the trial court’s decision,
albeit in less colorful terms, concluding simply that “[t]he police
power is vested in local government to the very end that the right of
property may be restrained when it ought to be because of a sufficient local need.”90
Roughly 100 localities in New Jersey now have rent control regulations that vary by local ordinance.91
Certainly, rent control in New Jersey did not alone cause the
growing unavailability of affordable housing. Much of the blame
should be placed on exclusionary zoning policies which the state
supreme court later found to be unconstitutional because zoning
that kept out the development of modest multifamily housing was
contrary to public policy . In striking down an exclusionary zoning
ordinance from Mt. Laurel Township, the court reasoned that “all
police power enactments, no matter at what level of government,
must conform to the basic state constitutional requirements of
substantive due process and equal protection of the laws” and “must
promote public health, safety, morals or the general welfare.”92
Because exclusionary zoning failed to do, it was unlawful.
3. States that Preempt Rent Regulation (and Have No Statewide
Controls)
Thirty-one states preempt rent regulation altogether. These include:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
89. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A. 2d 713 (1975).
90. Inganamort v. Fort Lee, 62 N.J. 521, 303 A.2d 298, 307 (1973).
91. 2009 Rent Control Survey, N.J. DEP’T CMTY. AFFS., DIV. CODES & STANDARDS, https://
www.nj.gov/dca/divisions/codes/publications/pdf_lti/rnt_cntrl_srvy_2009.pdf.
92. S. Burlington NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, 725 (1975). The court
noted that there was a shortage of 400,000 housing units in New Jersey alone and ten-million
nationwide. Id. at 203, 740 (Pashman, J., concurring.)
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Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and
Wisconsin. Recent initiatives to adopt rent regulations in several of
these states are worth noting:

a. Florida
Miami adopted a rent control ordinance in 1969. In a 1975 case,
City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., the Florida Supreme Court
held that as a matter of state constitutional law, rent regulations
can be adopted by local governments.93 However, Miami Beach’s
rent regulation law was struck down because it delegated too much
municipal power to an administrator. Today, as a practical matter,
Florida statutes make the adoption of rent regulation very difficult
and only of limited duration.
Florida Statutes 125.010394 and 166.04395 severely restrict the
ability of county local governments to impose rent regulation. Both
statutes begin by prohibiting any local government from “imposing
price controls upon a lawful business activity . . . unless specifically
provided by general law.”96 With respect to rent regulation, the Florida
Statute 125.0103 says:
(2) No law, ordinance, rule, or other measure which would have
the effect of imposing controls on rents shall be adopted or maintained in effect except as provided herein and unless it is found
and determined, as hereinafter provided, that such controls are
necessary and proper to eliminate an existing housing emergency which is so grave as to constitute a serious menace to the
general public.
(3) Any law, ordinance, rule, or other measure which has the effect
of imposing controls on rents shall terminate and expire within
93. 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974). The supreme court held that the home rule statute, even
insofar as it authorized rent regulation measures, was not unconstitutional; and that evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to overcome city council’s finding that an emergency existed
requiring adoption of rent regulation measures, but that the rent regulation measures constituted an unconstitutional delegation of council’s powers to the rent regulation administrator.
94. FL. STAT. § 125.0103 (2013), https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2013/125.0103.
95. FL. STAT. § 166.043 (2013), https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2013/166.043.
96. Id. § 125.0103.
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1 year and shall not be extended or renewed except by the adoption
of a new measure meeting all the requirements of this section.97

The section continues with an exception for luxury rentals—defined
as those being in excess of $250/month.
Recently, there has been an effort to repeal these restrictions. HB
6013 and SB 1390 would eliminate section 3 of Statutes 125.103 and
166.043. Both bills died in their respective committees without hearings in May of 2019. However, they were reintroduced in October
2019.98 According to the Orlando Sentinel,
it would restrict the reasons for which landlords can evict tenants;
require landlords to provide leases and eviction notices in tenants’
preferred language; prohibit evictions during a state of emergency; prevent landlords from charging exorbitant application
fees and require them to refund fees when no units are available.
It also would require landlords to provide tenants three months
of notice if raising rents more than 5%; and protect renters who
have been victims of domestic violence or who receive federal housing vouchers from being denied housing, among other things.99

The bills died in committee.100

b. Illinois
Illinois adopted a ban on rent regulation in 1997.101 HB 2430, a
legislative proposal to lift the ban, was defeated in a House judicialcivil committee by a 4–2 vote in March 2019.102 Another bill, HB
97. Id. § 125.0103(2)–(3).
98. Caroline Glenn, With Orlando rents averaging $1,217, lawmakers renew push for rent
control and tenant protections, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.orlandosentinel
.com/business/os-bz-florida-eskamani-rent-control-20191008-kjic6atg5baddhuv4pcbkqsefa
-story.html.
99. Id.
100. Florida Senate bill history found at https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2020/6013
(HB 6013) and http://www.flsenate.gov/session/Bill/2019/1390 (SB 1390).
101. The law states that governmental entities “shall not enact, maintain, or enforce an
ordinance or resolution that would have the effect of controlling the amount of rent charged
for leasing private residential or commercial property.” ILL. COMP. STAT. 825/5 (1997) (available
at https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=748&ChapterID=11).
102. Steven Stahler, Bill to lift ban on rent control fails in Springfield, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS.
(Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/government/bill-lift-ban-rent-control-fails
-springfield.
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2192, would establish regional boards with power to regulate rents.
On March 29, 2019, it was referred to the rules committee.103 In the
meantime, a group calling itself the “Lift the Ban Coalition” is actively agitating for a repeal of the ban with HB 255. Chicago has
passed nonbinding resolutions in support of lifting the ban, and the
current governor, J.B. Pritzker, has expressed his support for lifting
the ban.104 As of early 2021, the ban remains in place.

c. Massachusetts
In 1969 and 1970, the state of Massachusetts adopted laws allowing Boston, Cambridge, and other cities to adopt rent control laws. In
1994, property owners in Cambridge spearheaded a statewide referendum to ban rent regulation. It passed 51–49. Boston, Brookline, and
Cambridge, which had adopted rent regulations, were without rent
regulation by early 1995.105 The repeal had a significant positive
effect on housing supply and value. The National Bureau of Economic
Research has estimated that from 1994 to 2004, property values in
Cambridge rose in value by $1.8 billion, which included $1 billion in
spillover value added to never-controlled rental units.106 According
to the study’s conclusion:
Under any reasonable set of assumptions, increases in residential
investment stimulated by rent decontrol can explain only a small
fraction of these spillover effects. Thus, we conclude that decontrol led to changes in the attributes of Cambridge residents and
the production of other localized amenities that made Cambridge
a more desirable place to live.107

Nevertheless, a push is underway to repeal the ban. HB 3373 was introduced in January of 2019, to institute vacancy control for tenants
103. See Bill Status of HB2192, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.ilga.gov
/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocTypeID=HB&DocNum=2192&GAID=15&SessionID=108&
LegID=117947.
104. Maya Dukmasova, Chicago tenants continue to demand “rent control now,” CHI.
READER (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.ltbcoalition.org/.
105. Jay Fitzgerald, The End of Rent Control in Cambridge, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RSCH.,
https://www.nber.org/digest/oct12/end-rent-control-cambridge.
106. Id. (citing David H. Autor, Christopher J. Palmer & Parag A. Pathak, Housing Market
Spillovers: Evidence from the End of Rent Control in Cambridge Massachusetts (NBER
Working Paper, No. 18125, issued in June 2012), https://www.nber.org/papers/w18125.pdf.
107. Autor, Palmer & Pathak, supra note 106, at 31.
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over 75 years of age for buildings with six or more units. Another
bill, HB 3924, would give local communities the option to impose the
full gamut of rent regulations and vacancy controls on apartments
and mobile homes.108 While advocates are pushing for the bill,
Governor Charlie Parker has not expressed support, saying instead
that the solution to the housing crisis is to build more housing.109
For a number of years, various attempts to regulate rents have
failed. That has motivated the supporters of rent regulation to go
big against the forces of “private property and greed” as characterized by tenant advocate Lisa Owens:
A lot of our allies got together, saying that what we’re asking for
is so basic and it’s the same forces coming down so strongly on
the side of private property and greed . . . . There was this broad
consensus after those losses that we have to fight for what’s big
and bold and what we really need, because if we fight for small
things that are incremental, we still get the same forces coming
back at us.110

As of early 2021, these efforts to eliminate the profit motive in rental
housing have been unsuccessful.

d. Washington State
Washington State banned rent regulation in 1981 with RCW
35.21.830.111 This does not sit well with the Seattle progressive
political establishment, which is actively pursuing efforts to repeal
the ban. As explained on the city’s website:
108. Chris Lisinski, Rent Control Bill About Giving Communities Options, Sponsor Says,
WBUR NEWS (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/03/27/rent-control-bill-about
-giving-communities-options-sponsor-says.
109. Advocates call for a return of rent control in Massachusetts, WBUR NEWS (Oct. 29,
2019), https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/03/27/rent-control-bill-about-giving-communities-op
tions-sponsor-says.
110. Jared Brey, Could Rent Control Return to Boston?, NEXT CITY (Nov. 5, 2019), https://
nextcity.org/daily/entry/could-rent-control-return-to-boston.
111. The statute states:
The imposition of controls on rent is of statewide significance and is preempted
by the state. No city or town of any class may enact, maintain, or enforce ordinances or other provisions which regulate the amount of rent to be charged for
single-family or multiple-unit residential rental structures or sites.
WASH. REV. CODE § 35.21.830 (2020), https://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=35.21.830.
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In addition to rent control, we also need to tax the rich, and big
businesses like Amazon to fund a massive expansion of social
housing (publicly-owned, permanently-affordable homes) and to
fully fund homeless services. Our movement also needs to continue our ongoing successful fight for a full renters bill of rights.
....
The goal is to build mass protests for the next session of the
legislature in Olympia to make it clear that working people are
not willing to accept continued inaction on the severe affordable
housing crisis, and demand serious solutions, not lip service.
Let us begin!112

In the last six years, the Seattle area has added 400,000 new
residents but only 135,000 new homes.113 But the city politicians
don’t think more building is the answer. Instead, the city is planning to adopt its own rent and vacancy control ordinance in the
event that the statewide ban is lifted: “State law currently prohibits
rent control. [City Council Member] Sawant said her legislation, if
passed, wouldn’t take effect until that ban is repealed. The full city
council likely won’t take up the matter until December, after budget
negotiations have ended.”114
So far, the legislature has not moved forward with the city’s
symbolic agenda.
4. States with No Rent Regulation and No Preemption
Seven states have no statewide rent regulation but don’t expressly preempt it. These states include: Hawaii, Delaware, Maine,
Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, and Wyoming.
112. Seattle City Council, Rent Control FAQ’s and Myths, SEATTLE.GOV, http://www.seattle
.gov/council/meet-the-council/kshama-sawant/rent-strike/rent-control/rent-control-faqs-and
-myths.
113. Daniel Beekman & Brian Gutman, Seattle area has undergone record growth. Now
voters may reshape its politics., SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.seattletimes.com
/seattle-news/politics/seattle-area-has-undergone-record-growth-now-voters-will-decide-whether
-to-reshape-its-politics/.
114. Joel Moreno, Sawant’s rent control proposal takes aim at Seattle’s pricey housing
market, KOMONEWS (Sept. 24, 2019), https://komonews.com/news/local/rent-control-proposal
-takes-aim-at-seattles-pricey-housing-market.
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Additionally, seven other states have the so called “Dillon Rule,”115
meaning that while rent regulation is not preempted by state law,
if a local government (which may be limited by size) can persuade
the state legislature to give the local government permission to
adopt rent regulation, they may. These states are Alaska, Nevada,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia.
C. Federal Rent Regulation Agitation
1. The “A Just Society: A Place to Prosper Act of 2019”—
Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez
With the national election season behind us, and with the rise of
some progressives in Congress, there has been a call for the imposition of national rent regulation. Representative Alexandria OcasioCortez has submitted the “A Just Society: A Place to Prosper Act of
2019.”116 It did not pass, but we can expect a new version in 2021.
The law would have applied to owners with five or more units or
mobile home park owners with two or more parks. The proposal
would, among other things, impose nationwide rent caps with annual increases tied to the consumer price index or 3%, whichever is
greater. It also has vacancy controls, forbids discrimination against
Section 8 voucher holders, provides standing to tenants to sue, and
overrides any arbitration clause leases. Evictions may not be commenced until a tenant is two months behind in her rent, and there
will be a national program of free counsel to tenants facing evictions, with a fund of $6.5 billion annually to pay for the attorneys.
It provides that state attorney generals may sue to enforce the act.
The bill also would amend the Civil Rights Act to include people
who receive income such as Section 8 vouchers to be a “protected
class,” meaning landlord discrimination against a tenant with such
income would be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
115. The rule is derived from Iowa Supreme Court Justice Dillon’s opinion in City of
Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & M.R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 1866 WL 173 (1868). As Justice Dillon
put it, “Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly
from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist.
As it creates, so it may destroy.” 24 Iowa at 475.
116. A copy can be found here: https://ocasio-cortez.house.gov/sites/ocasio-cortez.house.gov
/files/A%20Just%20Society-%20A%20Place%20to%20Prosper%20Act.pdf.
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Another element of the proposal would require owners with over
1,000 units nationwide, or 100 units in a metropolitan area, to disclose for a public database, any information about their business
practices, including statistics on evictions, rents, code violations,
standard leases, and details on corporate ownership.
2. Senator Bernie Sanders
Senator Sanders’ “Housing for All”117 plan would do many of the
same things as the AOC plan. It would spend $1.4 trillion to restore
and build new government housing, end discrimination against
Section 8 recipients, impose a national rent cap of 3% or 1.5 times
the CPI (whichever is higher) “to help prevent the exploitation of
tenants at the hands of private landlords,” implement just-cause
eviction laws, allow states to adopt more stringent laws, and provide
$2 billion for attorneys for tenants facing evictions. There are a host
of other restrictions on house flipping, inclusionary zoning, and a
tax on vacant homes.
D. Miscellaneous Provisions
Some localities have adopted restrictions on the ability of landlords to use criminal background checks for tenant screening.118
Others put limits on rent deposits. Tenants represented by Pacific
Legal Foundation attorneys have filed challenges to Seattle ordinances that prohibit criminal background checks and require landlords to rent to the first applicant that meets minimum standards.
In December, the state supreme court upheld the ordinances. In
doing so, the court overturned over a century’s worth of precedent
that had held the state constitution did more to protect property
rights than the federal constitution.119
117. The “Housing for All” campaign platform can be found at: https://berniesanders.com/is
sues/housing-all/.
118. See, e.g., Jerimiah Jacobsen & Gordon Severson, Minneapolis council approves new
renter protections, KARE11 (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.kare11.com/article/news/local/min
neapolis-council-approves-new-renter-protections/89-1cc7a2de-0098-4bf7-9564-fb14f5aa0107.
119. See Yim v. City of Seattle, 454 P.3d 694 (Wash. 2019); Chong Yim v. City of Seattle,
454 P.3d 675 (Wash. 2019).
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CONCLUSIONS
As much as some politicians might try, no one has figured out a
way to repeal the law of supply and demand. There can be no repeal,
only workarounds. In some of the old (and current) communist
states, the workaround was mass starvation. That lessened demand.
Starvation, combined with political repression, staved off collapse.
Venezuela has made conditions so miserable that millions have resorted to the workaround of mass emigration, leaving those in charge
the masters of a much-diminished nation. And cities in California
have had their own workaround: effectively putting the casualties
of its housing policies onto the streets. But long term, the law of
supply and demand is inexorable: if you restrict prices, supply will
diminish, and demand will find substitutes, whether it be the streets,
emigration, or death.
Rent control to a housing crisis is like pouring hot soup over a
hungry person shivering in the freezing cold. At first it feels great.
There’s lots of warmth and soup. Then it cools off. The cold penetrates the soup-soaked clothing, and everything feels much colder
than before. The food is wasted, the hunger is greater, and the cold
is more bitter.
Rent control, whether it be of the traditional type or the more
flexible version of rent stabilization, isn’t designed just to establish
minimum living standards. It is directed toward wealth redistribution that favors a politically active constituency. Where it has been
adopted, it has only been effective in the short term. It lowers rents for
some. But because it also discourages the only practical means of
alleviating high housing costs—an increase in supply through new
free market construction—it ends up doing more harm than good.
The rise in progressive activism during the Trump years may have
been a reaction to the former president’s incendiary politics and
rhetoric. Whether progressives succeed on either the state or national
level to impose more rent controls during the Biden-Harris administration remains to be seen. Landlords know how to band together
and fight back, as they did in California to beat back two statewide
initiatives. But so long as there is a housing shortage resulting in
rents that are too high, rent control will remain in the hearts and
minds of renters everywhere. If they can muster their political forces,
they may well succeed. But if they do, will the nation’s shortage of
affordable housing be alleviated? Probably not.

SOLVING FOR HOMELESSNESS

WENDIE L. KELLINGTON*
INTRODUCTION—THE PROBLEM
Homeless people and homeless encampments are everywhere. The
housed look on in horror at the depressing symbols of homelessness—
tents on sidewalks, people in wheelchairs talking to no one in particular, the filthy plastic bucket in lieu of a toilet behind a wind-blown
decayed tarp; the person who simply relieves themselves on a sidewalk; the person on the street corner screaming epithets at unseen
enemies; feral children wandering about like zombies. No one deems
the state of affairs tolerable; yet homelessness stubbornly persists despite billions of dollars and countless person-hours devoted to its end.
The premise of this Paper is twofold, that: (1) homelessness must
end, and (2) it is a problem too big for the existing patchwork of state
and local initiatives to solve. Rather, the federal government must
step up to establish a coherent policy paradigm and associated programming that solves it.
As to the first premise, it is beyond debate that homelessness is a
dangerous social problem, an indicia of societal decline that our leaders cannot ignore. Homeless people lack basic sanitation resulting
in TB resistance (in all homeless communities),1 Hepatitis-A (San
Diego homeless outbreak 2016–18),2 typhus (Skid Row)3 and other
serious communicable diseases that flourish in unsanitary conditions.
Children are raised without access to stable education, in environments risking personal harm and disconnection from society, all of

* Kellington Law Group PC, Lake Oswego, Oregon.
1. TB in People Experiencing Homelessness, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, https://www
.cdc.gov/tb/topic/populations/homelessness/default.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2021).
2. Corey M. Peak et al., Homelessness and Hepatitis A—San Diego County, 2016–2018,
71 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 14 (2020) (available at https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/31412358/#:~:text=During%202016%2D2018%2C%20the%20County,risk%20factor%20for
%20the%20disease).
3. Dennis Romero & Andrew Blankstein, ‘Typhus zone’: Rats and trash infest Los
Angeles’ skid row, fueling disease, NBC NEWS (Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news
/us-news/typhus-zone-rats-trash-infest-los-angeles-skid-row-fueling-n919856.
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which contribute to the cycle.4 Homeless parents do not know where
to go for help and are frightened to reach out to social services for fear
of losing their children.5 Homeless women and children are at significantly higher risk of sexual assault and trafficking than the housed
population.6 Access to services is unreasonably complex and, often,
where access happens, the result is essentially nothing—a homeless
person invariably encounters long waiting lists and delays. Society
is unhappy with the situation and has a special dislike for how it
treats its homeless veterans for whom the ravages of military service
have left them mentally or physically unable to return to society; its
treatment of the elderly, who find themselves without adequate funds
to live; its foster youth, who age out and join the homeless ranks
with no social skills or desire to gain them; and its severely mentally ill citizens, who occupy expensive space in jails and emergency
rooms, rather than getting the treatment they need.
As to the second premise for this Paper, the federal government
must step in because state and local governments have failed to solve
the problem, despite at least two decades to do so. And regardless, the
problem is a national one; it is too big to expect state and local governments to solve. The federal government has solved similar problems before. It is uniquely capable and positioned to do so again, and
it must.
I. GREAT SOCIAL PROBLEMS REQUIRE NATIONAL SOLUTIONS
Homelessness is a significant national problem. America has dealt
with great national problems before. When it did, in the country’s
4. See Child Homelessness: A Growing Crisis, SAMHSA, https://www.samhsa.gov/home
lessness-programs-resources/hpr-resources/child-homelessness-growing-crisis (last visited
Sept. 24, 2021).
5. See Anne Gowen, Homeless families who turn to D.C. for help find no room, risk child
welfare inquiry, WASH. POST (June 23, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/homeless
-families-who-turn-to-dc-for-help-find-no-room-risk-child-welfare-inquiry/2012/06/23
/gJQAv9bJyV_story.html.
6. Diane M. Santa Maria et al., Gaps in Sexual Assault Health Care Among Homeless
Young Adults, 58 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 191, 191 (2020); Margot B. Kushel et al., No
Door to Lock: Victimization Among Homeless and Marginally Housed Persons, 163 ARCHIVES
OF INTERNAL MED. 2492 (2003) (available at https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternal
medicine/fullarticle/216287); Micah Bertoli, Homeless People at Greater Risk of Suffering
Sexual Violence, INVISIBLE PEOPLE (July 10, 2019), https://invisiblepeople.tv/homeless-people
-at-greater-risk-of-suffering-sexual-violence/.
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most difficult hour, instead of waiting and hoping that state and local
governments would do something, the federal government stepped
in and stepped up. Consider the size of the national crisis of 1929–39:
the Great Depression. While President Hoover urged Americans to
weather the economic storm with “courage and spirit” and told them
that the solution to the economic crisis was “not beyond the ability of
these thousands of community organizations to solve,” President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt (“FDR”), elected in 1932, promised intensive federal intervention.7 By the time of FDR’s election in 1932, the
American social fabric was in tatters and a serious homeless problem
manifested as “Hoovervilles” and “migrant camps” dotted the nation.
These makeshift “towns” were composed of people who had lost
everything, including their homes and jobs in the Great Depression,
and had nowhere to go.8 Displacement started earliest for farm laborers who lost farms or farm jobs to foreclosure arising from farm loan
overextensions that financed increased production during the recession following WWI. Farm labor job losses were worsened by the
seven-year drought between 1931–1938 that caused the “Dust Bowl,”
bringing ruinous environmental conditions to nineteen states.9 Americans who relied upon farming for their incomes migrated west, mostly
to California to live and work in “migrant camps.” Other Americans
suffered sudden job losses when business dried up during the Great
Depression and somewhere between forty and fifty percent of all
mortgages in the United States were in default.10
7. Herbert Hoover, President of the United States, Message Regarding Unemployment
Relief (Oct. 18, 1931), https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/October
-18-1931-message-regarding-unemployment-relief.
8. See Joseph Rose, Homelessness: Portland’s Great Depression Hoovervilles vs. ‘Halesvilles’ (photos), THE OREGONIAN (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.oregonlive.com/history/2016/04
/homelessness_portland_hoovervi.html.
9. Robin A. Fanslow, Voices from the Dust Bowl: the Charles L. Todd and Robert Sonkin
Migrant Worker Collection, 1940 to 1941: The Migrant Experience, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Apr. 6,
1998), https://www.loc.gov/collections/todd-and-sonkin-migrant-workers-from-1940-to-1941/ar
ticles-and-essays/the-migrant-experience/.
10. Report for Congress: The Labor Market During the Great Depression and the Current
Recession, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (June 19, 2009), https://www.everycrsreport
.com/reports/R40655.html; Housing 1929–1941, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclope
dia.com/education/news-and-education-magazines/housing-1929-1941#:~:text=Another%20
critical%20housing%20situation%20facing,the%20Great%20Depression%20was%20foreclo
sure.&text=By%201933%2C%2040%20to%2050,was%20sliding%20toward%20complete%20
collapse (last visited Sept. 24, 2021).
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Wherever the Depression-era homeless lived, the attendant problems were the same as they are now: conditions were deplorable and
unsanitary.11

Instead of today’s nylon tents and cardboard, Depression-era
makeshift shelters were composed of car parts, metal, wood, canvas
tents, anything that could be found. America had then what we have
now, huge numbers of homeless Americans. The difference is that
something was done about it.

11. Robin A. Fanslow, Voices from the Dust Bowl: the Charles L. Todd and Robert Sonkin
Migrant Worker Collection, 1940 to 1941: The Migrant Experience, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Apr. 6,
1998), https://www.loc.gov/collections/todd-and-sonkin-migrant-workers-from-1940-to-1941/ar
ticles-and-essays/the-migrant-experience/. H.M. Warner, Photograph of Seattle area Hooverville
(1935), Photo Courtesy of Washington State Archives.
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12

13

12. Dorothea Lange, Photograph of Migratory Mexican Field Worker’s Home, Imperial
Valley, California, in Farm Security Administration/Office of War Information Black-and
-White Negatives, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (1937), https://www.loc.gov/pictures/collection/fsa
/item/2017769879/.
13. Dorothea Lange, Photograph of Unemployed lumber worker going with his wife to the
bean harvest, in Farm Security Administration/Office of War Information Black-and-White
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Many federal programs were developed to solve the crisis. Two
particularly noteworthy programs are worth recalling as we consider solutions to today’s homelessness crisis. While no one suggests
the policies of the 1930s were perfect—they were not—it cannot be
denied that a less civilized time in our history resulted in the federal
government solving great problems that were as bad or worse than
those that characterize our great problems today. This tells us that
the federal government can certainly step up again.
One noteworthy Depression-era federal program, the Farm Security
Program of 1937 (“FSA”), was born from programs of the earlier federal Resettlement Administration (1935). The FSA responded to the
unsanitary conditions in migrant camps and, among other things,
funded migrant camp living quarters with running water and sanitation.14 These facilities were composed of largely canvas tents, with
community centers and shared facilities.

15

Negatives, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (1939), https://cdn.loc.gov/service/pnp/fsa/8b15000/8b15500
/8b15572_150px.jpg.
14. Christy Gavin & Garth Milam, A “Flat Tired People”: The Health of California’s Okies
During the 1930s, in CALIFORNIA ODYSSEY: DUST BOWL MIGRATION ARCHIVES 9, https://www
.csub.edu/library/_files/DB_files/OkieHealth.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2021).
15. Dorothea Lange, Photograph of Farm Security Administration camp for migrant
workers at Shafter, California, in Farm Security Administration/Office of War Information
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16

The federal government also constructed three brick and mortar
“Greenbelt Towns” that were “complete communities” designed for
“570 to 885 families” and had their own “stores, post office, community
center, schools, parks, and playgrounds.” These towns were “encircled”
by the “green belt” from which the projects took their names, were
“a girdle of farm and woodland” that served as “protection against
undesirable building encroachment in the future.”17 The “greenbelt”
Black-and-White Negatives, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (1938), https://www.loc.gov/pictures/collec
tion/fsa/item/2017770545/.
16. Dorothea Lange, Photograph of Farm Security Administration camp for migrant
workers at Shafter, California, in Farm Security Administration/Office of War Information
Black-and-White Negatives, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (1938), https://www.loc.gov/pictures/collec
tion/fsa/item/2017771021/.
17. 4 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 154 (1935); and see
Exec. Order No. 7027 (1935) (creating the “Resettlement Administration” which was responsible to establish “Greenbelt Towns” and other programs to resettle “destitute or low income
families from rural or urban areas, including the establishment, maintenance, operation, in
such connection of communities in rural or suburban areas.”).
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also to provided “garden tracts for those who wish[ed] to augment
their income by raising some of their food.”18 Then, as now, neighbors
did not like the idea of migrant labor camps, but the federal government established them anyway to respond to the large crisis.

19

Another important federal project of the time was the “Works
Project Administration,” The Final Report on the Works Project Administration Program 1935–43 (Report)20 explains that while by the
turn of the century, state and local governments had largely managed
18. 4 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note 17, at 154.
19. Photograph of men signing a petition in opposition to federal migratory labor camps,
in Opposition to government migratory labor camps: Portland, Oregon: intermediary roll film,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (1939), https://www.loc.gov/resource/fsa.8e04024/.
20. GEORGE H. FIELD, FINAL REPORT ON THE WPA PROGRAM (1946) (available at http://
lcweb2.loc.gov/service/gdc/scd0001/2008/20080212001fi/20080212001fi.pdf).
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to shame relatives into caring for their destitute relatives and, as
necessary, to house the “feeble minded,” the “insane,” orphans and
“infirm” in “poorhouses” or other institutions, state and local governments were ill-prepared to deal with the mass displacement and
unemployment of the Great Depression. Before the Social Security Act
of 1935, “the number of persons receiving aid was small and the relief
given inadequate[,]” but even so, the “relief given was permissive;
localities could adopt it or not as they chose.”
The Report observes that in the period leading to 1929, while
“substantial improvements” had been made to provide relief to “unemployables,” “little had been done toward developing any system
of relief” that could deal with “the destitution arising from unemployment.” The report explains that when some seven million people
were unemployed and homeless or at significant risk of homelessness by the end of 1930, “it became necessary to institute new relief
methods.” While the federal government initially relied upon bolstering state and local programs, the federal government under the
leadership of FDR, led the country out of its misery by establishing
dozens of federal “New Deal” programs to scaffold, and then all but
end, the nation’s serious homelessness problem. Many of those programs persist today, but none establish “migrant camps” with running water and sanitation, and none provide a place for people living
with serious mental illness or drug addiction to live and get help
while there.
In solving the problem of homelessness for people capable of work,
the WPA built or improved “651,000 miles of roads,” “125,110 buildings of all kinds,” “16,100 miles of water mains and distribution lines”
and “24,300 miles of sewerage facilities,” many airports and airport
facilities, as well as put otherwise homeless people to work in “service
projects,” including “serving of hot school lunches,” working to maintain “child-health centers,” “operating recreation centers and literacy
classes” and providing “many needed and valued community services.”21 The New Deal programs were not always politically popular,
but the federal government was then, and is now, in the best position
to weather local firestorms of opposition and provide meaningful
relief for all.
21. FIELD, supra note 20, at III.
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Today’s homeless problem is vastly smaller in scale than that of
the Depression, and its antecedents are no more complicated than
the homelessness the federal government ended in the 1930s and
early 40s. Today’s problem is different in the sense that many, and
perhaps most, of the people who make up the nation’s chronic homeless people are not relatable “down on their luck people,” looking for
hard work, eager to return to American society, like many of the
people whom the photographic history characterizes as the homeless
population of the 1930s. Today’s homeless population includes some
number (no one really knows the exact proportions) of people who
are severely mentally ill, drug addicted, or otherwise profoundly
disconnected from American society, making them in the main less
sympathetic characters, with fewer champions than the seven million
unemployed people in the 1930s and early 40s. But the current situation is intolerable, and to solve it we must agree to a federalized
program that charts a plausible exit from homelessness.
Homelessness today finds itself in a more shameful public policy
framework than existed in the 1930s and 40s. Then, there were institutions for people called “unemployables” to be cared for—people
too sick or disabled to work. While surely those institutions were not
acceptable models of civil rights protection that anyone would model
today, the fact is society made some effort then to appropriately
house otherwise homeless people and today we spend a lot of money
but do nothing meaningful to solve for the varied populations who live
on the streets today. Perhaps most shocking is that today, American
policy largely abandons severely mentally ill and disabled people to
the streets.22 Accordingly, our homelessness problem is worsened by
the lack of any serious, coordinated national effort to ensure there
is a place for citizens who cannot care for themselves to live and get
better if they can; for addicts to get clean and sober; for the chronically or newly unemployed to get meaningful job training, or really
any meaningful roadmap out of poverty or homelessness.
But while a desperate and serious problem for the homeless and
housed alike, today’s homelessness problem is one the federal government has solved before and can solve again. The only obvious
impediment is strong federal leadership committed to a solution.
22. E. FULLER TORREY, NOWHERE
MENTALLY ILL (1988).
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II. FORMULA FOR SUCCESS: DIVERSE AND POWERFUL
STAKEHOLDERS ARE MOTIVATED TO SOLVE HOMELESSNESS
While there are no universal champions for homeless people, there
is universal agreement among powerful constituencies that we must
solve the problem of homelessness. State, regional, and local governments, property owners, homeowner associations and neighborhood
groups, medical personnel, hospitals (especially emergency rooms),
first responders, educators, advocates for particular populations like
veterans groups, AARP (American Association of People with Disabilities), youth groups, foster parents, law enforcement, and so forth,
all want to see an end to the crisis. There is no one who thinks that
it makes any sense for our primary facilities providing services to the
severely mentally ill to be emergency rooms and jails; or that homeless people with drug-resistant TB should be released from emergency rooms with last resort drugs they have no way to store or take;
or that kids age out of foster care with nowhere to go but the street;
or that a victim of domestic abuse and her children have no place of
escape but their car or worse; or that retirees with inadequate savings
live in cars, tents, or RVs. That means there is a politically powerful
group of people that includes many and perhaps most Americans
who are motivated to solve the problem. That is a formula to get
Congress’ attention.
III. A COHERENT COORDINATED POLICY FRAMEWORK IS NEEDED:
LOCAL SWEEP-AND-TOW PROGRAMS SOLVE NOTHING
Today, the governmental response to homelessness includes a dizzying uncoordinated patchwork of largely ineffective state and local
programs funded by equally ineffective and uncoordinated federal
programs; and ultimately local sweep-and-tow programs that evict
homeless people from wherever they squat when the housed citizenry is fed up with the bounty of said ineffective responses.
From a policy perspective, sweep-and-tow programs are by their
nature Sisyphean; a homeless person evicted from one sidewalk or
park, simply moves to another such place. They are people, not vapor,
and it restates the obvious that they will situate somewhere.
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From a legal perspective, sweep-and-tow programs can expose
municipalities to federal civil rights liability. Jailing or criminally
citing a person for being homeless, or sweep-and-tow programs that
criminalize homelessness or confiscate the property of homeless
people, have been held to violate federal civil rights laws. Sweepand-tow programs that take a homeless person’s property can violate the U.S. Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, as the federal court held in Lavan v. City of Los Angeles.23
The Ninth Circuit has also held that universally criminalizing
sleeping on public property violates the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel
and Unusual Punishment clause. Thus, in Martin v. City of Boise,24
the court decided that “as long as there is no option of sleeping indoors, the government cannot criminalize indigent, homeless people
for sleeping outdoors, on public property, on the false premise they
had a choice in the matter.”
The “work arounds” to keep sweep-and-tow programs seem hardly
worth the effort, although it is possible to avoid Martin liability, if
that is a municipality’s goal. Local ordinances that criminalize
camping on public property in particular but not all city locations,
have passed legal muster.25 Martin itself “does not cover individuals
who do have access to adequate temporary shelter, . . . but who choose
not to use it.”26 This passage, repeated numerous times, justifies
shelter programs that do not and cannot solve the problem.27
While FDR declared in his third term inauguration speech of
1944, an “economic truth” that “we have accepted as self-evident” in
a “second Bill of Rights” that there is a “right of every family to have

23. 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[t]he government may not take property like a thief
in the night . . . .”).
24. 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 674 (2019),
25. Frank v. City of St. Louis, 458 F. Supp.3d 1090 (2020).
26. Martin, 920 F3d at 617 n.8.
27. See Ari Shapiro, Why Some Homeless Choose The Streets Over Shelters, NPR (Dec. 6,
2012), https://www.npr.org/2012/12/06/166666265/why-some-homeless-choose-the-streets-over
-shelters; Rick Paulas, This Is Why Homeless People Don’t Go to Shelters, VICE (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://www.vice.com/en/article/v74y3j/this-is-why-homeless-people-don’t-go-to-shelters;
Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, Portland Mayor Ted Wheeler’s urgent mandate to move homeless
campers into humane shelters isn’t working, THE OREGONIAN (Jan. 23, 2021), https://www.ore
gonlive.com/news/2021/01/portland-mayor-ted-wheelers-urgent-mandate-to-move-homeless
-campers-into-humane-shelters-isnt-working.html.
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a decent home,”28 it was a policy pronouncement, not a legal one. As
a result, in the absence of willing leaders, that “self-evident” right
has not materialized. For its part, the United States Supreme Court
has held that there is no “fundamental right to housing” in the
Federal Constitution. Thus, the United States Supreme Court explained in Lindsey v. Normet that in the context of an Oregon eviction
law, “[w]e are unable to perceive” that the U.S. Constitution has
“any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular
quality, or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real
property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease without the
payment of rent or otherwise contrary to the terms of the relevant
agreement.”29 The Court resolved any uncertainty about who was
responsible to solve the plight of the unhoused when it wrote “the
assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant
relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions.”30 While some
commentators observe that the case extends only to housing of a
particular quality and does not say there is no right to be “housed,”
that misses the point that the solution to the problem of homelessness lies with the legislature.31
Another example of the wisdom of the Supreme Court’s observation
that solving homelessness is the province of the legislature is a class
action suit brought by homeless men in New York that resulted in
a consent decree in which New York City committed itself to provide
shelters to its homeless citizens.32 The so-called “Callahan Consent
Decree” (1981) did not solve the city’s homeless problem; rather it
caused the city to assume merely providing shelters was enough, resulting in shelters that were little worse than living on the street.33
28. FDR and Housing Legislation: 75th Anniversary of the Wagner-Steagall Housing Act
of 1937, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM, https://www.fdrli
brary.org/housing (last visited Sept. 24, 2021); Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United
States, State of the Union Address (Jan. 11, 1944).
29. 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (emphasis added).
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. See NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING RIGHTS FOR ALL: PROMOTING AND DEFENDING HOUSING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 118 (5th ed. 2011).
32. Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Cot. 18, 1979) (consent decree
available at https://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Callahan
ConsentDecree.pdf).
33. See INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE, HORRORS IN HOMELESS HOUSING: NEW
YORK’S UNCLEAN, UNSAFE, DANGEROUS TEMPORARY SHELTER SYSTEM AND HOW TO FINALLY
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The idea of some state and local governments to put the problem
of “affordable housing” on the backs of private developers who did
not create the problem and who are ill-equipped to solve it is similarly a non-starter. Developers can only build housing that pencils,
or they cannot build anything. No lender will loan on a housing project
for which there is an inadequate predicted return on investment.
Further, all housing projects have built-in development costs, such
as high land costs; high government fees, and the cost of paying construction workers market wages, etc. that do not allow developers
to lose money to futilely attempt to solve public problems.34 Moreover,
the lack of “affordable housing” is but one problem contributing to
homelessness in many communities and is a problem that local land
use programs are largely responsible for creating.35
Regardless, homeless people include many different and difficult
populations who are not served by private “affordable housing” in any
event. In many ways, homelessness is a people problem. Many of the
problem people cannot manage any housing that is not institutional
in nature even if it is free to them: they cannot follow rules and are
more likely than not to be evicted for any number of reasons. As for
private housing, the problems are the same except that otherwise
homeless people largely lack incomes, or if they have incomes, they
are unlikely to be enough to afford any type of non-public housing.
TACKLE THE HOMELESSNESS EPIDEMIC (Jan. 2017) (available at https://www.nysenate.gov
/sites/default/files/horrors_in_homeless_housing_-_full_report.pdf).
34. See The cost of affordable housing: Does it pencil out?, URBAN INSTITUTE, https://apps
.urban.org/features/cost-of-affordable-housing/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2021); Daniel Herriges,
“Why Are Developers Only Building Luxury Housing?”, STRONG TOWNS (July 25, 2018),
https://www.strongtowns.org/journal/2018/7/25/why-are-developers-only-building-luxury-hous
ing; Brenda Richardson, Affordable Housing Is Doable For Builders And Buyers, But Here’s
The Problem, FORBES (June 2, 2019, 8:37 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brendarichardson
/2019/06/02/housing-affordability-report-outlines-challenges-solutions-for-turning-renters-in
to-homeowners/?sh=5314456b3397.
35. Jacob Passy, These cities have the toughest laws for home builders—and the highest
property prices, MARKET WATCH (Dec. 28, 2019, 11:22 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com
/story/these-cities-have-the-strictest-regulations-for-building-new-homes-and-the-highest-prop
erty-prices-2019-12-24; Gillian B. White, How Zoning Laws Exacerbate Inequality: Such laws
aren’t just a headache for developers, economists believe. They’re bad for (nearly) everyone, THE
ATLANTIC (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/11/zoning-laws
-and-the-rise-of-economic-inequality/417360/; Sanford Ikeda & Emily Hamilton, How LandUse Regulation Undermines Affordable Housing (Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Research Paper, 2015) (available at https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulation
/how-land-use-regulation-undermines-affordable-housing).
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The net result is that public or private “affordable housing” will not
solve the problem.
IV. LAND USE AND BUILDING CODE CONSTRAINTS
PREVENT SOLUTIONS
Ending homelessness requires providing places for the entire spectrum of otherwise homeless people to be. Society has been unwilling
to reinvest in institutions and has been unable to build enough
multifamily or other stick-built housing to house all homeless people
who could adopt to such living arrangements. Moreover, zoning and
building codes foreclose alternative living modalities like Quonset
huts, RVs, tents, tipis and tiny houses, that would enable society to
shelter and serve many of its homeless citizens. So, homeless people
wait on the street for years, and sometimes their entire lives, for a
place to call home to open up.
Zoning and building codes must be modified to enable immediate
available housing options, so policy makers can put an end to years of
long waiting lists, and shelter people of all types. It must be possible
to tow a homeless person’s RV to a designated place, or relocate his
or her tent, or to move him or her to a community of tiny houses, tipis,
Quonset huts or canvas tents (like the federal government provided
during the Depression), with needed services to care for the population. It must be possible to establish immediately available situations that if necessary, rely upon portable toilets, mobile handwashing,
shower trucks, food trucks, common refrigeration, and the like.
Instead of city officials ordering the towing of an RV from a public
street to a lot for destruction, it must be possible to tow it to a place
where it and its occupants can be. This recognizes that someone
lives in that RV and has nowhere else to go; and until we have
something else for them, it is cruel in the extreme not to tow their
home to a designated, suitable, safe place. Imagine being a homeless
woman who lives in an RV. A door that locks in a derelict RV is far
superior to the street, where there is no keeping out predators.
Depriving her of her RV serves no purpose other than condemning
her to serious risks of personal harm.
Or consider people who are evicted from public housing for rule
violations stemming from serious mental illness or drug addiction.
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They are evicted to the streets. It is impossible to find private housing
for homeless people with a history of eviction and extremely difficult
to find public housing for persons having that profile. Moreover, if
an otherwise homeless person finds public housing but goes to jail
for any period, they lose their apartment and has nowhere to go
when eventually released. Consider the example of “Todd,” a man in
his late 40s or early 50s, afflicted with serious mental illness (“SMI”)
that came to light in his late teens. His SMI causes him to devolve
into uncontrollable rages and experience extreme paranoia. While
homeless for most of his adult life, after many years, a social service
agency finally finds him a single-room occupancy hotel, and he weeps
with joy. A few months later, he has a significant SMI episode, resulting in his arrest and jail. In his absence, he loses his apartment
for good. When he is released, he again has nowhere to go.36
Removing land use and building codes barriers to immediate solutions to the homeless crisis is essential. Without these barriers
society can provide a place for jails and emergency rooms to release
troubled populations other than the street.
V. GETTING HOMELESS PEOPLE INTO SAFE AND ADEQUATE
SITUATIONS, FROM THE LENS OF HOMELESS PEOPLE AND EXPERTS.
RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE PEOPLE WHO UNDERSTAND WHAT
WORKS; THAT THERE ARE VERY DIFFERENT POPULATIONS TO BE
SERVED, AND THAT NO ONE SOLUTION WILL SOLVE THE PROBLEM
The housed often have particular ideas about what homeless
people want or need and appoint non-expert, well-meaning people
to offer to find solutions. But to solve this problem, the housed must
solicit input from the homeless populations to be served, from social
services, medical, and law enforcement experts, about what works.
This provides the greatest chance of success. Most of the housed do
not understand the complicated puzzle that is homelessness. Unless
a person has been exposed to the problem, or studies it, they cannot
possibly understand or untangle it.
36. See BEDLAM: AN INTIMATE JOURNEY INTO AMERICA’S MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS (International Documentary Association 2019).
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Contrary to what many people think, it is a fallacy to assume that
needy populations must be near the services they require. In fact,
society’s demand that homeless people figure out, identify, connect
with, and somehow get to services, wait in line for them, do an “intake” and be told to come back to repeat the process, diminishes the
possibility of successful services ever happening. This tragic situation
repeats itself regardless of how physically proximate the homeless
person is to said services. To be successful, services can and should
come to the needy population to be served and not the converse.
Service providers must be willing and able to travel. To be reasonably efficient and effective, establishing services where otherwise
homeless people will live is important. This has two benefits. It
enables services to be provided when they are needed to serve the
target population, but it also benefits service providers because they
know where to go, who to serve, and can do so in safety. It is unfair
to ask a social worker to enter an unsanctioned encampment when
she has no idea who is there or whom she will meet and has no
meaningful security to protect her.
Traditional shelters often touted as a community’s solution, are
not the answer. Shelters where homeless people go, by appointment
or if they manage to get a bed after waiting in long lines to stay only
for the night, solve little. Homeless people will tell this to anyone
who will listen. There are many reasons that homeless people avoid
shelters. Some shelters are simply unsafe.37 It is a fact that outside
of some shelters, bad actors “enjoy” hanging out to beat up, harass
and steal from homeless people for sport.38 Many homeless people
do not like the religious proselytizing that pervades some facilities
or being required to sit through religious services.39 Some homeless

37. See MYRON MAGNET, THE DREAM AND THE NIGHTMARE: THE SIXTIES LEGACY TO THE
UNDERCLASS 118 (2000); Jeremy Jojola & Katie Wilcox, We asked 100 homeless people if they’d
rather sleep outside or in a shelter, A vast majority of the people experiencing homelessness who
spoke to 9Wants to Know said they’d rather sleep outside in the cold than a shelter. Their
reasons varied, WUSA 9, http://www.wusa9.com/article/news/investigations/we-asked-100-home
less-people-if-theyd-rather-sleep-outside-or-in-a-shelter/493638711 (last visited Sept. 24, 2021).
38. Kylyssa Shay, Why Don’t Homeless People Use Shelters?, SOAPBOXIE (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://soapboxie.com/social-issues/why_homeless_people_avoid_shelters.
39. See id.; Shelters are for Someone Else, Part 1, GUIDE 2 HOMELESSNESS BLOG (Oct. 25,
2004), http://guide2homelessness.blogspot.com/2004/10/shelters-are-for-someone-else-part-1
.html.
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people are banned from shelters for misbehavior or are unable or
unwilling to comply with shelter rules and are ultimately thrown
out. Other homeless people refuse shelters due to legitimate fear of
disease and parasitic infections or an unwillingness to comply with
rules that require they be separated from family, significant others,
or pets. “No pets” prohibitions are particularly cited as a reason homeless people refuse to go to shelters.40
A segment of the homeless population is too sick to get in or stay in
most of the housing options available today, including shelters.41
There is a significant segment of homeless people who suffer from
untreated, severe mentally illness for whom private housing and
nonspecialized public housing, is unsuited. They require specialized
facilities that, in fact, no longer exist. A bit of history is in order.
America demolished most of its mental institutions in the 1960s and
70s with no replacement, in favor of “community-based programs”
focused on “prevention” that never did or could serve the population
living in institutions already afflicted with mental disease.42 The
states that had formerly been responsible for the care of the mentally ill and that had established mental hospitals were relieved of
that duty by the federal government.43 President Kennedy is primarily responsible for relieving the states of the obligation to care for
the mentally ill. He had a personal dislike of mental institutions,
likely because his sister had been sent to such a facility after a
lobotomy, exposing the fact that her case and many others, were
horrific.44 In 1962, Ken Kesey wrote One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s
Nest, which turned public opinion against mental institutions. President Kennedy successfully established federal laws to fund turnover
of the care of the mentally ill to “community-based” mental illness
“prevention” programs.45 However, Kennedy’s program made no
meaningful provision for severely mentally ill people who required
institutionalized treatment and who could not benefit from the particular version of community-based care that the new laws established.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Shay, supra note 38.
Id.
TORREY, supra note 22, at 118.
TORREY, supra note 22, at 96, 151–55.
TORREY, supra note 22, at 103–06.
TORREY, supra note 22, at ch. 5.
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The tragedy-in-making was set to happen. State mental hospitals
closed, and their patients were simply tossed into the street, where
they live and die to this day.46 President Reagan (wrongly credited
for the problem), decided that the federal government should not be
funding the program of community care, rather that communities
should be returned that responsibility, and so he largely cut off federal funding that Kennedy had established.47 But the states never
took the mental institution program back, and instead, inadequately
took on community-based treatment. And, so, we have what we see
today—people with severe mental illness on the streets with nowhere to go but emergency rooms and jails.
Further, any solution must consider that a significant segment of
the homeless population is addicted to narcotics. This means that
they, like the severely mentally ill, are unsuited for traditional
housing options and require options with significant treatment and
other support.
These are but a few examples of how the problem is inordinately
complex and why simply building “affordable housing” will not solve
the problem and why we need to consult with experts. We must keep
in sharp focus that it is critical that there be immediately available
suitable shelter options for all homeless people, regardless of their
sobriety or history. In the absence of this, they will continue to wander
the streets to their detriment and ours.
VI. FISCAL CONSTRAINTS
It is not possible to provide stick-built housing for all homeless
people; if it were, we would have done it decades ago. The reality is
that publicly subsidized stick-built housing is exceedingly expensive
and takes years to establish in too few numbers, to solve the problem.
A policy problem is that its advocates more often than not, demand
expensive architectural features and so-called “Leadership in Energy
and Environmental Design” or “LEED” certification compliance, which
46. TORREY, supra note 22, at 155 (“What federal and state officials thought was going to
happen to the hordes of discharged patients is one of the abiding mysteries of our time.”); and
see Chapter 10.
47. TORREY, supra note 22, at 196–98.
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adds to the cost and delay for this housing type. Stick housing is an
important part of the toolbox to solve homelessness, but it cannot
and should not be the only tool. The fallacy that stick-built housing
is the only tool is why we find ourselves with an intractable and
unacceptable homeless problem.
VII. FISCAL OPPORTUNITY
In the uncoordinated homeless services ecosystem, there is money,
a lot of it—money otherwise spent Band-Aiding the fiscal arterial
bleeding that characterizes homelessness. It is undeniable that
homeless people cost enormous amounts of public and private money
and impose significant drains on jails and hospital emergency rooms,
with little palpable return on that investment. These “hard costs”
are costs apart from the less considered social costs in terms of lost
participation in society, lost children, children who age out of foster
care and feed the cycle, and crime and victimization of both homeless people and others.
No one knows, and no study has been done, that attempts to figure
out all public and private costs of homelessness. It may be impossible
to do so. But what would happen if the federal government redirected
the money it spends on piecemeal programs designed to solve the
problem, but that do not do so? It is easy to say it is too expensive to
solve this problem, but looking at the numbers, it is also easy to see
that doing nothing costs enormous amounts of money—money we
should be able to better spend on long-term solutions. And what if
permanently solving homelessness costs more than we spend now?
The electors have shown a willingness to spend enormous amounts
of money to solve the problem. Surely, it is worth a try to actually
achieve that goal.
Consider that in 2017, HUD estimated each homeless person costs
$40,448 per year in 2002 dollars in a study that did not evaluate all of
the costs.48 Another study opined that for a single homeless person
“in four Canadian cities, institutional responses (jails, hospitals,
48. UNITED STATES INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, ENDING CHRONIC HOMELESSNESS IN 2017 (2017) (available at https://www.usich.gov/resources/uploads/asset_library

/Ending_Chronic_Homelessness_in_2017.pdf).
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etc.) cost $66,000–$120,000 annually, [and] emergency shelters cost
$13,000–$42,000 annually . . . .”49
Santa Clara County, California alone estimates the cost of homelessness to that community between the years of 2007 and 2012 was
“$520 million per year.”50 A recent study commissioned by the Mental
Health Treatment Research Institute LLC concludes that those who
have health insurance who are “high” medical service users, cost on
average $41,631 per year in health care costs.51 That study explains:
People struggling with homelessness are often frequent users of
emergency departments. On average, they visit the emergency
room five times per year. The highest users of emergency departments visit weekly. Each visit costs $3,700; that is $18,500 spent
per year for the average person and $44,400 spent per year for
the highest users of emergency departments.

Another study explains that “80% of emergency room visits made by
people struggling with homelessness is for an illness that could have
been treated with preventative care.”52
There are costs to society of homelessness that these studies may
not factor that are worth considering. They include:
• Law enforcement costs—crime, crises, public health and safety.
• Public works costs for refuse collection and cleaning streets
and parks of human waste.
• Transit district funds to clean stations, buses, and trains of
human urine/feces/trash.
• Lost transit ridership and fees because it is too filthy and
dangerous for business or family riders to use.
• Federal, state, and local department of social services case
management and response.
49. Cost Analysis of Homelessness, HOMELESS HUB, https://www.homelesshub.ca/about
-homelessness/homelessness-101/cost-analysis-homelessness (last visited Sept. 24, 2021).
50. Home Not Found: The Cost of Homelessness in Silicon Valley, DESTINATION HOME,
https://destinationhomesv.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FactSheetDestinationHome.pdf
(last visited Sept. 24, 2021).
51. SHODDARD DAVENPORT, TRAVIS J. GRAY, & STEPHEN P. MELEK, HOW DO INDIVIDUALS
WITH BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CONDITIONS CONTRIBUTE TO PHYSICAL AND TOTAL HEALTHCARE
SPENDING? 1 (2020) (available at https://www.milliman.com/en/insight/How-do-individuals-with

-behavioral-health-conditions-contribute-to-physical).
52. The Cost of Homelessness Fact, GREEN DOORS, https://greendoors.org/facts/cost.php
(last visited Sept. 24, 2021).
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• Non-profit money spent on homelessness whether through
government grant or private donors.
• School programs for homeless school children.
• Enforcing sit-lie ordinances.
• Tow contracts to remove the vehicles and RVs of homeless
people, costs of sweeps to remove encampments, etc.
• Veteran homeless programs.
• Drug treatment programs.
The point is that there are huge sums of money poured into solving the homelessness problem in a way that is an uncoordinated
patchwork of approaches that has solved little. There are rational
reasons to decide instead to dedicate resources to developing an
effective, comprehensive solution.
VIII. BASIC AND NECESSARY PREMISES OF A
COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION
There are several premises that policy makers must share to solve
the problem of homelessness.
First, it is necessary to commit to solve homelessness and understand that any solution will have two segments: immediate and long
term. We have to decide that in the immediate term, it is acceptable
that otherwise homeless people will live in government-sanctioned
places like tents, tipis, RVs, tiny houses, and Quonset huts, with sanitation provided minimally—by portable toilets with handwashing,
shower trucks, laundry trucks, food trucks, garbage service, centralized refrigeration and electricity, frequented by social service representatives who target, and are responsible to figure out and maintain,
needed services. And the duration of stays in such facilities could
morph into a long-term solution, for some people.
When the federal government established such places during the
Depression, their appearance was clean, their facilities adequate
and not so different than places that even rich people now choose to
live. Consider below, a community in Las Vegas where former Zappos
CEO Tony Hsieh lived53:
53. Diana Budds, Building community in Las Vegas with Airstreams: Tiny homes are
helping the city’s downtown turnaround, CURBED (Mar. 29, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www
.curbed.com/2018/3/29/17163698/tiny-house-las-vegas-zappos-downtown-project.
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Non-traditional immediate solutions are not inhumane. Rather,
it is inhumane to demand that homeless people remain in danger
and squalor on the streets until the housed get around to building
them a stick-built home of the sort that the housed will approve. Compare how rich folks choose to live in Las Vegas in the above image
with a canvas tent migrant camp run by the federal government
during the Depression55:

54. Photograph of Llamalopolis, in Llamalopolis, as Urban Tiny Living Oasis, TINY HOUSE
BLOG, https://tinyhouseblog.com/tiny-house/llamalopolis-an-urban-tiny-living-oasis/ (last visited
Sept. 24, 2021).
55. Lange, supra note 15 (Photograph of Farm Security Administration camp for migrant
workers at Shafter, California).
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It cannot be seriously disputed that the above image is far superior
to the living conditions of today’s homeless. We must accept that not
all homeless people want or need stick-built housing. In fact, not all
wealthy people want that either.
Second, we must recognize that local land use and other regulatory programs that forbid non-traditional housing solutions must be
changed to enable America to solve its homelessness problem. All
housing types and non-traditional situations (portable toilets, shower
trucks, etc.) must be allowed. Relatedly, the regulatory framework
for housing development can no longer be controlled by the “costs of
growth” and anti-“growth” advocates. States should carefully evaluate
administrative agency leadership to ensure that the persons who
manage “growth” are willing participants in solutions to allow growth
and the change that comes with it, to happen.
Third, it is critical to recognize that there are differing populations of homeless people with differing needs. It is important that
housing situations be tailored to the distinct populations of America’s
homeless people and to the societal objectives for their care. Relatedly, it is important to accept that not all populations of homeless
people are sympathetic.56 We have to be willing to provide minimally
adequate shelter for people viewed as freeloaders.
Fourth, it is essential to reject that homeless people do not deserve
the same level of safety and law enforcement response as anyone
else. “Self-governing” encampments should be a non-starter. No one
should be expected to resign to live under a “self-governing” despot
or despotic committee, apart from the rules of civilized society that
the rest of “us” are expected to adhere to and benefit from. We are
one people and we all should benefit from and be burdened by the
same laws. Society legitimately wants and expects otherwise homeless people to live in a way that is safe for all of us.
Finally, it is critical to recognize that there are no political villains
to blame—the problem of homelessness has worsened under both
Democratic and Republican administrations. We are in this political
moment, together.
56. See VICE, Inside Slab City, the Lawless City in the Desert, YOUTUBE (May 15, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0vVCSUafFVI&list=PLh0vqAIo2BuDfU1ULMac0w__vj
-xl0Gm_&index=11&t=0s; I was hunted at Slab City, REDDIT (Dec. 4, 2015, 3:19 PM), https://
www.reddit.com/r/solotravel/comments/3ve70i/i_was_hunted_at_slab_city.
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IX. TWO GUIDING STARS TO THE SOLUTION: (1) PAY ATTENTION
TO HUMAN BIOLOGY BY KEEPING HOUSING GROUPS SMALL,
AND (2) DO NOT CONCENTRATE FACILITIES
There are two guiding stars we must follow in establishing any
housing solutions for homeless people. The first is to limit the size
of communities we establish for otherwise homeless people, and the
second is a variant of environmental justice, to avoid concentrating
facilities in particular areas.
First, the maximum size of any community for the otherwise homeless cannot be composed of more than 150 people. Oxford Professor
Robin Dunbar has established that 150 people is the cognitive
number of people who can live together and maintain stable social
relationships.
According to the theory, the tightest circle has just five people—
loved ones. That’s followed by successive layers of 15 (good friends),
50 (friends), 150 (meaningful contacts), 500 (acquaintances) and
1500 (people you can recognize). People migrate in and out of these
layers, but the idea is that space has to be carved out for any
new entrants.57

As we establish communities where we expect otherwise homeless
people to live, we should observe “Dunbar’s Number” and ensure
that homeless communities do not exceed it. No one wants a repeat
of the “projects.”
Second, the places where homeless housing is established must
be distributed and not concentrated. Concentrating communities of
otherwise homeless people in particular areas risks blight, which
ultimately solves nothing. Worse, it results in the further social disconnection of the politically ignored housed. Relatedly, there are
good policy reasons why communities of otherwise homeless families
with children should be situated in the best school districts to ensure that formerly homeless children have the best chance at life
success and societal integration. More on this follows.
57. Christine Ro, The theory of Dunbar’s number holds that we can only really maintain
about 150 connections at once. But is the rule true in today’s world of social media?, BBC (Oct. 9,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20191001-dunbars-number-why-we-can-only-main
tain-150-relationships.
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X. A PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL “HOMELESSNESS NEW DEAL”
Congress should adopt a mandate that every city (big and small) in
America must have a proportional national share of housing for
people who are otherwise homeless, on particular time frames, and
to maintain that housing. The law would provide minimum standards and for regular audits. The need for new facilities in each
community would be reassessed annually. As homelessness is reduced, so is the need for more such places. Everyone is incentivized
to solve the problem. The mandate comes with federal money otherwise spent by the federal government on homelessness and its
trappings. State and local governments are expected to distribute
state money otherwise spent on the problem, on solving this problem. They can choose otherwise, but their federal funding will dry
up if they choose to do so. In other words, all levels of government
would be expected to commit to the program and its success.
Each and every city and other unit of government (counties,
villages) would be given a certain period of time with achievement
milestones to figure out where housing for their state proportion of
otherwise homeless people will be established within its boundaries,
what that housing will look like, and then to establish it.
Such programs may entail condemning and buying nearby homes
or commercial establishments to create a “buffer” around them for
political acceptability. Such purchased properties can be either resold
with a covenant that the owner understands who/what their neighbor is and/or that the property may be used for other palatable
public objectives.
However, if local communities fail to meet their timeline milestones,
the federal government is empowered to step in and do whatever is
left to be done, for them. In which case, the federal government will
begin where the local actors failed—they will designate the places
and the housing types for the local government’s proportional share
of homeless people if that has not been done. The federal government
will develop the housing if that has not been done or will perform
maintenance, all using federal funding the locality would otherwise
have received to do so.
Once communities establish (and maintain) housing for their proportion of homeless people, then state and local laws against camping
in unsanctioned public places are expected to be enforced.

2021]

SOLVING FOR HOMELESSNESS

173

All such housing establishments would be required to have particular minimum characteristics developed by experts must have at
the least:
1. Housing of some type (i.e.): tents, Quonset huts, tipis, RVs,
single room occupancy rooms, tiny houses and the following:
sanitation, a way to get and stay warm in winter, refrigeration, storage, electricity, laundry and shower services on site
or on weekly laundry and shower trucks, food services—on site
or trucks, services to meet the population, including adequate funding for law enforcement and social services which
come to the facility; each establishment is limited to no more
than 150 residents. And these facilities cannot be concentrated in particular areas of town.
2. Facilities for families of school-aged children must come with
excellent childcare, parenting training, drug rehab, intensive
supports, including “Individualized Educational Plan” (“IEP”)
or “Section 504” and related educational support for the children. Navigating the IEP and 504 maze is beyond the ken of
most housed parents. It is daunting in the extreme for homeless parents.
3. There will need to be a formula for distributing particularly
difficult groups, whom smaller communities cannot manage
(severely mentally ill people, pedophiles released from jail,
people who simply refuse to follow any rules, etc.). Along the
lines of other social programs, these more difficult populations would have to come with higher federal/state subsidies
and a detailed management program, developed by experts.
Within these basic requirements, state and local governments would
be authorized to make public-policy-driven housing choices and to
make targeted investments. Thus, a community might choose among
the following:
1. Prioritize public subsidized stick-built housing for families
with school-age children. Federal incentives might also provide for larger metro areas to establish this type of housing
in cities with the highest rated school districts.
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a. Intensive parenting education, support, interventions,
high quality day care, high quality before/after school care—
both linked to children’s and science museums, outdoor
programs,58 etc.; with skilled navigators to ensure IEP/504
and related educational services happen, to cut through
the inevitable red tape and bureaucracy.
b. There might be extra, targeted funding for public schools
serving these housing developments.
2. Prioritize SROs59 for veterans without school-age children
with whom they live.
a. Shared experiences may contribute to sense of community
and improve chances of success.
b. Provide targeted veterans’ services.
3. Establish a youth-hostel model for homeless youth aging out
of foster care with no social skills and little to no connection
with society.
a. Provide intensive targeted services.
b. Promote GED and college programs, with educational supports to provide youth with the best chance of success and
integration into society.
4. Establish a youth hostel model or SROs for elderly retiring
with inadequate savings to afford private housing.
a. Fund basic activities akin to “elder hostel” adventures available at low or no cost.
b. Connect to appropriate volunteer opportunities.
c. Provide geriatric medical services, onsite.
5. Establish RV/tent/tiny house communities for other populations with drug rehab/job counseling/social services where
the services come to them—and it is the social service provider who has the responsibility for managing those contacts.
These communities will likely serve the majority of homeless
people.
a. These places could have progressive levels of security to
address segments of the population who refuse or are unable to follow society’s rules. That population who cannot
58. Featured Programs, TRACKERS PORTLAND, https://trackerspdx.com/ (last visited
Sept. 24, 2021).
59. SROs are single room occupancy residences with individual bathrooms, but shared
eating and communing facilities.
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follow rules due to mental illness should be place in facilities where they can be treated. People who simply refuse
to follow rules must either find a private arrangement on
their own or accept the adequate, but modest, living situation the public provides, which would be tailored to this
population.
b. Some housing should be tailored to persons with serious
mental illness who can safely live outside of an institutionalized setting, but need help with medication management.
Federal laws would restore funding for institutionalized care for
persons with serious mental illness that cannot be safely managed
in less secure environments. And then each state would be expected
to use that money to establish an adequate number of federally
funded mental institutions, where the seriously mentally ill can be
treated and, if untreatable, where they humanely stay until unsupervised treatment is possible. Organizations with specialty in the
unique problems suffered by the severely mentally ill would establish,
manage, and oversee the protocols.
Federal law should adjust the “danger to oneself or others standard” so it is actually possible to commit seriously mentally ill people
to treatment who need it, for so long as they need it. Now it is said
that to be committed, a person either has to be actually actively trying
to kill her doctor or actively trying to kill herself in front of her doctor
to meet the standard. And almost no one meets it. As a consequence,
the seriously mentally ill are doomed to roam the streets where they
are abused, killed, and sometimes, commit crimes.
The federal government would also introduce something like the
Works Project Administration to put people to work in reasonable
paying jobs to fix ailing infrastructure, construct new housing (whatever that might look like), and retrain people whose jobs have been
lost or will be lost to automation. The people who would be put to
work should include otherwise homeless people, with the goal being
to (1) teach them job skills, (2) enable them to get experience and
references, to be able to succeed, and (3) reconnect with American
society and see themselves as important contributors to it.
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XI. THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF A 2021 FEDERAL NEW DEAL WOULD BE
STABILIZING AMERICAN SOCIETY AND BENEFITTING ALL AMERICANS
Homelessness is a critical social problem that divides us. Solving
it allows us to return to being a nation of people invested in the
future of our great country. In his inauguration speech for his third
term, FDR made poignant observations about the expected results
of his “second bill of rights” which included the right to decent
housing. They are repeated in closing here:
All of these rights spell security. And . . . we must be prepared
to move forward, in the implementation of these rights, to new
goals of human happiness and well-being.
America’s own rightful place in the world depends in large part
upon how fully these and similar rights have been carried into
practice for our citizens. For unless there is security here at
home there cannot be lasting peace in the world.
....
I ask the Congress to explore the means for implementing this
economic bill of rights—for it is definitely the responsibility of
the Congress so to do. . . .60

Committing to solving our homelessness crisis would go a long
way toward re-establishing a United States in which all citizens see
themselves as vital parts. But it seems certain that it will take an
act of Congress to achieve that.

60. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, State of the Union Address
(Jan. 11, 1944) (available at https://www.fdrlibrary.org/address-text).
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INTRODUCTION
Some of the worst atrocities in world history have come when the
masses, or at least a controlling faction, are blinded by what they perceive to be the greater good. “Experience should teach us to be most on
our guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes are
beneficent.”1 Far too often, the pursuit of the perceived collective
good stamps out the fundamental rights of the individuals standing
in its path.2 The rights of the individual become disposable. This
phenomenon is all too real for property owners in the path of eminent domain.3
While the Constitution memorializes the fundamental right to
private property, and specifically just compensation, the collective pursuit of public projects has trampled the rights of individual property
owners. It is for this reason alone that Americans now live under a
Constitution that guarantees just compensation but laws that guarantee otherwise.
The laws have developed to protect the takers, not the individuals
targeted by one of the most invasive powers of government. In the end,
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479, 48 S. Ct. 564 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
2. The U.S. Supreme Court recently declared: “The Founders recognized that the protection of private property is indispensable to the promotion of individual freedom.” Cedar Point
Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2071 (2021). It then noted that “protection of property rights
is ‘necessary to preserve freedom’ and ‘empowers persons to shape and to plan their own
destiny in a world where governments are always eager to do so for them.’” Id.
3. State Highway Dep’t v. Branch, 152 S.E.2d 372, 374 (Ga. 1966) (recognizing that “[t]oo
often . . . the desire of the average citizen to secure the blessings of a good thing . . . blinds them
to a consideration of the property owner’s right to be saved from harm by even the government”).
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the thirst for public projects and the zeal to attain them has left the
individual property owner—the prey in the property rights contest—
in the most precarious position.
For those on the outside looking in or who have never had their
property targeted by eminent domain, these claims may seem surreal. To those who wield the powerful stick of eminent domain, these
claims may seem overstated. To individuals on the opposite end of
that stick, these claims are real; they are truth.4
While practitioners and academics alike can argue over theory or
what the law should be, the law is what it is. This Article sheds light
on the actual state of eminent domain law and the burdens courts
have imposed on owners in America’s eminent domain courts today.
Imagine being told that you have to sell part of your property to
your neighbor. You do not have a choice. The neighbor can put the
burden of proving the value of the property on you, and, if you do not
meet that burden, the neighbor gets to name the price. In setting the
price, you cannot consider actual damages that will be inflicted to the
property that you will be left with after the sale. You have to live with
these damages forever and without compensation.
Property owners forced to sell their property under eminent domain
do not have to imagine this scenario. They live it. The only difference
is that the neighbor in the hypothetical is the government.
Owners seeking just compensation must overcome many hurdles,
some of which are insurmountable. This Article does not cover all
the burdens these owners shoulder, only some of the most glaring
ones. The hope is that the reader will gain better understanding into
what owners face each day in courts throughout America.
4. Part of the problem facing property owners today may be much deeper rooted, stemming
from the denial of absolute truth and the abandonment of fixed, enduring principles. This
departure presents a discussion far beyond the pages of this Article, but, suffice it to say,
denial of the existence of certain fixed principles is also a denial of gravity. As the late Ravi
Zacharias pointed out when touring the Wexner Center for the Performing Arts at Ohio State
University, “America’s first deconstructionist building,” the architect did not use the same
principles in constructing the foundation that he did in building the truth-defying parts of the
building. RAVI ZACHARIAS, CAN MAN LIVE WITHOUT GOD 21 (1st ed. 1994). So, too, a legal system cannot stand on any foundation other than those fixed, enduring truths our Founders
etched into our constitutional form of government. Recognition of the individual’s inalienable
rights—fixed, enduring rights that come from God, not government—is an individual’s only
defense against the masses, those in power, or the collective desire to achieve the prevailing
“greater good” of the moment.
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I. A REVIEW OF THE COMMON OWNER’S EXPERIENCE
REVEALS THE OWNER’S PLIGHT
The following scenario illuminates the owner’s plight in eminent
domain cases. A city land agent sends you a letter, stating he would
like to speak with you about a sewage project that will affect your
home. You call the number on the letter and schedule a meeting with
the land agent.
During the meeting, the land agent tells you the city is going to
build a sewage treatment plant about 150 feet from your front door.
He also says the city cannot build the sewage plant without taking
some of your front yard. The land agent then pulls out a map to show
you a drawing of the project. The map shows that, after the project,
your home will face the sewage pond. The pond will be located on
the neighbor’s property just on the other side of your property line.
It also shows that the service road for the sewage pond will run
through your front yard.
Before this project, you had a home on one acre with a front yard
covered in mature trees and landscaping. The trees provided privacy,
peace, and tranquility. After the project, this buffer will be gone. You
will have a view of the sewage pond and will have to endure its attendant odors.
You ask, “What happens if I do not want to sell part of my front
yard?” The agent responds, “Then we will have to take it.” After he
is finished explaining the project, the agent says he will come back
later with an offer. He gives you a copy of the map and leaves.
Several weeks pass, and the land agent calls to schedule another
meeting. During this meeting, the agent informs you the city is offering only $15,000 for the quarter acre of your yard that is needed
for the project. When you ask about the depreciation in the value of
your home after the taking (i.e., damages), he says the city cannot
pay you for that because only the service road will be located on the
quarter acre the city is taking from you. He explains that no part of
the sewage pond will be on your property.
The agent is very sympathetic and tells you he is sorry. He acknowledges your property will not be nearly as desirable or valuable
after the project. However, he explains that he has to follow the law.
He says the city has to be able to explain any purchase to its taxpayers
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and its auditors so the city must be careful not to pay any more than
it is legally required to pay.
He informs you that in your jurisdiction, the government, unlike a
private developer or a private party building a similar project, does
not have to pay for certain damages it causes when it takes property
by eminent domain. He explains that because only the service road,
as opposed to the sewage pond itself, is on the quarter acre the city
is taking from you, the city cannot compensate you for the loss in
value of your home caused by being next to a sewage pond.
You ask, “I cannot get paid for the loss in value caused by your
project for which you are taking my front yard?” The agent seems
very sympathetic but again explains the city cannot pay for any
depreciation in value that it is not legally required to pay. Unfortunately, according to the agent, you cannot get compensated for the
depreciation in your home, even if you would get compensated for
this reduction in value if you voluntarily sold your property to a
developer or private party that was doing a similar project.
You are shocked, but the worst is yet to come. You cannot believe
the government gets a condemnation discount and that you have to
bear that loss. You then say, “Well, even if I cannot be reimbursed for
the damage caused by the sewage pond, the quarter acre you are
taking is worth $30,000, not $15,000.” The agent then says the most
he can offer is $20,000. He explains that other owners have settled
with the city and that you will have to hire an attorney and go to
court if you do not accept the city’s offer. He explains, albeit sympathetically, that you will not be compensated for those expenses.
The agent leaves, and you immediately call an attorney. The attorney proceeds to inform you that, yes, you can go to court. However,
the burden of proving the value of your property is on you. Moreover,
even if you prove the city is wrong—i.e., that the land taken from you
is worth $30,000, not just $15,000 or $20,000—you will have to pay
attorneys, appraisers, and any other necessary experts. The city does
not have to reimburse you for these costs, even if you prove the city
is wrong or unreasonable. Thus, there is no way you can end up
with the value of your property even it is truly worth $30,000.
The attorney informs you that he disagrees with the agent’s statement that the depreciation in the value of your property after the
taking is not compensable. He then says, however, that some courts
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have ruled otherwise. He explains that some courts do not allow owners to consider many facts that ordinary buyers and sellers would
consider—facts appraisers would also consider in ordinary appraisals.
Worse yet, the attorney explains that the city can take your property now, build its sewage plant, and pay you later. Unlike a normal
sale, you may not get paid until months after your property is taken.
It may take twelve to twenty-four months or longer for you to receive the full value of your property. The only saving grace for you
is that, unlike some of your neighbors, your home is not being taken.
Thus, you do not have to vacate your home before the government
pays you the full value.
This scenario would not leave most owners feeling good about their
government or their courts. The fundamental unfairness is obvious.
Yet, this scenario is exactly the one courts have sanctioned for years.5
It is precisely what property owners face in some jurisdictions.
II. THE LAW PLACES THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE INDIVIDUAL
WHOSE PROPERTY IS TAKEN, NOT ON THE TAKER
Owners are different from all other defendants under the law. Not
only have they done nothing wrong, but they are not even alleged to
have committed any wrongdoing. As one judge stated:
Every other justiciable controversy of a civil nature arises out of
some prior relationship or contact between the parties. . . . But
in the condemnation proceeding the condemnee (who is actually
the defendant although in this state forced to assume plaintiff’s
burdens) has admittedly done no wrong, broken no promises and
committed no negligence. He has only exercised his constitutional
right to possess property—which in the condemnation situation,
unfortunately, is property coveted by another.6

Eminent domain is a forced sale imposed upon the owner. Yet, the
law in many jurisdictions puts the burden of proof on the owner whose
property is taken. The Wyoming Supreme Court recently observed:
5. This scenario continues to shed the legal profession in a negative light. To the average
person, it is an indictment on the attorneys that perpetuate such a system and on the courts
that allow it to continue. To those outside the system, it reveals an utter lack of common sense
and defies any notion of justice.
6. Peel v. Burk, 197 N.W.2d 617, 621–22 (Iowa 1972) (Reynoldson, J., dissenting).
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The landowner has the burden at trial to establish the amount
of just compensation. The landowners in eminent domain cases
have the burden of proving the just compensation to which they
are entitled. This is the general rule. This is not an idle statement
of a rule meant to be disregarded. This is true in both inverse condemnation actions, such as this case, and in formal eminent
domain proceedings, which this case was not.7

Although the condemnee is the one who has his property taken
against his will, “the burden as to value is on the condemnee.”8 “The
burden of proving the value of the land taken is on the landowner.”9
If the owner cannot overcome the legal burden, he has to surrender
his property at the government’s price. Leave it to politicians and
lawyers to think such a system is fair!
In all other legal disputes, plaintiffs bear the burden of proof. The
government likewise bears the burden in other cases in which it
exerts its power over the citizen. That is not the situation in eminent domain cases in many jurisdictions.
Placing the burden on the owner may seem benign. It is not. For
example, in many cases, the government does not even attempt to
value the entire disputed property. It just summarily states there
is no impact to certain portions of the property and refuses to make
the owner an offer that includes the impact to the entire property.10
Owners in such situations have no choice but to fight. The only way
7. Byrnes v. Johnson Cnty. Commissioners, 2020 WY 6, ¶ 26, 455 P.3d 693, 700 (Wyo.
2020). Many condemnors attempt to place an even heightened or more exacting burden of proof
on the owner. See Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. LEJ Investments LLC, 2018 UT App 213, ¶ 22, 437
P.3d 569, 574 (stating that while “[t]he burden of showing the damages which the owner will
suffer rests on him[,]” the owner “need only do so with reasonable certainty rather than with
absolute precision”).
8. Religious of Sacred Heart of Texas v. City of Houston, 836 S.W.2d 606, 613 (Tex.
1992); Stephens Prod. Co. v. Larsen, 2017 OK 36, ¶ 13, 394 P.3d 1262, 1267 (“Once the condemnor proves the validity of the taking, the burden shifts to the landowner to prove the fair
market value of the property.”). Some courts have held that neither party bears the burden
of proving the value of the property that is taken, the owner bears the burden of proving the
value of the damage to the property remaining after the taking, and the condemnor bears the
burden of proving enhancement. Hamer v. Sch. Bd. of Chesapeake, 240 Va. 66, 72, 393 S.E.2d
623, 627 (1990).
9. United States v. 69.1 Acres of Land, 942 F.2d 290, 292 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing United
States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 274, 63 S. Ct. 1047, 1052 (1943)); but see Dep’t
of Pub. Works & Buildings v. Bloomer, 28 Ill. 2d 267, 270, 191 N.E.2d 245, 248 (1963) (“While
the condemnor bears the burden of proving the value of the land actually taken, the owner
bears the burden of proof in seeking to recover for damage to the remainder.”).
10. See Comm’r of Highways v. Karverly, Inc., 295 Va. 380, 813 S.E.2d 322 (2018).
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the impact to the entire property will be assessed in such cases is if
the owner hires his own attorney and appraiser.
Even an owner with the resources to obtain legal counsel and
valuation experts still does not enter the courtroom as an equal.
They enter with a burden. This burden is especially onerous because
“no private purse can compete with the public treasury in the hiring
of counsel and expert witnesses.”11 Owners who do not (or cannot)
hire counsel enter the courtroom alone, forced to overcome the
burden themselves.
In jurisdictions like Virginia, the law saddles the owner with all the
disadvantages of plaintiffs and all the disadvantages of defendants,
not just the burden of proof.12 No other litigant in the law bears the
burdens of both plaintiff and defendant. The law singles out owners
in eminent domain cases for this dubious distinction.
Owners in such circumstances occupy the most disadvantaged
position any litigant can face. The owner has the burden of proof, but
he or she does not get the first and last word at trial like other litigants who carry the burden. In other legal cases, the plaintiff bears
certain burdens (e.g., burden of proof—substantive burden) while
the defendant bears others (e.g., does not get to speak first or last at
trial—procedural burden).
No principled basis exists for putting owners on a lesser footing
than the taker when it comes to proving the value of the taking. As the
government is forcibly taking the owner’s property against his will,
one might think that the owner would get the benefit of a base
runner in baseball where a tie goes to the runner. At the very least,
the owner should enter the courtroom as an equal when the government forces him into court. Anything less falls short of basic fundamental fairness.13
11. Comm’rs of Lincoln Park v. Schmidt, 386 Ill. 550, 564, 54 N.E.2d 525, 531 (1944).
12. See Commonwealth Transp. Comm’r v. Glass, 270 Va. 138, 149, 613 S.E.2d 411, 417
(2005) (“In a condemnation proceeding, the burden of proof rests upon a landowner to prove
the value of the land taken and the resulting damages.”); Hamer, 240 Va. at 74, 393 S.E.2d
at 628 (stating “it has been the traditional practice in this State for the condemner [sic] to
open and close the argument” and “[r]egardless of the burden of proof . . . the condemner [sic]
has . . . the right to open and close”).
13. Condemnors such as the government and large utility corporations almost always
have more resources than the individual owner. These entities often have trade organizations
and other groups, such as a league of municipalities and the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America. These entities pool resources to fund lobbying efforts, to conduct market
and appraisal studies they can use against owners, and to engage in other activities the
typical owner cannot afford. In fact, condemnors often argue that an owner should not be able
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III. THE LAW DENIES THE PROPERTY OWNER A RIGHT TO A JURY
Despite the Seventh Amendment’s provision guaranteeing the right
to a jury, many courts have denied owners the right to a jury. The
Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “In
Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”14 Yet,
the U.S. Supreme Court has stated “there is no constitutional right
to a jury in eminent domain.”15
The law has preserved the right to trial by jury since the Magna
Carta, which included a right to trial by jury when the King took property.16 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he colonists
brought the principles of Magna Carta with them to the New World,
including that charter’s protection against uncompensated takings
of personal property.”17 Yet, the same courts have rejected the provisions providing a trial by jury when the King took property.
Federal courts have unilaterally denied landowners a right to a
jury. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are court-created rules.
to present evidence of damages unless the owner has a market study like the ones these
organizations have paid tens of thousands of dollars to obtain.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The U.S. Supreme Court long ago stated that suits at
common law
meant . . . not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and
settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and
determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were
recognized, and equitable remedies were administered; or where, as in the admiralty, a mixture of public law, and of maritime law and equity was often found
in the same suit.
Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson, 28 U.S. 433, 447 (1830) (emphasis in original).
15. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 18, 90 S. Ct. 803, 806 (1970); Bauman v. Ross,
167 U.S. 548, 593, 17 S. Ct. 966, 983, 42 L. Ed. 270 (1897) (“By the Constitution of the United
States, the estimate of the just compensation for property taken for the public use, under the
right of eminent domain, is not required to be made by a jury, but may be entrusted by Congress
to commissioners appointed by a court or by the executive, or to an inquest consisting of more
or fewer men than an ordinary jury.”); Welch v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 108 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir.
1939) (explaining owners have no right to a jury because eminent domain proceedings are
statutory proceedings and not suits at common law); City of Perris v. Stamper, 1 Cal. 5th 576,
593, 376 P.3d 1221, 1229 (2016) (“The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
does not guarantee landowners a jury trial in eminent domain proceedings.”).
16. See MAGNA CARTA (1215) §§ 39, 52; see also Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 358,
135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426, 192 L. Ed. 2d 388 (2015) (“The colonists brought the principles of Magna
Carta with them to the New World, including that charter’s protection against uncompensated
takings of personal property.”); Baron de Bode’s Case, 8 Q.B. Rep. 208 (1845) (involving a
“petition of right,” an English common law action akin to inverse condemnation, for which
there was a right to a jury); Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5, 1787 WL 6 (1787).
17. Horne, 576 U.S. at 358, 135 S. Ct. at 2426.
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Rule 71.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly denies
owners the right to a jury. It gives federal judges the power to reject
an owner’s request for a jury and instead appoint three commissioners to determine just compensation.18
Even in cases where a court empanels a jury, the court may nevertheless deny the owner a right to a jury through its rulings. When
judges substitute their appraisal opinion for that of the independent
appraisal expert, they invade the province of the jury.19 Different
appraisers rarely, if ever, come to the same conclusion of value even
when asked to appraise the same property on the same day.20 This
result holds true among different appraisers hired by the same party,
such as when the condemnor hires multiple appraisers to value the
same property.
The appraisers also frequently employ different appraisal methodologies, techniques and approaches. One appraiser may use the
sales and cost approaches to measure value. Another appraiser may
use the sales and income approaches. Even when different appraisers
each use the sales approach, they often use different sales. These differences confirm what many courts have come to acknowledge: appraising is not a science but an art.21 Just because two appraisers use
different valuation approaches, different methodologies or techniques,
or different sales does not mean one appraiser did something inappropriate or that one appraisal is contrary to approved and accepted
18. See FED. R. CIV. P. 71.1(h)(2)(A) (“[I]f a party has demanded a jury, the court may instead
appoint a three-person commission to determine compensation.”).
19. Miss. State Highway Comm’n v. Terry, 288 So. 2d 465, 466–67 (Miss. 1974) (explaining that, although appraisals vary widely, the court cannot “substitute [its] judgment for that
of the jury” and that “resolution of fact issues is left to a jury of laymen” even if the court
disagrees with their opinion).
20. Terry, 288 So. 2d at 466 (“An opinion of a real estate appraiser as to land values is not
a matter so apodictically exact as not to be susceptible, in all honesty, to wide variation from
that of his fellows.”).
21. United States v. 1,378.65 Acres of Land, 794 F.2d 1313, 1318–19 (8th Cir. 1986)
(“Appraising real estate is more an art than a science; it is incapable of mathematical
precision and implicates methods of judgment.”); see also United States v. 5.65 Acres of Land,
No. 7:08-CV-00202, 2020 WL 5105206, *9 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2020); Ohio Dep’t of Nat. Res.
v. Thomas, 2016-Ohio-8406, ¶ 118, 79 N.E.3d 28, 52 (stating that “both parties stressed [that
appraising] was more “art than science” and explaining that “specific tests or procedures”
used for scientific experts “would not seem to coincide precisely with an appraisal opinion”);
Powell v. Kelly, 223 So. 2d 305, 309 (Fla. 1969) (“The appraisal of real estate is an art, not a
science.”); Trustees of Wade Baptist Church v. Miss. State Highway Comm’n, 411 So. 2d 761,
763 (Miss. 1982) (“[V]aluation of real estate may be an art, but it is not an exact science.”).
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appraisal methodology. Similarly, just because two appraisers arrived
at widely differing opinions of value does not mean one appraiser
violated approved and accepted appraisal methodology.22
In United States v. 5.65 Acres of Land, rather than attacking the
owner’s appraisal opinion through cross-examination, the United
States sought to summarily exclude it so that the jury could not hear
it. The court denied the government’s attempt, stating:
The United States appears to be attacking [the appraiser’s] assessment of $25,000 per acre as arbitrary when $14,000 per acre
could also have been selected within the bracket, but this attack
amounts to a complaint that appraisals are not capable of mathematical precision. “[T]here are no infallible means for determining
with absolute conviction what a willing buyer would have paid
a willing seller for the condemnee’s property at the time of taking.”
Appraisals are “more an art than a science; it is incapable of mathematical precision and implicates methods of judgment.” [The
appraiser’s] judgment rests on comparable sales; it is not invented
out of whole cloth. Accordingly, the United States’ attack goes to
Defendant’s expert’s factual credibility, not admissibility. [The
appraiser’s] valuation would inevitably rest on his judgment in
any case. That [the appraiser] ultimately chose a number does
not signify that his expert opinion is inadmissible.23

Courts have almost universally recognized that the determination of
market value amounts to an educated guess.24 “Appraising real estate is more an art than a science; it is incapable of mathematical
precision and implicates methods of judgment.”25 It “involves, at best,
a guess by informed persons.”26
22. See United States v. 0.376 Acres of Land, 838 F.2d 819, 827 (6th Cir. 1988) (explaining
that different appraisers can arrive at differing values even when they each use accepted
appraisal methodology and approaches). “[T]he accepted valuation approaches do not result
in absolute property values and thus provide a margin of latitude within which the conclusion
of different qualified appraisers acting in good faith could vary.” Id.
23. 5.65 Acres of Land, 2020 WL 5105206, at *9 (footnotes omitted).
24. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6, 69 S. Ct. 1434, 1438 (1949)
(“[S]ince a transfer brought about by eminent domain is not a voluntary exchange, this amount
can be determined only by a guess, as well informed as possible, as to what the equivalent
would probably have been had a voluntary exchange taken place.”).
25. 1,378.65 Acres of Land, 794 F.2d at 1318–19; 0.376 Acres of Land, 838 F.2d at 825 (“It
is true generally, however, that “[a]ppraising real estate is more an art than a science; it is
incapable of mathematical precision and implicates methods of judgment.”).
26. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375, 63 S. Ct. 276, 280 (1943).
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The market may ultimately prove one appraiser’s opinion right
(or closer to right), but it does not mean the other appraiser did something wrong. Varying opinions between appraisers is no different
than what occurs in the marketplace where market participants
exercise differences of opinions each day. Indeed, the one thing that
separates the most successful developers or investors from others is
the ability to see value or potential where others do not (or to identify risk where others do not see it).
Cases involving scientific expert opinions stand in stark contrast
to contests between varying appraisal or valuation opinions.27 Some
courts have recognized that imposing scientific standards on appraisal opinions invades the province of the jury by substituting the
judge’s opinion for that of the valuation expert.
The value of property taken by the Government, which is no longer
on the market, is largely a matter of opinion. Since there are no
infallible means for determining with absolute conviction what a
willing buyer would have paid a willing seller for the condemnee’s
property at the time of taking, eminent domain proceedings commonly pit the Government’s valuation experts against those of the
landowner. Thus, the exclusion of one or all of either party’s proposed experts can influence substantially the amount of compensation set by the factfinder. Not only does the landowner have a
strong interest in receiving just compensation for property, the
public as well has vested interests in insuring that the Government
does not pay more than what the owner justly requires. Recognizing the critical role of expert witnesses in these cases and the
strong interest on both sides that compensation be just, trial courts
should proceed cautiously before removing from the jury’s consideration expert assessments of value which may prove helpful.28

Denying the owner a trial by jury, whether by general rule or individual ruling, denies the owner his constitutional right to just
27. Buchanan Energy (N), LLC v. Lake Bluff Holdings, LLC, No. 15 CV 3851, 2017 WL
1232973, *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2017) (stating “real estate appraisal is not a branch of social
science,” and therefore, “the court need not apply the same standards of methodological rigor
required of social scientific inquiry.”). It can be difficult for courts to recognize the differences
between expert appraisal opinions and the opinions of scientific experts. Most jurisdictions,
New York being the exception, task their judges with handling all types of legal matters, ranging
from criminal, domestic relations, personal injury, medical malpractice, contracts, business
disputes, and other general types of law to eminent domain and other specialized matters.
28. United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1077–78 (5th Cir. 1996).
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compensation. If a person has a dispute involving a voluntary sale,
he gets a jury in most jurisdictions. It follows that he should not be
denied a jury when he is forced to sell.
[I]n most condemnation cases, the amount of what the award
should be varie[s] widely from witness to witness. . . . [U]nless the
testimony of an expert witness is irrelevant as to the real subject
at hand, which is the true loss of the landowner, it should not be
excluded merely because a witness has arrived at his conclusion
under a theory of compensation not adopted by the other side or
by the district court. . . . And the fact that the other side may not
agree with that theory does not mean that the jury should not
consider the evidence.29

Courts should carefully guard the owner’s constitutional right to
a jury. If one party does not like the other side’s appraisal, the remedy
is vigorous cross-examination. “[T]he trial court’s role as gatekeeper
is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system:
Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”30
IV. THE LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE THE TAKER TO PROVIDE FULL
DISCLOSURE TO THE OWNER—AND REQUIRES THE OWNER TO PAY
FOR SUCH DISCLOSURE WHEN IT IS PERMITTED
Some jurisdictions do not require the takers to disclose the appraisals or other statements of value. At least one state does not even
require the condemnor to make the owner an offer before it takes
the property.31
Federal law requires condemnors to obtain an appraisal and to
provide a copy to the owner.32 However, the same Act that establishes this requirement expressly states that it creates no rights.33
As courts have noted, “the statute [requiring disclosure of appraisals],
29. United States v. 97.19 Acres of Land, 582 F.2d 878, 883 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that
the testimony and opinion of each side’s s appraiser “should have gone to the jury and the jury
then should have made its award”).
30. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d at 1078.
31. See N.C.G.S. § 40A-4 (entitled “No Prior Purchase Offer Necessary”).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 4651.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 4602(a).
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42 U.S.C. § 4651, does not create any substantive rights and . . .
[t]herefore, the federal statute provides no basis for relief.”34
Even in jurisdictions that require disclosure, either under condemnation statutes or open records statutes, condemnors have attempted
to withhold documents related to valuation.35 The fact that the right
to disclosure has long been a contested issue reveals that condemnors
do not typically provide full disclosure unless forced to do so.36
Condemnors have used a multitude of creative arguments in their
attempt to withhold valuation information, but each argument places
the interests of the public collectively over the interests of the individual forced to surrender his or her property. For example, in State
by Commissioner of Transportation v. Hancock, the state argued:
There is a need to strike a balance in these cases between protecting the public fisc and providing a prospective condemnee
with enough information to make a determination whether the
State has made an acceptable offer of compensation. Requiring
the State to furnish its appraisal during pre-litigation negotiations
gives the prospective condemnee the opportunity to structure a
reactive appraisal and thereby to possibly prolong litigation by
seeking an excessive award.37
34. Portland Nat. Gas Transmission Sys. v. 4.83 Acres of Land, 26 F. Supp. 2d 332, 336
(D.N.H. 1998); Clear Sky Car Wash LLC v. City of Chesapeake, 743 F.3d 438, 444 (4th Cir.
2014) (stating “§§ 4651 and 4655 create[ ] no individually enforceable rights . . . [and provides
no] basis for a private action to remedy violations of those sections”); but see Bergano v. City
of Virginia Beach, 241 F. Supp. 3d 690 (E.D. Va. 2017) (finding the owner had a remedy under
the constitutional protections of due process and equal protection even when the Uniform
Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act provided no relief).
If the Act creates no right or enforceable benefits, the owner is left with a hearing before
the very agency that violated his rights. Bergano v. City of Virginia Beach, No. 2:15CV520, 2016
WL 4435330 (E.D. Va. 2016) (explaining the process under the Administrative Procedures Act).
The agency is effectively judge and jury in its own case with limited oversight or judicial review.
35. See, e.g., State v. D’Onofrio, 235 N.J. Super. 348, 355, 562 A.2d 267, 270 (Law Div.
1989) (“[T]he court holds that the reasonable disclosure aspect of bona fide negotiations
requires the condemnor to provide the prospective condemnee with all appraisals in its possession which have been obtained for the purposes of making its condemnation offer.”); but
see State v. Town of Morristown, 129 N.J. 279, 289, 609 A.2d 409, 414 (1992) (stating “DOT
need not disclose neighboring appraisals during the pre-complaint phase of the condemnation
process”); Dep’t of Transp. ex rel. People v. Hunziker, 342 Ill. App. 3d 588, 796 N.E.2d 122
(2003), as supplemented on denial of reh’g (Sept. 10, 2003).
36. See S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Booker, 260 S.C. 245, 195 S.E.2d 615 (1973) (discussing disclosure requirements and citing cases where disputes arose over disclosure); Pinkham
v. Dep’t of Transp., 2016 ME 74, ¶ 5, 139 A.3d 904.
37. 208 N.J. Super. 737, 741, 506 A.2d 855, 858 (Law. Div. 1985), aff’d sub nom, 210 N.J.
Super. 568, 510 A.2d 278 (App. Div. 1985).
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Similarly, in Cartwright v. Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner of Virginia,38 the condemnor argued that owners lose their
rights under the Freedom of Information Act the moment the government takes their property. According to the state in Cartwright, these
owners had to pay attorneys to obtain documents through discovery
even when the owners’ neighbors (whose property was not taken)
could get the same documents for free under the Freedom of Information Act.39 Without disclosure requirements or the ability for
owners to readily obtain valuation documents, owners are forced to
hire attorneys and to engage in costly litigation just to see the government’s documents related to the value of the owners’ property.40
Common sense and fundamental fairness seem to weigh in favor
of disclosure. If the government takes an owner’s property against
his will, is it not fair to at least require the government to show the
owner the documents related to the value of his property? After all,
the owner’s tax money was used, at least in part, to pay for these
documents. Moreover, the Constitution requires the government to
make the owner whole so one would think disclosure is consistent
with this aim. The lack of disclosure and transparency is yet another hurdle owners face—one that leaves an especially bad taste in
the mouths of those forced to surrender their property.
V. THE LAW PLACES UNDUE BURDENS ON OWNERS
A. The Law Allows the Government to Freeze an Owner’s Property
Under a Cloud of Condemnation
The sheer nature of eminent domain works certain hardships that
are seemingly ignored by nearly everyone except the owner and potential buyers or renters of the owner’s property. One such hardship is
the impact from project influence.41 When a condemnor announces
38. 270 Va. 58, 613 S.E.2d 449 (2005).
39. Id.
40. See Hancock, 208 N.J. Super. at 738, 506 A.2d at 856, aff d sub nom, Hancock, 210
N.J. Super. 568, 510 A.2d 278. The fact that an owner’s tax money is used to create documents
about the value of his own property makes the prospect of being denied access to these documents even more difficult to accept.
41. See Reichs Ford Rd. Joint Venture v. State Roads Comm’n of the State Highway Admin.,
388 Md. 500, 511, 880 A.2d 307, 313 (2005) (stating “there are many hidden costs involved in the
acquisition of property by the government for public projects that have not been determined
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a project, it often freezes the properties in the path of the project.
Tenants do not want to rent and buyers do not want to buy properties that are going to be taken. Owners in these situations are left
with properties they cannot rent or sell—and certainly not at market value. Yet, these owners must continue to pay their mortgages,
their taxes, and other holding costs. If they are unable to do so, they
lose their property through default.
This cloud of condemnation that hangs over the property is suffocating to many owners. Consequently, some owners have lost their
property or been forced to sell at extreme discounts while others
suffer immense losses before the condemnation ever occurs.42
In some jurisdictions, the government often sends tenants notices
to vacate before the government ever takes the property. The government even pays the tenants to leave the property before the
government takes it. This scenario leaves the owner with a mortgage and vacant buildings that he or she cannot rent. Owners with
rental property not only lose their property but also their income,
which in some cases is the owner’s sole source of livelihood.
A recent case in North Carolina represents these very real hardships.43 A family owned a multi-unit shopping center. This shopping
center was their sole source of livelihood. They rented several units
and operated their restaurant in another unit. The condemnor sent
the tenants notices to vacate many months before it took the property. The condemnor then paid the tenants to leave the property.
The condemnor subsequently sent a letter to the owners, stating
they could remain in the property for 90 days but were not guaranteed any more time. Again, the condemnor had not taken the property when it sent these notices.
In response to the condemnor’s actions, the owners shut down their
restaurant, auctioned off what items they could (for salvage value),
to be compensable as a matter of common law”); but see Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal.
3d 39, 54, 500 P.2d 1345, 1357 (1972) (recognizing “the cloud of condemnation over property”
targeted for acquisition and acknowledging the loss in use and value of such property).
42. There are legislative means of addressing this problem, although few have sought to
tackle this issue. For example, a condemnor could be required to take properties in the path
of the project within a certain time after the announcement of the project. They could also
mandate a reduction in taxes during the time the property is targeted for acquisition. While
not perfect solutions, such protections would at least ease some of the hardships faced by
those targeted for acquisition.
43. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Hilbert Crossing Plaza, LLC et al., Case No. 20 CVS 00754
(Craven Co. Sup. Court 2020).
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and vacated the property. Two weeks later, the project was suspended.
The owners were left with an empty building, no tenants, no restaurant, no livelihood, no income stream, and a huge mortgage. The
owners also faced the threat of being penalized by the locality if they
did not maintain their now vacant property, and they likewise risked
losing their insurance on the property because insurers often refuse
to insure vacant buildings.44
With the exception of premature notices to vacate, the cloud of
condemnation is a natural, unavoidable consequence of eminent domain, but this fact does not mean it should continue to go unaddressed. Most owners are unable to obtain relief from the debilitating
effects of the cloud of condemnation. “It is well settled that any
harm arising from the mere announcement or pendency of a project
is not compensable. Even the announcement of a projected public
improvement together with the preparation of plans and maps
showing the property in question within the limits of the project,
without interference with the landowner’s use, does not constitute
a present taking.”45
As harm stemming from the “pendency of a project is not compensable,” in most jurisdictions, the owner must wait until the condemnor eventually takes the property before the owner can obtain
compensation. It is true that the compensation the owner ultimately
receives will be based on an amount that does not include the depreciating effects of the project, but owners can recover this amount
only if they are able to hold their property until the condemnor
finally files suit and the case is resolved.
Some states have attempted to address these harms.46 However,
these statutes frequently fail to offer real relief to owners because
the owner must typically prove unreasonable delay or some form of
bad faith, and they typically force owners into protracted litigation.47 When owners are forced to resort to inverse condemnation
44. To its credit, the condemnor in this case voluntarily took measures to rectify the
situation before the owners had to resort to litigation.
45. State v. Westgate, Ltd., 798 S.W.2d 903, 907 (Tex. App. 1990), writ granted (June 5,
1991), aff’d and remanded, 843 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. 1992); see also Atchison etc. Ry. Co. v. S. Pac.
Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 505, 518, 57 P.2d 575, 581 (1936) disapproved of by Klopping, 8 Cal. 3d
39, 500 P.2d 1345.
46. See Reichs Ford Rd. Joint Venture, 388 Md. at 519, 880 A.2d at 318 (stating “[i]n an
attempt to remedy these problems, the [Maryland] Legislature enacted § 12-105(b)”).
47. See W. Va. Dep’t of Transportation v. Pifer, 242 W. Va. 431, 443, 836 S.E.2d 398, 410
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actions for relief, they are not typically well received by the courts.48
The case of Kiriakides v. School District of Greenville County,49 is
indicative of the judicial reception many owners receive when seeking relief through inverse condemnation. There the court stated,
“Construction of public-works projects would be severely impeded if
the government could incur inverse condemnation liability merely
by announcing plans to condemn property in the future.”50 It added
that “changes in value [caused by a public project] are incidents of
ownership.”51 If government were liable, it “would have a devastating
impact on government and its citizens.”52 The court rejected the owner’s argument that the “threat of a condemnation suit stigmatized
his property and that the [condemnor’s] alleged delay in bringing
th[e] action entitled him to damages for an inverse condemnation.”53
As it stands now, owners suffering under the cloud of condemnation
must try to hold on to their property until the condemnor eventually
files its suit and the case is resolved. As explained below, however,
(2019) (“Because some delays relating to public projects are natural and unavoidable, before
a landowner may recover damages for condemnation blight, he or she must establish that
there has been an unreasonable delay in instituting the condemnation proceeding following
its official announcement.”); Pearsall v. Richmond Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 218 Va. 892,
242 S.E.2d 228 (1978); see also Reichs Ford Rd. Joint Venture, 388 Md. at 523, 880 A.2d at 320
(noting that “[i]f lost rental value and other related damages are not recoverable, it might
encourage a condemning authority simply to extend, without justification, the encumbering
period prior to condemnation.”).
48. See Sproul Homes of Nevada v. State, 96 Nev. 441, 443–44, 611 P.2d 620, 621–22 (1980)
(stating that “[i]t is well-established that the mere planning of a project is insufficient to
constitute a taking for which an inverse condemnation action will lie [and that] not every decrease in market value as a result of precondemnation activity is compensable.”); Potomac Dev.
Corp. v. D.C., 28 A.3d 531, 548 (D.C. 2011) (dismissing the owner’s inverse condemnation action
stemming from the cloud of condemnation despite acknowledging that, at least as alleged, the
pending taking hung over the owner’s property like the “Sword of Damocles” and reduced the
income-generating potential of the property “to a small fraction of what it would otherwise
have been”); but see Stone v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. App. 3d 987, 124 Cal. Rptr. 822 (Ct.
App. 1975).
49. 382 S.C. 8, 16–17, 675 S.E.2d 439, 443–44 (2009).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. As this case demonstrates, many modern courts are seemingly more concerned
about the perceived “devastating impact” to the public than what is often an actual “devastating
impact” to the individual owner. This utilitarian approach does not bode well for individual
owners despite the Just Compensation Clause that was supposed to ensure that any owner
forced to surrender his or her property is made whole for such sacrifice.
53. Id. (noting that “impairment of the market value of real property” alone does not give
rise to a cause of action. Id. (citing Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 15, 104
S. Ct. 2187 (1984)).
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even those owners must eventually part with their property at a
condemnation discount.
B. The Law Allows the Condemnor to Take the Owner’s Property
and Pay for It Later—Often Months or Years Later
Unbeknownst to the average citizen, the law allows condemnors
to take property and pay for it long after it is taken.54 This process
is called the quick take power. The condemnor files a document in
court and deposits into court what it claims to be the value of the
property taken. The condemnor gets title and possession of the owner’s
property the moment it files these documents.
The quick take power is especially burdensome when the government’s deposit is less than the owner’s mortgage. The mortgage company gets the money, leaving the owner with the remaining balance
on the mortgage, no property (whether it is a home or business), and
the need to find a new place to go. Owners in this predicament are
saddled with (1) two mortgages—the one on the property taken and
the one on the new property to which they relocate—if they can get
financing under these circumstances or (2) a mortgage and a lease—
the mortgage on the property taken and a lease on the new property
to which they relocate.55 Needless to say, this scenario puts inordinate pressure on owners hoping to hang on long enough to obtain
just compensation.
As courts have long upheld the use of quick take power that allows government to take property long before it pays the owner just
compensation, condemnors routinely exercise this well-entrenched
power.56 Who would not take property now and pay for it later if they
54. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 381, 63 S. Ct. 276, 283–84 (1943) (explaining the
process and purpose of the quick take power); see also Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. 1, 104 S. Ct. 2187
(discussing the process for the exercise of the quick take power).
55. Some condemnors may argue that the relocation statutes help offset some of these
burdens on owners, but, as explained earlier, courts have held that the relocation statutes are
a matter of legislative grace and that these statutes create no rights and are unenforceable.
See Clear Sky, 743 F.3d at 444.
56. See, e.g., Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 399, 16 S. Ct. 43, 48 (1895) (holding it is permissible for a condemnor to take property before just compensation is ultimately paid to the owner);
see also State Highway Dep’t v. Mitchell’s Heirs, 142 Tenn. 58, 216 S.W. 336 (1919); City of
Richmond v. Dervishian, 190 Va. 398, 411 (1950) (citing Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203
(1945); Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57 (1919)) (“That the requirements of due process do not
inhibit the sovereign from taking physical possession of private property for public use in a
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had the power to do so? Even when the legislature has not authorized certain condemnors to exercise the extraordinary quick take
power, courts have judicially granted this power.57
Courts have largely ignored or discounted the hardships the quick
take power imposes upon owners. For example, the condemnor may
abandon the project after it takes the owner’s property but before it
pays the owner. This situation recently occurred when Dominion Energy and Duke Energy abandoned their multistate pipeline project—
the Atlantic Coast Pipeline.58 It is little solace to owners that they may
recover damages if a condemnor, such as Dominion, has already razed
buildings or cut through their land.59
Such abandonment is not mere speculation; Enron proved no
company is too big to fail, and the Atlantic Coast Pipeline project
proved the same for individual projects. Additionally, in the wake
of COVID-19, condemnors have suspended or abandoned several
projects. Moreover, a condemnor could become insolvent. This fact
is especially concerning with private condemnors, as they are not
backed by the public treasury.
Finally, and as explained above, in situations when the condemnor deposits less money than the owner’s mortgage (i.e., times
of economic downturns or depressed real estate markets), the owner
has to relocate and has to carry the remainder of the mortgage on
the old property. No reasonable owner would sell his or her property
in times of economic downturn unless he or she absolutely had to
sell. Instead, the owner would hold his or her property until the
market recovered. Owners are not given this choice when the power
of eminent domain is exerted upon them, forcing them to sell when
the market is low.60
condemnation proceeding prior to notice to the owner and in advance of a judicial determination of the validity of such taking has been settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court
and the rulings of this court.”).
57. See, e.g., E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that the
court-created rules of civil procedure authorized courts to empower private condemnors to
exercise the quick take power even in the absence of legislative authorization); Transcon. Gas
Pipe Line Co., LLC v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir. 2018); Nexus Gas Transmission,
LLC v. City of Green, 757 F. App’x 489 (6th Cir. 2018).
58. See Dominion Energy and Duke Energy Cancel the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, DOMINION
ENERGY (July 5, 2020), https://news.dominionenergy.com/2020-07-05-Dominion-Energy-and
-Duke-Energy-Cancel-the-Atlantic-Coast-Pipeline (announcing cancellation of the project).
59. Sage, 361 F.3d at 826 (stating “the company would be liable to the landowner for . . .
any damages” if it abandoned its project after taking the property).
60. Imagine if the government could seize investment accounts when the market is low.
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In at least one state, the law did not require condemnors to give
owners notice when it took their property by quick take. Until 2017,
Virginia law did not require the government to tell the owner when
it took the owner’s property.61 Unless the government benevolently
sent a copy of the certificate it filed when it took the property, owners would not know the government had taken their property until
the bulldozers arrived. Before the Virginia General Assembly enacted laws requiring notice, the government vehemently defended
its right to take property without notice.62
The Virginia Commissioner of Highways asserted that owners
could check the courthouse records or call the highway department
if they wanted to know if the Commissioner had taken their property.63 The Commissioner’s position is indicative of the attitude some
condemnors have toward owners.
First, the Virginia Commissioner of Highways argued that the
Constitution does not require condemnors to give owners notice
when it takes their property by quick take.64 The Commissioner
went so far as to argue that it does not have to give owners notice of
the taking even after it takes the property. It stated: “The only
question before the Court is whether post-recordation notice that a
certificate has been recorded is constitutionally required. The answer to that question is clear—it is not.”65 In its subsequently filed
Reply brief, the Commissioner added, “While other forms of notice
are obviously preferred, commencement of construction activity
provides yet another form of notice that a certificate has been recorded”—i.e., the owner will know when the bulldozers arrive.66
Public outcry would almost certainly ensue. The result is no different when the government
takes homes and business properties when the real estate market is low.
61. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 25.1-306, 33.2-1020 (requiring condemnors to provide notice to
the owner).
62. The Commissioner’s strenuous opposition to a legal notice requirement was even more
telling given the fact that notice would cost the Commissioner only the price of a postage stamp.
The Commissioner argued that he gave owners notice as a matter of policy, which several
owners contested, but the Commissioner apparently did not want to be legally bound to do so.
63. Comm’r of Highways Memo. in Support of his Demurrer and Plea in Bar at 7,
Pahlavani et al. v. Comm’n of Highways, Case No. 96850 (Loudoun Co. Cir. Court 2016)
[hereinafter Comm’r of Highways Memo] (contending “the Landowners could easily determine
whether a certificate has been recorded—by checking the land records or simply asking VDOT”).
64. Id. at 12–14.
65. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
66. Comm’r of Highways Reply Memo. at 11 n.14, Pahlavani et al. v. Comm’n of Highways,
Case No. 96850 (Loudoun Co. Cir. Court 2016).

198

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:177

Second, the Commissioner was so resolute in his position that owners are not entitled to notice that he asserted the owner’s suit demanding such notice was unnecessary and a waste of judicial resources.67
The Commissioner stated: “The Commissioner hopes the Court will
press the Landowners to explain why they even filed their lawsuit. It
seems unnecessary . . . and both the Court and the Commissioner
could better devote resources elsewhere.”68 In other words, how dare
a landowner demand to receive notice when the Commissioner takes
his property!
Third, the Commissioner contended that courts should not give
strict scrutiny to statutes infringing on property rights even though
the Commissioner admitted that Virginians amended their constitution in 2012 to expressly affirm that private property is a “fundamental right.”69 According to the Commissioner, other fundamental
rights should get strict scrutiny, but not property rights.
While the court in Pahlavani did not agree with the Commissioner’s arguments, at least one Virginia court found no problem with
the lack of notice in Virginia’s statutes.70 Apparently, the arrival of
the bulldozers was good enough. Thankfully for Virginians, as multiple lawsuits challenging the lack of notice were making their way
through the legal system, the Virginia General Assembly decided to
correct this obvious problem.71
The quick take power may allow the government or other condemnors to acquire property more quickly. It may also allow the
government to build its project more quickly. However, the quick
take power sacrifices the rights and concerns of the owner on the
altar of expediency. Once again, individual owners suffer uncompensated losses for the alleged public good, even when that good is the
profit of a private company.72
67. Comm’r of Highways Memo, supra note 63, at 6.
68. Comm’r of Highways Memo, supra note 63, at 6.
69. Comm’r of Highways Memo, supra note 63, at 17–18 (stating “the Court should not
use the ‘strict scrutiny’ test” even though “Article I, Section 11 [of the Virginia Constitution as
amended in 2012] now characterizes the right to private property as being a fundamental right”).
70. Order, Gottlieb v. City of Suffolk, Case No. CL16-208 (City of Suffolk Cir. Ct. Dec. 20,
2016) (sustaining the city’s Plea in Bar asserting that notice is not legally required).
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1-306 (2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 33.2-1020 (2021).
72. Gas companies asking courts for the quick take power often argue that having to take
property through the normal eminent domain process would result in increased costs for their
projects. These companies contend that they need the owners’ properties immediately—before
the companies pay the amount determined to be just compensation. Rather than require these
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VI. THE LAW ALLOWS THE GOVERNMENT TO ENGAGE IN COERCIVE
TACTICS DESIGNED TO LITIGATE OWNERS INTO SUBMISSION
While some hardships imposed upon owners stem from the unavoidable nature of eminent domain, others are the direct and deliberate
result of the government’s actions. The lack of disclosure is not the
sole way that some condemnors play “fast and loose” with owners.
For years, some condemning authorities have engaged in a litigation
tactic that owners and their counsel have affectionately dubbed “the
leg sweep” or “the bait and switch.”73
Here is how this tactic works. The condemnor obtains an appraisal
and makes the owner an offer. If the owner rejects the offer, the
condemnor deposits its appraised value into court and immediately
takes title and possession of the owner’s property. The owner has to
leave the property. After the owner vacates the property but before
trial, the condemnor obtains a lower appraisal, often from a select
group of appraisal firms.
The condemnor then tells the owner that he must accept the first
appraised amount or have to pay money back to the condemnor—if
the court awards the property for an amount less than the amount
the condemnor previously said the property was worth. Moreover,
the condemnor asks the court to exclude any evidence of the original
appraisal the condemnor used when it evicted the owner. The condemnor does not want the jury to hear about its original opinion of
value or the amount it previously stated was just compensation and
paid into court.
This practice is extremely coercive, as the owner faces the prospect
of having to pay back the money he was paid when he had to leave
his property. Oftentimes, the owner has already used this money to
buy his replacement home or business property or to pay toward the
mortgage on the property that was taken. Sometimes the owner is
companies to engage in better planning, courts shoulder individual owners with the burden
of the gas companies’ poor planning and failure to appropriately schedule their projects.
73. See Ramsey v. Comm’r of Highways, 770 S.E.2d 487 (Va. 2015); Coleman v. Miss.
Transp. Comm’n, 159 So. 3d 546, 551 (Miss. 2015); Redding v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 169 So.
3d 958 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014); Dept. of Transp. v. Frankenlust Lutheran Congregation, 711
N.W.2d 453, 460 (Mich. App. 2006); Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Johnson, 780 S.W.2d 326,
330 (Ark. 1989); Thomas v. State, 410 So.2d 3, 5 (Ala. 1981); United States v. 320.0 Acres of
Land, 605 F.2d 762, 825 (5th Cir. 1979); see also NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, Ch. 18
§ 18.12[1] (Matthew Bender, 3d ed., 2013).
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stuck paying two mortgages (i.e., if the amount originally paid was
less than the mortgage)74 until he or she receives full compensation via
a trial or settlement. Under this tactic, the law allows the condemnor
to pay the owner for his property and then renege on the price only
after the condemnor has taken possession and forced the owner to
vacate. This tactic is neither novel nor new. Condemnors have employed it for years.75
As if the bait and switch alone was not bad enough, some lower
courts have not allowed the owner to tell the jury about the condemnor’s original appraisal and statement of value. The only appraisal the jury heard in such instances was the condemnor’s latter,
lower appraisal.76 Fortunately for owners, appellate courts that have
addressed this tactic have seen through it.77 While not forbidding
the tactic, these courts have held that the owner is entitled to tell
the jury about the condemnor’s initial appraisals and statements of
value.78 Thus, the owner is at least entitled to a fair fight in which
the jury is permitted to hear all the evidence, not just the evidence
the condemnor wants it to hear.
While some may argue that this tactic is designed to force owners
to be reasonable, such rationale does not justify the action. No reasonable person permitted to sell his property voluntarily would sell at
the lower end of the price spectrum. He would sell at the highest
price he can get. Since the condemnor’s duty is to make the owner
whole and to place the owner in the same position he would occupy
if the taking had not occurred, the condemnor should not seek to get
the owner to part with his property for the lowest price possible.
Condemnors should not seek to “win” at the owner’s expense. “Just
as the Government’s interest ‘in a criminal prosecution is not that
74. During economic downturns, it is not uncommon for payments to be less than the
mortgage. Eminent domain forces the owner to sell his property during this time, and the
owner is not permitted to hold his property until the real estate market recovers—as he would
without the use of eminent domain to force the sale of his property.
75. See, e.g., 320.0 Acres, 605 F.2d 762.
76. Denying the jury the right to hear evidence about the condemnor’s previous statement
of value effectively perpetrates a fraud on the jury as the jury is asked to make a decision
based on only half the story. Some jurors are none too happy to learn, only after making a
decision, that they were not allowed to hear all the evidence.
77. 320.0 Acres, 605 F.2d at 825 (stating “the Government is not completely free to play
fast and loose with landowners telling them one thing in the office and something else in the
courtroom.”).
78. See, e.g., Ramsey, 770 S.E.2d 487.
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it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done,’ so its interest as
a taker in eminent domain is to pay ‘the full and perfect equivalent
in money of the property taken,’ neither more nor less—not to use an
incident of its sovereign power as a weapon with which to extort a
sacrifice of the very rights the Amendment gives.”79 The bait-andswitch tactic imposes yet another hardship on owners in eminent domain cases, one designed solely to litigate owners into submission.80
VII. THE LAW GUARANTEES THAT OWNERS CANNOT RECOVER
THE MARKET VALUE OF THEIR PROPERTY
The Constitution requires just compensation, yet the law (as applied by the courts) guarantees owners cannot recover the market
value of their property. If the government does not offer to pay market value, owners cannot recover it! The courts treat “Just Compensation” as if it were “just” compensation.
Courts often give flowery rhetoric to the requirements of just
compensation. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that
“‘just compensation’ means the full monetary equivalent of the property taken. The owner is to be put in the same position monetarily
as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken.”81 It
has also declared that just compensation “bar[s] Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”82
79. United States v. Certain Property Located in Borough of Manhattan, 306 F.2d 439,
452–53 (2d Cir. 1962) (citations omitted).
80. The owners did not argue the practice was unlawful but rather that the jury should
be permitted to hear the evidence.
81. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473–74,
93 S. Ct. 791, 794 (1973); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373, 63 S. Ct. 276, 279–80
(1943) (“The owner is to be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if
his property had not been taken.”); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299,
304, 43 S. Ct. 354, 356 (1923) (“The compensation to which the owner is entitled is the full and
perfect equivalent of the property taken. It rests on equitable principles and it means substantially that the owner shall be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have been
if his property had not been taken.”).
82. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S. Ct. 1563, 1569 (1960); United
States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502, 65 S. Ct. 761, 764 (1945) (stating “just
compensation . . . undertakes to redistribute certain economic losses inflicted by public
improvements so that they will fall upon the public rather than wholly upon those who
happen to lie in the path of the project.”). “‘The word ‘just’ in the Fifth Amendment evokes
ideas of ‘fairness’ and ‘equity.’” United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 631, 81
S. Ct. 784, 789 (1961).
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Despite this judicial rhetoric, these same courts have expressed
a willingness to tolerate undercompensation. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declared that takings are not unlawful simply because they fail to fully compensate the owner. The
court noted: “The fact that ‘just compensation’ tends systematically to
undercompensate the owners of property taken by eminent domain
underscores the fact that such a taking is not a wrongful act.”83 The
U.S. Supreme Court announced that it is willing to “tolerate” undercompensation.84 It “acknowledged that, in some cases, th[e] standard [applied by the courts] fails fully to indemnify the owner for his
loss” but then added that it is “willing to tolerate such occasional
inequity . . . because of the need for a clear, easily administrable
rule governing the measure of ‘just compensation.’”85
Thus, the owner’s ability to recover just compensation is dependent upon the benevolence of the taker. Unless a condemnor makes an
owner a fair market value offer (or, in partial taking cases, an offer
that includes the depreciation in the value of the property remaining
after the taking), the owner cannot recover the fair market value of
the property taken from him or her. This statement is not hyperbole;
it is a fact! Owners cannot be said to receive “just compensation” if
they cannot recover (1) the fair market value of the property taken
from them or (2) in partial taking cases, the depreciation in the value
of the property they are left with after the taking (i.e., the difference
in the market value of such property before and after the taking). The
court-created non-compensable damages doctrine and the lack of reimbursement for litigation expenses are the major reasons owners
cannot receive just compensation despite the constitutional mandate.
A. The Court-Created Non-compensable Damages Doctrine Denies
Owners the Ability to Obtain Just Compensation
The reason owners cannot recover just compensation is because
courts have created rules that substitute fictional value for market
value. These rules prohibit jurors from considering facts and circumstances that buyers and sellers would consider in a voluntary sale.
83. United States v. Norwood, 602 F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir. 2010).
84. Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10, 104 S. Ct. 2187, 2194 (1984)
(acknowledging that the law as applied by the courts “does not make the owner whole”).
85. Id.
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Consequently, owners suffer uncompensated damages and depreciation in the value of their property that they would not suffer in a
voluntary sale, i.e., a condemnation discount.
Courts do not deny these damages exist. Rather, they have labeled
them as “non-compensable damages.”86 Condemnors have long seized
on these court-created rules that reduce what condemnors must pay
and that simultaneously shortchange owners.87 Rather than seeking
to fully compensate owners, many condemnors have acquisition manuals with entire chapters dedicated to the damages they can inflict on
owners without compensation, i.e., “non-compensable damages.”88
Courts employing the non-compensable damages doctrine may
claim to use market value as the standard of just compensation, but
they do not. These courts require the parties to substitute fiction for
fact. They require the jury to value the property according to this
fiction.89 They reject ordinary appraisals used in the marketplace and
replace them with eminent domain appraisals that fail to include
the facts and circumstances considered in the marketplace.
Although courts have rejected fair market value in practice, they
have universally professed to adopt fair market value as the standard for determining just compensation for forced eminent domain
sales.90 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “fair market value
constitutes just compensation.”91
86. The principle of just compensation and the notion of non-compensable damages are
mutually exclusive.
87. See, e.g., Utah Dep’t of Transportation v. Target Corp., 2020 UT 10, 459 P.3d 1017
(involving a condemnor arguing for the imposition of non-compensable damages); State by
Humphrey v. Strom, 493 N.W.2d 554, 560 (Minn. 1992); Ryan v Davis, 201 Va. 79, 82, 109
S.E.2d 409, 412 (1959). “Experience has shown all too well the abuses which could thus be
made of the privilege of condemnation.” Comm’rs of Lincoln Park v. Schmidt, 386 Ill. 550, 564,
54 N.E.2d 525. 531 (Ill. 1944).
88. See, e.g., OREGON DEP’T OF TRANSPORTATION RIGHT OF WAY MANUAL, § 5.450 (entitled
“Non-Compensable Damages”); TEXAS ROW APPRAISAL AND REVIEW MANUAL, Chapter 3, § 3
(entitled “Non-compensable Items”).
89. Worse yet for jurors is the fact that they make a decision without even knowing they
were denied the right to hear all the relevant and meaningful evidence.
90. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2015); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S.
369, 373–75, 63 S. Ct. 276, 280 (1943).
91. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 33, 105 S. Ct. 451, 457 (1984); United
States v. 564.54 Acres, 441 U.S. 506, 510–13, 99 S. Ct. 1854, 1857–58 (1979) (stating the court
has adopted “fair market value to determine the condemnee’s loss”); Ne. Ct. Econ. Alliance,
Inc. v. ATC P’ship, 256 Conn. 813, 833, 776 A.2d 1068, 1080 (2001) (“just compensation is
ordinarily calculated by determining the fair market value of the property”).
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There are at least two methods by which just compensation in
partial taking cases can be ascertained. The first is the beforeand-after method of valuation, which computes damages to be
the difference in the value of the entire parent tract before the
taking and the value of the portion remaining after the taking.
The second method computes damages as the value of the actual
land taken plus the diminution in the value of the remaining
land in the parent tract. Both methods take into consideration the
loss of the part taken and severance damages to the remainder
of the property left after the taking.92

In such cases, “[d]amages . . . are to be measured by the difference
in market value of the respondents’ land before and after the interference or partial taking.”93
Just compensation in cases involving a partial taking is generally
the fair market value of the property taken plus all the damages
which the residue suffers, including the diminution of the fair
market value of the remainder. . . . if a condemnor acquires an
easement by eminent domain, just compensation can be no less
92. United States v. 5.65 Acres of Land, No. 7:08-CV-00202, 2020 WL 5105206, at *8 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 31, 2020).
93. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 624–25, 83 S. Ct. 999, 1009 (1963); Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 332, n.27, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1484
(2002) (stating the “underlying purpose of the guarantee that private property shall not be taken
for a public use without just compensation applies to partial takings as well as total takings”);
State ex rel. Miller v. Filler, 168 Ariz. 147, 149, 812 P.2d 620, 622 (1991) (“In determining just
compensation in a partial taking case, Arizona courts consider (1) the market value of the property actually taken by the condemnation and (2) the diminution in the remaining property’s
market value caused by the taking.”); see also State by Comm’r of Transp. v. Weiswasser, 149
N.J. 320, 329, 693 A.2d 864, 868 (1997) (“One of two formulas may be used to calculate just
compensation in a partial-taking case. The first measures damages as the market value of the
land taken plus the difference before and after the taking in market value of the remainder
area. The second set measures damages as the difference between the value of the entire tract
before the taking and the value of the remainder area after the taking.”); W. Va. Dep’t of
Highways v. Bartlett, 156 W. Va. 431, 440, 194 S.E.2d 383, 389 (1973) (“[T]he measure of damages in an eminent domain proceeding where parts of the land are taken is the fair market
value for the land at the time it was taken, plus the difference in the fair market value of the
property claimed to be damaged immediately before and immediately after the taking, less all
benefits which may accrue to the residue from the construction of the improvement for which
the land was taken.”); Kendry v. Div. of Admin., State Dep’t of Transp., 366 So. 2d 391, 393 (Fla.
1978) (stating that, in a partial taking case, “damages to the remainder . . . are measured by
the reduction in value of the remaining property”); Greene v. D.C., 56 A.3d 1170, 1176 (D.C.
2012) (stating “when the government makes only a partial taking, just compensation requires
consideration of any decrease or increase in market value to the land that is untaken”).
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than the difference between the fair market value of the property
before the easement is taken and its market value as burdened
with the easement. . . . determination of just compensation must
be based upon a determination of the fair market value of the
property sought.94

Whether the case involves a full or partial taking or a fee taking
versus an easement taking, courts have adopted the fair market value
standard in their attempt to replicate the marketplace. This standard aims at determining the price a willing buyer and willing seller
would agree upon in a voluntary sale. As market value is the standard, neither the condemnor nor the owner should stand on any better
or worse footing than an ordinary buyer or seller would occupy in a
voluntary sale.
A simple analogy reveals that court-created rules create a fiction
that does not replicate the marketplace, but instead puts the parties
on much different footing than they would occupy in a voluntary
sale. Suppose a developer sought to purchase part of an owner’s
front yard for a sewage plant project to serve the developer’s new
residential community. The developer needed the owner’s property
to build a service road to the sewage plant. Suppose further that,
while the service road will be on the owner’s property, the actual
sewage pond will not be on the owner’s property. The pond will sit
about 100 feet from the owner’s front door but will be physically
located on his neighbor’s property.
In determining the sales price for the land, the owner would
certainly consider the fact that his home will sit next to a sewage
pond after the sale to the developer. The developer could not prohibit the seller from considering this fact. Moreover, the developer
must either pay a price that contemplates this change or build his
service road elsewhere.
If the developer moves the service road onto one of the owner’s
neighbor’s parcel, that neighbor will likewise consider the sewage
plant in setting the sales price. No reasonable owner would sell his
property without considering the fact that his house will sit next to
a sewage plant after the sale. The developer could not force any of the
owners to sell their property without contemplation of the impact
from the project.
94. Unger v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 420 N.E.2d 1250, 1259–60 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
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This result should not be different when it is the government taking
the property by force rather than the developer purchasing it voluntarily. Yet, courts that apply the non-compensable damages doctrine
force owners to sell their property based on a fiction that the project
will not exist and will not impact the property. This approach is not
only contrary to the facts and conditions that actually exist, but it is
also contrary to the way buyers and sellers would value the property
in a voluntary sale as demonstrated in the developer analogy above.
The end result of these court-created rules is that the government
gets a condemnation discount. The government’s discount is the
owner’s loss. The owner is not made whole under such a scenario as
he or she suffers losses he or she would not endure in a market sale.
Courts applying fictional value place the government on better footing than the developer and place the owner on lesser footing than an
owner in a market sale.
For example, if it were the government taking the owner’s property to build a service road to a public sewage plant, some courts
applying the fictional value standard would not allow the parties to
consider the sewage pond. They would not allow the parties to
consider the sewage pond because it is not on the owner’s property.
It would not matter that the government used the owner’s property
for its sewage project just like the developer in the example above
used the owner’s property for his or her sewage project. This analogy reveals that courts are using a fictional value standard rather
than market value.95
The absurdity of the non-compensable damages doctrine was recently borne out in Utah Department of Transportation v. Target
Corp.96 In that case, the condemnor built an interchange with a bridge,
and part of the bridge was on the owner’s property. The condemnor
argued that the court should parse out the different pieces of the
bridge and that the jurors should be able to consider those pieces of
the bridge that were on the owner’s property but not those pieces
that were not.97
95. The fictional value imposed by courts is also unfair to the juror exercising his or her
civic duty who believes he or she has determined market value only to learn after trial that the
jurors were not told the actual facts and conditions of the property as it existed after the taking.
96. 2020 UT 10, 459 P.3d 1017.
97. Id. ¶ 2, 459 P.3d at 1019 (stating the condemnor argued that the owners “had failed
to establish that their severance damages stemmed from the portion of the interchange
situated on the claimants’ property condemned by UDOT”).
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No buyer of the owner’s property after the taking would break the
bridge into parts and only consider those parts that are on the owner’s
property. The arguments in Target stand in stark contrast to the
logical approach illustrated in the developer analogy above. Again,
the developer analogy, unlike the approach urged by the condemnor
in Target, is the approach buyers and sellers use in the marketplace.
Courts have relied upon faulty reasoning to support the noncompensable damages doctrine that results in a fictional value.
These courts have argued that, when only part of an owner’s property is taken, the owner should not receive compensation for damages resulting from the use of his neighbor’s property because the
owner cannot control what the neighbor does on his property.98 These
courts also argue that the owner whose property is taken should not
receive compensation because the neighbors (whose property is not
taken) do not recover such damages.99
The developer analogy above bears out the fallacy in this rationale.
The arguments in support of the non-compensable damages doctrine
are contrary to what happens in the marketplace. Again, if a developer needed part of an owner’s property to build a project, the owner
would not sell his property without considering what the developer
would be doing—regardless whether the project would be entirely, or
only partially, on the owner’s property. Similarly, the developer would
have to pay the person whose property it needed but would not have
to pay the neighbors unless it needed their property, too. None of
the rationale used by the courts support any different result or approach when the government takes an owner’s property by force.
98. Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368, 45 S. Ct. 115 (1924); DuBois v. State, 54
A.D.2d 782, 782, 387 N.Y.S.2d 753, 755 (1976) (stating “damages are plainly limited to those
which arise by reason of the use to which the State puts the property taken and do not encompass those which result from the taking of neighbors’ land”); but see Lee Cnty. v. Exch. Nat.
Bank of Tampa, 417 So. 2d 268, 269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (noting the many exceptions to the
rule); State ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm’n v. Horine, 776 S.W.2d 6, 11–12 (Mo.
1989) (“Considering these rules, we believe the better policy is to permit persons whose land
is taken as part of a single public improvement project and who are part of a condemnation
action to recover their consequential damages even though it is not the taking of their land
that is the direct cause of their damage.”).
99. See Foster v. City of Augusta, 165 Kan. 684, 690–91, 199 P.2d 779, 784 (1948) (“When
it takes only a part of the owner’s property it pays the full price for the part taken and such
damages as result to the owner’s property by reason of the fact that a part of it is taken.
Owners of other property nearby or adjoining that which is taken are not entitled to receive
any compensation, though in fact they may sustain some loss or injury, such being regarded
as consequential and damnum absque injuria.”).
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Ironically, courts have been willing to tolerate inequity among
neighbors when it resulted in lower compensation to the owner but
have rejected supposed inequity when it resulted in higher compensation to the owner.100 In Miller, the Court stated that an owner is
not entitled to recover any increase in value caused by the project
even though his neighbors whose property is not taken get to enjoy
the increase in value. The Court added that the neighbors, unlike
the owner, would be entitled to recover the increased value caused
by the project if their property was later taken by the government.101
Courts have readily acknowledged that, while it may be unequal
to allow consideration of appreciation caused by a public project (i.e.,
enhancement or benefits), it is not unjust. For example, an owner
whose property is taken may suffer $100,000 in damages caused by
the project but those damages are offset by $100,000 in appreciation
also caused by the project. It is a net zero gain or loss for such owner.
Meanwhile, the owner’s neighbor, whose property is not taken, enjoys the full measure of the $100,000 in appreciation caused by the
project because the neighbor did not lose any of his or her property.
Courts have recognized this result is unequal but not unjust.
As the Virginia Supreme Court explained:
It is true the law may operate unequally as most human laws do.
One class of persons may receive equal benefits with another,
and may contribute less or lose nothing. But so long as the other
class receives a fair equivalent for losses, how can it be said that
the property of those who belong to this class is taken without
consideration, and that in violation of the Constitution? The
simple fact is, that they get the worth of their property, while
others, who lose no land, share the benefit. This is inequality,
but not injustice. It is the case of the laborers in the vineyard,
who bore the burden and heat of the day, but received only the
penny which was given to the eleventh hour man.102

Just as it may be unequal but not unjust to allow consideration
of the project when the project increases an owner’s property value, it
is not unjust to allow consideration of the project when it decreases
100. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376, 63 S. Ct. 276, 281 (1943).
101. Id. at 376, 63 S. Ct. at 281 (“Should the Government, at a later date, determine to take
these other lands, it must pay their market value as enhanced by this factor of proximity.”).
102. Town of Galax v. Waugh, 143 Va. 213, 237, 129 S.E. 504, 511 (1925); see also Dep’t of
Transp. v. Rowe, 353 N.C. 671, 680, 549 S.E.2d 203, 210 (2001).
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the owner’s property value.103 Indeed, that is precisely what happens
in the marketplace. If a developer needs part of a person’s property to
build a project, the developer must pay the owner for any impact the
project will have on the owner’s property. The developer does not have
to pay the neighbors whose property it does not need for the project.
The rationale of courts attempting to justify undercompensation
merely underscores the owner’s plight as many courts seemingly
view themselves as a defender of the public purse rather than a constitutional check or balance on the power of the other branches of
government.104 In Symons, the California Supreme Court explained:
“The courts have assumed the burden and responsibility of seeing
to it that the cost of public improvements involving the taking and
damaging of private property for public use be not unduly enhanced.”105 The court denied the owner recovery of damages caused
by the project because it “would impose a severe burden on the
public treasury and, in effect, place an embargo upon the creation
of new and desirable roads.”106 If it saved the government money,
the court was willing to saddle the individual owner with the entire
cost of the damages rather than requiring the public to bear its
proportionate share.
“Just and adequate compensation should be a two-way street. The
public should not expect to finance its improvements by the expropriation of private property. Nor should any citizen expect to be enriched
(as opposed to compensated) from the public treasury.”107 It follows
103. Any argument that the neighbor in this scenario ends up with a net loss in the value
of his or her property merely begs the following question: Why should any individual bear
losses caused by a public project rather than the public sharing equally in such costs? Moreover, unlike a person whose property is needed for a public project, the neighbor whose
property is not needed does not have to surrender part of his or her property.
104. See, e.g., People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Symons, 54 Cal. 2d 855, 860–62, 357
P.2d 451, 454–55 (1960) (superseded by statute); see also United States v. Merchants Matrix Cut
Syndicate, 219 F.2d 90, 98–99 (7th Cir. 1955) (stating “condemnation juries . . . commence deliberations in a positive awarding-state-of-mind[,]” that many “envision the public treasury as
fair game in [condemnation] proceedings[,]” and that “[a]ll too frequently, profit seeking motives creep into condemnation cases”); W. Va. Dep’t of Highways v. Berwind Land Co., 167 W.
Va. 726, 737, 280 S.E.2d 609, 616 (1981) (explaining that courts have applied certain rules, such
as the unit rule, to “reduce the likelihood of . . . exorbitant awards of compensation by juries”);
Richmond v. City of Hinton, 117 W. Va. 223, 185 S.E. 411, 412 (1936) (“If damages could be
recovered in such circumstances, crushing burdens would be imposed on the public treasury.”).
105. 54 Cal. 2d at 861, 357 P.2d at 455.
106. Symons, 54 Cal. 2d at 862, 357 P.2d at 455.
107. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Funk, 263 Ga. 385, 388, 435 S.E.2d 196, 200 (1993).
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that neither the owner nor the condemnor should be on any greater
or lesser footing than a buyer and seller in a voluntary sale.
Nevertheless, courts have been more apt to look at the owner with
a skeptical eye than at the party taking the property, resulting in
rules that foster systemic undercompensation.108 Courts are seemingly less concerned about undercompensation than they are about
overcompensation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
explained:
“Just compensation” is that amount of money necessary to put
a landowner in as good a pecuniary position, but no better, as if
his property had not been taken. Eminent domain is an indispensable means of constructing public improvements. No citizen
has a right to thwart the public use through obstinance, or to
reap a windfall from the public treasury because his land must
be taken. Overcompensation is as unjust to the public as undercompensation is to the property owner.109

Courts with an eye toward protecting the public purse rather than
applying the plain meaning and spirit of “just compensation” often
fall prey to applying a double standard. For example, courts routinely apply a “fictional” value when it reduces the amount owed to
the owner. Yet, courts have been quick to dismiss a “fictional” value
when it increases the amount owed to the owner.110
In ATC Partnership, the court stated that certain facts related to
contamination should be considered over the owner’s objection because
“to conclude otherwise could result in a fictional fair market value
of the condemned property.”111 Just as “[i]t blinks at reality to say that
a willing buyer would simply ignore the fact of contamination,” it
likewise blinks at reality to say a willing buyer would blink at the
project that will exist after the taking.112 The former (i.e., contamination) decreases the amount the government must pay the owner
108. United States v. Norwood, 602 F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging that the
judicial application of just compensation “systematically . . . undercompensate[s]” property
owners).
109. United States v. 69.1 Acres of Land, 942 F.2d 290. 292 (4th Cir. 1991).
110. Ne. Ct. Econ. Alliance, Inc. v. ATC P’ship, 256 Conn. 813, 843, 776 A.2d 1068, 1085–86
(2001) (stating that certain facts related to contamination should be considered over the
owner’s objection because “[t]o conclude otherwise could result in a fictional fair market value
of the condemned property.”).
111. ATC P’ship, 256 Conn. at 843, 776 A.2d at 1085–86.
112. ATC P’ship, 256 Conn. at 833–34, 776 A.2d at 1080.
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whereas the latter (i.e., the project) increases the amount the government must pay.
Similarly, some courts have gone so far as to hold that certain
facts (i.e., the project) can be considered if it decreases just compensation but not if it increases just compensation. In other words, the
project can be considered for enhancement but not for damages.113
These courts allow jurors to consider the impact a public project has
on the value of the property remaining after the taking only when
the project enhances the value of the property but not when the
project damages the owner’s property. Rather than basing just
compensation on the fixed principle of indemnity, or even the difference in the actual market value of the property before and after the
taking, these courts base just compensation on how much the government has to pay.
Some courts and legislators have, at least partly, begun to see
through the fallacy of the court-created non-compensable damages
doctrine.114 Some states, such as Utah and Virginia, recently enacted
statutes that did nothing more than state that the parties can consider everything a buyer and seller would consider in a voluntary
sale.115 The fact that such statutes had to be enacted is a seeming
indictment on lawyers and the courts. After all, what reasonable
person asked to determine market value would not consider things
a buyer and seller would consider? Can you imagine telling the
average person that he or she must determine market value, but
then telling them that they cannot consider things market participants would consider? Yet, that is precisely what courts routinely
tell jurors in many eminent domain courts.
The notion of non-compensable damages is inconsistent with the
principle of “just compensation.” It is also contrary to “the basic
equitable principles of fairness” embedded in the constitutional
113. Compare Long v. Shirley, 177 Va. 401, 14 S.E.2d 375 (1941) (allowing consideration
of general enhancement or damages from the project) with State Highway & Transp. Comm’r
v. Lanier Farm, Inc., 233 Va. 506, 357 S.E.2d 531 (1987) (disallowing consideration of damages from the project).
114. See, e.g., S.C. Dep’t of Transp. v. Powell, 424 S.C. 206, 818 S.E.2d 433 (2018), reh’g
denied (Sept. 28, 2018); Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 2011 UT 62, 275
P.3d 208 (2011); Los Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809,
820–21 (Cal. 1997) (stating that damages “can be based on any factor, resulting from the
project, that causes a decline in the fair market value of the property” and that “the landowner . . . need only prove the value of his or her property has been impaired, not that other
members of the public are not similarly affected”).
115. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 25.1–230.
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requirement of just compensation.116 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reasoned, jurors should be permitted to consider
such matters [as] would be considered by any business man in
selling, buying or valuing the property; and when the court adopts
the standards of the market place in making valuations there is
no reason why it should close its eyes to how the market place
arrives at and applies the standards. . . . It is difficult to perceive
why testimony, which experience has taught is generally found to
be safely relied upon by men in their important business affairs
outside, should be rejected inside the courthouse.117

If just compensation is truly “designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,” owners
must be permitted to consider everything a buyer and seller would
consider in setting a price in a voluntary sale.118 If “the owner is entitled to receive ‘what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing
seller’ at the time of the taking,” owners must be permitted to consider
the facts and circumstances that buyers and sellers would consider.119
Anything less is a fictional value that requires the owner to part
with his property at a condemnation discount.
B. Litigation Expenses Deny Owners the Ability to Obtain Just
Compensation
Another reason owners cannot obtain just compensation is that the
law in many jurisdictions does not allow the owner to obtain reimbursement for appraisal and attorney fees and other costs—even if the
owner proves the condemnor’s offer was grossly below market value
and thus constitutionally insufficient.120 Like the non-compensable
116. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490, 93 S. Ct. 801, 803 (1973) (“The constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as much content from the basic equitable
principles of fairness as it does from technical concepts of property law.”).
117. Cade v. United States, 213 F.2d 138, 140–41 (4th Cir. 1954).
118. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S. Ct. 1563, 1569 (1960).
119. Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10, 104 S. Ct. 2187, 2194 (1984).
120. See, e.g., Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Boggess-Draper Co., LLC, 2020 UT 35, ¶ 43, 467
P.3d 840, 849 (holding “just compensation under . . . the Utah Constitution . . . does not . . .
cover costs incurred in defending a condemnation action”); see also United States v. Bodcaw
Co., 440 U.S. 202, 203–04 (1979) (stating “[a]ttorneys’ fees and expenses are not embraced
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damages doctrine, the failure to reimburse owners for their litigation expenses guarantees that owners cannot receive just compensation unless the government benevolently makes a fair offer that
approximates market value. If the government does not make such
an offer, the owner has a choice: either (1) take the government’s offer
and accept less than market value or (2) be sued by the government
and forfeit a portion of market value to litigation expenses.121
Neither choice gives the owner an opportunity to recover just
compensation or market value.122 The owner’s conundrum is exacerbated in cases where the condemnor engages in protracted litigation
that is costly to both parties. The owner is not reimbursed for litigation expenses regardless of the condemnor’s actions, and some condemnors seize on this fact.
Suppose an owner’s home is worth $200,000, and the condemnor’s
best offer is $160,000. When the owner rejects the offer, the condemnor sues him to take his property. The owner has to hire an
attorney and an appraiser. The court determines the value of the
home is $200,000, but the owner has to forfeit $25,000 to litigation
expenses.123 The owner receives $175,000 for a $200,000 home he
within just compensation”); Ryan v Davis, 109 S.E.2d 409, 414 (1959); Ellis v. Ark. State Highway Comm’n, 2010 WL 1720610 (Ark. 2010) (declining to reconsider the rule that just
compensation does not require reimbursement for litigation expenses); Comm’rs of Lincoln
Park v. Schmidt, 386 Ill. at 563–64, 54 N.E.2d at 531–32 (explaining that, absent reimbursement
for expenses in at least some circumstances, condemnors have the power to litigate owners
into submission). Courts have denied reimbursement for litigation expenses on the grounds
that “just compensation is for the property, and not to the owner.” Bodcaw, 440 U.S. at 203.
This assertion ignores the nature of the Bill of Rights, which protects persons, not things. Just
compensation is a personal right belonging to the owner, not the property. See Boston
Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195, 30 S. Ct. 459, 460 (1910) (acknowledging that just compensation is a personal right of the owner and that “the question [in such
cases] is, What has the owner lost?”).
121. State v. Johnson, 282 N.C. 1, 22, 191 S.E.2d 641, 655 (1972) (stating that “in order to
avoid the expense . . . of the condemnation proceeding . . . the [owner] may accept less” than
fair market value).
122. Any argument that the Constitution merely requires the government to pay market
value, as opposed to the owner receiving market value, ignores several key points. First, unlike
other rights, just compensation is a constitutional right to money. It guarantees the owner a
right to a certain amount of money. Second, the government can deprive the owner of this
monetary right through its own actions, i.e., making a constitutionally insufficient offer and
then forcing the owner into costly litigation when he does not accept it. Third, the right to just
compensation, like other rights in the Bill of Rights, is an individual right for the benefit and
protection of the owner, not the government.
123. Litigation expenses include attorney and expert witness fees, appraisal fees, exhibit
costs, court reporter fees, and other expenses associated with trial.
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did not want to sell.124 Has the owner received market value? Has
the law put the owner in as good a position as he would have occupied absent the taking?
It is difficult to perceive why one who is forced into court through
no fault of his own should not be reimbursed for litigation expenses
when (1) he proves the government was wrong and (2) he cannot receive the constitutionally guaranteed amount of money (i.e., just
compensation or market value) absent reimbursement for expenses
caused solely by the government.
Fortunately, at least some courts and judges have recognized that
just compensation cannot be achieved without reimbursement for
litigation expenses. The Florida Supreme Court declared:
Since the owner of private property sought to be condemned is
forced into court by one to whom he owes no obligation, it cannot
be said that he has received “just compensation” for his property
if he is compelled to pay out of his own pocket the expenses of
establishing the fair value of the property, which expenses in
some cases could conceivably exceed such value. The plight of
the land owner in this situation is well stated . . . as follows: He
does not want to sell. The property is taken from him through
the exertion of the high powers of the statute, and the spirit of
the Constitution clearly requires that he shall not be thus compelled to part with what belongs to him without the payment,
not alone of the abstract value of the property, but of all the
necessary expenses incurred in fixing that value. This would
seem to be dictated by sound morals, as well as by the spirit of
the Constitution; and it will not be presumed that the Legislature has intended to deprive the owner of the property of the full
protection which belongs to him as a matter of right.125

As Justice Reynoldson of the Iowa Supreme Court aptly stated:
It is illogical to contend . . . that costs in a condemnation proceeding should be treated as costs in any other action. This is no
ordinary lawsuit. We are here breathing life into a constitutional
right—the right to possess and protect property. We are further
124. Even if one assumes the owner would incur 6% realtor fees if he sold his home voluntarily, the owner of a $200,000 home would recover $188,000, far more than the amount he
would recover in the condemnation scenario.
125. Dade Cnty. v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602, 604–05 (Fla. 1950) (citations omitted).
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charged with enforcing a constitutional mandate that such property shall not be taken without payment of just compensation.
[I]n the condemnation proceeding the condemnee . . . has admittedly done no wrong, broken no promises and committed no negligence. He has only exercised his constitutional right to possess
property—which in the condemnation situation, unfortunately,
is property coveted by another. . . . [I]t cannot be said that he
has received ‘just compensation’ for his property if he is compelled to pay out of his own pocket the expenses of establishing
the fair value of the property.126

Other courts have refused to address the undeniable injustice
caused by the lack of reimbursement.127 In Bodcaw, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated: “Perhaps it would be fair or efficient to compensate a
landowner for all the costs he incurs as a result of a condemnation
action. . . . But such compensation is a matter of legislative grace
rather than constitutional command.”128 The Utah Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Boggess-Draper illustrates the reluctance of courts
to address unjust decisions once established. Courts are not always
quick to admit past mistakes. While the Utah Supreme Court did so
in the context of eminent domain less than a decade ago,129 that same
court refused to revisit its prior decisions on litigation expenses,
thereby perpetuating the injustice of undercompensation.130
Leaving the issue of reimbursement to the legislature in the face
of the constitutional requirement of just compensation is like leaving
the keys to the chicken coop with the fox. By punting on the issue
or, worse yet, embracing undeniably unjust past case law, courts
have left the issue of reimbursement for takings in the hands of the
party with the power to take—the legislature.
The power of eminent domain has as much ability to destroy as the
taxing power.131 Courts should not interpret the Just Compensation
Clause in a manner that allows the power to take to become the
power to destroy. The lack of reimbursement for litigation expenses
126. Peel v. Burk, 197 N.W.2d 617, 621–22 (Reynoldson, J., dissenting) (citing Brigham,
47 So. 2d at 604–05)).
127. See Boggess-Draper, 2020 UT at ¶¶ 39–48, 467 P.3d at 848–50.
128. United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 204 (1979).
129. See Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 2011 UT 62, 275 P.3d 208 (2011).
130. But see id.; Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 471 Mich. 445, 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004).
131. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819) (stating “the power to tax involves the
power to destroy”).
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empowers the government to destroy the owner’s right to just compensation. In small takings, the litigation expenses can exceed the
entire amount of just compensation.132
At least one court has implicitly recognized that litigation expenses
can destroy an owner’s right to just compensation. In State by Commissioner of Transportation v. Hancock,133 the court held that the
condemnor must fully disclose its valuation information because
that was the only way to ensure the owner would not be subject to
litigation expenses that would erase the compensation for the modest taking. The court explained:
This matter does not involve substantial money. The State’s
offer of compensation totals $9550. The fact that the amount is
modest highlights the significance of the principle involved. The
statutory requirements of bona fide negotiations and reasonable
disclosure are particularly important when minor property interests are being acquired by an exercise of the power of eminent
domain. Condemnees subject to these takings can ill afford to
hire attorneys and appraisers whose fees are not recoverable in a
condemnation proceeding (except in circumstances not relevant
here). They must be given every assurance that their government,
spending, in part, their money, is treating them with absolute
candor and fairness. Such assurance can be provided only if the
government, when undertaking negotiations, fully discloses all
of the information upon which it relies in making its offer. How
else can its negotiations be bona fide?134

The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged: “The fundamental
right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is that the owner
shall not be deprived of the market value of his property under a rule
of law which makes it impossible for him to obtain just compensation.”135 If this statement amounts to more than mere rhetoric,
courts must (1) reject the court-created non-compensable damages
doctrine and (2) require reimbursement to owners for litigation expenses when the condemnor fails to make a constitutionally sufficient
132. Owners in these situations have little choice but to accept whatever amount the
condemnor offers.
133. 208 N.J. Super. 737, 738, 506 A.2d 855, 856 (Law. Div. 1985), aff’d sub nom, Hancock,
210 N.J. Super. 568, 510 A.2d 278 (App. Div. 1985).
134. Id. at 738, 506 A.2d at 856.
135. McCoy v. Union Elevated R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 354, 365, 38 S. Ct. 504, 507 (1918).
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offer that approximates market value.136 Anything less “makes it impossible for [the owner] to obtain just compensation.”137
VIII. THE FACT THAT THE LAWS ARE SKEWED AGAINST
OWNERS SHOULD NOT BE A SURPRISE
A. The Burdens the Law Places on Owners Today—and the
Imbalance Between Government Power and Individual
Protections—Is the Result of Good Intentions
The current state of eminent domain law largely stems from what
can be best described as the tyranny of good intentions. The owner’s
plight is not the result of ill-intentioned politicians or evil-minded
bureaucrats. Just the opposite!
The sincere desire to use eminent domain for good, and to protect
the public purse while doing so, has plagued the decision-making of
legislators and other public officials alike, leading to a skewed system.
Meanwhile, those exercising the power of eminent domain seek to
save the taxpayers money when carrying out public projects. The
problem is that they tend to forget that the property owner is a taxpayer, too. He or she should not be forced to bear a disproportionate
share of the cost of the project even if it would result in savings for
the rest of the taxpayers.
In their zeal to promote public projects and limit costs, public
officials and their counsel can succumb to the danger of acting like
they are ordinary buyers, attempting to obtain the property as
136. Denying an owner reimbursement for litigation expenses in effect penalizes the owner
for exercising his constitutional right. As the High Court has recognized in other contexts, “if
the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected
speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and
inhibited. This would allow the government to ‘produce a result which [it] could not command
directly.’” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). The Court added that “[s]uch interference with constitutional rights is impermissible.” Id. Just as “retention of a public position
does not require, and cannot be conditioned upon requiring, an employee to completely forego
the exercise of his rights to freedom of speech and association,” see Perez v. Cucci, 725 F. Supp.
209, 232 (D.N.J. 1989), an owner’s right to just compensation (i.e., to receiving the value of
the property taken from him) cannot be conditioned upon the owner’s willingness to forego
this right by accepting a condemnor’s constitutionally insufficient offer.
137. McCoy, 274 U.S. at 354.
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cheaply as possible. Lost in this zeal is the individual owner and the
constitutional duty to make each owner whole.138 While their intentions may be good, the result is not.
B. The Powers of Eminent Domain Have Increased with the
Growth of Government
As the size and scope of government has grown, so too have government projects and the use of eminent domain power. There have
been periods of rapid expanse of eminent domain powers, such as
the golden era for railroads near the turn of the twentieth century.
For the most part, however, legislatures have gradually expanded
powers of eminent domain, in turn chipping away at the protections
for owners. Unfortunately for owners, courts have not heeded the
warning in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, where the
court explained:
Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing
in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations
from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security
of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and
literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads
to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in
sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for
the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon.139

Contrary to this declaration, courts have “liberally construed” government power while narrowly construing individual constitutional
protections.140 Meanwhile, legislatures have delegated vast powers
of eminent domain to an array of public and private entities.141
138. See Certain Property Located in Borough of Manhattan, 306 F.2d 439. 452–53 (2d Cir.
1962).
139. 148 U.S. 312, 325, 13 S. Ct. 622, 626 (1893).
140. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (broadly construing public use and the government’s power of eminent domain); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2328, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1984).
141. See JEREMY HOPKINS, THE REAL STORY OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN VIRGINIA, A VIRGINIA
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Today, a multitude of entities, some accountable to the people and
others not, wield vast powers of eminent domain over the citizens and
their private property. Even entities such as the mosquito control
commission in Virginia have wielded this immense power.142
Each new delegation of eminent domain power creates another
condemnor interested in preserving its power through the legislative
process. Federal and state governments and their many agencies or
departments, local governments and their various subdivisions and
associations,143 common carriers such as railroads, and utility companies routinely wield the eminent domain power. These entities have
cohesive, powerful, well-funded, and politically connected lobbying
organizations, trade organizations, and other groups that routinely
participate in the legislative process. Meanwhile, the individual
owner, who may face eminent domain once or twice in his lifetime,
is busy working to provide for his family and to pay his taxes—taxes
that are sometimes used to pay the very lobbyists seeking to limit
his property rights.144
In some jurisdictions, public employees and tax-funded lobbyists
participate in the legislative process to determine eminent domain
laws.145 Taxpayers in these jurisdictions fund the demise of their
own property rights. Given this state of affairs, it is no wonder that
eminent domain laws have become skewed in favor of power and
against protections.
The fact that the intentions of those using or promoting the power
of eminent domain may be good does not lessen the burdens imposed upon individuals facing this power. Indeed, “[t]he greatest
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding.”146
INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY REPORT (2006) [hereinafter THE REAL STORY OF EMINENT
DOMAIN IN VIRGINIA].
142. Id.
143. Cities and counties have active lobbying arms through their associations like the
municipal leagues and associations of counties.
144. See THE REAL STORY OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN VIRGINIA, supra note 141. This author
once heard it said that “Democrats do not believe in property rights, and Republicans do not
want to pay for them.” While this statement is too sweeping, there is much truth to the fact
that owners have not traditionally been represented in the political process surrounding the
making of eminent domain laws. With that said, there has been a recent movement in states
like Virginia to change this situation.
145. Id.
146. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572–73 (1928).
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C. As Courts Have Broadly Construed Powers of Eminent Domain
and Narrowly Construed Individual Protections, It Has Further
Skewed the Balance Between Powers and Protections
Courts are not immune from the same dangers that plague legislators and other public officials. These courts tend to view their
role as a check on the individual’s constitutional rights as opposed to
a check on the government’s power.147 Although courts once exercised judicial review as a check and balance on the other branches
of government,148 some of today’s eminent domain courts view themselves as a check on the owner and a protector of the other branches.149
Imagine how an owner must feel in a court where one branch of
government is taking his property, and the other branch of government presiding over the trial is there to protect the taker, not the
constitutional rights of the owner!
This judicial phenomenon reminds this author of a debate between
a prominent judge and a leading constitutional scholar. At one point,
the judge declared, “I find it difficult to find rights that are not in
the Constitution.” The opponent responded, “I find that difficult to
believe, judge, because you do not have any problem finding powers
that are not in the Constitution.”
This statement rings true with regard to private property rights
where judicial construction has led to further imbalance between
powers and protections. The Constitution once provided a sea of liberty
with mere islands of government power, but the Constitution as construed by the courts today consists of a sea of government power with
only islands of liberty.150 Thomas Jefferson’s warning that “[t]he
natural progress of things is for the government to gain ground and
147. See, e.g., People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Symons, 54 Cal. 2d 855, 861, 357 P.2d
451 (1960) (stating “courts have assumed the burden and responsibility of seeing to it that the
cost of public improvements involving the taking and damaging of private property for public
use be not unduly enhanced”).
148. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
149. See, e.g., Symons, 54 Cal. 2d 855, 357 P.2d 451.
150. Georgetown law professor Randy E. Barnett, coined the phrase and discussed the topic
of islands of power in a sea of liberty (and vice versa) in his book, Restoring the Lost Constitution. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (1st ed. 2004). As Profession
Barnett stated, “The Constitution that was actually enacted and formally amended creates
islands of government powers in a sea of liberty. The judicially redacted constitution creates
islands of liberty rights in a sea of governmental powers.” Id. at 1.

2021]

HURDLES TO JUST COMPENSATION

221

for liberty to yield” has proven prophetic, especially with regard to
property rights.151
The infamous Kelo case illustrates the expansion of power and
contraction of protections. In Calder v. Bull,152 the Court noted that
“a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B. . . . is against
all reason and justice.” In 2005, the Court declared that government
can take one person’s property (Susette Kelo’s home) and give it to
another (Pfizer Inc.).153 The Court reasoned that such government
action was legal because it created more jobs and increased tax
revenue.154 Once again, the Court eradicated the protections for the
individual because it felt it was better for the public at large.
Eminent domain powers that are unquestioned today would have
been unthinkable in years past.155 Even the quick take power, which
is universally accepted today and used almost exclusively by some
condemnors, was once questionable.156
Anyone that doubts the courts’ narrow construction of property
rights protections need only spend a day or two in the trial courts. One
trial court’s construction of a seemingly clear constitutional restriction is indicative of the courts’ approach. The question presented to
the court was: “Whether Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of
Virginia limits the Commissioner to taking only the property necessary to achieve the public use?”157 The court acknowledged: “The
voters amended Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia
in 2012 by adding, ‘[n]o more private property may be taken than
necessary to achieve the stated public use.’”158 It then concluded:
151. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington, May 27, 1788, in THE PAPERS
13:208–09.
152. 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).
153. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Yarborough v. N.C. Park Comm’n, 196 N.C. 284, 145 S.E. 563, 569 (1928)
(stating “a proposition to take private property . . . for a public park would formerly have been
regarded as a novel exercise of legislative power, but now the validity of legislative acts
erecting such parks and providing for their cost is uniformly upheld”) (citing Shoemaker v.
United States, 147 U. S. 282, 297, 13 S. Ct. 361 (1893)). The court noted that “the old doctrine
[limiting the government’s eminent domain power] is now little more than a theory or a canon
of construction.” Yarborough, 196 N.C. at 292, 145 S.E. at 569.
156. See Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 399, 16 S. Ct. 43, 48 (1895) (determining the constitutionality of the quick take power).
157. Comm’r of Highways v. Sadler, No. CL14-292, 2016 WL 1390274, *1 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Mar. 16, 2016).
158. Id. at *2. Amongst other provisions in the constitutional amendment, Virginians had
to add a provision reaffirming that private property is a fundamental right because courts had
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
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“This Court is not convinced by the respondent’s argument that
amendment of Article I, Section 11 limits the Commissioner to take no
more property than that which is necessary to achieve the stated
public use.”159
It is difficult to perceive a more limited construction of the constitutional amendment than the one the court provided there. After
all, the court concluded that “no more private property may be taken
than necessary to achieve the stated public use” did not “limit[] the
Commissioner to take no more property than that which is necessary to achieve the stated public use.”160
Condemnors arguing against compensation frequently seize on
the judiciary’s tendency to view itself as the protector of the public
purse. In Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, the
Court explained: “Time and again in Takings Clause cases, the Court
has heard the prophecy that recognizing a just compensation claim
would unduly impede the government’s ability to act in the public
interest.”161 The Court further recognized that, despite these arguments, the “sky did not fall” as predicted by condemnors seeking to
avoid payment of compensation.
Any argument that awarding just compensation for depreciation
caused by the project would increase the costs of public projects
merely admits that condemnors have been shortchanging owners.
If compensating owners for depreciation to their property increases
the cost of a project, it means only that individual owners have been
shouldering this cost alone—as opposed to the public at large. The
cost of public projects does not change. The only thing that changes
is who pays for it.162 Does the individual forced to surrender his property pay this entire cost alone or does the public, for whom the
property is taken, share in this cost?
In Tidewater Railway Co. v. Shartzer,163 the Virginia Supreme
Court was faced with the argument that allowing damages from a
not given property rights the protections afforded other fundamental rights or the heightened
judicial scrutiny given to infringements upon other fundamental rights. The courts had
treated private property as something other than a fundamental right.
159. Id. at *3.
160. Id.
161. 568 U.S. 23, 36–37, 133 S. Ct. 511, 521 (2012).
162. Id. at *2. The damages caused by the project are part of the costs. The fact that some
courts do not require the public to reimburse the owner for these costs does not change the
fact that such costs exist.
163. 107 Va. 562, 573–74, 59 S.E. 407, 411 (1907).
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railroad project would “give rise to an indefinite number of claims.”164
The court stated that “this contention . . . is without merit.”165 It
then explained,
If it is to be asked where the line is to be drawn, I answer, not by
distance in point of measurement. Premises might be injuriously
affected by the stopping of a landing place 10 miles away, if
there was no other within 20 of the premises affected. The line
is to be drawn by ascertaining whether the premises are actually
or potentially affected, for present or other purposes or the man,
whether it is only the person who happens to be using them. It
is said this might give the right to make an immense number of
claims. Suppose it did. Suppose there were 1,000 claims of
£1,000 each. If they are well founded, £>>1,000,000 of property
is destroyed, and why is not that part of the cost of the improvement; and, if taken into account as such, why should not the
loser of it receive it?166

IX. THE QUESTION OF JUST COMPENSATION
GOES FAR BEYOND MONEY
Some may say that just compensation is merely a question about
money. Nothing could be further from the truth. Tell the farmer who
lost the land that had been in his or her family for six generations, the
mother or father that just lost their family’s home, or the small business owner that just lost his or her shop that just compensation is
only about money.
The right to just compensation extends far beyond mere dollars
and cents. It impacts people and affects their lives forever. In too
many instances, those individuals impacted by eminent domain
cannot recover enough to restore what they lost. They are not, in the
words of the court, put in the same monetary position they occupied
before the taking.
The protections afforded to the right to just compensation, and
property rights in general, are one of the most telling indications
about the nature and character of a government and the freedoms
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 573–74, 59 S.E. at 411.
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of its people.167 While courts once understood this fact, they have
seemingly forgotten it. In Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United
States, the United States Supreme Court declared:
The question presented is not whether the United States has
the power to condemn and appropriate this property of the
Monongahela Company, for that is conceded, but how much it
must pay as compensation therefor. Obviously this question, as
all others which run along the line of the extent of the protection
the individual has under the Constitution against the demands
of the government, is of importance, for in any society the fullness and sufficiency of the securities which surround the individual in the use and enjoyment of his property constitute one of
the most certain tests of the character and value of the government. The first ten amendments to the Constitution, adopted as
they were soon after the adoption of the Constitution, are in the
nature of a bill of rights, and were adopted in order to quiet the
apprehension of many that without some such declaration of
rights the government would assume, and might be held to possess, the power to trespass upon those rights of persons and property which by the Declaration of Independence were affirmed to
be unalienable rights.168

Private property and the venerable right to just compensation is
one of the last barriers the individual has against the masses and
the prevailing political winds of the moment.169 Without it, an
167. In The Guardian of Every Other Right, Professor Jim Ely highlights the history and
importance of private property rights in the protection of liberty. He explains how private
property rights undergird every other right. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY
OTHER RIGHT (2d ed. 1998). With the expanse of government and the rise of governmental
projects that require a weakening of private property rights, the importance of private
property has been lost on politicians, practitioners, and professors alike—many of whom later
sit as judges in eminent domain cases.
168. 148 U.S. 312, 324, 13 S. Ct. 622, 625, 37 L. Ed. 463 (1893).
169. The rights to private property and just compensation protected in the Constitution
illustrate one of the most important differences between a democracy and the constitutional
republic our Founders created. As James Madison explained in Federalist 10, “democracies
have ever been . . . found incompatible with . . . the rights of property.” In a democracy, the only
limit on government power is the will of the majority, and every person’s home, farm, business,
or place of worship is subject to the whim of such majority. As John Adams declared: “The
moment the idea is admitted into society, that property is not as sacred as the laws of God, and
that there is not a force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence.”
JOHN ADAMS, DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1787).
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individual has no liberty.170 The Supreme Court of Georgia summed
it up well when it avowed:
Private property is the antithesis of Socialism or Communism.
Indeed, it is an insuperable barrier to the establishment of either
collective system of government. Too often, as in this case, the
desire of the average citizen to secure the blessings of a good
thing like beautification of our highways, and their safety, blinds
them to a consideration of the property owner’s right to be saved
from harm by even the government. The thoughtless, the irresponsible, and the misguided will likely say that this court has
blocked the effort to beautify and render our highways safer. But
the actual truth is that we have only protected constitutional rights
by condemning the unconstitutional method to attain such desirable ends, and to emphasize that there is a perfect constitutional way which must be employed for that purpose. Those
whose ox is not being gored by this Act might be impatient and
complain of this decision, but if this court yielded to them and
sanctioned this violation of the Constitution we would thereby
set a precedent whereby tomorrow when the critics are having
their own ox gored, we would be bound to refuse them any protection. Our decisions are not just good for today but they are
equally valid tomorrow.171

Only time will tell if America’s courts will wake up to the injustices
they are perpetrating every day in eminent domain courts throughout
the country. “Just compensation” will not fulfill the plain meaning
of those two, simple words until such awakening occurs.172 It is too
late for Susette Kelo and for the many individuals who have been
170. See ELY, supra note 167.
171. State Highway Dep’t v. Branch, 222 Ga. 770, 772, 152 S.E.2d 372, 374 (1966).
172. As illustrated by the earlier example of the Virginia trial court’s construction of the
constitutional amendment of 2012, even if the people act to restore their own property rights,
those rights will not be secure absent a place the people can go for a remedy, i.e., the courts.
As Chief Justice John Marshall declared:
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may
not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are
powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if
these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The
distinction, between a government with limited and unlimited powers, is
abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed
....
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
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shortchanged by their government, despite the principles of equity
and indemnification embedded in the Just Compensation Clause. It
is not too late for those whose ox may be gored tomorrow or for a
government that is teetering on the edge of a slippery slope into a
form of government this nation has never seen—one that has a complete disregard for the property rights of the citizen and the liberties
these rights undergird.173
CONCLUSION
The owner’s plight today reminds one of President Reagan’s prescient words: “The nine most terrifying words in the English language
are, ‘I’m from the government, and I’m here to help.’”174 Owners
forced to surrender their property for the public good should not
bear the burdens and injustices they suffer today. “[A] strong public
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of
paying for the change.”175
The time is long overdue to reconsider America’s eminent domain
laws and to restore individual protections. To paraphrase Thomas
Paine in Common Sense, doing a wrong thing for a long time does
not make it right.176 Time may make more converts than reason,177 but
one can only hope that reason and justice will ultimately prevail.
173. James Madison wrote, “Government is instituted to protect property of every sort.”
See James Madison, Property, in PRIVATE PROPERTY AND POLITICAL CONTROL 30 (1992).
Madison noted that every individual “has a property . . . in . . . his person” as much as in his
possessions. Id. As Madison further explained, property (and, with it, liberty) are in jeopardy
when there is an (1) “excess of power” (i.e., no protection against government encroachment)
or (2) “excess of liberty” (i.e., anarchy or no protection against one’s neighbors). In each instance, “the effect is the same.” Id. The right to private property succumbs to the whim of the
majority. The only difference is that the former is clothed in governmental authority.
174. This warning is especially prudent in today’s “sloganeering culture” in which those
seeking to agitate the masses or escape constitutional restrictions have “cleverly redefin[ed]
words and prostitute[ed] ideas.” See ZACHARIAS, supra note 4, at 11. By saying these slogans loud
enough and long enough, they have been able to escape reason and, all too often, the language
of the Constitution. Id. In the context of property rights, one must point no further than Susette
Kelo or the many urban homeowners who lost their family homes to “regentrification.”
175. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416, 43 S. Ct. 158, 160 (1922).
176. “[A] long habit of not thinking a thing wrong[ ] gives it a superficial appearance of
being right.” (emphasis in original). THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 1 (Dover Publications,
Inc. 1997) (1976).
177. See id.
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The balance between government power and individual protections
for private property is far off-kilter. While the property owners should
not get a windfall, they certainly should not bear burdens they
would not have to suffer if they voluntarily sold their property. Until
the process and method of providing “just compensation” fulfill the
plain meaning of the Just Compensation Clause, this supposed constitutional right will be nothing more than a noble concept on a
Constitution that provides little more than a lofty ambition.

IMPLIED PREEMPTION IN THE REGULATION OF LAND

DAVID L. CALLIES* & ELLEN R. ASHFORD**
INTRODUCTION
The subject of preemption by one unit of government over another
is a fundamental issue precedent to the exercise of regulatory authority by state and local government. While preemption—in particular
state and local preemption by the federal government—has been the
subject of considerable discussion in the literature,1 there has not been
much recent discussion of preemption in the context of real property.
The subject is treated more or less the same by most courts, whether
the case involves federal preemption of state (and occasionally local)
government law, or whether it involves state preemption of local government law.2 The only critical difference—and it is critical—with
respect to federal preemption is the need to carefully evaluate and
analyze the federal government’s authority to exercise the allegedly
preemptive statutory or regulatory authority in the first place, since
the federal government is one of enumerated powers with virtually no
independent regulatory authority beyond that conveyed by an admittedly generous interpretation of the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce
Clause. The 11th Amendment also forbids the federal government
from commanding states to regulate its citizens under the so-called
anticommandeering doctrine. Both of these principles are fully and
* FAICP, ACREL, Benjamin A. Kudo Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of
Law, The University of Hawai‘i at Mœnoa. AB, DePauw University, JD, University of Michigan,
LLM, Nottingham University (England), Life Member, Clare Hall, Cambridge University.
** Co-Editor-in-Chief, University of Hawai‘i Law Review.
1. Michael T. Flannery, Social Security, Divorce, and the Scope of Federal Preemption, 66
BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2018); Amelia Raether, Commandeering, Preemption, and Vehicle Emissions
Regulation Post-Murphy v. NCAA, 1014 NW. U.L. REV. 1015 (2020); Rachel Rothschild, State
Nuisance Law and the Climate Change Challenge to Federalism, 27 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 412
(2019); Federalism—Preemption—Massachusetts District Court Finds Portion of Local Drone
Ordinance Preempted by FAA Regulation—Singer v. City of Newton, No. CV 17-10071, 20017
WL 4176477 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 2017), 131 HARV. L. REV. 2057 (2018); Jason A. Kurtyka, Flying
First Class: The Third Circuit Establishes a Methodology for Implied Preemption Analysis of
Federal Premarket Approval Regulations in Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Aircorp, 62 VILL.
L. REV. 527 (2017).
2. NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A STATE-BY-STATE
ANALYSIS 3 (2018).
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clearly discussed and articulated in Murphy v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association.3 Since states have all the powers not granted to
the federal government, reserved specifically to the states by the 10th
Amendment, the only needful fundamental preliminary investigation
with respect to state preemption of local government authority is the
extent of limitations in the relevant state constitution, since state
constitutions are limits, not grants, on otherwise plenary authority
to regulate and govern.4
The standards—if not their application—are relatively straightforward and articulated in any number of recent cases. Virtually all
commence with the fairly obvious statement that a superior level of
government—subject to the limitations set out in the preceding
paragraph—can always expressly preempt an inferior level, as the
U.S. Supreme Court recently noted.5 Absent such express preemption,
the analysis and discussion generally passes on to the most difficult
and arguably troublesome type: implied preemption. The elements
of preemption are nicely set out by the Supreme Court in Murphy:
Our cases have identified three different types of preemption . . .
“conflict preemption”. . . [where] state law imposed a duty that was
inconsistent—i.e., in conflict—with federal law . . . “[e]xpress preemption”. . . illustrative [by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
which provided] that “no State or political subdivision thereof . . .
shall enforce or enact any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other
provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates,
routes, or services of any [covered] air carrier,”. . . and “[f]ield
preemption [which] occurs when federal law occupies a ‘field’ of
regulation ‘so comprehensively that it has left no room for supplementary state legislation.’”6

As the Court observed, express preemption is usually not difficult
to apply. It is implied preemption that most often leads to litigation.
A relatively recent magistrate order in Hawai‘i7 best illustrates the
primary factors favoring such implied preemption in a property law
context:
3. 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
4. DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
(8th ed. 2014).
5. Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019).
6. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480.
7. Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Cnty. of Kauai, 2014 WL 4216022, at *1 (D. Haw. Aug. 25, 2014).
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1. Does the superior government occupy the field?
2. Does the superior government evince a comprehensive plan
or scheme?
3. Is there a need for statewide or federal uniformity?
4. Does the inferior government forbid what the superior government permits?
5. Does the inferior government permit what the superior
government prohibits?
In Syngenta Seeds v. County of Kauai, the county passed an ordinance regulating the growing of genetically modified organisms
(“GMO”)8 agricultural products. Concerned primarily with the spreading of pesticides, the ordinance:
1. Imposed various notification requirements on commercial
agricultural entities, including mandatory disclosure of the
use of certain restricted pesticides and the possession of
GMO by commercial agricultural entities;
2. Created pesticide buffer zones;
3. Required the county to complete an Environmental and Public
Health Impact Study to address environmental and public
health questions related to large-scale commercial agricultural
entities using pesticides and GMO; and
4. Placed a penalty provision providing that any firm or corporation violating the ordinance shall be assessed a civil fine
of $10,000 to $25,000 per day, per violation and shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction be punished by a fine
of not more than $2,000 or imprisoned for not more than one
year, or both, for each offense.9
Syngenta Seeds challenged the ordinance on a motion for summary
judgement.10
While noting that Hawai‘i’s four counties have authority to enact
laws pertaining to agriculture, both as a matter of state enabling
statutes and broad state constitutional power, the court noted that
8. In this Article, GMO is used to describe any organism whose genetic material has been
altered using genetic engineering techniques.
9. Syngenta Seeds, 2014 WL 4216022, at *1–2.
10. Id. at *1.
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such power was not unlimited.11 After dismissing plaintiffs’ claims
that the county ordinance prohibited certain disclosure requirements under a state statute governing disclosure and that a statutory
right to farm law precludes the county from regulating nuisance—in
other words, finding no direct conflict—the court then addressed
implied conflict.12
It held that such a conflict existed and so the ordinance was impliedly preempted.13 Finding that the ordinance legislated in an area
already staked out by the legislature for exclusive use and statewide
statutory treatment, the court found the ordinance impermissibly
entered an area of such use and treatment because of the comprehensive nature of the state’s statutory scheme.14 First, the court held
that the ordinance covered the same subject matter embraced by
state law and regulation.15 The ordinance imposed various pre- and
post-application reporting requirements and established buffer zones
in which no crops to which pesticides would be applied could be
planted.16 However, the state pesticide law already addressed pesticide use and granted extensive rulemaking authority to State of
Hawai‘i Department of Agriculture (“HDOA”).17 The court found
these to be so extensive as to cover the same subject matter as the
ordinance.18 The court found the same to be true with respect to
licensing, sales and enforcement.19 Therefore, this “evidences the legislature’s intent that the state law be both uniform and exclusive.”20
The court also found the same to be true with respect to annual
GMO reporting requirements.21 In sum, the court determined:
[T]hat these statutory provisions, in the context of art. XI § 3,
the comprehensive administrative system established under the
HDOA, and the complete absence of reference to counties or local
governments therein, evidence the legislature’s intent that the
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *5–7.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Syngenta Seeds, 2014 WL 4216022, at *8.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. at *8.
Id.
Id.
Syngenta Seeds, 2014 WL 4216022, at *8–9.
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state scheme for the regulation of specific potentially harmful
plants be both uniform and exclusive preempting the imposition
of local regulations on this specific issue.22

Accordingly, the court held the GMO notification provision of the ordinance was preempted by state law and barred from taking effect.23
The court then turned to federal preemption.24
Plaintiffs also claimed that the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) preempted some of the informational requirements of the county ordinance and that a federal coordinated
framework comprehensively regulated GMO, thereby impliedly preempting both state and county regulation.25 Noting that Congress
has the constitutional power to preempt state law either expressly
or implicitly within the sphere of federal power and authority, the
court further explained that in the absence of express preemptive
language, preemption may be “inferred” (presumably the same as
implied) first under either field preemption, “where federal law ‘so
thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it’
or ‘where the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject’”; or second, where the state law actually conflicts with federal
law such that “compliance with both . . . is a physical impossibility”
or the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”26
Turning first to the ordinance’s reporting requirements, the court
held there was neither express nor implied preemption by FIFRA.27
According to the court, FIFRA imposes only informational restrictions on records maintained under FIFRA and the county ordinance
imposed record-keeping requirements pursuant to a separate and
independent state power, and so FIFRA’s restrictions do not apply.28
As to GMO regulations, since the county ordinance did not deal with
movement in interstate commerce which would conflict with the
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at *9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id.
Syngenta Seeds, 2014 WL 4216022, at *11–12.
Id. at *12.
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Federal Plant Protection Act (“PPA”), there was no preemption in
the GMO notification provision of the county ordinance, nor do the
county reporting requirements interfere with Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service regulations dealing with the conduct of
field trials.29 The federal district court’s decision was affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit on appeal on all accounts.30
What follows is a longer discussion of preemption in the area of
GMO regulation and a summary of other property cases by subject
matter which deal with implied preemption standards mostly as set
out in Syngenta Seeds.
I. THE CASE LAW: A SURVEY BY SUBJECT
A. Transgenic Agriculture (GMO and GE)
Recently, Americans have become increasingly concerned about
how food is grown and produced. With the trends in farm-to-table dining and organic farming, attention becomes focused on the seasonless
American supermarket with year-round strawberries and tomatoes
grown halfway around the world. Given the continuing debate on
transgenic agriculture, which includes use of genetic engineering
techniques (“GE”) and GMO, there has been surprisingly little litigation of state-local preemption of transgenic agriculture regulation,
even though regulation of land use and agriculture are traditionally
areas of local concern.
GMO are achieved through a GE process in which a laboratory
technician extracts genes from the DNA of one species and combines
them with the genes of another.31 According to the Federal Drug
Administration (“FDA”), genetic modification uses a biotechnological
method to manipulate an organism’s genome.32 Foreign genes are
not necessarily extracted from like species and may originate in “bacteria, viruses, insects, animals, or even humans.”33 GE has been used
29. Id. at *12–14.
30. Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. County of Kauai, 842 F.3d 669 (9th Cir. 2016).
31. What is a GMO?, INST. FOR RESPONSIBLE TECH., http://responsibletechnology.org/gmo
-education (last visited June 21, 2021).
32. Genetic Engineering, Agricultural Biotechnology Glossary, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
https://www.usda.gov/topics/biotechnology/biotechnology-glossary (last visited June 21, 2021).
33. INST. FOR RESPONSIBLE TECH., supra note 31.
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to increase nutritional benefits or crop productivity,34 disease resistance,35 herbicide tolerance, and the ability of the plant to produce its
own pesticide.36 While selective breeding to achieve certain desirable
traits has been practiced by farmers for centuries, modern technology permits giant strides in improved crop yields, enhanced nutritional value, and improved drought-resistance and tolerance to cold
temperatures and insects.37
However, some critics claim that trait manipulation may cause
unforeseen effects to the global ecosystem and ecological processes,38
or that the prevalence of GMO will result in less biodiversity and
increase the development of pesticide-resistant insects and weeds.39
As a result, the federal government has enacted a comprehensive
framework of regulation for transgenic agriculture. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (“USDA”) Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (“APHIS”) and Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
consider potential environmental impacts of pest-resistant biotechnology on other species like honeybees and earthworms, through
testing.40 The EPA and FDA also test for potential toxicity and potential to cause an allergic response to regulate food safety of GMO.41
Because GMO are heavily regulated by the federal government, it
is unsurprising that most preemption claims relating to GMO are
of the federal-state type. Nevertheless, a few recent cases evaluating
claims of state-local preemption suggest that some local governments continue to regulate GMO.
34. Biotechnology Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.us
da.gov/topics/biotechnology/biotechnology-frequently-asked-questions-faqs (last visited June 21,
2021) (“Biotech crops may provide enhanced quality traits such as increased levels of betacarotene in rice to aid in reducing vitamin A deficiencies and improved oil compositions in
canola, soybean, and corn.”).
35. Id.
36. INST. FOR RESPONSIBLE TECH., supra note 31.
37. Genetically Modified Crops, CASE STUDIES IN AGRICULTURAL SECURITY, https://fas.org
/biosecurity/education/dualuse-agriculture/2.-agricultural-biotechnology/genetically-en
gineered-crops.html (last visited June 21, 2021).
38. Joel Achenbach, Are GMO Crops Safe? Focus on the Plant, Not the Process, Scientists
Say., WASH POST (May 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-of-science
/wp/2016/05/17/ge-crops/?utm_term=.b5f81185fce2.
39. Julie M. Muller, Naturally Misleading: FDA’s Unwillingness to Define “Natural” and
the Quest for GMO Transparency Through State Mandatory Labeling Initiatives, 48 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 511, 516–17 (2015).
40. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 34.
41. Id.
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Hawai‘i remains ground zero in the debate over local regulation
of GMO.42 Beyond the discussion of Syngenta Seeds in the Introduction above, it is therefore worth summarizing two other GMO cases
from Hawai‘i.
In an unreported case, a federal magistrate judge found a Hawai‘i
County ordinance restricting “the open air cultivation, propagation,
development, or testing of genetically engineered crops or plants”
preempted by state law and, in part, expressly preempted by federal
law.43 Though unreported, it has been relied on by federal courts in
subsequent decisions.44 The challengers argued that state law preempted the ordinance based on the state constitution vesting the state
with exclusive authority over agriculture and the HDOA and Hawai‘i
Board of Agriculture (“HBOA”) exercising such exclusive authority
by establishing a comprehensive framework for regulating plants
that present the same risk of environmental impacts the ordinance
claimed to address.45 The magistrate judge noted these were the
same arguments for state preemption before the court in Syngenta
Seeds.46 Applying the “comprehensive statutory scheme test” from
Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, the magistrate noted the
“critical determination . . . is whether the statutory scheme . . . indicates a legislative intention, express or implied, to be exclusive and
uniform throughout the state.”47 Upon finding overlapping subject
matter in the statutory scheme and municipal ordinance, the magistrate proceeded to analyze the uniformity and exclusivity of a statutory scheme.48 Based on the HBOA receiving input on statewide
agricultural problems from members who reside in each county and
the HBOA chair’s position on a state advisory committee with
42. David L. Callies, GMO Regulation, 38 No. 10 ZONING & PLANNING L. REPORT 1 (2015).
There is a recent, unreported case of note where a federal district court in Oregon upholding
a county ordinance approved by ballot measure, finding no preemption under Oregon’s Right
to Farm Act and additional, recent state law authorizing such ordinance. Schultz Family
Farms LLC v. Jackson Cnty., 2015 WL 3448069, at *1 (D. Or. May 29, 2015).
43. Haw. Floriculture & Nursery Ass’n v. Cnty. of Haw., 2014 WL 6685817, at *1 (D. Haw.
Nov. 26, 2014).
44. Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cnty. of Maui, 111 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1104, 1108, 1111–12 (D.
Haw. 2015); Atay v. Cnty. of Maui, 842 F.3d 688, 704 n. 9 (9th Cir. 2016).
45. Haw. Floriculture, 2014 WL 6685817 at *3.
46. Id.
47. Id. at *4 (citing Richardson v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 868 P.2d 1193, 1208–09 (Haw.
1994)).
48. Id. at *6.
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“extensive and broad responsibilities over agricultural problems
spanning the various counties to form a coherent and comprehensive
statewide agricultural policy,” the magistrate concluded “legislative
intent for a . . . comprehensive state statutory scheme . . . preempt[ed] the County’s ban on genetically engineered organisms.”49
Accordingly, the ordinance was invalidated by virtue of implied
preemption by state law.50
The magistrate also reviewed the different standards for federal
implied preemption that applied.51 For federal field preemption to
apply, federal law must either “so thoroughly occup[y] a legislative
field as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
for the States to supplement it,” or “the federal interest [must be] so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”52 For federal conflict
preemption to apply, “compliance with both federal and state regulations [must be] a physical impossibility, or when the state law [must
stand] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.”53 Thus, the magistrate
also found that the ordinance’s ban on open air field testing of GE is
expressly preempted under the PPA by parsing the statutory language to identify the domain expressly preempted.54
In its 2015 decision of Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. County of Maui 2015,
a federal court for the District of Hawai‘i found a Maui County GMO
ordinance preempted by state and federal law, thereby in excess of
the county’s ability to regulate.55 The court found the Maui ordinance
was expressly preempted by federal regulation of plant pests and
noxious weeds.56 The stated purpose of the Maui ordinance was to
“protect against transgenic contamination caused by [genetically engineered] operations and practices . . . (including pesticide use and
testing); to preserve the right of the County to reject [genetically
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing Richardson v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 868 P.2d 1193, 1207, 1209 (Haw.
1994)).
51. Id. at *9–10.
52. Id. at *9 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) and Hawaiian
Navigable Waters Pres. Soc’y v. State of Hawaii, 823 F. Supp 766. 771 (D. Haw. 1993)).
53. Id. (quoting Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985)).
54. Id. at *7–8.
55. Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cnty. of Maui, 111 F. Supp. 3d 1088 (D. Haw. 2015).
56. Id. at 1104.
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engineered] operations and practices based on health-related, moral,
or other concerns, and to preserve Maui County’s environment and
public trust resources.”57
The court examined the plain language of the ordinance to determine whether it was preempted by the PPA.58 The PPA expressly
preempts any “State or political subdivision of a State” from regulating
plants pests and noxious weeds, among other plant types.59 According
to the findings and purpose of the Maui ordinance, which included
preventing contamination of and damage to non-GE papaya and
banana crops, the court found:
The Ordinance inherently considers [genetically engineered] organisms to be ‘noxious weeds’ and/or ‘plant pests’ as defined in [the
Plant Protection Act].
According to the Ordinance, GE plants directly and indirectly
injure or damage crops, agriculture interests, public health and
the environment. The Ordinance therefore seeks to regulate what
it sees as a ‘noxious weed’ as defined by federal law.60

In finding the Maui ordinance expressly preempted by federal law,
the court rejected the argument by proponents of the ordinance that
“because the Ordinance has an alleged purpose other than governing
‘plant pests,’” preemption does not apply.61
The court did not stop there. The court continued to find the ordinance invalid by implied conflict preemption under federal law.62 A
purpose of the PPA is to set “a national standard governing the
movement of plant pests and noxious weeds in interstate commerce
based on sound science.”63 The Maui ordinance ban on GE organisms, including some plant pests, “causes the ordinance to run afoul”
of the purpose of the PPA, thereby frustrating its purpose.64
The court then turned to the issue of preemption under state law,
applying the test for “exclusive and statewide statutory treatment”
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 1103 (citing the ordinance).
Id. at 1104.
Id. at 1102.
Id. at 1104.
Robert Ito Farm, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 3d at 1105.
Id. at 1107.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id.
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from Syngenta Seeds.65 Following the two-step analysis, the court
first “determine[d] whether an ordinance impermissibly legislates in
an area of exclusive and statewide statutory treatment”—the “comprehensive statutory scheme” test—was applied.66 The court found
the “state statutes and regulations create a comprehensive scheme”
that reflect the authority of the state over plants that may harm
agriculture, the environment, or the public.67 Thus, the ordinance
attempted “to regulate the same subject matter that the [existing]
state framework addresses.”68 The argument by a proponent of the
ordinance that the state framework addressed a “statewide concern”
while the ordinance “addresse[d] local health and safety concerns . . .
within the County,” failed because “preemption of a county ordinance
by state law does not turn on whether the ordinance addresses local,
rather than statewide, concerns.”69 The court stated that GE organisms may be “embraced within a comprehensive state statutory
scheme” “absent explicit mention of GE organisms in a particular
state law,” and in this case, “the scope of [the state framework]
reaches GE organisms” and the absence of explicit mention of “GE
organisms in no way precludes preemption.”70
Second, the court considered “whether the statutory scheme
disclose[d] an express or implied intent to be exclusive and uniform
throughout the state.”71 The court noted the network of state agencies created by the state legislature that have “extensive and broad
responsibilities over agricultural problems spanning the various
counties to form a coherent and comprehensive statewide agricultural policy” sufficient to “disclose[] an intent to be the exclusive
and uniform [regulating bodies] throughout the state.”72
65. Id. at 1109. “Any ordinance that ‘conflict[s] with the intent of a state statute or legislate[s] in an area already staked out by the legislature for exclusive and statewide statutory
treatment’ is preempted by state law.” Id. (citing Richardson v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 868
P.2d 1193, 1207 (Haw. 1994); and Syngenta Seeds, 2014 WL 4216022, at *1 (D. Haw. Aug. 25,
2014)).
66. Robert Ito Farm, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 3d at 1109.
67. Id. at 1110.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1110–11.
70. Id. at 1109, 1011.
71. Id. at 1109.
72. Robert Ito Farm, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 3d at 1112 (quoting Haw. Floriculture, 2014 WL
6685817, at *1, *6 (D. Haw. Nov. 26, 2014)). The court took great care to note that its decision
does not pass judgment on the merit, benefit, or harm posed by GMO.
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decisions below, finding the Maui
ordinance expressly preempted by federal law as applied to GE plants
federally regulated as plant pests, but neither expressly nor impliedly
preempted as applied to GE plants that have been deregulated.73
The Ninth Circuit further found the ordinance impliedly preempted
by state law in its application to federally deregulated, commercialized GE plants, thereby affirming the invalidation of the ordinance.74
The court first identified three conditions in the express preemption
provision in the PPA that “must be met for a local law to be preempted.”75 The court looked at the express design and purpose of the
ordinance and the scope of the federal regulation to conclude that all
three conditions for express preemption under the PPA were met to
the extent the ordinance sought to regulate GE plants that are federally regulated as plant pests.76
The appellate court did, however, disagree with the finding of the
court below that the ordinance was “impliedly preempted by the
PPA in its application to deregulated, ‘commercialized’ GE crops.”77
The court began its “search for implied preemptive intent by [noting] the PPA’s express preemption creates a ‘reasonable inference’
that Congress did not intend to preempt state and local laws that do
not fall within [the scope of its preemption clause].”78 While this
inference can be overcome by proof that the ordinance creates an
“actual conflict” with any federal statutory or regulatory provision,
or more broadly that the ordinance impermissibly “frustrates any
federal objective,” the court found the opponents of the ordinance
failed to do both.79 Following the Supreme Court’s “warn[ing] that
obstacle preemption analysis does ‘not justify a freewheeling judicial
inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives[, because] such an endeavor would undercut the principle that
it is Congress rather than the courts that preempts state law,’” the
73. Atay v. Cnty. of Maui, 842 F.3d 688, 710 (9th Cir. 2016). Note that the Ninth Circuit’s
unpublished decision of Syngenta Seeds was filed on the same day. 2014 WL 4216022, at *1
(D. Haw. Aug. 25, 2014).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 701.
76. Id. at 702–03.
77. Id. at 703–04 (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995)) (internal
citations omitted).
78. Atay, 842 F.3d at 704.
79. Id.
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Ninth Circuit maintained a high threshold for conflict preemption
and found nothing in the PPA or its “implementing regulations suggest[] a local government could not choose to” ban commercialized,
deregulated GE crops.80 Regulation of commercialized crops that
have been federally deregulated therefore remains within the authority of state and local governments.81
The Ninth Circuit, however, affirmed the finding of the court below
that the ordinance’s “remaining application to [deregulated,] commercialized GE plants” was preempted by state law.82 The court used
the three-part test from Richardson, evaluating each of the three
“overlapping elements”: “(1) [that] state and local laws address the
same subject matter, (2) that state law comprehensively regulates
that subject matter, and (3) that the legislature intended the state law
to be uniform and exclusive.”83 The court found that “the pervasiveness of the . . . statutory scheme” as well as “[s]everal specific provisions of the . . . scheme . . . evidence[d]” the legislature’s intent that
“the State’s regulatory oversight of potentially harmful plants . . . be
uniform and exclusive of supplemental local rules,” concluding that
“the [o]rdinance impermissibly intrudes into this area of exclusive
State regulation” and thereby impliedly preempted.84
B. Cannabis
The growing legalization of cannabis use at the state level has
resulted in preemption challenges on the federal-state level, because
the Federal Controlled Substances Act still plainly criminalizes all
use of cannabis and related activities. However, as of November of
2020, thirty-six states and Washington, D.C. have legalized the use
and cultivation of cannabis for medical and/or recreational use.85
State authorization, however, does not prevent local attempts at
regulation or exclusion of cannabis-related land use within a municipality. Most of the existing state statutes limit local authority to
80. Id. at 705.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 705–06.
83. Id. at 706.
84. Atay, 842 F.3d at 710.
85. Jeremy Berke, Shayanne Gal & Yeji Jesse Lee, Marijuana legalization is sweeping the
US. See every state where cannabis is legal., BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 14, 2021), https://www
.businessinsider.com/legal-marijuana-states-2018-1.
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regulate land use pertaining to cannabis within their jurisdictions.86
The ability of local governments to regulate cannabis within its boundaries differs from state to state: some states expressly preempt local
regulation of marijuana while others are silent on the subject,
leaving open the issue of whether the statutory scheme impliedly
preempts such regulation by imposing statewide regulation.87
1. Zoning
An obvious means of excluding cannabis cultivation and dispensaries from a municipality is through zoning. As the statutes legalizing certain cannabis activities vary from state to state, so do the
local attempts to curtail such activities that are legalized at the
state level. Generally, total bans achieved through local zoning have
been upheld, though a recent appellate decision in Arizona discussed
below offers a minority approach to the preemption issue of excluding
legalized use of cannabis through zoning.
The Township of Byron, Michigan passed a zoning ordinance requiring medical marijuana caregivers to obtain a permit and “cultivate marijuana as a ‘home occupation’ at a full-time residence.”88
The ordinance was challenged by a licensed qualifying patient and
registered primary caregiver who grew cannabis without a permit
“on rented commercially zoned property” in an enclosed, locked
facility.89 The township sent the caregiver’s landlord a cease and
desist letter, which “asserted that violations of the zoning ordinance
were a nuisance per se.”90 The caregiver challenged the permit requirement and locational restriction, claiming that the “zoning ordinance was preempted . . . and . . . therefore, unenforceable.”91 The
trial court found the “ordinance impermissibly subjected . . . caregivers
to penalties,” which state law prohibits and that the “[t]ownship
could not prohibit what [state law] explicitly authorized—the medical use of [cannabis].”92 The court of appeals affirmed.93
86. Martha H. Chumbler, Land Use Regulation of Marijuana Cultivation: What Authority
is Left to Local Government, 49 URB. LAWYER 505 (2017).
87. Id. at 506.
88. DeRuiter v. Twp. of Byron, 949 N.W.2d 91, 93 (Mich. 2020).
89. Id. at 94.
90. Id. at 95.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.

2021]

IMPLIED PREEMPTION IN THE REGULATION OF LAND

243

In 2020, the Supreme Court of Michigan addressed only conflict
preemption on appeal, finding no preemption and upholding the validity of the ordinance.94 The court defines conflict preemption narrowly: only where “its additional requirements do not contradict the
requirements . . . in the statute.”95 So long as the municipality does
not prohibit or penalize all medical cannabis cultivation or “impose
regulations that are ‘unreasonable and inconsistent with regulations established by state law[,]’” there is no conflict.96 The court
also found the permit requirement did not impermissibly infringe on
the caregiver’s medical use of cannabis, because “the permit requirement does not effectively prohibit medical use . . . .”97
In 2015, the Supreme Court of Washington found state law permitting patients to grow medical marijuana in “collective gardens”
did not preempt a city from banning collective gardens in the city
through its zoning ordinance.98 The original purpose of the statute
was to provide “an affirmative defense to criminal prosecution” of
medical cannabis users.99 The same statute permitting collective
gardens also grants cities and towns the power to zone the “production, processing, or dispensing of medical [cannabis].”100 Under this
authority, the City of Kent enacted the zoning ordinance described
by the court as follows: “Styled as a zoning ordinance, it prohibits
collective gardens . . . in every zoning district within the city and
deems any violation a nuisance per se that shall be abated by the
city attorney. The city may enforce the Ordinance with criminal and
civil sanctions.”101
Despite this zoning ordinance banning a land use legalized by state
law and defeating the purpose of protection of medical use from
criminal prosecution, the Supreme Court of Washington upheld the
ordinance as “a valid exercise of the [city’s] zoning authority . . .
because the [o]rdinance merely regulates land-use activity.”102 The
court characterized the statute as clarifying that “local governments
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

DeRuiter, 949 N.W.2d at 101.
Id. at 100.
Id.
Id. at 101.
Cannabis Action Coal. v. City of Kent, 351 P.3d 151, 152, 155 (Wash. 2015) (en banc).
Id. at 153.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 153–54 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 152.
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retain authority to regulate . . . medical marijuana through zoning.”103
Local prohibition on cannabis in Washington has expanded since the
state supreme court upheld a ban on what the statute permits. In
2014, the Attorney General’s Office “opined that state law did not
preempt local government[s]” from enacting local bans on cannabis
sales.104 In 2018, an appellate court upheld a “county ordinance that
banned the retail sale of recreational [cannabis].”105 The applicant
seeking a cannabis retailer license argued that the ordinance
“irreconcilably conflict[s] with state law” legalizing recreational cannabis.106 The court determined “the ordinance does not prohibit what
state law permits,” does not “thwart legislative purpose,” and that
“the county did not exercise unauthorized power.”107 The applicant’s
“implied preemption argument assert[ed] that allowing piecemeal
county-level bans would render the [legislative] intent to establish a
regulated [cannabis] market ‘meaningless.’”108 The court disagreed,
finding “a closer reading” of the statute and interpretation of legislative history “indicat[ing] the legislature intended to leave local
governments’ zoning authority undisturbed.”109 In sum, total bans of
medical and recreational cannabis by zoning or other local ordinance
appear immune from preemption.
In Inland Empire, the Supreme Court of California reached the
same conclusion: its medical cannabis statutes do not preempt a
local ban on facilities that distribute medical cannabis.110 The City
of Riverside amended its zoning ordinances to provide that medical
cannabis dispensaries are “a prohibited land use within the city and
may be abated as a public nuisance.”111 “The . . . ordinance also bans,
and declares as nuisance, any use that is prohibited by federal . . .
law.”112 Under this ordinance, the city brought a nuisance action
against a distribution facility that argued “the local ban . . . conflict[s]
103. Id. at 153.
104. Emerald Enterprises, LLC v. Clark Cnty., 413 P.3d 92 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 97.
107. Id. at 98–103.
108. Id. at 104.
109. Id. at 104–05.
110. City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Ctr., Inc., 300 P.3d
494, 496 (Cal. 2013).
111. Id. at 496.
112. Id.
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with, and is thus preempted by,” state law.113 The court found that
“[n]othing in [the medical cannabis statutes] expressly or impliedly
limits the inherent authority of a local jurisdiction . . . to regulate
the use of its land, including the authority to prohibit distribution
facilities within its borders.”114 Because some counties might come
to the reasonable conclusion that a dispensary “facilit[ies] within its
borders, even if carefully sited, well managed, and closely monitored, would present unacceptable local risks and burdens”; the court
could not “lightly assume the voters or the [state legislature] intended a one size fits all policy” under which “each and every one of
California’s [local governments] must allow the use of land for”
dispensary facilities.115 The court characterized state law as “merely
removing state law criminal and nuisance sanctions from” certain
conduct, leaving local governments “free to accommodate [or prohibit]
such conduct” within their borders, finding no conflict and no implied preemption.116 Because state law merely “remove[s] state-level
criminal and civil sanctions from specified medical [cannabis] activities,” and does not “establish a comprehensive state system of legalized medical [cannabis,] . . . grant a ‘right’ of convenient access to
[cannabis] for medicinal use[,] . . . override the zoning, licensing,
and police powers of local [governments,] or mandate local accommodation of medical [cannabis] cooperatives, collectives, or dispensaries[,]” the court found local prohibition of cannabis use legalized at
the state level was not preempted.117 Similar county ordinances
severely restricting cannabis businesses have been upheld under
this decision.118
An appellate court in Arizona reached the opposite conclusion on
the permissiveness of a total ban through local zoning. In 2010,
Arizona voters passed a state law “decriminaliz[ing] and provid[ing]
protection . . . for the medical use, possession, cultivation, and sale
of [cannabis].”119 The statute permits local jurisdictions “to ‘enact
reasonable zoning regulations that limit the use of land for [medical
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 508.
116. City of Riverside, 300 P.3d at 512.
117. Id. at 513.
118. E.g., Safe Life Caregivers v. City of Los Angeles, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 524 (Cal. Ct. App.
2016) (upholding an ordinance regulating medical cannabis businesses).
119. White Mountain Health Ctr., Inc. v. Maricopa Cnty., 386 P.3d 416 (Ariz. 2016).
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marijuana dispensaries] to specified areas.’”120 Maricopa County
publicly opposed the statute and amended its zoning ordinance text
to restrict industrial use that conflicts with federal law.121 In 2012,
the county “refused to issue the necessary zoning documents” to
establish a medical marijuana dispensary.122 The Arizona state appellate court affirmed the court below, which struck the text amendment.123 The county argued the zoning issue turned on “whether
[state law] preempts local jurisdictions from regulating . . . the
location” of dispensaries, but the appellate court rejected this argument, stating the real issue was “whether a local jurisdiction can ban
[dispensaries] under the guise of ‘reasonable zoning’ by authorizing
[dispensaries] in an area but then adding a poison pill to that use,
prohibiting [a dispensary] from conducting business in violation of
[federal] law.”124 The court concluded that a county “cannot adopt . . .
zoning . . . that is self-defeating by banning [dispensaries]” because
“a ban . . . cannot be a ‘reasonable zoning regulation.’”125
2. Nuisance
In the City of Claremont, California, the city planning director
told a citizen seeking to open a medical cannabis dispensary that
such use was not enumerated in the city zoning code and “could not
be easily [included] under any existing permitted use,” and that the
dispensary “would not be permitted at any location within the city”
and a code amendment would be necessary to permit such use.126
Accordingly, the city denied the application for a business permit and
business license for a dispensary.127 The city then “impos[ed] a fortyfive-day moratorium preventing the approval or issuance of any
permit, variance, license, or other entitlement [to establish] a medical
[cannabis] dispensary in the [c]ity” by ordinance.128 The moratorium
rendered the citizen’s appeal of the city’s denial of his business
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 435 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 420.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 435.
White Mountain Health Ctr., Inc., 386 P.3d at 435.
City of Claremont v. Kruse, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7.
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license and permit applications moot.129 The moratorium was later
extended for ten and a half months, and again for an additional
year.130 Meanwhile, the applicant opened a dispensary without a business license, prompting the city to direct him to cease and desist.131
Upon the applicant’s refusal to cease operation of the dispensary,
the city sought “a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
and permanent injunction to abate a public nuisance.”132
An appellate court in California found state law neither expressly
nor impliedly preempted the city’s actions.133 The court declined to
find implied preemption for three reasons. First, “[n]either statute
addresses, [let alone] completely covers the areas of land use, zoning, and business licensing[,]” so the court determined “[n]either
statute imposes comprehensive regulation demonstrating that the
availability of medical [cannabis] is a matter of ‘statewide concern.’”134
Second, there was no indication that local action should be precluded,
except in a few areas enumerated by the statute, and there is simultaneously legislative intent to permit local regulations consistent
with state law.135 Finally, since state law does not “compel the establishment of local regulations to accommodate medical [cannabis]
dispensaries; the City’s enforcement of its licensing and zoning laws
and its temporary moratorium on medical cannabis dispensaries do
not conflict with [state law permitting dispensaries].”136
A medical cannabis user sought to invalidate an ordinance banning
cannabis dispensaries, medical cannabis cultivation, and medical
cannabis storage in Fresno County.137 The county classified violations
of the ordinance as both public nuisances and misdemeanors.138
Among other challenges, the user alleged the ordinance’s criminalization of cultivation and storage conflicted with state law that expressly
states qualified users “shall not be subject to arrest for possession
or cultivation of medical cannabis pursuant to [state law].”139
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
Id.
City of Claremont, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 8.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 20–21.
Kirby v. Cnty. of Fresno, 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at 819.
Id.
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The California appellate court found the provision of the ordinance
criminalizing violations preempted by state law protecting against
arrests relating to medical use of cannabis.140 The court found the
legislature intended to protect medical users from prosecution on a
number of grounds. The Legislature’s reference to “arrest and prosecution” indicated to the court an intent to preclude local law enforcement agencies and officers “from taking subsequent steps in the
criminal justice process, including prosecuting protected persons
under a local ordinance.”141 Another indication of legislative intent
was derived “from the absence of limiting phrases deemed significant to the interpretation of statutory provisions at issue in Inland
Empire” decided by the state supreme court.142 The court concluded
the state law “prohibition of arrests manifest the legislature’s intent
to fully occupy the area of criminalization and decriminalization of
activity directly related to [cannabis].”143 The criminalization provision of the ordinance, therefore, conflicts with state law and was
severed from the ordinance by the court.144
3. Statutory Text Matters
Cases on other subject matter convey how preemption issues are
a matter of statutory interpretation, and the scope of the statutory
text is crucial. For example, an Oregon appellate court recently found
that a local ordinance requiring homegrown cannabis for personal
use be grown indoors was not preempted by state law prohibiting
local government regulation on the production and use of plant
seeds.145 The court rejected the plaintiff’s contention “that homegrown [cannabis] plants are grown for their [flowers] . . . and that
therefore their seeds are ‘flower seeds’” because the statute clearly
defines flowers as those “grown for ornamental purposes, not flowers grown for medical or recreational consumption or processing.”146
The court also rejected the plaintiff’s contention that her plants were
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 830.
Id. at 829.
Id.
Kirby, 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 830.
Id.
Brown v. City of Grants Pass, 414 P.3d 898 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).
Id. at 901.
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“nursery stock” simply “because they are botanically classified[,]”
because “the requirement . . . that the plants be kept ‘for propagation or sale’ suggests a commercial use[,]” for which home grown
medical cannabis do not qualify.147 Finding “[cannabis] seeds from
plants grown at home do not fall within the [statutory] text[,]” the
court found “they are not subject to the statute’s preemptive effect
“and affirmed the trial court below.148
4. Exclusion of an Initiative by Preemption
An appellate court in Minnesota, where cannabis has not been
legalized, offers an example of how preemption has been used to bar
the inclusion of an invalid initiative on a general election ballot for
Minneapolis.149 A citizen group filed a signed petition for a proposed
charter amendment to legalize and protect medical use of cannabis
in the City of Minneapolis.150 After the city council conducted a
hearing on the petition, it ruled against inclusion of the petition.151
The council also found the amendment (1) violates the Supremacy
Clause of the federal constitution and is therefore preempted by
federal law; (2) “contravenes state public policy and is preempted by
Minnesota law”; and (3) is an “unauthorized, [illegal] initiative that
addresses specific operations of municipal government rather than
a valid charter amendment [addressing] general form and structure
of municipal government.”152 The county district court and state
appellate court upheld the council’s refusal to place the proposed
amendment on the ballot, finding the initiative preempted by both
state and federal law.153
C. Fracking
Hydraulic fracturing, also known as “fracking,” has emerged as a
valuable contributor to profitable oil and gas development in the
United States. Fracking has been credited with reducing the country’s
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 902–03.
Id. at 903.
Haumant v. Griffin, 699 N.W.2d 774 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 776.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 780–81.

250

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:229

dependence on foreign oil and gas while giving way to the possibility
that the United States may soon be a future net exporter of natural
gas.154 Fracking is a necessary step to unlock oil and natural gas reserves embedded in shale and other tight, underground rock formations found across the country.155 The process entails the injection
of water and chemicals into rock at high pressure to release oil and
gas.156 Fracking was “[f]irst used commercially in 1949 and is now
a process [used] common[ly] worldwide.”157 Such valuable technology,
however, does not come without controversy. Proponents of fracking
tout the tremendous amounts of natural gas that can now be economically extracted, and the resulting effect on natural gas prices.158
Opponents, however, warn of reported “poisoned drinking water,
polluted air, animal deaths, and industrial disasters and explosions”
linked to fracking accidents.159
Every step of the way, including site preparation, well drilling,
and waste disposal, is subject to regulation,160 typically by state
government.161 State regulatory programs vary.162 While some states
require disclosure of chemicals and practices used during fracking,
other states protect this information as confidential or make exceptions for trade secrets.163 The expansion of fracking however, has
caused some local governments to seek greater control over the industry within its jurisdictional lines.164
A New Mexico county board voted to adopt an ordinance seeking
to ban fracking and in doing so, purporting to strip all challengers
154. Hydraulic Fracturing, AM. PETROLEUM INST., https://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas
/wells-to-consumer/exploration-and-production/hydraulic-fracturing (last visited June 21, 2021).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. City of Longmont Colo. v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 576 (Colo. 2016) (en
banc).
158. Fred Dews, The economic benefits of fracking, BROOKINGS (March 23, 2015), https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2015/03/23/the-economic-benefits-of-fracking/.
159. Stopping Fracking, EARTHJUSTICE, https://earthjustice.org/climate-and-energy/oil-gas
/fracking (last visited June 21, 2021).
160. Unconventional Oil and Natural Gas Development, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www
.epa.gov/uog (last visited June 21, 2021).
161. Fracking: Regulatory Failures and Delays, GREENPEACE, https://www.greenpeace
.org/usa/ending-the-climate-crisis/issues/fracking/regulatory-failures-and-delays/ (last visited
June 21, 2021).
162. James Knight & Bethany Gullman, The Power of State Interest: Preemption of Local
Fracking Ordinances in Home-Rule Cities, TUL. ENV’T L. J. 297, 300 (2015).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 298.
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of “the authority to enforce state or federal preemptive law.”165 The
ordinance also included provisions stripping challengers of their
rights under the First and Fifth Amendments, Commerce Clause,
and Contract Clause.166 Among a host of other issues, a federal district court found “state law impliedly preempts the [o]rdinance, because it conflicts with state law.”167 The court determined that the
“[s]tate law does not [impliedly] preempt the entire oil and gas field”
because there is “room for concurrent regulation.”168 However, the
court found the ban on fracking was “antagonistic to state law” by
“prohibit[ing] activities that . . . state law permits.”169 Since New
Mexico has an extensive statutory and regulatory scheme to “regulat[e] oil-and-gas production in a manner intended to prevent waste,”
the court concluded that “the [s]tate has indicated oil-and-gas extraction is permitted.”170 But because “state law specifically allows
certain activities or is of such a character that local prohibitions on
those activities would be inconsistent with or antagonistic to that
state law or policy,” the court invalidated the ordinance because it was
impliedly preempted by state law by virtue of the conflict created.171
Local regulation of fracking in Colorado, the state with the fourth
highest number of gas and oil wells in the United States,172 also
provides a pair of cases that deal with state-local preemption in the
area of fracking. In City of Longmont Colorado v. Colorado Oil &
Gas Association, the court found the Longmont ban on fracking and
the storage and disposal of fracking waste within the city limits
“materially impede[d]” the application of state law and was thereby
impliedly preempted.173 In City of Fort Collins v. Colorado Oil, the
court found the city’s “five-year moratorium on fracking . . . operationally conflict[ed] with . . . state law” and was thereby impliedly
preempted.174 These decisions are especially noteworthy coming
from a state supreme court in a strong home-rule state.
165. SWEPI, LP v. Mora Cnty., 81 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1094 (D.N.M. 2015).
166. Id. at 1093–94.
167. Id. at 1193.
168. Id. at 1197.
169. Id. at 1198.
170. Id. at 1199.
171. SWEPI, LP, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1199–1200 (quoting Stennis v. City. of Santa Fe, 176 P.3d
309, 315 (2008)).
172. Knight & Gullman, supra note 162, at 299.
173. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573 (Colo. 2016) (en banc).
174. City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil, 369 P.3d 586 (Colo. 2016).
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In 2012, residents of the home-rule municipality of Longmont voted
to add an article to the city charter banning hydraulic fracking and
the storage and disposal of fracking waste within the city.175 The
Supreme Court of Colorado began its preemption analysis by acknowledging confusion caused by its prior preemption cases before
clarifying the applicable test for preemption.176 The Longmont court
then turned to the preemption issue. “To determine whether a regulatory matter is one of statewide, local, or mixed state and local concern, ‘[the court] weighs the relative interests of the state and the
municipality in regulating the particular issue in the case,’ making
the determination on a case-by-case basis considering the totality of
the circumstances.”177 The court considered “the need for statewide
uniformity[,]” “extra-territorial impact of local regulation, . . .
whether the state or local governments . . . traditionally regulate[]
the matter, and . . . whether the [state] [c]onstitution specifically
commits the matter to either state or local regulation[,]” to determine that fracking is a matter of mixed state and local concern.178
Next, the Longmont court reviewed the three forms of preemption
it recognizes, all of which are “primarily matters of statutory interpretation.”179 Colorado’s definition of express preemption and implied preemption have common distinguishing features: “[e]xpress
preemption applies when the legislature clearly and unequivocally
states its intent to prohibit local government from exercising authority
over the [regulatory] matter[,]” and implied preemption applies when
the language used and the scope and purpose of the legislative scheme
“evince[] a legislative intent to completely occupy a field given by
reason of a dominant state interest.”180 The third kind of preemption,
operational conflict, is “whether the effectuation of a local interest
would materially impede or destroy a state interest, recognizing that
a local ordinance that authorizes what state law forbids or that forbids
what state law authorizes will necessarily satisfy this standard.”181
The court noted that this is “a facial evaluation of the . . . statutory
175. City of Longmont Colo., 369 P.3d at 577.
176. Id. at 578–83.
177. Id. at 580.
178. Id. at 581.
179. Id. at 582 (quoting Colo. Mining Ass’n v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Summit Cnty., 199
P.3d 718 ,723 (2009)).
180. Id. (internal citations omitted).
181. City of Longmont Colo., 369 P.3d at 582.
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and regulatory schemes, and not a factual inquiry” as to how those
schemes work in effect.182
Despite the state’s arguments that implied preemption is at issue,
the court disagreed based on prior cases finding state law does not
preempt a local government’s authority to enact land-use regulations of oil and gas and legislative recognition of the propriety of local
land use ordinances that relate to oil and gas development.183 The
court rejected the state’s “argument that preemption may be implied
when state law manifests a ‘sufficiently dominant’ state interest[,]”
because dominant state interest alone does not prove intent to
exclude all local regulation.184 The dominance of a state interest is
instead “more appropriate [in determining] whether a regulatory
matter involves an issue of local, statewide, or mixed concern than
it is to the question of implied preemption.”185
The only remaining theory for preemption was operational conflict.
The pervasive state rules and regulations, “evinc[ing] state control
over numerous aspects of fracking, . . . convince[d] [the court] that
the state’s interest in the efficient and responsible development of
oil and gas resources includes a strong interest in the unfirm regulation of fracking.”186 The charter amendment banning fracking within
Longmont “prevents operators from . . . fracking . . . even if the
operators abide by state rules and regulations, rendering those rules
and regulations superfluous.”187 Such a result led the court to conclude
that “by prohibiting fracking and the storage and disposal of fracking
waste, [the charter amendment] materially impedes the effectuation
of the state’s interest.”188 Because the charter amendment “materially impedes the application of state law,” the court found the charter amendment was impliedly preempted by state law.189
In 2013, citizens of Fort Collins voted to enact a citizen-initiated
ordinance imposing a five-year moratorium prohibiting fracking and
storing fracking waste in the city.190 The municipal charter was
amended accordingly, allowing “[c]ertain wells that existed prior to
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id. at 583.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 585.
City of Longmont Colo., 369 P.3d at 585.
Id.
Id.
City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil, 369 P.3d 586, 589 (Colo. 2016).
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the amendment” an exemption from the prohibition.191 Fort Collins
argued “a five-year moratorium [was] sufficiently different from a
perpetual ban” and “a valid exercise of zoning authority” because
“the . . . moratorium affects only a nonessential phase of production”
and creates “a temporary ‘time-out’” giving the city time “to study
the impact of fracking and waste disposal on public health.”192 The
court found “the availability of alternatives to fracking” does not save
the moratorium from preemption because the prohibition interferes
with fracking for production which many operators have deemed
necessary to ensure productive recovery, which in turn “materially
impedes the state’s goal” of maximum, efficient production.193 The
argument that the purpose and limited duration of the moratorium
save it from preemption failed because the moratorium was not
merely a regulation, but a length prohibition that “(1) deleteriously
affects what is intended to be a state-wide program of regulation
and (2) impedes the goals of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act . . .
as well as the state’s interest in fracking as reflected in the Act and
the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.”194
Applying the framework established in Longmont, the court
stated that a home-rule city’s ordinance seeking to regulate fracking
involves a matter of mixed state and local concern and that the
validity of the local regulation “turns on whether it conflicts with
state law.”195 The court found the Fort Collins “moratorium renders
the state’s statutory and regulatory scheme superfluous” and thereby
creates an operational conflict.196 Expressing no views on the propriety of a moratorium of a materially shorter duration, the court invalidated the five-year moratorium as preempted by operational
conflict with the Act.197
D. Inclusionary Zoning/Rent Control
State rent control laws arose as a reaction to economic distortions
caused by the nationalization of our economy during World War I.198
191. Id.
192. Id. at 593.
193. Id.
194. Id. (citation omitted).
195. Id. at 591.
196. Id. at 593.
197. Id. at 594.
198. R. S. Radford, Regulatory Takings Law in the 1990’s: The Death of Rent Control?, 21
SW. U. L. REV. 1019, 1028 (1992).
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As early as 1921, Justice Holmes explained the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision to uphold rent control:
[A] public exigency will justify the legislature in restricting property rights in land to a certain extent without compensation. . . .
The regulation is put and justified only as a temporary measure.
A limit in time, to tide over a passing trouble, well may justify
a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change.199

Today, a formal declaration of emergency is no longer a precondition
to the constitutional validity of a rent control scheme.200 Means of
rent control have become more creative, including complicated systems of incentives, grants, in-lieu fees, among other sticks and carrots.
While landlords are constitutionally entitled to a fair rate of return
on their property,201 the appropriate measure of that return is less
clear. However, a number of jurisdictions agree that the appropriate
standard is fair return on investment.202
As described in a 2020 treatise on local government law, local rent
control ordinances are vulnerable to preemption:
Landlords are entitled as a matter of procedural due process to a
reasonably flexible and expeditious rent adjustment mechanism.
A rent control ordinance must set forth standards and criteria
199. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 156–57 (1921) (citations omitted).
200. See, e.g., Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1976) (holding that the
existence of an emergency is not necessary for rent control when such regulation is reasonably
related to the furtherance of a legitimate governmental purpose); Berman v. Downing, 229
Cal. Rptr. 660 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1986) (justifying rent control based on housing shortage); and Colonial Arms Apartments v. Vill. of Mount Kisco, 104 A.D.2d 964 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984) (invalidating resolution based on housing emergency declared that lacked factual basis).
201. Adamson Co. v. City of Malibu, 854 F. Supp. 1476 (C.D. Cal. 1994); Baker v. City of
Santa Monica, 226 Cal. Rptr. 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Oceanside Mobilehome Park Owners’
Ass’n v. City of Oceanside, 204 Cal. Rptr. 239 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Hemsley v. Borough of Ft.
Lee, 411 A.2d 203 (N.J. 1980); Niles v. Bos. Rent Control Adm’r, 374 N.E.2d 296 (Mass. Ct.
App. 1978).
202. See, e.g., Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851 (Cal. 1997) (finding
twelve percent annual limit on rent increases deprived landlord of a fair return); Steinbergh
v. Rent Control Bd. of Cambridge, 571 N.E.2d 15 (Mass. 1991) (upholding rational basis for
regulating allowing small-scale landlords to recoup capital investments at a higher rate of
return than large-scale landlords because large-scale landlords have greater ability to obtain
finance capital); Cromwell Assoc. v. Mayor & Council of City of Newark, 511 A.2d 1273 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (maximum limit on annual return is facially unconstitutional since
it precludes a case-sensitive determination of what is “fair and just” return).
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by which parties, administering agency, and reviewing court can
be guided in determining adequacy of return on landlord’s investment. The protections afforded to a tenant attach only to the
primary place of residence, and cannot be assigned by the tenant.
Contracts made by the tenant purporting to waive rent control
protection are against public policy and unenforceable.
The administrative mechanism for the enforcement of rent control
does not violate state separation-of-powers principles, but a locality
cannot prescribe a rule of evidence as by creating a presumption
that a controlled tenant was evicted in retaliation for exercise of
his rights. . . Rent control and condominium conversion ordinances are vulnerable to claims that the state has preempted local
regulation. Local rent control of federally subsidized housing projects is subject to preemption by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development. The Sherman Act does not tacitly preempt
an ordinance requiring landlords to rent vacant apartments to
would-be tenants.203

Unsurprisingly, many of the preemption cases in this category
discussed below come from the state of California, which is rife with
local land use controls on rent and housing. As of October of 2020,
approximately fifteen California municipalities had enacted local
residential rent control laws.204
1. Rent Restrictions
Simple rent restrictions appear to be declining in popularity as
creative ways of achieving the same effects as rent control become
more commonplace. Nevertheless, remaining rent control ordinances burdening properties result in landowners continuing to rely
on preemption to avoid such controls. As rent-controlled buildings
are transferred to new owners, so run the obligations and legal status
of rent controllability, as the next three cases demonstrate.
In Baychester Shopping Center v. San Francisco Residential Rent
Stabilization and Arbitration Board of City and County of San
Francisco, the issue was whether the successor landlord was liable
for rent charges exceeding the local ordinance controls charged by
203. JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 14:30 (2020) (footnote omitted).
204. TERRY B. FRIEDMAN ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: LANDLORD-TENANT 5-A (2020).
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the predecessor landlord.205 The successor landlord argued state law
precluding a landowner from being held liable for a breach committed by a predecessor landlord preempted liability for the rent overcharges under the county ordinance.206 The court disagreed, finding
the successor’s obligations under the rent ordinance, arising by
operation of law, materially different from implied covenants that
run with the land, arising out of a contract between parties, and
that the state law therefore did not apply.207
Another successor landlord to a building on Central Park subject
to below-market rent control under an agreement with HUD sought
to avoid liability for his predecessor landlord’s overcharging of rent.208
The successor landlord argued that the use agreement, entered
between the landlord and HUD, federally preempts local rent regulation.209 The preemptive clause in the use agreement was explicit,
so the question before the court was whether a private contract between HUD and a landlord can have the same preemptive effect as
federal law.210 Because “the critical question in any federal preemption analysis is . . . whether Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state law . . . any preemption of local rent regulation
by the National Housing Authority must have been intended by
Congress.”211 The court found that a contractual preemption provision “fails to withstand constitutional scrutiny” because the federally
authorized contracts themselves are not “Laws of the United
States.”212 The court concluded that because “Congress did not
explicitly authorize the Use Agreement’s contractual preemption of
local rent regulation,” local rent regulation still applies to the subject units.213
Just as liability for overcharge under a rent control ordinance can
transfer to a subsequent landowner, so can an exemption from rent
control ordinances. In Block 268, LLC v. City of Hoboken Rent Leveling
205. Baychester Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. S.F. Residential Rent Stabilization & Arb. Bd. of
City & Cnty. of S.F., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 341 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
206. Id. at 345.
207. Id. at 345–46.
208. 435 Cent. Park W. Tenant Ass’n v. Park Front Apartments, LLC, 58 N.Y.S.3d 898
(N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
209. Id. at 904.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 908–09.
212. Id. at 910.
213. Id. at 911.
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and Stabilization Board, a successor landlord successfully argued that
its buildings were exempt from rent control ordinances, affirmed on
appeal by a New Jersey state appellate court.214 The court found the
prior landlord legally obtained a rent control exemption under the
state rent control statute and the exemption could not be nullified
by either a transfer in title or by a conversion from rental units to
condominiums due to a “hypertechnical omission or oversight.”215
The trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed), “that the
[l]egislature had preempted the [county rent stabilization] [b]oard
from taking any action that would impair the exception.”216 The
statutory langue made it clear that the county rent stabilization
board could not limit or impair an exemption, preempting the field,
so that the city and board could not exercise a power that contradicts the state legislature’s policy.217
In Herzberg v. County of Plumas, landowners upset by “their
neighbor’s cattle [coming] onto their property, eating the vegetation,
defecating, and trampling the ground and sensitive creek beds . . .
sued their neighbors” and the county.218 A county ordinance regarding open range lands gives owners “of unfenced land within the
designated open range the right to ‘a reasonable rental fee from any
person who pastures livestock thereon.’”219 The plaintiff-landowners’
general issue with this ordinance was that it “improperly shifted the
burden of animal grazing from cattle ranchers to private [landowners] . . . within the open ranges.”220 The plaintiffs also complained
that the burden of determining who the cattle belonged to, “collecting
a reasonable rental fee, and erecting a lawful fence if the owner
wanted to exclude the cattle, fell on the [land]owner.”221 In part, the
plaintiffs sought to invalidate the ordinance due to conflict preemption
with state law allowing commercial rent control.222 The ordinance
constituted illegal commercial rent control, according to the plaintiffs, “because it ‘interferes with [landowners’] ability to negotiate
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

952 A.2d 473, 479 (N.J. App. Div. 2008).
Id. at 477.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 478.
34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 591 (citing the ordinance).
Id. at 592.
Id.
Id. at 603.
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rent from graziers at a price dictated by market conditions.’”223 The
court disagreed, finding no preemption under the state rent control
law because the ordinance merely “place[s] a floor, not a ceiling, on
the reasonable rent for pasturage” in the open range lands.224
In Apartment Association of South Central Wisconsin v. City of
Madison, an appellate court in Wisconsin found the City of Madison
had no authority to enact its inclusionary housing ordinance because such ordinance was preempted by state law.225 A non-profit
corporation of members of the rental housing industry challenged
the city ordinance, which imposed a requirement that developers
“charge no more than a specified amount of rent for no less than a
specified percentage of rental dwelling units.”226 The statute prohibited certain governmental entities from “regulat[ing] the amount of
rent or fees charged for the use of a residential dwelling unit.”227 The
appellate court read the statute closely, concluding that “the legislature ha[d] expressly withdrawn the power of the City to enact [the
ordinance]” because it “regulates the amount of rent that property
owners . . . may charge for rental dwelling units[,]” which is the type
of regulation the legislature expressly prohibited.228 Therefore, the
ordinance was void because it is preempted by state law.229
2. Eviction Controls
Relatively recently, the Ninth Circuit found a “good cause” regulation by HUD did not preempt Los Angeles County from enacting a
local eviction control.230 The county ordinance “restricts possible
grounds for eviction to thirteen enumerated reasons, including violation of material terms of the lease, property damage, and criminal
activity.”231 “The only business-related reasons [(economic justifications)] are renovation, removal of the unit from the rental market,
or placement of a family member or resident manager into the
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 604.
Id.
722 N.W.2d 614 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 616–18.
Id. at 618 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 66.1015).
Id. at 625.
Id. at 625–26.
Barrientos v. 1801–1825 Morton LLC, 583 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1206.
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unit.”232 The relevant rule of HUD provided that “good cause” is
required “for all mid-lease terminations and nonrenewals.”233 While
the district court found the ordinance “conflict[ed] with the [federal]
regulation because ‘it takes away a right specifically granted by the
HUD regulation[,]’”234 the Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding no conflict because “[t]he HUD regulation does not create a ‘right’ to evict
tenants to raise the rent . . . [but] merely creates a floor of protection
which local laws may enhance.”235
San Francisco’s rent control ordinance was adopted in 1979
because “the lack of affordable rental housing was creating hardships . . . .”236 The ordinance recites a number of purposes, including
“the limitation of rent increases for tenants in occupancy, the arbitration of rental increase adjustments, and the restriction on the
grounds on which landlords can evict tenants from their rental
units.”237 The ordinance includes and has been amended to include
a number of creative protections for its tenants, which sometimes
appear to abut state law protecting landlords from rent control by
local governance. The following two cases illustrate the particular
tension created by local eviction controls in San Francisco, which
are carefully drafted to elude preemption by state law.
In Small Property Owners of San Francisco Institute v. City and
County of San Francisco, careful drafting was not sufficient to evade
preemption under state law.238 California’s Ellis Act “allows property
owners who seek to exit the rental business to evict residential tenants and prohibits local governments from ‘compell[ing] the owner of
any residential real property to offer, or continue to offer, accommodations in the property for rent or lease.’”239 San Francisco adopted an
ordinance that allowed property owners to make changes to nonconforming housing units—including expansion, alterations, and reconstruction—that were not previously allowed.240 The ability to make
such changes on units where tenants are evicted under “no-fault”
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
Id. at 1204.
Id. at 1207.
Id.
Foster v. Britton, 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 800, 803 (Cal Ct. App. 2015).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
231 Cal. Rptr. 3d 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
Id.
Id. at 226.
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provisions, including tenants evicted in accordance with the Ellis
Act, were subject to waiting periods of five to ten years under the
ordinance.241 Units from which tenants evicted in accordance with
the Ellis Act were subject to a ten-year waiting period.242 The ordinance was challenged, in part, “on the grounds that the ordinance
imposes a prohibitive price on property owners exercising their right
to exit the rental business and therefore conflicts with and is preempted by the Ellis Act.”243 The trial court denied the challengers
petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief in
its entirety.244 The appellate court, however, agreed with the challengers that the ordinance, on its face, penalizes a landlord exercising
Ellis Act rights, and is therefore preempted.245 The court “focused
broadly on whether [the ordinance] ‘duplicates, contradicts, or enters
an area fully occupied by general law[.]’”246
The Ellis Act completely occupies the field of substantive eviction
controls over landlords’ desiring to exist the residential market.247
The San Francisco ordinance does not merely regulate the particulars
of remodeling a nonconforming unit, but instead prohibits changes
for ten years after the property owner exists the rental business.248
By imposing such a prohibition, the ordinance improperly attempts
to regulate within the field of substantive eviction controls over such
property owners.249 The court found that “an inevitable burden of
exercising Ellis Act [evictions] rights is a prohibition against” remodeling for ten years, which “far exceeds the scope of permissible
local governance [permitted] by the Ellis Act.”250
In Foster v. Britton,251 the challenged ordinance provided that “a
tenant may not be evicted for violating an obligation that was not
included in the tenant’s original rental agreement unless the change
is authorized by San Francisco’s rent control ordinance, is required
241. Id.
242. Id. at 227.
243. Id.
244. 231 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 230.
245. Id. at 230–31.
246. Id. at 232 (citing S.F. Apartment Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of S. F., 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 684,
702 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016)).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 233.
249. Id.
250. 231 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 235.
251. Foster v. Britton, 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 800 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
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by law, or accepted by the tenant in writing.”252 “State law[, however,]
provides that a landlord may change the terms of a month-to-month
lease after giving [thirty] days’ notice” and that the changed terms
must be incorporated into the lease so long as the tenant continues
to hold the premises after the notice takes effect.253 Upon its acquisition of a multi-unit apartment building, the new landlord gave its
tenants thirty days’ notice of new house rules pursuant to state
law.254 A tenant refused to agree to the “unilateral changes to her
rental agreement” and in the following dispute, the landlord took
the position that state law preempted the city ordinance restricting
eviction based on a tenant’s refusal to acquiesce to a change in terms
from the original lease agreement.255
The appellate court disagreed, finding the ordinance did not conflict with state law. Relying on the Supreme Court of California’s
decision of Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley,256 the court held that while
a municipality cannot interfere with the procedural protections offered by the state, it retains its authority to limit the substantive
grounds for eviction.257 The court found that the “purpose of [the
statute] is to establish procedural safeguards for tenants when
landlords . . . change [the] terms of the tenancy, and does not prevent local governments from regulating the substantive grounds for
eviction.”258 The ordinance does not interfere with any procedural
protections conferred by state law but regulates the substantive
grounds on which a landlord may evict a tenant.259 Accordingly, the
court concluded there was no conflict or preemption by state law.260
The City of Oakland, California’s rent control ordinance, first enacted in 1980, differed from many other cities’ rent control laws by
virtue of not requiring landlords to show good cause to evict tenants.261
A voter initiative was adopted by ordinance. In 2002, the Oakland
Just Cause For Eviction ordinance required a landlord “to plead and
252. Id. at 803.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 804.
255. Id.
256. 550 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1976),
257. Foster v. Britton, 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 800, 809 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 809–10.
261. Rental Hous. Ass’n of N. Alameda Cnty. v. City of Oakland, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 181 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2009).
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prove a specified ground for any eviction.”262 A group of landlords in
the city sought a writ of mandate to prohibit enforcement.263 The
trial court found certain provisions of the ordinance preempted by
state law.264 The appellate court affirmed, additionally finding a
portion of the ordinance that was not challenged also preempted.265
3. Mobile Homes
In California alone, approximately ninety jurisdictions regulate
rents in mobile home parks, many of which go beyond classic “rent
stabilization” to impose severe eviction controls as well.266 The unique
characteristics of mobile and manufactured home ownership—
namely the difficulty and cost of moving the homes—gives the community operator tremendous leverage in establishing rent levels,
fees, rules and other terms of tenancy.
A manufactured home park resident who received notice from the
City of Burnsville, Minnesota of alleged property maintenance and
zoning code violations brought a class action against the city, alleging the city’s enforcement in the manufactured home park was
preempted by federal and state law.267 The county court granted
summary judgment and permanent injunctive relief.268
On appeal, the court found the city’s enforcement of its code was
neither expressly preempted by the National Manufactured Housing
Construction and Safety Standards Act,269 nor preempted by express
or field preemption by state law.270 Federal law expressly preempted
“construction or safety of the manufactured home itself.”271 “The city
attempted to regulate carports, awnings, zoning setbacks, trash
screening, and exterior storage within a manufactured home park.”272
Because these do not relate to the construction or safety of the
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 186–88.
Id. at 186.
Id.
Id. at 190–91.
FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 204, at 5-k.
Eich v. City of Burnsville, 906 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).
Id.
Id. at 875–76.
Id.
Id. at 875.
Id. at 876.
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manufactured home itself, the city code does not fall within the scope
of the Act’s express preemption.273 Minnesota adopted state standards concerning the safety and construction of manufactured homes
that are identical to the federal standards, so there was no express
preemption under state law of the city codes for the same reasons
that there was no express preemption under federal law.274
In Cacho v. Boudreau, mobile home park residents sued park
owners in San Diego in small claims court, challenging a monthly
pass-through charge for property taxes imposed on park land that
was separate from and in addition to space rent.275 The case was
transferred to county court, where the park owners sought declaratory relief and residents asserted the local ordinance was preempted
by state law.276 The county court entered summary judgment for
residents and imposed statutory penalties against the park owners
for their willful violation of state law.277 The Court of Appeals affirmed.278 The Supreme Court of California reversed, finding the
ordinance was not preempted by state law.279
The state Mobile Home Residency Law provides that “[a] homeowner shall not be charged fees other than rent, utilities, and incidental reasonable charges for services actually rendered”; “parks
subject to local rent collection laws” must still be allowed to “separately charge park residents for certain government-imposed fees,
assessments, and other charges” (except for ad valorem property
taxes); and that a trial court has discretion to impose civil penalties
up to “$2,000 for each ‘willful violation’ of the law.”280 The supreme
court addressed whether this “state . . . law preempt[s] a local rent
control ordinance that allows a mobile home park owner to separately charge park residents for property taxes imposed on the land
on which the park is situated[.]”281 To determine whether there was
“an actual and irreconcilable conflict between state and law,” which
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Eich, 906 N.W.2d at 876.
Id. at 876–77.
Cacho v. Boudreau, 149 P.3d 473, 476 (Cal. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 474–75.
Cacho, 149 P.3d at 475.
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the court of appeals concluded, or merely “an immaterial difference
in terminology,” as the park owners argued, the court used statutory
analysis to harmonize the provisions of state law that restrict rental
fees while permitting a park owner to separately charge residents
for governmental fees or assessments.282 Using legislative history,
the court determined “the aim of the legislation was to [allow] park
owners to pass through to park [tenants] the costs of new or increased fees and assessments imposed on the [rental units].”283 The
purpose is to relieve the park owner of the “unfair burden” otherwise imposed on them in rent-controlled areas where they could not
increase rent to accommodate increased fees.284 Because the ordinance treats property taxes as a component of the rental rate formula, it is treated as a rental charge, and not a fee prohibited by
state law.285
In Griffiths v. County of Santa Cruz, tenants who occupied mobile
home sites complained that the community operator violated a
county mobile home rent control ordinance by failing to reduce rent
commensurate to his discontinuance of garbage collection services.286
The operator challenged the ordinance, in part on the grounds that
state law preempts the County’s ordinance.287 The operator argued
that because state law “excludes recreational vehicles from the definition of a mobile home,” the County is preempted from including
“recreational vehicles within its definition of mobile home.”288 The
court disagreed, finding the state law relied on by the operator does
not apply to the ordinance, where “the relevant purpose implicates
the operator’s landlord-tenant relationship with his . . . tenants.”289
Further, the county’s “inclusion of recreational vehicles within the
definition of ‘mobile home’ . . . is consistent with” the state law that
does apply.290 Thus, the court found that state law did not preempt
the county ordinance and affirmed the court below.291
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id. at 477.
Id. at 480.
Id.
Id. at 483.
Griffith v. Cnty. of Santa Cruz, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 801, 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 804.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 804–05.
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4. Relocation Assistance
Another mechanism of rent control is relocation assistance: financial assistance landlords are required to provide to tenants to relieve
relocation costs when the tenant is permanently or temporarily displaced from a residential unit. Because displacement precedes the
need for relocation assistance, it is often improperly understood as
“rent control.” Nevertheless, many rent control state and local laws
seek to regulate the way landlords conduct their evictions, including
requiring a landlord to set aside financial aid for relocation services
in an escrow account upon providing notice of displacement.
In July of 2020, an appellate court in Oregon considered whether
a provision in a Portland “ordinance . . . requir[ing] landlords to pay
relocation assistance to tenants following a rent increase of [ten]
percent or more if the tenant responds by terminating the tenancy,”
is “rent control” and therefore expressly preempted by state law
prohibiting local rent control.292 The City of Portland added tenant
protections to address a city housing emergency, including a requirement that “landlords pay relocation assistance to tenants under
certain circumstances.”293 The landlords challenging the ordinance
argued that the statutory “text expresses an intention to preempt
‘[a]ny local enactment that has the effect of “controlling”—that is,
restraining or exercising influence over to limit—the rent that may
be charged.’”294
The appellate court disagreed, finding that the text of the statute,
when read in context, demonstrates “the legislature did not intend to
broadly prohibit any [local] regulation that could” affect a restraint on
rent, but instead “is solely directed at prohibiting ‘rent control’” as in
the direct regulation of the amount of rent to be paid to a landlord.295
Finding “nothing in the statut[ory] text, context, or legislative history” that would support finding the legislature intended to preempt
other types of restrictions than direct regulation of rent charged to
tenants, the court found no express or implied preemption.296
The court also disagreed with the landlords’ argument “that the
ordinance falls within the statute’s prohibitory scope” because it
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Owen v. Cty. of Portland, 470 P.3d 390 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
Id. at 392–93.
Id. at 396 (citing plaintiff’s brief).
Id.
Id. at 397.

2021]

IMPLIED PREEMPTION IN THE REGULATION OF LAND

267

regulates the “same area” as state law.297 Instead, the court found
the relocation assistance “does not fall within the common understanding of ‘rent control’ that the legislature intended when it enacted” the statutory prohibition on rent control.298 The court also
declined to find implied preemption by conflict, because “operation of
the ordinance does not make it impossible to comply with the statute.”299 Concluding that the ordinance is not “in truth incompatible”
with state law, the court found the ordinance was not preempted by
state law.300
5. Affordable Housing Mitigation Requirements
The Town of Telluride enacted an ordinance “which imposes an
‘affordable housing’ requirement on [most] . . . new developments”
in town.301 Under the ordinance, property owners must “create
affordable housing for forty percent of the employees generated by
new development.”302 The ordinance provides four options to satisfy
the affordable housing requirement, which can also be combined to
meet the requirement: (1) “constructing new housing units with fixed
rental rates,” (2) “imposing deed restrictions on free market units
in order to fix rental rates,” (3) “paying fees in lieu of housing,” or (4)
“conveying land to the [t]own for affordable housing.”303 The Supreme
Court of Colorado found the ordinance “fall[s] within the commonly
understood meaning of rent control,” therefore conflicting with the
state’s broad prohibition on local measures controlling rents.304 The
court further held that the statute addressed a matter of mixed local
and statewide concern, concluding that the conflicting ordinance
was invalid.305
The statute does not explicitly define rent control, but the court
found it to be “clear on its face.”306 The ordinance “operates to suppress
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 398.
Owen, 470 P.3d at 398.
Id. at 400
Id. at 401.
Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, LLC, 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000) (en banc).
Id. at 33.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 35.
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rental values below their market values[,]” thereby “restrict[ing] [a]
property owner’s ability to develop his land as he sees fit.”307 Therefore, the ordinance “violates the plain language of the state prohibition on” “any ordinance or resolution which would control rents.”308
Developers in Los Angeles were issued a writ of mandate that
precluded the city from enforcing an affordable housing ordinance
against developers’ mixed-use project.309 In the as-applied challenge,
the county court found “the affordable housing ordinance conflicts
with[,] and is [accordingly] preempted by vacancy decontrol provisions” of state law, which permits “residential landlords to set the
initial rental levels” at the beginning of a tenancy term.310 The challenged ordinance required applicants for a multifamily residential
or mixed-use project to comply with one of two options for “replacement and inclusionary dwelling requirements,” whichever results
in more affordable housing units.311 The ordinance also provided a
third option: if the applicant does not wish to build inclusionary
housing, the applicant can pay an “‘in-lieu’ fee.”312 After the developer’s administrative appeal was denied, it filed for writ of mandate,
alleging the application of the ordinance’s housing requirements to
the project violated state law.313
The trial court agreed, issuing the developer such a writ to prevent the application of the ordinance to its project. State law clearly
states that residential landlords “establish the initial rental rate for
a . . . unit.”314 The ordinance, on the contrary, “require[d] [the developer] to provide [sixty] affordable housing units at regulated rent
levels that must be preserved either of the life of the units or [thirty]
years, whichever is greater.”315 Finding the ordinance’s affordable
housing requirements hostile to state law “by denying [the developer] its right to establish the initial rental rates for affordable
307. Town of Telluride, 3 P.3d at 35.
308. Id. (citing the statute).
309. Palmer/Sixth Street Properties, L.P. v. Cty. of L.A., 96 Cal. Rtpr. 3d 875, 877 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2009).
310. Id. at 878–79.
311. Id. at 879.
312. Id. “The in lieu fee for a required Very Low Income Dwelling Unit shall be $100,576.14
per unit. The in lieu fee for a required Low Income Dwelling Unit shall be $78,883.41 per
unit.” Id.
313. Id. at 881.
314. Id. at 886.
315. Palmer/Sixth Street Properties, L.P., 96 Cal. Rtpr. 3d at 886.
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housing units[,]” the ordinance conflicted with state law and was
therefore preempted.316 The appellate court affirmed.317
6. Other Regulatory Burdens on Landlord
In Lake Valley Associates, LLC v. Township of Pemberton, a corporate owner of a 450-unit apartment complex challenged a township
ordinance imposing “registration obligations and other regulatory
requirements on landlords on landlords within the town.”318 The
owner challenged “the ordinance [as] preempted because [its] registration is overseen by state agency and that the additional information [required] by the ordinance is forbidden” from being collected
under other law.319 Specifically, the owner argued “there is conflict
between the ordinance and [state] law” pertaining to Hotel and Multiple Dwellings and that the state law “was intended to be exclusive
in its field and is so pervasive that it precludes coexistence of a
[local] ordinance.”320 The appellate court adopted the analysis of the
court below, finding the explicit statement of legislative intent in
both state laws cited by the owner did not “preclude the right of any
municipality to adopt and enforce ordinances, or regulations, more
restrictive than the statutes any rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder” could not be clearer.321 The court found the ordinance in
some ways more restrictive and expansive than the state law, which
is specifically allowed by the statute itself.322 For these reasons, the
appellate court affirmed the finding of no preemption under state
law, upholding the validity of the ordinance.
Recently, a California appellate court found the state’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) does not preempt a San Francisco ordinance banning discrimination based on tenant’s participation
in Section 8 housing program.323 In 1998, San Francisco amended its
“existing housing discrimination ordinance to [ban] discrimination
based on a person’s ‘source of income,’ . . . defined broadly to include
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Id. at 886–88.
Id. at 888.
Lake Valley Assoc., LLC v. Twp. of Pemberton, 987 A.2d 623, 624 (N.J. App. Div. 2010).
Id. at 625.
Id. at 625–26.
Id. at 627.
Id.
City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Post, 231 Cal. Rptr. 3d 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
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government rent subsidies” (like Section 8 housing vouchers).324 The
California legislature expanded FEHA the following year “to prohibit discrimination based on a tenant’s ‘source of income,’” but used
a much narrower definition that “does not reach government rent
subsidies.”325 An agent for a San Francisco landlord advertised available units “on Craigslist and ApartmentsInSF.com[,]” stating in each
posting “that the landlord would not accept Section 8 vouchers.”326
The city sued, alleging such discrimination violated its ordinance
prohibiting discrimination based on source of income.327 The landlord filed a motion to dismiss “on the ground[s] that FEHA preempts
the source-of-income provision” of the ordinance, which the court
overruled.328 The court then granted the city’s motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the landlord from continuing to discriminate against Section 8 participants.329
On appeal, the landlord argued FEHA preempts the ordinance in
two ways.330 First, that language in FEHA stating it is “the intention of the Legislature to occupy the field of regulation of discrimination in employment and housing encompassed by provisions of
this part . . . expressly occupies the field . . . [and] exclud[es] all local
laws.”331 Second, that FEHA impliedly preempts the ordinance’s
“source-of-income discrimination provision because FEHA leaves
[the] landlord free to choose whether to participate in the Section 8
housing,” but the ordinance “compels participation[,]” which “directly contradicts the policy choice” made by the state in FEHA.332
The court rejected the argument that the preemption clause in
FEHA preempts the broad field of discrimination in housing, focusing on the language “encompassed by the provisions of this part” to
narrowly define FEHA’s field of exclusivity to only the areas of discrimination explicitly encompassed by FEHA.333 The court found
FEHA does not cover discrimination against Section 8 participants,
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id. at 238.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
City & Cnty. of S.F., 231 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 239.
Id. at 242.
Id.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 243–46.
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whereas the ordinance is aimed at preventing such discrimination,
finding no express preemption.334 For similar reasons, the court found
no implied preemption by FEHA.335 Because FEHA expresses no
policy preference toward landlords’ decision to participate in the
Section 8 program or not, there is no inherent contradiction between
FEHA and the ordinance.336
7. Other Regulatory Burdens on Tenant
The Supreme Court of Illinois recently upheld a city ordinance as a
valid exercise of home-rule authority, despite the condominium’s contention that the ordinance conflicts with portions of state statutes
pertaining to condominium ownership.337 A Chicago condominium
unit owner sought “production of specific documents and records
relat[ing] to the building’s management” under a city ordinance.338
The ordinance permits condominium unit owners to inspect financial books and records of their condominium association within
three business days of delivering written request.339 The unit owner
complained upon his request being denied.340 The condominium
association argued the ordinance conflicts with portions of two state
statutes and is therefore unenforceable.341 The “statutes require
condominium unit owners to state a proper purpose for obtaining
association financial books and records, . . . production of only [ten]
years of records, and allow the association [thirty] days to gather and
produce records.”342 The ordinance, however, requires no stated
proper purpose, does not restrict the age of documents sought, and
requires production within three business days of the request.343
The unit owner, joined by the city who intervened to defend the validity of its ordinance, argued that “the legislature has not specifically
limited the authority of home rule units to regulate condominiums
or reserved [such] power for itself, and [that] the state does not have
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id. at 247.
City & Cnty. of S.F., 231 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 248.
Id.
Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condo. Ass’n, 988 N.E.2d 75, 79 (Ill. 2013).
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 79.
Id.
Palm, 988 N.E.2d at 79.
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a vital interest in regulating condominiums” sufficient to preempt
the city’s ordinance.344 Under the Illinois Constitution, “[c]omprehensive legislation that conflicts with an ordinance is insufficient [alone]
to limit or restrict home rule authority.”345 Instead, the legislature
must explicitly deny municipal exercise of home-rule power or require
its exercise of that power to be consistent with statutory provisions.346 Since the legislature has not expressly curtailed the city’s
power to exercise authority over condominium record production,
the court concluded that the city’s ordinance is a valid exercise of
home-rule authority, and upheld the ordinance.347
8. COVID-19
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor of Pennsylvania imposed a sixty-day moratorium on evictions and foreclosures.348
The Philadelphia City Council enacted five separate bills temporarily amending the Philadelphia Code, collectively the Emergency
Housing Protection Act (“EHPA”),349 which provides:
1) [T]hrough August 31, 2020, landlords cannot evict residential
tenants and cannot evict small businesses that can provide a
certification of hardship due to COVID-19; 2) landlords must
allow tenants who did not timely pay rent between March 1 and
August 31, and who can prove that they suffered a COVID-19
financial hardship, to pay past due rent on a set plan through
May 31, 2021; 3) through December 31, 2020, before taking steps
to evict residential tenants who have suffered a COVID-19 financial hardship, landlords must attend mediation; and 4) through
May 31, 2020, landlords are barred from charging late fees and
interest to residential tenants who have experienced a COVID19 financial hardship.350

An association of property owners and managers challenged these
temporary city code amendments arguing, in part, that the state
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

Id. at 79–80.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id. at 84–85.
HAPCO v. City. of Phila., 2020 WL 5095496, at *1 (E.D. Penn. Aug. 28, 2020).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *4.
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Landlord-Tenant Act preempted conflicting amendments.351 The
challengers alleged state law, which providers a landlord can recover
rent and interest from a tenant in an action of assumpsit, “preempts
the EHPA’s temporary prohibition on late fees and interests on late
rent.”352 However, the statutory text allowing interest if “deemed
equitable under the circumstances of the particular case,” saved the
ordinance from preemption, because “[t]he City’s determination that
it would be inequitable to require a tenant [experiencing] a COVID19 financial hardship to pay interests or late fees” places those cases
falling under the ordinance in the exception to the Landlord-Tenant
Act.353 Despite acknowledging there is “no mention of late fees”
where it is inequitable, the court found there was no conflict between the ordinance and statute on these grounds.354 The challengers also alleged that the section of “the Landlord-Tenant Act, which
provides the process for summary eviction proceedings, preempts
[local] limitations on evictions.”355 Relying on a state supreme court
decision, the court concluded EHPA does not conflict with eviction
procedures set forth in state law because it merely regulates when
landlords have the right to evict.356
CONCLUSION
Preemption is an increasingly fundamental precedent issue addressed by state and local government prior to the regulation of real
property across a range of subjects. Often as not, the question of
whether a state regulation is preempted by federal regulations or a
local government is preempted by federal or state regulations ends up
in court. This review does not purport to judge which level of government is best suited to regulated across the categories of regulation
summarized in the preceding sections. We seek rather to summarize
relatively recent significant cases from a number of jurisdictions to
demonstrate the factors courts consider in deciding which level of
government is entitled to regulate. Few of the cases deal with express
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Id. at *13.
Id.
Id.
HAPCO, 2020 WL 5095496, at *13.
Id. at *14.
Id.
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preemption for the obvious reason that few cases arise. The question
in such cases, if any, is only the source of authority for the preemptive regulation, particularly at the federal level which triggers 10th
and 11th Amendment issues. Otherwise, the vast majority of the cases
deal with the more difficult question of implied preemption, where the
principal question is usually whether the preempting level of government has either occupied the field, promulgated a comprehensive
scheme of regulation, or demonstrated a need for uniformity.

“ALL TEMPERATE AND CIVILIZED GOVERNMENTS”;
A BRIEF HISTORY OF JUST COMPENSATION IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY

JAMES W. ELY JR.*
In 1816, Chancellor James Kent of New York, in the landmark case
of Gardner v. Trustees of Village of Newburgh, insisted that to sustain
the exercise of the power of eminent domain “a fair compensation
must, in all cases, be previously made to the individuals affected.”
This limitation on legislative authority, the eminent jurist explained,
“is adopted by all temperate and civilized governments from a deep
and universal sense of its justice.”1 Hence, compensation was required
for diversion of a water stream from the claimant’s land, although
at that date the New York Constitution contained no such express
mandate. As we shall see, other courts in the nineteenth century
echoed Kent’s views. Taking Kent’s confident assertion as a starting
point, these remarks explore the origins of the just compensation
norm, the rationale behind the compensation requirement, and early
attempts to define the contours of such compensation.2
I. SOURCES OF THE COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE
The compensation norm can be traced to several sources. Perhaps
foremost is the English common law tradition. Chapter 28 of the 1215
Magna Carta provided: “No constable or other of [o]ur bailiffs shall
take corn or other chattels of any man without immediate payment,
* Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law, Emeritus, and Professor of History, Emeritus,
Vanderbilt University. This Article is an expanded version of remarks presented at the
Seventeenth Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference at William & Mary Law
School on October 2, 2020. I wish to acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Katie
Hanschke and Meredith Ashley Capps of the Massey Law Library of Vanderbilt University.
1. Gardner v. Trs. of the Vill. of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 166 (N.Y. 1816). See also 2
JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 275, 339 (1827) (“A provision for compensation is a necessary attendant on the due and constitutional exercise of the power of the
lawgiver to deprive an individual of his property without his consent; and this principle in
American constitutional jurisprudence is founded in natural equity, and is laid down by
jurists as an acknowledged principle of universal law.”).
2. For my earlier examination of these issues, see James W. Ely Jr., The Historical
Context of Just Compensation, 30 THE PRACTICAL REAL ESTATE LAWYER 9–19 (2014).
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unless the seller voluntarily consents to postponement of payment.”3
This appears to be an affirmation of a settled practice. Starting in the
sixteenth century, Parliament authorized the acquisition of property
for fortifications, roads, bridges, and river improvements. These acts
regularly provided for a compensation scheme.4 In his influential Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–1769), William Blackstone
treated compensation as an established principle of the common
law. Acknowledging that Parliament could acquire property for “the
public good,” Blackstone famously observed: “But how does it interpose
and compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property
in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification
and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained.”5
Although the experience in colonial America was not always consistent, especially with respect to roadways, the evidence demonstrates
the broad acceptance of the compensation principle. By modern standards, colonial governments made modest use of eminent domain.
Lawmakers utilized eminent domain to construct a variety of public
buildings, including courthouses, forts, lighthouses, and custom
houses, as well as roads.6 In addition, mill acts empowered the owner
of a grist mill to erect a dam across a stream and thereby flood the
adjacent lands of riparian owners upon the payment of compensation.7 Compensation statutes spoke in terms of “true worth,’ “due
satisfaction,” and “just satisfaction.”8 William B. Stoebuck aptly concluded that “compensation was the regular practice in England and
America, as far as we can tell, during the whole colonial period.”9
The Revolutionary Era was a period of constitutional experimentation by the newly independent states. Several states placed the
3. Chapter 28 of the 1215 Magna Carta, reprinted in A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM
RUNNYMEADE; MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 387 (University of Virginia
Press 1968). For a discussion of Magna Carta as a source of protection for property rights, see
id. at 332–40.
4. William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553,
578–79 (1972).
5. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, A FACSIMILE OF
THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765–1769, 135 (Univ. Chi. Press 1979).
6. James W. Ely, Jr., “That due satisfaction may be made:” the Fifth Amendment and the
Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 4–13 (1992).
7. 1 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES,
544–48 (3d ed. 1906).
8. Ely, supra note 6, at 6–12.
9. Stoebuck, supra note 4, at 583.
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common law principle of compensation in their constitutions. The
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 mandated that “whenever the
public exigencies require that the property of any individual should
be appropriated to public use, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor.”10 Congress, under the Articles of Confederation,
followed suit. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 declared that if a
person’s property was taken for public use, “full compensation shall
be made for the same.”11 The language was clearly a precursor to the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Since Kent spoke of “all temperate and civilized governments,”
however, it is necessary to consider sources beyond the English common law tradition. Writing in 1625, Dutch diplomat and jurist Hugo
Grotius was the first to employ the phrase “eminent domain.”12 He
insisted that when the state acquires property under the power of
eminent domain “the state is bound to make good at public expense
the damage to those who lose their property.”13 Later in the seventeenth century, Samuel Pufendorf, a German jurist and natural law
theorist, agreed that compensation was necessary.14 Both were cited
by Kent, who helped to cement their views in American law. We will
revisit these influential continental authorities at a later point.
Drawing upon these diverse sources, a number of state courts
during the antebellum period invoked unwritten fundamental
principles to mandate payment of compensation when property was
taken for public use even if the state constitution was silent on the
matter.15 The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Sinnickson v. Johnson
(1838) brushed aside the contention that, absent a provision in the
10. MASS. CONST. of 1780, part 1, art. X.
11. An Ordinance for the government of the territory of the United States North West of
the river Ohio (July 13, 1787), 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 334, 340
(1774–1789). The Ordinance was reenacted in 1789 by the first Congress under the Constitution. An Act: To provide for the government of the territory north-west of the river Ohio,
ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50 (Aug. 7, 1789). See Matthew J. Festa, Property and Republicanism in the
Northwest Ordinance, 45 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 409, 453–57 (2013).
12. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (1625) bk. III, at 420 (Stephen E. Neff
ed., 2012) (discussing “the right of eminent domain over the property of subjects”).
13. Id. at 429.
14. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND OF NATIONS 1285–86 (1672) (C.H.
Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., 1934).
15. J.A.C. Grant, The “Higher Law” Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 WIS.
L. REV. 67, 71–81 (1930–1931) (reviewing state court cases that invoked natural law to require
payment of compensation when property was taken).
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state constitution, the state could take property without compensation. “This power to take private property reaches back of all constitutional provisions,” the court declared, “and it seems to have been
considered a settled principle of universal law, that the right to compensation, is an incident to the exercise of that power: that the one
is so inseparably connected with the other, that they may be said to
exist not as separate and distinct principles, but as parts of one and
the same principle.”16 It added that compensation “is operative as a
principle of universal law; and the legislature of this State, can no
more take private property for public use, without just compensation, than if this restraining principle were incorporated into, and
made part of its State Constitution.”17
Indeed, a leading commentator maintained that the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment was simply “an affirmation of a great doctrine established by the common law for the protection of private
property. It is founded in natural equity, and is laid down by jurists
as a principle of universal law.”18
In the same vein, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the
compensation norm notwithstanding its absence in the state constitution. The court determined that the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment did
not create or declare any new principle of restriction, either upon
the legislation of the National or State governments, but simply
recognized the existence of a great common law principle, founded
in natural justice, especially applicable to all republican governments, and which derived no additional force as a principle, from
being incorporated into the Constitution of the United States.19

It viewed the Fifth Amendment as merely declaratory “of a great constitutional principle of universal application.”20 Other state courts
16. Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129, 145 (1839).
17. Id. at 146.
18. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 661
(1833).
19. Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31, 44 (1847).
20. Id. at 45. See also Parham v. Justs. of the Inferior Ct. of Decatur Cnty., 9 Ga. 341,
349–51 (1851) (treating compensation requirement as a long-established principle of common
law binding on lawmakers absent a state constitutional provision on compensation). See
generally Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State Courts, 92 MINN. L. REV 1,
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followed suit, treating the compensation requirement as a fundamental principle of universal application.21 In Pumpelly v. Green Bay
Company (1871), the U.S. Supreme Court joined the chorus, recognizing that the compensation limitation on the exercise of eminent
domain was an essential element of the common law, even before it
was incorporated into the Bill of Rights.22
II. REASONS FOR COMPENSATION REQUIREMENT
Although the compensation principle was seemingly settled before
being expressly adopted in the written Bill of Rights, it remains to
consider the rationale for mandating such compensation. Put bluntly,
why should the state be expected to pay anything when it acquires
private property? Indeed, the writings of Thomas Hobbes23and JeanJacques Rousseau24 suggest that private property rights are subordinate to the needs of the state. Under this approach, the will of the
community must prevail over claims of private rights in property.
Common law sources give almost no attention to why compensation
was necessary. John Locke, for example, did not squarely address the
compensation issue, but declared: “The great and chief end therefore
37–43 (2007) (discussing state court decisions that viewed the just compensation requirement
of the Fifth Amendment as stating a fundamental principle applicable to the states).
21. Ex parte Martin, 13 Ark., 198, 206 (1853) (“The duty of making compensation may be
regarded as a law of natural justice, which has its sanction in every man’s sense of right, and
is recognized in the most arbitrary governments.”); Stuyvesant v. Mayor of New York, 7 Cow.
588, 606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (acknowledging “a fundamental principle of civilized society,
that private property shall not be taken even for public use without just compensation”). The
North Carolina Constitution does not contain an express provision requiring compensation,
but courts in that state have long taken the position that the legislature cannot take property
without payment. Raleigh & Gaston Rail Road Co. v. Davis, 19 N.C. 451, 459–61 (1837); Station
v. Norfolk & Carolina R.R. Co., 111 N.C. 278, 182–83 (1892) (reviewing prior authority).
22. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 179 (1871) (Miller, J.) (citing Gardner v. Vill.
of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816)).
23. See RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 32 (Alfred A. Knopf ed. 1999) (summarizing
Hobbes’s thinking about private property: “Since it is the king who has made property possible,
he has a legitimate claim on it: he can tax and confiscate without his subjects’ consent.”);
Johan Olsthoorn, Hobbes on Justice, Property Rights and Self-Ownership, 36 HIST. OF POL.
THOUGHT 471, 472 (2015) (noting that Hobbes repeatedly insisted that “private property
rights are introduced by the civil laws and remain dependent on the will of the sovereign”).
24. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, ch. IX (1762) (Rose M. Harrington
trans., 1893) (declaring that “for the state, in regard to its members, is master of all their
property by the social contract, which, in the state, serves as the basis of all rights” and that
“the right which each individual has over his own property is subordinated to the right which
the community has over all”).
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of Mens uniting into Commonwealths and putting themselves under
Government, is the Preservation of their Property.”25 Hence, one might
infer that Locke would find it unacceptable for government to simply
take property without recompense, as such a step would be inconsistent with his thesis protective of property.26 More concretely, some
continental writers and natural law theorists offered a rationale.
Samuel Pufendorf explained:
Natural equity is observed, if, when some contribution must be
made to preserve a common thing by such as participate in its
benefits, each of them contributes only his own share, and no
one bears a greater burden than another . . . . [T]he supreme
sovereignty will be able to seize that thing for the necessities of
the state, on condition, however, that whatever exceeds the just
share of the owners must be refunded by other citizens.27

Pufendorf seemingly maintains that there is a general principle of
equal treatment that applies to property interests. Since exercises
of eminent domain inevitably fall unevenly upon members of the
community, an indemnity is essential to achieve this “natural equity”
in sharing the societal burden.
In the leading case of Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance (1796), Justice
William Paterson, who had been a member of the constitutional convention, addressed the purpose of the compensation norm. He explicated the purpose of the compensation in words that paralleled
Pufendorf: “[N]o one can be called upon to surrender or sacrifice his
whole property, real and personal, for the good of the community,
without receiving a recompense in value. This would by laying a burden upon an individual, which ought to be sustained by the society
at large.”28
25. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. IX, ¶ 124 (1689) (Locke defined
property as encompassing “Lives, Liberties and Estates”). Id. at ¶ 123.
26. Locke, of course, was highly influential with the founding generation. Ellen Frankel
Paul, Freedom of Contract and the ‘Political Economy’ of Lochner v. New York, 1 NYU J L. &
LIBERTY 515, 528–37 (2005) (surveying Locke’s impact on the constitution-making process and
concluding: “The founding, it would seem fair to say, was a ‘Lockean moment.’”). In a regulatory
takings case, Justice Anthony Kennedy brushed aside the state’s contention that a successive
title holder who took with notice could not challenge an earlier-enacted regulation. Suggesting
the continuing impact of Locke, Kennedy declared: “The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian
stick into the Lockean bundle.” Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
27. PUFENDORF, supra note 14, at 1285.
28. Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 310 (1795).
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The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in Sutton’s Heirs v. City of Louisville (1837), endorsed this view. Noting that the proposed extension
of a municipal street burdened the owners of a particular lot, it
observed: “Improvements, made for common benefit, should be made
by common means, or by a just distribution of the public burden, by
approximating as near equality as may be reasonably expected in
the administration of the concerns of a diversified community.”29
The Supreme Court first addressed the aim of the compensation
mandate in the landmark case of Monongahela Navigation Company
v United States (1893). Justice David J. Brewer, speaking for a unanimous Court, explained the compensation requirement in terms of
“natural equity.” Citing Sinnickson and Gardner, Brewer proclaimed
that the compensation principle
prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than
his just share of the burden of government, and says that when
he surrenders to the public something more and different from
that which is exacted from other members of the public, a full
and just equivalent shall be returned to him.30

Justice Hugo Black echoed this view a half century later. In 1960,
he observed that the Takings Clause “was designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”31
Justices Brewer and Black were wrestling with a fundamental question posed by the Takings Clause: should individual owners or the
general public bear the expense of providing social goods? To achieve
“natural equity” espoused by Pufendorf, the Takings Clause prevents
the government from singling out a few individuals to contribute
disproportionately toward the cost of public projects. As one prominent
scholar insisted, aptly characterizing the prevailing understanding,
“we must say that compensation exists to insure that no more of an
individual’s property rights will be taken from him than represents
his just share of the cost of government.”32
29. Sutton’s Heirs v. City of Louisville, 35 Ky. 28, 33 (1837). See also James River &
Kanawha Co. v. Turner, 36 Va. 313, 339 (1838) (Tucker, J.) (explaining just compensation principle in terms of placing public burdens equally upon all).
30. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
31. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
32. Stoebuck, supra note 4, at 588.
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III. EVOLUTION OF THE JUST COMPENSATION NORM
A. Who Determines Compensation
In the early nineteenth century, nearly all appropriations of property were the result of actions by the state governments or private
corporations to whom state legislatures delegated the power of eminent domain.33 Consequently, state courts for the most part took the
lead in grappling with the concept of “just compensation.” A threshold
question was which governmental body should assess the amount
of indemnity. Lawmakers sometimes sought to either fix the amount
of compensation or determine the formula by which such compensation should be determined. As early as 1795, Justice Paterson rejected this practice, stressing that in eminent domain proceedings, the
legislature “cannot constitutionally determine upon the amount of the
compensation, or value of the land.”34 State courts likewise reasoned
that compensation was a judicial matter. St. George Tucker, speaking
for the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, explained in 1842 that
“the question of compensation is a judicial question, and it is not in
the power of the legislature to settle it, since this would be to unite
judicial and legislative power, and so to enable the government to
decide in its own cause.”35Other state courts moved in the same direction.36 In 1868, Thomas M. Cooley, a leading scholar and treatise
writer, insisted that the proceeding to determine compensation was
“judicial in character.” He added that: “It is not competent for the
State itself to fix the compensation through the legislature, for this
would make it the judge in its own cause.”37
33. Not until 1876 did the Supreme Court determine that the federal government had
eminent domain authority as an inherent aspect of sovereignty. In Kohl v. United States, 91
U.S. 367 (1876), the Court upheld the exercise of eminent domain by the United States to
acquire land for a post office and pointed out that historically the states had condemned land
for use by the federal government. See also Miss. & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S.
403, 406 (1878) (Field, J.) (“The right of eminent domain, that is, the right to take private property for public uses, appertains to every independent government. It requires no constitutional
recognition; it is an attribute of sovereignty.”). See generally William Baude, Rethinking the
Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L. J. 1738 (2013) (asserting that the federal government
was not originally understood to have general eminent domain power).
34. Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 312 (1795).
35. Tuckahoe Canal Company v. Tuckahoe & James River R.R. Company, 38 Va. 42 ,78
(1840).
36. See, e.g., Penn. R.R. Co. v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 60 Md. 263, 269 (1883); Isom v. Miss.
Cent. R.R., 36 Miss. 300, 315 (1858).
37. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 563 (1868).
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In Monongahela Navigation Company, the Supreme Court brushed
aside an effort by Congress to ascertain the measure of compensation
for the acquisition of a lock and dam by excluding from consideration
the value of a franchise to collect tolls, and strongly affirmed the judicial role. Writing for the Court, Justice Brewer declared:
It does not rest with the public, taking the property, through
Congress or the legislature, its representative, to say what compensation shall be paid, or even what shall be the rule of compensation. The Constitution has declared that just compensation shall
be paid, and the ascertainment of that is a judicial inquiry.38

B. Measure of Compensation
Courts were also called upon to ascertain what measure should
be employed to determine the amount of “just compensation.” Courts
spoke in terms of an equivalent value for the property taken. Yet this
goal was not easy to achieve. As the Iowa Supreme Court elaborated
in 1855, the words “just compensation” “undoubtedly, mean a fair
equivalent; that the person whose property is taken, shall be made
whole. But while the end to be attained is plain, the mode of arriving at it, is not without its difficulty.”39 Courts and commentators
gravitated to the fair market value at the time of the taking.40 This
standard, however, proved easier to articulate than to always apply.
Courts grappled with how to ascertain market value.41 A fair market test presupposes a price set as part of a voluntary bargain between
38. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893). The Supreme
Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this cardinal principle. See, e.g., United States v. New River
Colliers Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343–44 (1923) (Butler, J.) (“The ascertainment of compensation is
a judicial function, and no power exists in any other department of the government to declare
what the compensation shall be or to prescribe any binding rule in that regard.”).
39. Sater v. Burlington & Mt. Pleasant Plank Rd. Co., 1 Iowa 386, 393 (1855).
40. Harrison v. Young, 9 Ga. 359, 364 (1851) (“When land or any other property is taken
for public use, the owner is entitled to compensation for its whole value; not for this or that
particular object, but for all purposes to which it may be appropriated. . . . The value of the
land or anything else, is its price in the market.”); Troy & Bos. R.R. Co. v. Lee, 13 Barb. 169, 172
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852) (treating “the market value of the property” as the governing principle);
Little Rock Junction Ry. v. Woodruff, 49 Ark. 381, 5 S.W. 792, 793–94 (1887); San Diego Land
& Town Co. v. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 67–68, 20 P. 372 (1888).
41. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is Just?, 42 CATH. U.L.
REV. 721, 723–29 (1993) (outlining different evaluation techniques employed by courts to
ascertain fair market value).

284

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:275

a willing seller and a willing buyer.42 Speaking for the Supreme Court
in 1878, Justice Stephen J. Field set forth the common standard:
In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes, the same considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of
property between private parties. The inquiry in such cases must
be what is the property worth in the market, viewed not merely
with reference to the uses to which it is at the time applied, but
with reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted; that is
to say, what is it worth from its availability for valuable uses.43

This was clearly fictitious in the context of a forced sale. There was
no willing seller, so comparisons to a private transaction are misleading. Moreover, in many instances there would be no recent sales of
similar property nor any current price rates by which to determine fair
market value. Landed property is typically unique. Absent such evidence, courts typically turned to the opinions of knowledgeable persons who gave estimates as to value.44 Yet persons can differ widely
in their assessment of what a property would bring in the open market. At the end of the day, even expert opinion is still an estimate.
Still, the fair market test is seemingly objective, and this, no doubt,
is part of its appeal. It takes no account of subjective values that an
owner has in his or her property. This would exclude not only sentimental attachment but the suitability of the property for personal
needs. Nor does it consider relocation costs. Cooley, for example,
conceded that the circumstances of different appropriations were
sometimes so different “that it has been found somewhat difficult to
establish a rule that shall always be just and fair.” He explained
that the “question is reduced to one of market value.” Cooley agreed
that “the market value may not seem to the owner an adequate compensation” for his own reasons, but maintained that such personal
reasons cannot be taken into account in eminent domain proceedings which must “measure the worth of property by its value as an
article of sale.”45 The Supreme Court also noted complexities in
42. 2 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES
1228 (3d ed. 1906).
43. Miss. & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 408 (1878).
44. See, e.g., Little Rock Junction Ry., 5 S.W. at 794; San Diego Land & Town Co., 78 Cal.
at 69.
45. COOLEY, supra note 37.
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applying the market value test: “So many and varied are the circumstances to be taken into account in determining the value of property condemned for public purposes, that it is perhaps impossible to
formulate a rule to govern its appraisement in all cases.”46 Notwithstanding shortcomings, the fair market value test remains the
prevailing rule in determining just compensation. The Supreme
Court has never squarely addressed the reasons for its adherence to
this standard, but apparently it is seen as practical and relatively
easy to apply. In Miller v. United States (1943), the Court observed:
“In an effort, however, to find some practical standard, the courts
early adopted and have retained, the concept of market value.”47
C. Mode of Compensation
In the antebellum era, new challenges complicated the assessment of just compensation. The Fifth Amendment and most of its
state counterparts mandate payment of “just compensation,” and do
not specify what form such compensation must take.48 In Vanhorne’s
Lessee, Justice Paterson asserted: “No just compensation can be made
except in money. Money is a common standard, by comparison with
which the value of any thing may be ascertained. . . . Compensation
is a recompense in value, a quid pro quo, and must be in money.”49
A few state constitutions expressly mandated that no property could
be acquired by a private corporation until full compensation was paid
in money.50 But this was not the only view.51 States in practice
46. Miss. & Rum River Boom Co., 98 U.S. at 408.
47. Miller v. United States, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943). See also Olson v. United States, 292
U.S. 246 (1934) (“that equivalence in the market value of the property at the time of the
taking contemporaneously paid in money”).
48. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
195 (1985) (“The Constitution speaks only in terms of ‘just compensation,’ not of the form it must
take. In principle, therefore, the state may provide compensation in what ever form it chooses”.).
49. Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 315 (1795). See also Henry v. Dubuque &
Pac. R.R. Co., 2 Iowa 288, 300 (1855) (construing “just compensation” provision in Iowa Constitution of 1846 to require that a person whose property was taken for public use “shall have
a fair equivalent in money for the injury done him by such taking; in other words, that he shall
be made whole, so far as money is a measure of compensation . . .”); Deaton v. City of Polk, 9
Iowa 594, 596 (1859) (citing Henry, and requiring monetary compensation where land was taken
for a roadway without consideration of any advantages that might result to the landowner).
50. ALA. CONST. of 1868, art. XIII, § 5; ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. V, § 48; KAN. CONST. of
1859, art. XII, § 4.
51. Alton & Sangamon R.R. Co. v. Carpenter, 14 Ill. 190, 192 (1852) (“The word
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enjoyed some latitude to provide compensation in a variety of forms,
including implicit compensation.
As a practical matter, lawmakers found it difficult to raise substantial revenue to pay for public undertakings. As J. Willard Hurst
has observed that “through most of the nineteenth century government found it impractical to command sizeable resources by taxation
in a chronically cash-scarce economy.”52 Notwithstanding constitutional guarantees, therefore, state legislatures had every incentive to
hold down the cost of acquiring property in eminent domain proceedings. Consequently, they sought to circumvent the need to make
monetary payments.
The same considerations applied to acquisitions by private enterprises.53 There was a widespread public desire to improve transportation facilities.54 The ensuing transportation revolution triggered
frequent delegation of eminent domain authority to privately owned
canal, turnpike and railroad companies.55 Often thinly capitalized,
these private enterprises were undertaking speculative projects
with uncertain prospects of success. State legislatures frequently
sought to promote transportation schemes by curtailing the amount
of monetary compensation awarded in eminent domain proceedings.
Some state courts were receptive to legislation curtailing the
amount of compensation awards. In 1848, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, for example, expressed concern that generous just compensation awards might retard construction of railroads in the state.
compensation means that which is given as an equivalent for a loss, and the constitution does
not determine how that equivalent shall be made up.”). See also San Fran., Alameda &
Stockton R.R. Co. v. Caldwell, 31 Cal. 368, 374 (1866) (“The Constitution does not require the
compensation in such cases to be rendered in money . . . ”); James River & Kanawha Co. v.
Turner, 36 Va. 313, 325 (1838) (Parker, J.) (“But [compensation] need not be made in money,
nor in any thing admitting of a certain, precise and invariable value.”).
52. J. WILLIARD HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 167 (1972).
53. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 124 (3d ed. 2005) (“More often
than not in the first half of the nineteenth century it was not the state itself that used the
power.”).
54. GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR,THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION, 1818–1860 (1951); DANIEL
WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815–1848
325–69 (Oxford University Press 2007) (detailing the impact of the transportation revolution
on American society).
55. JAMES W. ELY JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 35–36 (University Press of Kansas
2001) (discussing delegation of eminent domain power to railroad companies). See also Tide
Water Canal Co. v. Archer, 9 G. & J. 476, 482–83 (Md. 1839) (upholding exercise of eminent
domain by canal company).
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It worried that “the damages will be swelled to such an amount as
greatly to embarrass, if not seriously to endanger, the ultimate success of a work destined at no distant day to increase the prosperity
of the commonwealth to an extent beyond the most sanguine calculations.”56 Likewise, a Virginia judge worried that if courts “give to the
owner of the land, in every instance, the full value of his land, enhanced in value by the actual location of the road or canal through
it, without abatement, I very much fear a serious blow will be given
to the cherished policy of the state.”57 Insisting that the state constitution requires that “compensation shall be made in money to the
full value of the property taken to public use,” an Ohio judge bitterly
charged in dissent that both lawmakers and judges were more
anxious to promote enterprise than to vindicate the constitutional
norm of just compensation. He maintained:
Any other construction would never have been for a moment
entertained, except from the fact that public improvements were
deemed of the utmost importance to the growth and welfare of
the state. An anxiety to carry out a scheme of internal improvements at the least possible expense, has induced the legislature
and the courts to forget the provisions of the constitution. But,
however great the public benefit derived from public improvements, it should be remembered that the highest possible public
good is to secure every person in the full and complete enjoyment of his property. This clause of the constitution was designed to check the license of power, and secure to every person
the full enjoyment of the natural and constitutional right.58

IV. OFFSET OF BENEFITS
A. Overview
The fair-market-value standard in total taking cases did not readily
fit the circumstances of partial takings. With partial takings, there
could be advantages or injury to the remaining portion of the property. The question of considering such benefits in the calculation of
compensation was first raised in the context of local governments
56. Penn. R.R. v. Heister, 8 Pa. 445, 450 (1848).
57. James River & Kanawha Co. v. Turner, 36 Va. 313, 330 (1838) (Parker, J.).
58. Symonds v. City of Cincinnati, 14 Ohio 147, 184 (1846) (Read, J., dissenting).
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laying out roadways.59 In the same vein, the Ohio legislature in 1825
authorized the state canal commissioners to acquire land and materials by eminent domain for a state-sponsored canal project. The
statute directed that the appraisers should “make a just and equitable estimate and appraisal of the loss or damage, if any over and
above the benefit and advantage to the respective owners.”60
The advent of privately owned canal and railroad companies in
the early nineteenth century presented this issue in a new and more
pressing light. Rather than acquiring an entire parcel of land, such
enterprises typically took a strip of land through a larger parcel.
Determining the just compensation proved especially vexing in
partial-takings situations. In these circumstances, just compensation related to the actual value of the land acquired, as well as the
impact of the acquisition on the remainder of the estate. The Supreme Court of Kansas explained in 1878 that compensation
includes more than the mere value of the property taken, for
often the main injury is not in the value of the property absolutely lost to the owner, but in the effect upon the balance of his
property of the cutting out of the part taken. He is damaged
therefore, more than in the value of that which is taken.61

For example, a tract severed by a roadway or canal might well be
less valuable when divided. The severance might result in limited
access between the divided parcels, or cause one portion to be cut off
from a water supply, or necessitate additional fencing.
59. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Coombs, 2 Mass. 489, 492 (1807) (“In estimating the
damages, the committee are not confined to the value of the land covered by the road, and the
expense of fencing the ground. The owner may suffer much greater expense by the road
depriving him of water, or by otherwise rendering the cultivation of his farm inconvenient and
laborious; or it may happen that the new highway may essentially benefit his farm, and that
he may suffer very little or no injury by the location.”); Livingston v. City of New York, 8
Wend. 85, 101–02 (N.Y. 1831) (benefit to person whose land was taken for city street offset
against loss or damage).
60. An Act to provide for the internal improvement of the State of Ohio, by navigable
Canals, February 4, 1825, Laws of Ohio. The wording of this statute suggests that lawmakers
contemplated there would be few situations in which losses to landowners outweighed
presumed benefits. Other curious features of the measure were that the appraisers were to
be appointed by the canal commissioners, the taking party, and there was no provision for
judicial review of the determination by the appraisers.
61. Pottawatomie Cnty. Comm’rs v. O’Sullivan, 17 Kan. 58, 60 (1876) (Brewer, J.). See
also Lewis v. City of Seattle, 5 Wash. 741, 755, 32 P. 794, 799 (1883) (declaring “often the
damage to the remainder of the tract is of much more consequence than the value of the part
taken”); LEWIS, supra note 42, at 1176–77.
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In respect to transportation projects utilizing eminent domain, state
legislatures often mandated that the value of perceived benefits should
be offset against any loss suffered by the taking. State courts generally upheld this arrangement, at least in part, against constitutional
objection.62 Indeed, a few courts even maintained that the enhanced
value to the remaining land might fully satisfy the just compensation requirement, and thus there would be no need for any monetary
award.63 As a practical matter, the land could be taken for free.64
To complicate matters, courts were not in agreement as to their
understanding of offsets. Did offsets speak to whether a taking of
property occurred, or did they represent an alternative mode of just
compensation for a taking? The Supreme Court of Illinois exemplified the former position. It declared that if the enhanced value to the
part of a tract not acquired by eminent domain was equal to the
damages to the owner
then in the very act of appropriating part of his land to the
public use, an equivalent is rendered to him, in the increased
value given to the rest. In such a case it cannot in any just sense
62. San Fran., Alameda & Stockton R.R. Co. v. Caldwell, 31 Cal. 368, 374 (1866) (“Just
compensation requires a full indemnity and nothing more. When the value of the benefit is
ascertained there can be no valid reason assigned against estimating it as a part of the
compensation rendered for the particular property taken, as all the Constitution secures in
such cases is a just compensation, which is all that the owner of property taken for public use
can justly demand.”); Whitman’s Ex’r v. Wilmington & Susquehanna R.R. Co., 2 Harr. 514,
524 (Del. 1839) (affirming constitutionality of legislative requirement that determination of
compensation should take into consideration advantages as well as disadvantages to owner’s
land, and declaring: “It is not easy to perceive any other mode of arriving at a just compensation than by considering all the consequences of the act complained of, whether they
enhance or mitigate the injury.”).
63. Alton & Sangamon R.R. Co. v. Carpenter, 14 Ill. 190, 192 (1852) (“If the advantages
really and substantially resulting from the increased value given to that part of a tract of land
not taken for public use are equal to the damages which the owner will sustain by the
deprivation to which he is subjected, then in the very act of appropriating part of his land to
the public use, an equivalent is rendered to him, in the increased value given to the rest.”).
Penn. R.R. v. Heister, 8 Pa. 445, 450 (1848) (“Is the property benefited, or is it injured by the
improvement, is a most material injury. If benefited, the owner neither is, nor ought to be,
entitled to recover any compensation whatever.”); Livingston, 8 Wend. at 101 (“The owner of
the property taken is entitled to a full compensation for the damage he sustains thereby, but
if the taking of his property for the public improvement is a benefit rather than an injury to
him, he certainly has no equitable claim to damages.”).
64. CARMEN F. RANDOLPH, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 253
(1894) (“The allowance of benefits may effect, in some cases, so just a balance between
advantage and disadvantage as to reduce pecuniary compensation to the vanishing point”).
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be said that any portion of his property has been taken, and
consequently he is entitled to no compensation.65

In contrast, the Supreme Court of Indiana viewed offsetting as a
means of satisfying the just compensation norm. Recognizing that
an owner was entitled to “a fair recompense—something equivalent”
when property was taken for public use, it emphasized that compensation did not necessarily mean payment in money. “The real controversy,” the court explained, “is not as to the measure of damages,
but as to the mode of compensation.”66 Of course, most courts did not
devote time to probing the nature of benefit offsets. They generally
just viewed offsets as a deduction from the injury suffered by the
owner, and thus as a means of satisfying the compensation mandate.67
It was hardly a surprise that from the outset, the legislative practice
of offsetting alleged benefits was highly controversial.68 In a revealing
1838 exchange, Virginia judges sharply debated the extent to which
offsetting advantages was consistent with the constitutional norm
of just compensation. Judge Richard E. Parker took the position that
65. Alton & Sangamon R.R. Co., 14 Ill. at 192.
66. McIntire v. State, 5 Blackf. 384, 385–84 (Ind. 1840). See also San Francisco, Alameda
& Stockton, 31 Cal. at 374 (treating benefits as part of compensation).
67. The uncertainty over the understanding of benefit offsets anticipated a similar issue
in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) involving
transferable development rights (TDRs). The City of New York designated Grand Central
Terminal an historical landmark, thus imposing regulations which severely limited future
changes to the structure. As part of this scheme the city granted Penn Central TDRs over other
properties. Brushing aside a challenge, the Supreme Court majority concluded that the deprivation of developmental rights over Grand Central did not constitute an unconstitutional taking
of property. It conceded that the TDRs would probably not amount to payment of just compensation if there had been a taking, but seemingly considered these “valuable” rights as a factor in
determining the existence of a taking. Id. at 137. The dissenting justices found that the city’s
actions constituted a compensable taking. They charged that TDRs should be analyzed as a
proffered just compensation, and insisted that they did not bear on the question of a taking. The
dissenters characterized TDRs as having uncertain and contingent market value, and expressed
doubt that such rights would constitute just compensation. Id. at 151. See EPSTEIN, supra note
48, at 190 (“In Penn Central the government evaded the constitutional command by paying
Penn Central with a set of twisted and contingent rights that cannot be valued sensibly.”).
68. In 1831 a New York attorney argued:
Again; the compensation to be made is to be a just compensation, not a prospective and conjectural benefit and advantage to the adjoining lands of the owner,
by reason of the street being opened; in this way no compensation whatever is
made for the property taken. . . . Nothing but the value of the property awarded
to him in money is just compensation.
Livingston v. City of N.Y., 8 Wend. at 92.
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advantages to the landowner should be offset even if others in the
community also enjoyed such benefits. He was untroubled by the unequal impact of this approach on those who lost part of their land,
reasoning that “inequality, and even injustice, is incident to every imposition of burdens, for the use of the public.”69 The other judges rejected this analysis. Judge William Brockenbrough insisted that to
permit the offset of general benefits to the community would deprive
the landowner “of the just compensation intended by the constitution.”70 He would only allow consideration of advantages to the particular parcel of which a portion was condemned, not benefits shared
in common with the community. Brockenbrough further opined that
the legislature could not have intended to authorize a canal company
“under the pretext of making him[the landowner] a compensation
for a general advantage, which will deprive him of the just compensation intended by the constitution.” He explained that the legislature
could not have intended “to compensate the riparian proprietor for the
land taken for public uses, by the value of the real or supposed advantages derived from the improved navigation, when those same advantages were conferred freely on all others, without being viewed
as a compensation.”71 Agreeing, Judge Henry St. George Tucker asserted that to offset “advantages of a general character” would render
the just compensation norm “a mockery, instead of a wise, just and
salutary safeguard of the rights of the people.” Tucker pointed out
that the purpose of the just compensation norm was “to place the
public burdens equally upon all, by paying the proprietor for that
which is taken from him. This is the very object of the constitution.”
This object would be frustrated, he continued, because the offset of
general advantages placed the landowner in a worse condition than
his neighbor who enjoyed the benefits of a project but had not lost
any of his land.72
As this exchange indicates, the use of offsets to reduce compensation
awards was open to several objections. First, legislative mandates
69. James River & Kanawha Co. v. Turner, 36 Va. 313, 326 (1838).
70. Id. at 334–35.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 339. Tucker also distinguished between the land actually condemned and incidental damage to the residue of the parcel. He maintained that the full value of the land taken
must be compensated “and cannot be extinguished by setting off speculative advantages.” The
special advantages to the residue could only be offset against the peculiar damage to the
remainder of the tract. Id. at 441.
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to offset the supposed advantages of a project were seemingly inconsistent with the cardinal principle that the determination of just
compensation was a judicial responsibility. Second, the anticipated
benefits were highly speculative and might never in fact be realized.73
Indeed, a sizeable number of canal and railroad companies became
insolvent, leaving the landowner with no advantages and no effective redress.74
Third, attempts to offset general benefits received by the community at large were highly inequitable. Neighboring owners might well
also enjoy enhanced land values but did not have to bear any of the
cost by having part of their land taken. The offsetting of general
benefits thus tended to single out an individual landowner to suffer
a loss that would benefit the community at large, a result, as Judge
Tucker pointed out, that contradicted the very purpose of the constitutional guarantee of just compensation.75 In 1849, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts acknowledged a “great inequality”
to landowners
by way of reduction of damages for his land thus taken, to be
charged for all the incidental benefits, which he receives from
the location of the railroad in the vicinity of his other land and
establishment, while his neighbor, who is equally benefited, is
exempt from any contribution to this object.76

Prominent authorities stressed the unfairness of offsetting general benefits. Cooley, for example, declared:
73. See Jones v. Wills Valley R.R. Co., 30 Ga. 43, 46 (1860) (Lumpkin, J.) (directing offset
of benefits against incidental damages to remainder of land, although acknowledging that the
railroad might never be built).
74. TAYLOR, supra note 54, at 340 (pointing out that by the 1840s revenue from canals was
“so disappointing as to bankrupt private companies and saddle state governments with
unprecedented debts”); ELY, supra note 55, at 19 (observing that “railroading was an
expensive and speculative venture”). See also Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 103 U.S. 599, 600–01
(1881) (noting that the canal project at issue was abandoned and never completed).
75. ELY, supra note 55, at 191 (noting that the offset of general benefits tended to single
out individuals to suffer loss for community benefit).
76. Meacham v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 58 Mass. 291, 297 (1849). Other courts also stressed
the inequity of offsetting general benefits. See R.R. Co. v. Foreman, 24 W. Va. 662, 672–73
(1884) (“The reason for this is obvious; for if their general benefits would be thus offset, against
actual damages done the owner of the land, it would impose on him an unequal burden for the
common good, exacting in effect contribution from those whose property is taken, and relieving
others who derive an equal advantage from the public work.”).
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But, in estimating either the injuries or the benefits, those which
the owner sustains or receives in common with the community
generally, and which are not peculiar to him and connected with
his ownership, use, and enjoyment of the particular parcel of land,
should be altogether excluded, as it would be unjust to compensate him for the one, or to charge him with the other, when no
account is taken of such incidental benefits and injuries with
other citizens who receive or feel them equally with himself, but
whose lands do not chance to be taken.77

John Lewis, in his early and important treatise on eminent domain,
also criticized consideration of general advantages in the assessment
of compensation for partial takings: “These advantages may never be
realized, and, if they are, it is unjust that one person should be obligated to pay for them by a contribution of property, while his neighbor whose property is not taken enjoys the same advantages without
price.”78 Despite this trenchant criticism, some judges were untroubled by the inequity of upholding the offset of general benefits.79
B. Varied Reactions to the Offset of Benefits
States responded to the controversy over offsetting in diverse
ways. Constitution makers and lawmakers in a few states closed the
door early on this practice. For example, the Ohio Constitution of
1851 and the Iowa Constitution of 1857 provided that an assessment of damages should not take into account any imputed advantages to the landowner on account of the improvements.80 The
77. COOLEY, supra note 37, at 566.
78. LEWIS, supra note 42, at 1198. See also RANDOLPH, supra note 64, at 251 (“The
argument for disallowing general benefits is that otherwise one whose property is taken for
a public use would be in effect forced to pay for an advantage which his neighbors would freely
enjoy, the amount paid being, of course, the value of the general benefit.”).
79. See, e.g., Alton & Sangamon R.R. Co. v. Carpenter, 14 Ill. 190, 191 (1852) (“It is immaterial how the owner of the land is benefited, or that others whose lands are not entered
upon are benefited to an equal or greater extent.”); McIntire v. State, 5 Blackf. 384, 389 (Ind.
1840) (“If others, whose property the public exigency does not require, are equally benefited,
it must be set down as one of those chances by which fortune distributes her favors—a
distribution which no Legislature or other earthly power can render equal among men.”);
Greenville & Columbia R.R. Co. v. Partlow, 39 S.C.L. 428, 439 (1852) (“If his neighbors are
more benefited by the construction of the road than he may be, that is no loss to him.”).
80. OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. I; IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 18. Even before adoption of
the 1857 Iowa Constitution, the Supreme Court of Iowa had construed the “just compensation” requirement of the earlier 1846 Constitution to mandate payment of the full value of
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Kansas Constitution of 1859 mandated that a corporation could not
appropriate a right of way until full compensation was made in money
“irrespective of any benefit from any improvement proposed by such
corporation.”81 The New York general railroad acts of 1848 and 1850
barred consideration of benefits when railroads acquired property by
eminent domain.82 A 1852 Indiana law directed that when a canal,
railroad, or turnpike acquired property by eminent domain, in calculating just compensation “no deduction shall be made for any benefit
that may be supposed to result to the owner, from the contemplated
work.”83 Similarly, an 1852 Illinois statute mandated that when a
railroad, turnpike, or “other public work” should invoke eminent domain, the commissioners to assess damages “shall not estimate any
benefits or advantages which may accrue to lands affected in common with adjoining lands, on which such road or canal or other work
does not pass.”84 Absent such constitutional or legislative limitations, however, courts addressed the question of benefit offsets as an
aspect of determining the meaning of “just compensation.”
In so doing, courts were called upon to address several interrelated questions. Should they permit any offset of supposed benefits
the property taken “without any regard whatever to the benefits and advantages resulting” to
the landowner. Sater v. Burlington & Mount Pleasant Plank Rd. Co., 1 Iowa 386, 388 (1855).
Nonetheless, many delegates to the 1857 Constitutional Convention insisted that this principle
should be expressly incorporated in the Constitution. The proposal was adopted by a close
vote. 1 DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF IOWA 202–07 (1857).
81. KAN. CONST. of 1859, art. XII, § 4. See Pottawatomie Cnty. Comm’rs v. O’Sullivan, 17
Kan. 58, 60–61 (1876) (construing this provision to apply to transportation corporations and
not to opening public roads).
82. An Act to authorize the formation of railroad corporations, ch.140, § 20, Laws of New
York, 1848; An Act to authorize the formation of railroad corporations, ch. 140, § 16, Laws of
New York. New York courts construed this measure to require that railroads must pay full
market value with no benefit deductions for any land acquired by eminent domain but that
benefits could be considered in assessing damages to the residue. Newman v. Metropolitan
Elevated Railway Company, 118 N.Y. 618, 623, 23 N.E. 901 (1890).
83. 1852 Revised Statutes of Indiana, § 711, at 193. See White Water Valley R.R. Co. v.
McClure, 29 Ind. 538, 539 (1868) (“It was evidently the intention of the legislature, in enacting
this provision, to change the old rule of assessment in such cases, and to require that property
taken by these corporations should be paid for, without regard to any benefit or enhanced value
of the residue of the owner’s property by the facilities afforded by the construction of the road.”).
84. An Act to amend an Act entitled “An Act to amend the Law Condemning Right of Way
for Purposes of Internal Improvement, 1852 Ill. Laws 1038. This measure was construed to
mean that the landowner must receive the full value of land taken in money without regard
to benefits, but that benefits could be taken into consideration in assessing damages to the
remaining land. Hayes v. Ottawa, Oswego & Fox River Valley R.R. Co., 54 Ill. 373, 378 (1870);
Wilson v. Rockford, Rock Island & St. Louis R.R. Co., 59 Ill. 273, 274–75 (1871).
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to reduce the amount of monetary compensation? If so, should they
uphold the offset of general advantages to the community resulting
from projects or just the special benefits to a particular parcel? How
should they differentiate between general and special benefits? Should
offsets be allowed against the value of the land actually taken, the
damage to the remainder of the parcel, or both? As might be expected,
these inquiries proved a fertile source of litigation. Courts reached
a wide range of conclusions and generalization is difficult. Although
many of these cases involved transportation projects, it should be
noted that state and local governments continued to claim offsets for
the construction of streets and highways. The full complexity of
benefit offsets cannot be treated in detail here.85 Some representative examples illustrate the range of approaches adopted by courts.
A few state courts totally rejected the offset of benefits on constitutional grounds. At issue in Carson v. Coleman (1856) was a claim
for compensation arising from a legislative scheme to straighten the
channel of a creek. The legislation contained no provision for compensation to the affected landowners. The commissioners proposed
to cut a new channel across a landowner’s property and argued that
the benefits expected to accrue to the landowner from the improvement should constitute his compensation. Dismissing this contention, the New Jersey Court of Chancery reasoned:
There is but one fair construction to be put upon the language of
the constitution. It means that, where private property is taken by
virtue of the authority of the sovereign power, compensation shall
be made in money; that a fair valuation shall be made of the property taken, and the amount of such valuation in money shall be
paid to the Individual before his property can be taken from him.86

Tellingly, the court warned: “Any other construction would make this
provision of the constitution utterly worthless. A means of legislation
could soon be devised to substitute an imaginary benefit for that
just compensation which was intended to be provided.”87
85. For a comprehensive survey of cases dealing with the offset of benefits in partial
takings in the nineteenth century, see LEWIS, supra note 42, at 1177–1206. See also Comment,
Eminent Domain—Set-Off of Benefits Against Damages to Remaining Land Denied, 43 IOWA
L. REV. 303–08 (1958).
86. Carson v. Coleman, 11 N.J. Eq. 106, 108 (1856).
87. Id. Subsequent legislation in New Jersey mandated the offset of benefits from a
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Lawmakers often required the offset of damages in determining
the amount of just compensation payable in partial takings. Strongly
rejecting this approach, a pair of decisions by the Supreme Court of
Mississippi invalidated a provision in a railroad charter requiring
the jury, in assessing the injury to the owner whose land was taken,
to “take into the estimate the benefit resulting to such owner or
owners, by reason of said road passing through or upon said land,
towards the extinguishment of such claim for damages.” Invoking
the state constitution, the court in Beatty v. Brown (1857) declared
that the landowner
was entitled to the cash value of the land when the assessment
was made, and also to be indemnified for the damage to his adjacent land, consequent upon the location of the road. He was
entitled to be paid in money. It was as clearly incompetent for the
legislature to prescribe in what he should be paid, as to prescribe
how much or how little he should receive.

The court added that one whose property is taken for a railroad
“cannot be compelled to receive as compensation the estimated
enhancement in the value of his remaining property.”88 It declared
the charter provision authorizing the offset of benefits to be invalid.
A year later, the Mississippi court, citing Vanhorne’s Lessees, underscored its insistence that monetary compensation was constitutionally required in eminent domain proceedings. Emphasizing that the
determination of just compensation was a judicial, not a legislative
function, it dismissed “prospective railroad benefits, which may never
occur, and in most instances, are never realized” as a “moonshine
standard of value.”89
A number of other states limited but did not entirely close the
door on the offset of incidental benefits. In Woodfolk v. Nashville &
Chattanooga Railroad Company (1852), for example, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee emphatically declared that a landowner
is entitled to the value of the land taken from him . . . in money,
and that this value, when ascertained, cannot be liquidated, in
project, and this provision was construed to encompass the offset of particular benefits derived
by the landowner against the value of the land taken. Loweree v. City of Newark, 38 N.J.L.151,
155 (1875) (land taken for opening of street).
88. Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227, 241–42 (1857).
89. Isom v. Miss. Cent. R.R., 36 Miss. 300, 312–13 (1858).
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whole or in part, by any “benefit or advantage” he may in fact or
by supposition, derive from the making of the road, in the appreciation of his remaining land, or otherwise.90

It revealingly explained: “To compel him to take anything else,
would render the constitutional guarantee ineffectual and delusive.”91
Yet the court ruled that any enhancement in value particular to the
remaining land of the owner by virtue of the railroad could be offset
against incidental loss to the parcel.92 It cautioned that this was a
separate inquiry from the valuation of the land actually taken. It
further cautioned that such offset could not encompass the general
increase in value common to all in the neighborhood produced by
the public work.93
Taking a somewhat different tack, courts in Kentucky adhered to
the view that when property was acquired by eminent domain, the
state constitution mandated that the owner must “be paid, in
money, the actual value of the property, and the actual or supposed
advantage to him, of the appropriation cannot be set off against that
value.”94 With respect to consequential injury to the owner’s remaining land, on the other hand, Kentucky courts took the position that
both special and general advantages arising from the project could
set off against the disadvantages to the remainder of the parcel in
determining just compensation.95
Notwithstanding this line of decisions, which sought to confine
the scope of benefit offsets, a sizeable number of state courts in the
antebellum era sustained the balance of either special benefits, or
90. Woodfolk v. Nashville & Chattanooga R.R. Co., 32 Tenn. 422, 436–37 (1852).
91. Id. at 440.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 441 (declaring that offset of benefits must be confined “to such improvements
in value as is the result of running the road at that particular place, and not to the general rise
of property in the country, or in that neighborhood, produced by the public work. That which
is common to all should not be charged to him, because this is an advantage to which he is
entitled as a citizen and tax-payer of the state.”). For the same approach, see Chi., Kan. & Neb.
Ry. Co. v. Wiebe, 25 Neb. 542, 41 N.W. 297 (1889) (excluding general benefits shared in common
from consideration in the assessment of damages to the remainder of the parcel not taken).
94. Sutton’s Heirs v. City of Louisville, 35 Ky. 28, 33–34 (1837). See also Rice v. Danville,
Lancaster & Nicholasville Turnpike Rd. Co., 37 Ky. 81, 88 (1838) (affirming that there “must
be a pecuniary compensation equivalent to the value of the land intended to be taken”); Jones
v. Wills Valley R.R. Co., 30 Ga. 43, 45–46 (1860) (owner must be paid cash value of land
taken, but benefits may be offset against incidental damages to residue).
95. Sutton’s Heirs, 35 Ky. at 33.
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both special and general benefits, against the value of the property
actually taken as well as the damage to the remainder of the parcel.
A decision by the Court of Appeals of South Carolina in Greenville &
Columbia Railroad Company v. Partlow (1852) well exemplified this
reasoning. In assessing the compensation for the construction of a
rail line through the claimant’s land, the court declared:
Compensation is an equivalent for property taken, or for an
injury. It must be ascertained by estimating the actual damage
the party has sustained. That damage is the sum of the actual
value of the property taken and of the injury done to the residue
of the property, by the use of that part which is taken, less the
benefit which accrues to the residue of the said property by the
use of that which is taken. The benefit is, in part, an equivalent
to the loss and damage.96

It added that the “benefit may consist in the enhanced value of the
residue of the land.”97 If such imputed benefit exceeded the amount
of the damage, the landowner was deemed fully compensated. Drawing no distinction between benefits unique to the owner and those
general advantages received by the community at large, the court dismissed the argument that it was inequitable for contiguous owners
to enjoy these same benefits of increased land value while suffering
no loss. The court concluded that the claimant was simply entitled
to compensation and “cannot require a premium.” It added: “If his
neighbors are more benefited by the construction of the road than
he may be, that is no loss to him.”98
As this survey makes clear, with some exceptions state courts
proved quite receptive to the use of offsetting supposed advantages.
Indeed, some were openly supportive of prompting enterprise by
holding down compensation costs. Public opposition to such practice,
however, mounted following the Civil War. Accordingly, a number
of states adopted constitutional provisions which prevented transportation corporations from relying on the offset of imputed benefits
in calculating compensation for acquiring property through eminent
domain. For example, the South Carolina Constitution of 1868
declared: “No right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any
96. Greenville & Columbia R.R. Co. v. Partlow, 39 S.C.L. 428, 437 (1852).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 438–39.
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corporation until full compensation therefor shall be first made, or
secured by a deposit of money, to the owner, irrespective of any benefit
from any improvement proposed by such corporation. . . .”99 Note that
these provisions halted offsets for business corporations and did not
pertain to just compensation for takings of property by state and
local governments.
C. Supreme Court
The Supreme Court was a late participant in the vexing controversy over just compensation and offsetting benefits. Recall that the
Bill of Rights, including the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
was originally understood to apply only to the federal government.100
In 1850, the Supreme Court emphatically rejected a challenge alleging
that Illinois had taken property for private use and awarded no compensation. “It rests with state legislatures and state courts,” the
Court intoned, “to protect their citizens from injustice and oppression
of this kind.”101 Not until the seminal case of Chicago, Burlington and
Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago (1897) did the Court rule that compensation for private property taken for public use was an essential
element of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
against state infringement.102 For its part, the federal government
rarely invoked eminent domain in the nineteenth century.103
It followed that the Supreme Court had little opportunity to consider the question of offsetting benefits during most of the nineteenth
century. In an 1880 quiet-title action, Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite
recognized that the construction of a canal
might confer benefits that would be a just compensation for the
private property taken for its use; but until such a structure is
actually furnished complete, it can in no proper sense be said
that the works have been constructed from which the benefits
that are to make the compensation can proceed.104
99. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. XII, § 3. For similar language see, e.g., ARK. CONST. of 1868,
art. V, § 48; CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. I, § 14; FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. XVI, § 29; N.D. CONST.
of 1889, art. I, § 14.
100. Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
101. Mills v. St. Clair Cnty., 49 U.S. 569, 585 (1850).
102. Chi., Burlington & Quincy v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 228 (1897).
103. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 53.
104. Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 103 U.S. 599, 605 (1881).
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This comment suggested a guarded openness to the offset of advantages. On the other hand, Justice Brewer in Monongahela Navigation expressed a more skeptical view about the appropriate use of
offsets. At issue was the amount of compensation payable in an action
by the federal government to acquire through eminent domain. a privately owned lock and dam on the Monongahela River. In the course
of his opinion, Justice Brewer observed that the concept of just
compensation “excludes the taking into account, as an element in
the compensation, any supposed benefit that the owner may receive
in common with all from the public uses to which his private property is appropriated. . . .” To be sure, this was not a situation of a
partial taking where the issue was the impact on the remainder of
a parcel. But Brewer signaled a cautionary approach with respect
to general benefits.
The Supreme Court first squarely addressed the offset question
in Bauman v. Ross (1897).105 The case involved congressional legislation authorizing the commissioners of the District of Columbia to
extend highways and for that purpose to condemn rights of way. The
law provided that where only part of a tract was taken, the jury to
assess damages “shall take into consideration the benefits that the
purpose for which it is taken may be to the owner or owners of such
tract or parcel by enhancing the value of the remainder.” The Supreme Court strongly affirmed the power of Congress to provide for
the deduction of benefits from the compensation for taking part of a
parcel and injuring the rest. “The just compensation required by the
constitution to be made to the owner,” it explained, “is to be measured by the loss caused to him by the appropriation. He is entitled
to receive the value of what he has been deprived of, and no more. To
award him less would be unjust to him; to award him more would
be unjust to the public.”106 The Court pointed out that the “Constitution of the United States contains no express prohibition against
considering benefits in estimating the just compensation to be paid
for private property taken for the public use.”107 It had no hesitancy
in ruling that Congress could direct that “any special and direct benefits, capable of present estimate and reasonable computation” could
be considered in assessing damages for the land taken, as well as for
the part remaining.
105. 167 U.S. 548 (1897).
106. Id. at 574.
107. Id. at 584.
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D. Summary of Offset Imbroglio
By the end of the nineteenth century, the practice of offsetting
benefits in partial takings was widely accepted, but remained controversial and in flux. As we have seen, a number of states eliminated
or curtailed this practice, either totally or with respect to transportation corporations. A majority of jurisdictions upheld the offset of
special benefits, either against both the value of the land taken and
damages to the remainder or just against the injury to the residue.
Only a minority of jurisdictions permitted the offset of general advantages. The upshot was a high degree of confusion. In 1888, Issac
F. Redfield, a leading commentator on railroad law observed: “But in
consequence of numerous ingenious speculations in regard to possible advantages and disadvantages arising from public works for
which lands are taken, the whole subject has become, in this country,
especially, involved in more or less uncertainty.”108 “The constitutions, statutes, and decisions of the several States,” another authority aptly pointed out, “so deal with this question as to create an
inharmonious body of law.”109
The distinction between special and general advantages was easy
to articulate in the abstract but more difficult to apply in concrete
situations. William A. Fischel has correctly pointed out: “The distinctions between general and special often seem arbitrary and unstable.”110 Courts repeatedly grappled with the tests to determine what
amounted to special or general benefits.111 Moreover, the assessment
of damages and benefits was presented to a finder of fact, either jurors
or appointed commissioners as state law dictated, under instructions from the trial court. These were fact-intensive inquiries based
on different sets of circumstances. Accordingly, any generalization
about results must be approached with caution.
V. SUBSIDY THESIS RECONSIDERED
A group of historians has posited the thesis that eminent domain
policy in the nineteenth century functioned as a subsidy for transportation corporations. They maintain that courts developed doctrines
108.
109.
110.
111.

1 ISSAC F. REDFIELD, THE LAW OF RAILROADS 270 (6th ed. 1888).
RANDOLPH, supra note 64, at 246.
WILLIAM J. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 85 (1995).
RANDOLPH, supra note 64, at 250–53 (differentiating special and general benefits); PHILIP
NICHOLS, THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 332–37 (1909) (discussing tests for special benefits).

302

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:275

that minimized the expense of utilizing eminent domain, and in
effect placed much of the cost on owners forced to sell their property
at below market prices. “It is not too much to conclude,” Harry N.
Scheiber argued, “that in reality the states engaged in the systematic extraction of involuntary subsidies from persons on whom the
costs of so-called public enterprises fortuitously fell.”112 According to
this analysis, there was a sizeable gap between judicial rhetoric about
the sanctity of property and the limited protection actually afforded
landowners in eminent domain cases. In particular, these scholars
allege that courts weakened the “just compensation” requirement.
They insisted that the offset of estimated benefits was among the
most potent devises to limit monetary compensation. “This offsetting doctrine,” Scheiber maintained, “held down the state’s costs,
and provided the basis for a potentially large involuntary subsidy
for the projects being undertaken.”113 Scheiber pointed to his research indicating that in Ohio (before 1851) and Illinois railroads
were able to obtain land at virtually no cost due to generous assessments of offsets.114 Similarly, Lawrence M. Friedman insisted that
courts favored transportation companies over landowners, and that
the offsetting doctrine amounted to a subsidy for such enterprise.
He noted, however, that subsidies were generally popular because
of the intense public desire for improved transport facilities.115
Morton J. Horwitz advanced an even more sweeping subsidization
theory, contending that courts in the antebellum era revamped the
law governing eminent domain, nuisance, and torts in order to minimize compensation awards and facilitate economic development.116
A number of other scholars have cast a skeptical eye on the subsidy thesis from different perspectives. Peter Karsten, for instance,
correctly pointed out that state courts tightened the scope of benefit
offsets and that state constitutions increasingly prohibited the
112. Harry N. Scheiber, The ‘Takings’ Clause and the Fifth Amendment: Original Intent
and Significance in American Legal Development, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS; ORIGINAL MEANING
AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 241 (Eugene W. Hickok ed. 1991).
113. Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government: the United States, 1789–1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232, 236 (1973).
114. HARRY N. SCHEIBER, OHIO CANAL ERA: A CASE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND THE
ECONOMY, 1820–1861, 277–78 (1969).
115. FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 124–25.
116. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, 63–108
(1977).
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practice.117 Fischel questioned the economic efficiency of offsets,
noting the railroads received various kinds of gifts and subsidies. He
pointed out that the perceived unfairness of offsets induced judges
and lawmakers to substantially modify the application of offsets
over time.118 In his study of eminent domain awards in four midAtlantic states, Tony A. Freyer, directly challenged the subsidy thesis.
He found that transportation companies preferred to avoid expensive and time-consuming litigation and rarely attacked compensation awards favorable to landowners in appellate courts.119 Kermit
L. Hall and Peter Karsten asserted that “the judiciary generally
balked at allowing railroads such ‘offsets,’” and concluded that “most
railroads paid property owners considerably more than the objective
value of the land they took.”120
Given these disparate voices, this seems a propitious time to revisit
the question of benefit offsets and their relationship to the constitutional norm of just compensation. We should begin by examining the
relative position of lawmakers and judges. It bears emphasis that
in many respects state legislatures played the most important role
in determining eminent domain policy. After all, it was legislatures
that delegated eminent domain authority to privately owned canal,
turnpike, and railroad companies. Moreover, it was legislators who
frequently mandated that perceived benefits should be offset against
damages suffered by individual landowners. Judges were simply
reacting to a legislative scheme. While some courts enthusiastically
endorsed the notion of offsetting, others were more wary. A few insisted on payment of just compensation in money. In addition, the
majority of courts modified the offset of benefits in ways that
strengthened the rights of owners. By rejecting the offset of general
advantages, they addressed the blatant unfairness of considering
117. Peter Karsten, Supervising the “Spoiled Children of Legislation”: Judicial Judgments
Involving Quasi-Public Corporations in the Nineteenth Century U.S., 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
315, 332–41 (1997).
118. FISCHEL, supra note 110, at 80–88.
119. Tony Freyer, Reassessing the Impact of Eminent Domain in Early American Economic
Development, 1981 WISC. L. REV.1263, 1265–66, 1271–72. See also John D. Majewski,
Commerce and Community: Economic Culture and Internal Improvements in Pennsylvania
and Virginia, 1790–1860, 284–307 (1994) (Ph.D. diss, University of California, Los Angeles)
(on file with the University of California, Los Angeles library) (finding that offset provisions
were not consistently effective in reducing eminent domain awards in antebellum Virginia).
120. KERMIT L. HALL & PETER KARSTEN, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY
130 (2d ed. 2009).
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such widely shared benefits and curtailed the room for rank speculation about often speculative advantages. However imperfectly,
courts generally took the lead in seeking to vindicate the just compensation principle. In due course, state constitution-makers and
legislators followed the same path by curtailing or barring the use
of offsets in compensation awards.
This is not to deny that transportation companies gained from the
offset policy, but how much remains unclear. The subsidy thesis
relies upon a large amount of guesswork. Scheiber, for example,
maintained that offsets amounted to “a potentially large involuntary
subsidy,” but conceded that “a precise quantitative estimate of the
subsidy cannot be calculated.”121 Freyer noted “the difficulties inherent in determining just how much of a benefit eminent domain was
to transportation corporations, and who gained and who lost in the
process.”122 No doubt the offset policy raised the distinct possibility
of undercompensation for landowners by excessive evaluation of
speculative benefits. On the other hand, railroads sometimes appealed without success from what they viewed as generous eminent
domain awards.123 Absent further empirical study of the frequency
and extent to which compensation awards were reduced by offset,
however, the subsidy thesis remains problematic. To place this matter
in economic perspective, one must remember that, in addition to
eminent domain, states showered benefits in the form of tax exemptions, monopoly privileges, direct financial aid, and land grants on
transportation enterprises. These forms of assistance dwarfed offsets in eminent domain proceedings.
By the end of the nineteenth century, moreover, state and local
governments undertook more complex projects, such as creating
urban parks124 and establishing municipal utility services.125 They
increasingly eclipsed private transportation companies as the prime
beneficiaries of benefit offsets. The most common exercise of eminent domain by public agencies, of course, involved opening roads126
121. Scheiber, supra note 113, at 236–37.
122. Freyer, supra note 119, at 1285.
123. See, e.g., White v. Charlotte & S.C. R.R. Co., 40 S.C.L. 47, 48–50 (Ct. App.1852).
124. Attorney General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 478, 479, 55 N.E. 77, 78 (1899) (“It is only
within a few years that lands have been taken in this country for public parks. Now the right
to take land for this purpose is generally recognized and frequently exercised.”).
125. LEWIS, supra note 7, at 535–37.
126. Trosper v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Saline Cnty., 27 Kan. 391, 394 (1882) (value of special

2021]

“ALL TEMPERATE AND CIVILIZED GOVERNMENTS”

305

and widening city streets.127 Both raised the question of offsets. Any
balancing benefits against damages in these instances, of course, had
the effect of reducing the cost of public projects to the taxpayers while
placing the burden disproportionally on individual property owners.128
VI. TOWARD THE FUTURE
Doctrines set in the nineteenth century regarding the determination
of “just compensation” have continued to cast a long shadow in eminent domain proceedings to the present. “The problem of undercompensation,” Gideon Kanner has explained, “is rooted in long-standing doctrinal and moral deficiencies in decisional law.” He criticized
judicial failure to “modify outmoded, largely nineteenth century rules
of ‘just compensation’ law.”129 Three areas warrant further discussion.
A. Fair Market Value
The fair market value unquestionably remains the norm when an
entire piece of property is acquired by eminent domain. Yet the inadequacy of this standard has been convincingly demonstrated. Unlike
items which are the subject of frequent market transactions, establishing the value of a unique parcel of land is more complicated.
Sales of comparable properties are not always available. Even the
most conscientious appraisal is still ultimately an educated guess.130
Moreover, the fair market standard as currently understood does
not consider highly relevant factors, such as relocation costs, loss of
benefits may be deducted from special damages sustained by establishing highway); Newby
v. Platte Cnty., 23 Mo. 258, 273–76 (1857) (offset of special benefits in calculating damages
from opening of road); Beekman v. Jackson Cnty., 18 Or. 283, 287–89, 22 P. 1074 (1890) (offset
of special damages against damages for opening county road).
127. Lewis v. City of Seattle, 5 Wash. 741, 754–57, 32 P.794, 798–99 (1893) (special benefits
for widening street may be offset against damages to owner).
128. A change of street grade could injure abutting property without a taking. Many state
statutes therefore allowed an award of damages to abutting owner who suffered a loss because
of the new grade. As with analogous cases involving acquisition of property by eminent domain, special benefits could be considered in reduction of damages. LEWIS, supra note 42, at
1305–08. See also Chase v. City of Portland, 86 Me. 367, 29 A. 1104, 1106–07 (1894); Dayton
v. City of Lincoln, 39 Neb. 74, 57 N.W. 754, 757 (1894).
129. Gideon Kanner, “Fairness and Equity,” or Judicial Bait-And-Switch? It’s Time to
Reform the Law of “Just” Compensation, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 38, 40 (2011).
130. Miller v. United States, 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1943) (stating that “the application of this
concept involves, at best, a guess by informed persons”).
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business goodwill, and litigation expenses.131 Thomas W. Merrill has
cogently concluded: “The most striking feature of American compensation law—even in the context of formal condemnation or expropriation—is that just compensation means incomplete compensation.”132
Put bluntly, the fair market value falls well short of the “full indemnification and equivalent for the injury” set forth by Blackstone.
B. Benefit Offsets
The balance of supposed benefits against damages remains a
vexing dimension in eminent domain proceedings. The constitutionality of allowing states to offset benefits appears well settled. In
McCoy v. Union Elevated Railroad Co. (1918), the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected a contention that by allowing offset benefits a state deprived the owner of property without due process of law in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. “It is almost universally held,” the
Court explained, “that in arriving at the amount of damage to property not taken allowance should be made for peculiar and individual
benefits conferred upon it; compensation to the owner in this form
is permissible.”133 In 1943, the Supreme Court simply remarked,
with respect to a partial taking, that “if the taking has in fact benefited the remainder the benefit may be set off against the value of
the land taken.”134
In many respects, the debate over offsetting has not moved far
from its nineteenth century roots. Most courts adhere to the special/general benefit dichotomy fashioned in the nineteenth century,
and allow only special benefits to be offset in condemnation proceedings.135 Hence, the Supreme Court of Texas explained: “The theory
131. Gideon Kanner, When Is “Property” Not “Property Itself”: A Critical Examination of the
Bases of Denial of Compensation for Loss of Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6 CAL. W.L. REV.
57 (1969).
132. Thomas Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 110, 111
(2002). See also Lucas J. Asper, The Fair Market Value Method of Property Valuation in
Eminent Domain: “Just Compensation” or Just Barely Compensating?, 58 S.C.L. REV. 489,
498–508 (2007) (arguing that current method of determining fair market value is inadequate
and proposing revisions).
133. McCoy v. Union Elevated R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 354, 365–66 (1918).
134. Miller, 317 U.S. at 375.
135. Note, From Railroads to Sand Dunes: An Examination of the Offsetting Doctrine in
Partial Takings, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1561–65 (2014) [hereinafter Note, From Railroads
to Sand Dunes].
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underlying the distinction between special and general benefits is
that the landowner’s recovery should not be reduced by benefits that
arise from the condemnation itself and that inure to the community
at large, rather than only to the landowner.”136 Yet the difference
still perplexes courts. “In practical application,” a Missouri appellate
court lamented, “the distinction between special benefits and general
benefits is shadowy at best.” It added that “the question of whether
there are special benefits and the extent of them is a jury question.”137 Generally speaking, then, courts have not provided fresh
analysis or broken new ground regarding the practice of offsetting.
In sharp contrast, two states have junked the long-standing separation of general and special benefits. The Supreme Court of California in Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority
v. Continental Development Corp. (1997) adopted a rule permitting the
offset “of all reasonably certain, immediate and nonspeculative
benefits” against severance damages. It concluded that “in determining a landowner’s entitlement to severance damages, the factfinder henceforth shall consider competent evidence relevant to any
conditions caused by the project that affect the remainder property’s
fair market value, insofar as such evidence is neither conjectural nor
speculative.”138 The Supreme Court of New Jersey adhered to the same
view. Asserting that “the terms special and general benefits do more
to obscure than illuminate” the calculation of just compensation, it
held that “reasonably calculable benefits—regardless of whether
those benefits are enjoyed to some lesser or greater degree by others
in the community—that increase the value of property at the time
of the taking should be discounted from the condemnation award.”139
To date, no other jurisdiction has adopted this approach.
This sweeping alteration of the rule for ascertaining just compensation in the case of partial takings is troublesome. It is a departure
from the prevailing rule in the United States and marks a return to
a consideration of general benefits widely rejected in the nineteenth
century. It will likely result in the undercompensation of owners.140
136. Taub v. City of Deer Park, 882 S.W.2d 824, 828 (Tex. 1994) (holding that benefits at
issue were general in nature and could not be used to offset damages to remainder).
137. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Koziatek, 639 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Mo. App. Div. 2
1982).
138. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809, 824 (Cal. 1997).
139. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 539–43 (N.J. 2013).
140. For a different assessment of this new rule, see Note, From Railroads to Sand Dunes,
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Moreover, as one of the dissenting judges in Los Angeles County
charged, the new formula opened the door to a grievously wrongful
outcome in which neighbors enjoy similar advantages while suffering
no pecuniary loss.141 Justice Joyce L. Kennard persuasively explained:
When a parcel of property is severed by a government taking,
any damages to the remainder are part of the injury the landowner suffers. To refuse to compensate the landowner for those
damages by offsetting against them the general benefits that all
in the vicinity of the project receive unfairly forces the landowner to pay for benefits that others receive for free. Limiting
offsets only to special benefits more equitably distributes among
the entire community the benefits and burdens of the project.142

What would have prompted these courts to take such a radical
and retrograde step? The opinions offer clues. Both the California
and New Jersey courts assert that the separation of special from
general benefits originated in the context of railroad expansion.143
Hence, this division of benefits was pictured as an effort to curtail
claimed offsets by private railroad companies exercising eminent
domain power. “The historical reasons that gave rise to the development of the doctrine of general and special benefits,” the New Jersey
Supreme Court maintained, “no longer have resonance today.”144 The
unspoken assumption was that governmental agencies, which initiate
nearly all condemnation proceedings in modern times, should receive more favorable treatment than private transportation companies. Indeed, the Supreme Court of California in Los Angeles County
made explicit its desire to hold down the cost of public projects
through more generous offsets, declaring:
One general principle relevant to this determination is that taxpayers should not be required to pay more than reasonably
necessary for public works projects. Stated another way, compensation for taking or damage to property must be just to the
supra note 135, at 1566–75 (arguing that the distinction between special and general benefits
should be rejected because “public policy concerns of the twenty-first century public are
different,” and maintaining that the offset of all nonspeculative benefits is fair to landowners).
141. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 941 P.2d at 830 (citing Lewis, Cooley, and Nichols).
142. Id. at 836.
143. Id. at 816; Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d. at 536, 542–43.
144. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d. 524, 542 (N.J. 2013).
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public as well as to the landowner. A rule permitting offset against
severance damages of all reasonably certain and nonspeculative
benefits minimizes the cost of public works projects in two respects: Certain offsets would be permitted that presently are disallowed, and transaction costs would be reduced due to the new
rule’s greater clarity and certainty.145

Justice Marvin R. Baxter, in dissent, cast a critical eye on this
revised rule, which minimized expense to governmental agencies by
reducing monetary compensation to individuals whose property was
taken. “For the first time in modern California history,” he complained, “a public agency that condemns part of a larger parcel may
reduce its monetary liability for severance damages by ‘setting off’
benefits to the remainder which are widely shared by condemned
and noncondemned parcels alike.” Baxter warned against abandoning a formula which “for nearly a century, has justly protected the
rights of California property owners against abuse of the awesome
sovereign power of eminent domain.”146
No doubt the dichotomy between special and general benefits has
long bedeviled courts. In practice, however, this distinction serves
to safeguard, even if imperfectly, the rights of property owners by
limiting the extent of benefit offsets. By eliminating this traditional
division, the California and New Jersey courts signal that their primary concern is to shield government from financial liability. Yet
one might well ponder whether, if the differentiation between special and general benefits is so vexing, courts should reject all offsets
and, following the lead of Justice Paterson, hold that the constitutional requirement of “just compensation” contemplates payment in
money. Arguably this approach would better effectuate the protective function of the compensation mandate.147
C. Troublesome Legacy of Undercompensation
Inadequate compensation for persons whose property has been
taken by eminent domain has been a persistent theme originating
in the nineteenth century. Despite brave words about “full and just
145. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809, 823 (Cal. 1997).
146. Id. at 837.
147. See EPSTEIN, supra note 48, at 190 (“The state can always compensate with cash, so
its unilateral decision to pay with nonstandard coinage properly invites heightened judicial
scrutiny.”).
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equivalent,” the actual performance by courts has too often fallen
short of this goal. The fair market standard, as applied, simply did not
put the owner in as good a position as before the taking of a parcel.148
From the beginning of the nineteenth century, moreover, legislators
mandated and courts broadly sustained the offset of supposed benefits
in lieu of monetary compensation for partial takings.
Why did courts that extolled the importance of private property
dilute the promise of just compensation when property was taken?
Policy considerations bulk large in the continued deliberations over
how much compensation should be payable in eminent domain
proceedings. As one scholar has pointed out: “Yet behind the façade
of those seeming clear legal standards lurks an underlying division
between those who would require the government to provide a more
generous measure of compensation and those who would require the
government to pay less.”149 One line of thinking views just compensation as a bulwark against eminent domain abuse and an affirmation of the critical place of private property in the constitutional order.
Another sees just compensation as a potential barrier to desired
governmental action and thus favors a less fulsome measure of
compensation. This is a variation on the ongoing debate over what
governmental actions amount to a taking of property, with proponents of regulation and public projects supporting a narrow understanding of a taking.150
Although the pattern of decisions was uneven, we have seen that
many courts in the nineteenth century devised formulas to hold
down monetary compensation awards in order to promote transportation projects. This pattern continued into the twentieth century,
but then the beneficiaries were largely governmental agencies
pursuing a variety of expansive projects. Further, jurisprudential
changes reinforced the weakening of the just compensation requirement. The Progressive movement of the early twentieth century
downplayed claims of individual rights and expressed faith in government to reshape society. Progressives displayed little patience
with constitutional doctrines which confined the reach of government.
In particular, they challenged the central place of property rights in
148. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTION TO U.S. LAW:
PROPERTY 249–50 (2010).
149. Lunney, supra note 41, at 722.
150. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST
FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 359–60 (2014).
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the constitutional order. The political triumph of the New Deal in
the 1930s brought this trend to fruition.151 Distinguishing between
the rights of property owners and other individual liberties, New Deal
Constitutionalism afforded property rights a greatly reduced level
of constitutional protection.152 This was a radical departure, because
neither the language of the Constitution and Bill of Rights nor the
views of the framers draw any dichotomy between different categories of rights.153 The effect, of course, was to strengthen governmental control over private property.154 As signs of this profound change,
the once-potent contract clause was virtually eviscerated155 and the
“public use” clause of the Fifth Amendment was drained of efficacy
at the federal level.156
In this new constitutional climate of privileging governmental action, it was not surprising that the “just compensation” clause would
be construed as narrowly as possible. In 1943, the Supreme Court
pictured the measure of just compensation as the subject of a tradeoff. Speaking for the Court, Justice William O. Douglas opined: “The
law of eminent domain is fashioned out of the conflict between the
people’s interest in public projects and the principle of indemnity to
the landowner.”157 Not only is this a highly simplistic rendering of
eminent domain history, but it intimates that adequate compensation to persons whose property is taken is somehow antagonistic to
public projects.158 The Supreme Court of California was more explicit
151. James W. Ely, Jr., The Progressive Era Assault on Individualism and Property Rights,
29 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 255 (2012). See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES
REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2006).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 303 U.S. 144 (1938) (placing the
rights of property owners in a subordinate category entitled to a lesser degree of protection
under the due process norm).
153. Walter Dellinger, The Indivisibility of Economic Rights and Personal Liberty, CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 9, 19 (2003–2004) (“Economic rights, property rights, and personal rights have
been joined, appropriately, since the time of the founding.”).
154. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 123–41 (3d ed. 2008). See also Dellinger, supra note 153.
155. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 216–37 (2016).
156. James W. Ely, Jr., ‘Poor Relation’ Once More: The Supreme Court and the Vanishing
Rights of Property Owners, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39, 53–65 (2004–2005) (tracing Supreme
Court decisions that gutted the “public use” clause). See also ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND:
KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN 55–60 (2015).
157. United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 280 (1943).
158. Kanner, supra note 129, at 60–63 (analyzing Powelson and criticizing judicial assumption
that full compensation would hamper public projects).
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in articulating its policy preference favoring public projects. In a
remarkable but disturbing opinion, the court insisted in 1960 that
it had a duty to minimize the size of condemnation awards. Otherwise, it fretted, the cost of public improvements would increase and
“impose a severe burden on the public treasury.”159 The court was
more concerned with an imagined impact on government than with
the constitutional right of an individual to receive a full indemnity.
This bizarre reasoning entirely inverts the purpose of the just compensation norm to prevent government from singling out a few
individuals to bear the cost of providing social goods. Indeed, it
strongly indicates a dismissive attitude that the just compensation
requirement is an unwelcome obstacle to be circumvented to the
greatest extent possible.
Equally problematic, skimpy compensation awards encourage more
aggressive use of eminent domain by government. Yet with the erosion
of the “public use” limitation on the exercise of eminent domain, the
“just compensation” requirement is the only meaningful check on governmental abuse. One authority has cogently observed: “Efficient
just compensation should provide the significant legal check on the
use of eminent domain that is now lacking. As long as the Court
chooses not to permit meaningful review of public use claims, just
compensation is the only effective constitutional check on governmental exercises of eminent domain.”160
The melancholy trend of denying full compensation in eminent
domain proceedings has continued. For example, in Bay Point Properties, Inc v. Mississippi Transportation Commission (2016), the Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld a jury verdict that a state agency
effected a taking of land by exceeding the terms of an express easement for highway purposes in order to construct a park.161 Generally,
when an easement is created for a specific purpose, it terminates upon
the cessation of that purpose and the land reverts to the landowner
159. People ex rel. Dept. of Pub. Works v. Symons, 357 P.2d 451 (Cal. 1960).
160. James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain,
69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1312 (1985). See also MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 148, at 250–51 (pointing out the formulation of a “just compensation” standard “aimed at providing more complete
compensation would enhance the security of property rights and would be consistent with a
general objective of promoting governmental forbearance”).
161. Bay Point Props., Inc. v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 201 So.3d 1048, 1051 (Miss. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2002 (2017). I joined an amicus brief in Bay Point supporting the petitioner’s
request for a writ of certiorari.
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free of the burden of the easement.162 However, the majority incredibly ruled that because of a state statute requiring release of highway easements on the books of the transportation commission the
easement was still in effect despite being converted to a very different use. Therefore, it denied just compensation for the unencumbered value of the land despite the taking for a park and upheld a
nominal award.163 The two dissenters charged that the state statute
did not bar recovery of compensation for unencumbered property
and that the outcome violated Bay Point’s federal and state constitutional right to just compensation for the value of the land without
the easement.164 The United States Supreme Court declined review,
but Justices Neil Gorsuch and Clarence Thomas separately stated:
When a state negotiates an easement limited to one purpose but
later uses the land for an entirely different purpose, can the State
limit, by operation of statute, the compensation it must pay for
that new taking? The Mississippi Supreme Court held that it
may do just that. But this decision seems difficult to square with
the teachings of this Court’s cases holding that legislatures
generally cannot limit the compensation due under the Takings
Clause of the Constitution.165

In Bay Point, the Supreme Court of Mississippi in effect endorsed
the taking of property without just compensation. One must be careful
about generalizing from a single case, but the outcome does not bode
well for judicial willingness to insist upon sufficient compensation
when property is taken.
Nineteenth century courts, of course, cannot be held responsible
for the dismissive attitude of the post–New Deal legal culture toward the rights of property owners. In many respects courts in the
162. JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND
§ 10:8 (2d ed. 2020).
163. Bay Point Props. Inc, 201 So.3d at 1055–57.
164. Id. at 1059–63. See Steven J. Eagle, Land Use Regulation and Good Intentions, 33 J.
LAND USE & ENV’T L. 87, 140 (2017) (picturing Bay Point as an example of courts permitting
state government to “reconfigure infrastructure more inexpensively by disregarding property
rights”); Note, Parks and Separation: How the Mississippi Legislature Decided Just Compensation in Bay Point Properties, Inc .v. Mississippi Transportation Commission, 38 MISS. C.L.
REV. 49, 68 (2019) (asserting that the state statute “put the state’s financial interests ahead
of private property rights,” and that this “appears to be nothing more than a clever avoidance
of just compensation”).
165. Bay Point Props., Inc. v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2002 (2017).
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nineteenth century were far more protective of property owners than
is the norm today. For example, they upheld contracts against attempted impairment by state legislatures,166 looked skeptically upon
confiscation schemes,167 and began to fashion a doctrine of regulatory
takings.168 In many states, starting with Illinois in 1870, constitutionmakers strengthened the state’s taking clause by requiring compensation when property was “taken or damaged for public use.”169 Still,
the courts in the nineteenth century fell short of requiring adequate
compensation when property was acquired by eminent domain, and
this doleful legacy haunts us today.

166. ELY, supra note 155, at 30–191.
167. See generally DANIEL W. HAMILTON, THE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY: PROPERTY CONFISCATION IN THE UNION AND CONFEDERACY DURING THE CIVIL WAR (2007).
168. David J. Brewer, The Protection of Private Property from Public Attack, 55 NEW
ENGLANDER & YALE REV. 97, 102–05 (1891) (“Property is as certainly destroyed when the use
of that which is the subject of property is taken away, as if the thing itself was appropriated,
for that which gives value to property is its capacity for use.”); Bent v. Emery, 173 Mass. 495,
496, 53 N.E. 910 (1899) (Holmes, J.) (“It would open to argument at least that an owner might
be stripped of his rights so far as to amount to a taking without any physical interference with
his land.”). See also Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting the Record
Straight, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1211, 1259 (observing that “numerous state courts recognized
devaluative takings to be compensable at an early stage. Both regulatory takings and consequential takings were acknowledged”).
169. LEWIS, supra note 7, at 627–28. See also Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161, 166 (1888)
(Harlan, J.) (observing that state constitution framers added language to give greater security
to private property).

“EQUITABLE COMPENSATION” AS “JUST
COMPENSATION” FOR TAKINGS

BRIAN ANGELO LEE*
ABSTRACT
The Fifth Amendment’s requirement that the government pay “just
compensation” to owners of taken property is typically assumed to
mean “full” compensation, equivalent to the taken property’s fair
market value. In this symposium contribution to the Brigham-Kanner
Property Rights Journal, I explore an often overlooked alternative
understanding of “just compensation” for takings, one freed from
automatic equation with full, fair-market-value compensation. Rooted
in traditional equity, this “equitable compensation” alternative has
significant historical roots, starting with the Fifth Amendment’s
drafters’ striking choice not to follow the Northwest Ordinance of
1787’s requirement of “full” compensation, and running through a line
of cases and commentary that has emphasized takings compensation’s
equitable nature. I argue that recognizing takings compensation’s
equitable dimension—particularly equity’s attention to reciprocal
obligations—can help takings law more naturally respond to thorny
difficulties caused by specific rigidities in takings doctrine, rigidities
that create challenges when takings doctrine is forced to address
situations that differ from core cases of eminent domain. Attending
to the relative weights of parties’ reciprocal duties, and equitably
adjusting compensation in response, can help resolve such cases
more plausibly, including takings for private projects with public
benefits (as in Kelo v. New London) and regulatory takings.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. DISCRETE DOCTRINE FOR CONTINUOUS PROBLEMS . . . . . . .
II. “JUST COMPENSATION” AND “FULL COMPENSATION” . . . . . .
A. Current Doctrine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. “Full” or “Just”? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

316
317
323
323
326

* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. My thanks to Henry E. Smith and participants in the 2020 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference for their comments on an
earlier draft of this Paper. Any errors are my own. The Brooklyn Law School Dean’s Summer
Research Stipend provided financial support for this project.

315

316

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:315

III. EQUITABLE COMPENSATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Takings’ Equitable Aspect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Equity and Arbitrariness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. When “Full,” When “Equitable”? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. APPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Hybrid Public-Private Takings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Regulatory Takings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

328
328
333
338
342
342
346
350

INTRODUCTION
That the U.S. Constitution requires the government to pay “just
compensation” to owners of property taken through eminent domain
is well known, and what “just compensation” means may seem equally
settled: The U.S. Supreme Court has said that “just compensation”
for taken property is a “full and perfect equivalent in money of the
property taken,” an equivalent measured by the taken property’s fair
market value.1 And as Justice Jackson famously noted of his Court,
its finality makes it infallible.2
However, doctrines that have become so familiar as to seem infallible can evolve, even in the eyes of courts, when those doctrines no
longer seem adequate to new problems or situations. I am grateful to
the organizers of the 2020 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference for their invitation to contribute a discussion of the “just compensation” requirement to the current volume, and I wish to take
this opportunity to explore briefly an alternative understanding of
“just compensation” for takings, one freed from automatic equation
with full, fair market value compensation. For the sake of convenience,
this alternative, rooted in traditional equity, might be called “equitable
compensation.” I shall suggest that the “equitable” understanding
of “just compensation” both has significant historical roots and might
help takings law more naturally respond to thorny difficulties that
spring from specific rigidities in takings doctrine, rigidities that create
challenges when takings doctrine is forced to address situations that
differ from familiar core cases of eminent domain.
1. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373–74 (1943).
2. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J. concurring) (“We are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”).
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What follows is necessarily abbreviated and does not pretend to be
definitive. If persuasive, it will do no more than make a prima facie
case for the value of recognizing an equitable dimension in the just
compensation requirement. My hope is, however, that establishing
this prima facie case may open a fruitful discussion about the plausible ways in which “full” and “fair” compensation might sometimes be
two different quantities, and how recognizing those situations might
yield a more coherent and less contentious takings jurisprudence.
I. DISCRETE DOCTRINE FOR CONTINUOUS PROBLEMS
The constitutional foundation for prominent contemporary takings
debates rests on the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause,3 which
effectively provides a checklist of four elements, each of which must
be satisfied for a governmental action to qualify as a justified taking.
Each element corresponds to a separate word or phrase in the clause:
“nor shall private [1] property be [2] taken for [3] public use, without
[4] just compensation.”4
A fundamental feature of the first three of these four elements is
their binary, all-or-nothing nature. The item in dispute either is property or it is not. It either was taken, or it was not. And the intended
use either was public, or it was not. Such determinations leave little
room for shades of gray, and yet any one of these determinations
can decide the outcome of a case. Thus, these determinations are
absolute, both in nature and in consequence.5
Forcing every specific instance of an alleged taking onto one side or
the other of these bright-line divides is straightforward enough when
dealing with garden-variety takings cases, such as condemning a
private home so that the city can build a police station there.6 The
3. State constitutions also have a role to play, but since those constitutions commonly
contain provisions closely modeled on the U.S. Constitution’s Takings Clause, the issues raised
here with respect to the latter can be expected to apply to the former as well. Independent of any
state constitutional provisions, courts also read the Fourteenth Amendment as providing constitutional protections in the context of takings by state governments. See, e.g., 1A NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.8 (Julius L. Sackman et al. eds., 3 ed. 2021).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
5. In Carol Rose’s terminology, takings doctrine is quite crystalline. See Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577 (1988).
6. As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, “The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.”
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 528 (2005).
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farther that a case is located from paradigm instances of takings, however, the less obvious it may become on which side of a relevant line
the case belongs. As a result, each of these elements has spawned its
own jurisprudence when courts have needed to apply these rigid categories to circumstances removed from the relatively easy core cases.7
Indeed, two of the most controversial areas of takings scholarship
and takings law spring from the need to draw these binary distinctions: takings for private projects with public benefits, and regulatory takings. The central question in these cases is how to categorize
the project or regulation, when only two options are available. And
the consequences of that categorization can be enormous. If a project
with both public and private benefits is deemed to be for public use,
then the owner of property condemned to advance that project has
no choice but to relinquish the property and accept in return whatever amount of money is deemed to be the property’s market value.
But if the project is ruled to be for private use, then the condemnation is prohibited altogether. Likewise, if a regulation is deemed to
have gone “too far”—as Justice Holmes put it in Pennsylvania Coal
v. Mahon—and thus to constitute a taking, the government must pay
the burdened parties the full market value of the loss that they suffered, an obligation that in practice will often make the regulation
infeasibly expensive, and thus impossible to impose altogether.8 But
if the regulation has not crossed the nebulous line that determines
how far is “too far,” then the state is free to impose that regulation,
and the burdened owner gets nothing.9
The reason that such cases are controversial is that the facts that
give rise to them do not easily fit within a binary doctrinal framework,
7. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (addressing whether the
item in question qualified as property); Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23
(2012) (addressing whether the property was taken); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469
(2005) (addressing whether the taking was for public use); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S.
369 (1943) (addressing whether the owner received just compensation for the taken property).
8. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). See also First Eng. Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles Cty., 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (specifying that once
a regulation has been deemed a taking, the government’s three possible options are “amendment
of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent domain.”).
For concerns about the infeasibility of paying compensation, see Section IV.B, infra.
9. Sometimes, as in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978), the regulation itself may provide partial compensation (see Section IV.B, infra.) However, regulations that do not constitute takings are not obligated to provide such compensation,
and this sort of voluntary compensation can give rise to its own set of problems. See, e.g.,
Christopher Serkin, Penn Central Take Two, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (2016).
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resulting in high-stakes questions for which there are no obvious
answers. The world which the law seeks to regulate sometimes is
continuous rather than discrete.10 Rather than neatly falling into
one category or another, cases may lie at some intermediate point on
a spectrum between two poles. As a result, government projects and
regulations sometimes are partially one kind of thing, while simultaneously partially a different kind of thing.
Consider, for example, the challenge that faced the U.S. Supreme
Court in Kelo v. City of New London, where the Court had to decide
whether taking property for use by private companies as part of an
economic redevelopment project qualified as a “public” use or as
merely a “private” use.11 The project in question involved building
various attractions, including a hotel, a museum for the U.S. Coast
Guard, and a large research center for the Pfizer pharmaceutical company. The plan later evolved to give a private developer a 99-year
lease for $1 on some of the project property in exchange for agreeing
to develop that land in accordance with the development plan.12 The
city claimed that the project was “projected to create in excess of 1,000
jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city, including its downtown and waterfront areas.”13
When private property owners challenged the validity of the use
of eminent domain to take their property for use in this project, takings doctrine required the Court to decide whether the project was
“public” or “private,” when in fact the project was simultaneously
somewhat public and somewhat private.14 Existing doctrine, however, provided no way to reach a decision that matched this reality,
10. Larry Alexander has used the terms “scalar” and “binary” in discussing related phenomena in moral philosophy. Larry Alexander, Scalar Properties, Binary Judgments, 25 J.
APPLIED PHIL. 85 (2008).
11. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). For similar examples, see Kaur v.
N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010) (concerning the exercise of eminent
domain to take property in a “blighted” Manhattan neighborhood for use by Columbia University); Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d. 164 (N.Y. 2009) (concerning the
exercise of eminent domain to take property in the “Atlantic Yards” area of Brooklyn for a
land improvement project involving a private developer’s mixed-use development).
12. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 476 n.4.
13. Id. at 472.
14. Others have noted that the all-or-nothing nature of the “public use” determination can
intensify the harmful consequences of judicial error in such determinations and can create incentives for governments to act in socially undesirable ways. See James E. Krier & Christopher
Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 864–65 (2004).
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demanding instead an all-or-nothing choice. The result was a decision
beset by controversy.15 Such controversy was perhaps inevitable, for
when courts are compelled to decide whether an effectively hybrid
governmental act is wholly inside or wholly outside rigid doctrinal
categories, either decision will necessarily be partially inadequate.
A similar challenge arises when courts attempt to determine which
sorts of government restrictions on the use of private property constitute a “taking” of that property—i.e., whether a “regulatory taking”
has occurred. Once again, the law requires a binary, all-or-nothing
decision. If the regulation is deemed to constitute a taking, then the
aggrieved property owner is entitled to full compensation for the inflicted loss. And the cost of providing that compensation, either to
one particular owner or to everyone who is similarly burdened, may be
so high that the government, as a practical matter, may not be able to
afford to impose the regulation at all. On the other hand, if the court
deems the regulation not to be a taking, then the property owner
receives zero compensation, and the government can impose the
regulation at no monetary cost to itself beyond the cost of enforcement.
But, as in the case of hybrid public-private uses, the world to which
this doctrine is applied does not always fall neatly onto one side or the
other of the regulatory takings threshold. Justice Holmes’s question
in Mahon (Did the regulation go “too far”?) implicitly acknowledged
that the burdens imposed by regulations come in degrees. Nevertheless, the need to determine whether a taking either has or has not
occurred requires drawing a sharp distinction between regulations
on the near side of the “too far” line and regulations that have crossed
that line.16
15. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Case Won on Appeal (To Public), NEW YORK TIMES (July 30,
2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/30/weekinreview/the-nation-case-won-on-appeal-to
-public.html (noting that the Kelo decision “provoked outrage from Democrats and Republicans,
liberals and libertarians, and everyone betwixt and between. Dozens of state legislatures
considered bills to protect private property from government seizure, and many passed new
legislation; Justice John Paul Stevens, the author of the decision, issued something like an
apology; a campaign was started to use eminent domain to seize the home of another justice,
David H. Souter . . . .”).
16. Although regulatory takings questions commonly involve determining whether a
regulation has gone “too far,” U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence has identified a few very
narrow situations in which a regulation will automatically be deemed a taking. See Cedar
Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021) (holding that a regulation requiring agricultural
employers to allow union organizers onto the employers’ property for up to three hours per
day, 120 days per year constituted a per se taking); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S.
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Such determinations are not self-evident. Holmes in Mahon presented a four-factor test to guide the Court in reaching that determination, but the factors offered do not promise a reliably neat binary
conclusion.17 Two of the factors rely on quantities that lie somewhere
on a continuum of values: how much diminution in value the regulation had caused and whether the owner burdened by the regulation
was also receiving benefits from that regulation’s application to others
(“average reciprocity of advantage”). A third factor—whether a regulation addresses a public nuisance—does involve a binary determination on its face, but nuisance decisions themselves can be contentious,
as nuisance doctrine inherently lacks the bright-line character of
trespass law.18 And the fourth factor—whether the regulation destroyed an existing property or contract right—was itself controversial,
rejected by Brandeis’s dissent as irrelevant.19
Passage of time did not clarify matters, and when the Court
revisited the regulatory takings issue in Penn Central, it offered a
somewhat different set of factors.20 Compounding the resulting uncertainty in regulatory takings doctrine, neither the Mahon Court
nor the Penn Central Court offered any clear guidance about exactly
how their stated factors should be combined and balanced to generate
the required ultimate conclusion. This silence was not the courts’
fault; the situations simply were not amenable to greater certainty.21
The need to make high-stakes, all-or-nothing choices between two
possible outcomes in circumstances where neither answer is clearly
528, 528 (2005) (“Regulatory actions generally will be deemed per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes (1) where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical
invasion of her property, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
or (2) where regulations completely deprive an owner of ‘all economically beneficial us[e]’ of
her property, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019.”).
17. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
18. See, e.g., 81 JOHN A. GEBAUER, N.Y. JUR. 2D NUISANCES § 1 (2021) (“There is no exact
rule or formula by which the existence of a nuisance may be determined, but each case must
stand on its own facts.”); Rose, supra note 5, at 579 (“[N]uisance is one of those extraordinarily
shapeless doctrinal areas in the law of property. . . . You don’t know in advance how to answer
these questions and how to weigh the answers against each other; that is to say, you don’t
know whether your building will be found a nuisance or not, and you won’t really know until
you go through the pain and trouble of getting a court to decide the issue after you have built
it or have had plans drawn up.”).
19. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 420 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
20. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
21. The Penn Central court described these questions as “essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries.” Id.
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right is not unique to the takings context—many situations in life
do not fit neatly in pre-existing categories—nor may it always be of
concern.22 If two parties find themselves in this sort of situation
often, so that there are multiple cases, and thus multiple decisions,
the judgments may tend to “even out” as some cases are deemed to
fall on one side of the relevant line, while others are deemed to fall
on the other side, causing the cumulative result to reflect something
close to the average “correct” answer. Unfortunately, eminent domain cases are commonly quite different. Unless the owner of the
taken property is quite unfortunate, he or she is unlikely to have
property condemned more than once. Hence, there is little opportunity for evening out, and each private owner remains at a risk of
suffering a considerable loss.23
Trying to force a continuous world into discrete, binary doctrinal
categories can therefore produce an unfortunate combination of high
stakes and low certainty. As courts have struggled with that combination in cases that differ significantly from the central paradigms
of eminent domain, the result might seem to be a perpetually unsettled and ultimately unsatisfying doctrinal morass.
At first glance, this unfortunate state of affairs may seem inescapable. After all, the law has to reach one decision or another in such
cases, and reality is unlikely to lose its sometimes graduated nature.
Hence, binary takings decisions may initially seem to be unavoidable even when reality is non-binary.
That worrisome conclusion, however, overlooks the presence of
the fourth takings element: the requirement of “just compensation.”
Unlike the other three elements—whether there was a “property”
interest at stake, whether the property interest was “taken,” and
whether the taking was for a “public” use—the fourth, just compensation element is naturally amenable to gradation, because compensation can be awarded in different amounts. When deciding what
22. For a discussion of similar concerns principally in the context of criminal law and tort
law, see Adam Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 655 (2014).
23. In theory, spreading that risk through private insurance might be possible, but in
practice insurance against takings is not available. See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 593–96
(1984) (noting the absence of private insurance against takings and attributing that absence
to moral hazard and adverse-selection problems).
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amount of compensation to award, the question isn’t “whether,” but instead “how much,” and the answer to that question isn’t limited to
“yes” or “no” but could theoretically be any dollar amount imaginable. At least in principle, courts’ decisions about how much compensation to award could therefore make smooth the sharp discontinuities
created by the binary nature of the other three elements of takings
doctrine. In cases which seemed truly to be partly one thing and
partly another, the level of compensation could be adjusted to better
reflect the reality of the situation, enhancing certainty and predictability, and reducing the number of extreme outcomes. Those benefits, in turn, might also reduce the risk of popular outrage and increase
the perceived legitimacy of the property law system as a whole.
Later I will discuss how this abstract suggestion might be translated into practical applications in the two sets of controversial
cases just mentioned, but first it is necessary to address what might
seem to be two fatal objections to this suggestion: First, that wellestablished takings doctrine is quite clear that courts’ flexibility in
awarding compensation is very limited. And, second, that allowing
courts this flexibility would be undesirable, even if it were doctrinally possible, because it would give judges dangerously unfettered
discretion in awarding compensation. The answer to both objections,
I shall suggest, lies in recognizing the equitable dimension of takings
compensation. The Constitutional requirement of “just compensation” might sometimes best be understood as a requirement of “equitable compensation.”
II. “JUST COMPENSATION” AND “FULL COMPENSATION”
A. Current Doctrine
Today, the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of “just” compensation is canonically taken to be synonymous with “full” compensation.
In the leading case on the question, United States v. Miller, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that “just compensation” was a “full and perfect
equivalent in money of the property taken.”24 That monetary equivalent, in turn, was determined by “what a willing buyer would pay in
cash to a willing seller” in order to acquire the property.25 In other
24. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).
25. Id. at 374.
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words, just compensation is full compensation, and full compensation is fair market value compensation.
Although this elaboration of the meaning of “just compensation”
is now so familiar that its mention can easily pass without drawing
a second glance, there is nothing logically necessary about equating
“just” compensation with “full” or “fair market value” compensation.
There are many competing understandings of justice, and even more
potential different conclusions about what any one of those understandings would require when applied to specific contexts, such as
government interactions with private property.26
Hence, a fundamental question is why the Miller Court thought
that this particular elaboration of “just compensation” was the appropriate elaboration. Unfortunately, the Court’s discussion of this
point was quite thin, resting principally on the observation that the
Court had said something similar in 1893 when deciding Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States.27 And the Monongahela Court in turn
offered little more than a declaration that the equivalence is true.28
Perhaps these courts implicitly conceived of eminent domain as
a form of “forced sale.” Historically, that particular conception has
been common. For example, in Boston & Roxbury Milldam Corp. v.
Newman, the Massachusetts Supreme Court declared, “The principle
is, that the lands of individuals are holden subject to the requisitions
of the public exigencies, a reasonable compensation being paid for
the damage. It is not taking the property of one man and giving it to
another. At most, it is a forced sale, to satisfy the pressing want of
26. For one overview of various theories of justice, see David Miller, Justice, in STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice/. For an example of
how specific understandings of justice can affect conclusions about compensation for takings,
see two papers by Hanoch Dagan arguing for adjusting takings compensation based on
progressive egalitarian principles: Hanoch Dagan, Re-Imagining Takings Law, in PROPERTY
AND COMMUNITY 39 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver eds., 2009); Hanoch
Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741 (1999).
27. Miller, 317 U.S. at 373 (citing Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S.
312 (1893)).
28. Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 325 (“when he surrenders to the public something more and
different from that which is exacted from other members of the public, a full and just equivalent
shall be returned to him”); id. at 336 (“if the adjective ‘just’ had been omitted, and the provision
was simply that property should not be taken without compensation, the natural import of the
language would be that the compensation should be the equivalent of the property. And this
is made emphatic by the adjective ‘just.’ There can, in view of the combination of those two
words, be no doubt that the compensation must be a full and perfect equivalent for the property taken.”).
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the public.”29 If a taking is merely a “forced sale,” and the compensation paid is akin to the payment that would have been made in an
ordinary purchase, then the property’s current market price might
seem to be a natural measure of the compensation owed.
The difficulty with this reasoning is that a “forced” sale is fundamentally different from a genuine sale, which depends upon a
voluntary agreement between the parties, and for which the price
is deemed to be just only to the extent that the parties voluntarily
agreed upon that price. What a “willing” buyer would pay a “willing”
seller in cash has little obvious relevance to what is owed in situations which arise only when the “seller” is unwilling. Determining
what justice requires in such circumstances necessarily must involve something more than merely invoking what would satisfy
justice in fundamentally different circumstances. Thus, even the
“forced sale” analogy leaves open the question of why the just “price”
for that forced “sale” is determined by the property’s market value.
Ultimately, these courts may simply have thought that the equation
of “just compensation” with full market-value compensation was obvious. They would not have been the first to do so, and Nichols, in his
prominent early twentieth-century treatise, went so far as to assert:
It has never been disputed that when property taken by eminent
domain is of such a character that its market value can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such value is the measure of
compensation. The use of market value as a test in land damage
cases preceded the publication of judicial decisions in this country, so that we find it looked upon as an established principle in
the earliest reported cases.30
29. Bos. & Roxbury Milldam Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. 467, 485 (1832). See also Miss.
& Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 407–08 (1878) (“In determining the value
of land appropriated for public purposes, the same considerations are to be regarded as in a
sale of property between private parties.”); 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.142[6] (2016)
(asserting that acceptance of the theory that eminent domain is a compulsory sale “seems
almost inevitable” in jurisdictions that require payment of compensation in advance for taken
property); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139 (“The public is now considered as an
individual, treating with an individual for an exchange. All that the legislature does is to
oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price . . . .”).
30. 1 PHILIP NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 217 (2nd ed. 1917). (The current
edition of Nichols’s treatise retains that language. 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.01[3]
(2021).) Another treatise from the same era raised the question “Is Market Value the Only
Standard?” and then laconically answered, “The market value of property is usually the basis
for assessment.” CARMAN F. RANDOLPH, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 252, at 234 (1894). See also United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 344 (1923)
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However, history shows that equating just compensation with
full, fair market value compensation is not obvious. Indeed, it may
not even have been what the Fifth Amendment itself actually was
intended or understood to mean when it was drafted and ratified.
B. “Full” or “Just”?
Although there is little historical evidence about the drafting of the
Takings Clause, and little record of debate about its ratification, it
has often been noted that the Takings Clause had three historical
antecedents: the Vermont Constitution of 1777, the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780, and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.31 Curiously, there has been little attention to the fact that the wording of
these three predecessors differs, both from the Takings Clause and
from each other. Where the Takings Clause required “just” compensation, the Vermont Constitution required payment of “an equivalent
in money,”32 the Massachusetts Constitution required “reasonable”
compensation,33 and the Northwest Ordinance required “full” compensation.34
One cannot draw definitive conclusions from a historical record
as sparse as that which exists for the creation of the Takings Clause.
Nevertheless, it is striking that those who created the Takings Clause
chose not to adopt the “full compensation” wording of the Northwest
Ordinance—a foundational constitutional document enacted only
two years earlier—but instead chose to require compensation that
is “just.”
(stating, in rather circular fashion, “Where private property is taken for public use, and there
is a market price prevailing at the time and place of the taking, that price is just compensation. . . . More would be unjust to the United States, and less would deny the owner what
he is entitled to.”).
31. For a summary of these historical antecedents, see William Treanor, The Origins and
Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J.
694, 701–08 (1985).
32. Vt. Const. of 1777, ch. I, art. II (“whenever any particular man’s property is taken for
the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in money.”).
33. Mass. Const. of 1780, part I, art. X (“And whenever the public exigencies require, that
the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor.”).
34. Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, § 14, art. 2, reprinted in
1 U.S.C. at LV (2006) (“should the public exigencies make it necessary, for the common preservation, to take any person’s property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation
shall be made for the same”).
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This choice cannot plausibly be attributed to ignorance of the
Northwest Ordinance’s language. The Congress that drafted the Bill
of Rights certainly was familiar with the Ordinance’s provisions,
since one of Congress’s first acts under the Constitution, executed
the very same year that it was drafting the Bill of Rights, was “reenacting” the Ordinance (with minor modifications), to address concerns that its original enactment had been beyond the powers
granted Congress by the Articles of Confederation.35 Nor is it plausible that the Ordinance might have been overlooked as insignificant,
since, as Gordon Wood commented, “[a]part from winning the War of
Independence, [the Northwest Ordinance] was the greatest accomplishment of the Confederation Congress.”36 Peter Onuff’s similar
appraisal of the Ordinance as “one of the most important documents
of the American founding period” is now commonplace.37
Likewise, it is unlikely that the Bill of Rights’ drafters would have
considered the document to be inferior work unworthy of attention.
Benjamin Fletcher Wright suggested that the Constitution’s provision prohibiting the impairment of contracts was directly inspired
by similar provision in the Northwest Ordinance, a provision that
appeared in the very same article which contained the “full compensation” requirement for taken property.38 And Joseph Story praised
the Ordinance as “equally remarkable for the beauty and exactness
of its text, and for its masterly display of the fundamental principles
of civil and religious and political liberty.”39
35. Dennis P. Duffey, Note, The Northwest Ordinance as Constitutional Document, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 929, 940 n.77 (1995).
36. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY 122 (2009).
37. PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE
xxiii (2019). See also Anon., Introduction, in THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE: ESSAYS ON ITS FORMULATION, PROVISIONS, AND LEGACY vii, vii (Frederick D. Williams ed., 1988) (describing the
Ordinance as “one of the most important laws in the nation’s history”); Matthew J. Festa,
Property and Republicanism in the Northwest Ordinance, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 409, 435 (2014) (“As
a matter of legal history, [the Northwest Ordinance] also serves as excellent evidence of the
original understandings of the founding generation, especially concerning the original meaning
of the Constitution’s property clauses.”); James H. Madison, Forward, in THE NORTHWEST
ORDINANCE, 1787: A BICENTENNIAL HANDBOOK vii, vii (Robert M. Taylor, Jr. ed., 1987) (“The
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 is among the most important documents in American history.”).
38. BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 8
(1938) (“it appears to be certain that [Northwest Ordinance Article 2’s] guarantee of security
to bona fide private contracts was the immediate cause for the proposal of a similar clause in
the Federal [Constitutional] Convention.”).
39. JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 218, at 139 (1840).
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Thus if “just” compensation was originally meant to be merely a
synonym for “full” compensation, there is no obvious reason why the
Takings Clause’s drafters would not simply have followed immediately prior practice and said “full” compensation. Their declining to
do so is not, of course, conclusive evidence that “just” compensation
originally meant something different than “full” compensation, but
it is at least suggestive.
An originalist might find this suggestion to be important in itself as
helping to guide a proper interpretation of the Constitution. But even
a non-originalist may find it useful as suggesting that alternative understandings of “just” compensation are possible. As the next section
will discuss, one plausible alternative is “equitable compensation.”
III. EQUITABLE COMPENSATION
A. Takings’ Equitable Aspect
Historically, characterizing just compensation for eminent domain
as equitable was a recurring theme in judicial decisions, although
typically with little attempt to elaborate the implications of that
characterization. For example, Chancellor Kent asserted that “to
render the exercise of the [eminent domain] power valid, a fair compensation must, in all cases, be previously made to the individuals
affected, under some equitable assessment to be provided by law.”40
A century later, the U.S. Supreme Court in Seaboard Air Line Railway
Co. v. United States (1923) commented that the Monongahela Navigation Court’s requirement that compensation be “the full and perfect
equivalent” of the taken property “rests on equitable principles.”41
And in United States v. Fuller (1973), the Court acknowledged that
Miller requires compensation equal to “fair market value” but added
the qualification that “that [fair market value] term is not an absolute
standard nor an exclusive method of valuation.”42 The Fuller Court
then immediately added, “The constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as much content from the basic equitable principles of fairness as it does from technical concepts of property law.”43
40.
41.
42.
43.

Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 166 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (Kent op.).
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923).
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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These allusions to an “equitable” component to takings compensation raise the question of exactly what that means. The term “equity” has multiple meanings, and various taxonomies—often quite
similar—have been offered.44 For our purposes, an elaboration by
John Salmond will be useful. Salmond noted that “the term equity
possesses at least three distinct though related senses.”45
In one sense, “which is peculiar to English nomenclature, . . . .
[e]quity is that body of law which is administered in the Court of
Chancery, as contrasted with the other and rival system administered in the common law courts.”46 Equity, in this sense, is a particular set of formal rules that now are principally distinguished merely
by having a particular historical origin. Maitland’s famous history
of equity focused on this aspect of equity, asserting that “if we were
to inquire what it is that all these rules [of equity] have in common
and what it is that marks them off from all other rules administered
by our courts, we should by way of answer find nothing but this, that
these rules were until lately administered, and administered only,
by our courts of equity.”47
This formal aspect of equity does sometimes appear in the eminent
domain context. The modern edition of Nichols on Eminent Domain
notes that the judicial process in eminent domain cases involves
aspects traditionally associated with equity, so much so that they
are effectively a hybrid of law and equity.48 And Thomas Merrill’s
recent discussion of anticipatory remedies for takings examined
equity in its technical sense.49
However, this particular understanding of equity is tangential to
the issue under consideration here. This Paper is not suggesting that
takings compensation is (or should be) governed by the developed
44. See, e.g., 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 43–45,
at 46–49 (4th ed. 1918).
45. JOHN W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 47 (1902).
46. Id. at 50.
47. F.W. Maitland, The Origin of Equity, in EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON
LAW: TWO COURSES OF LECTURES 1 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whitaker eds., 1910) (available at
ARCHIVE.ORG, https://archive.org/details/equityalsoformso00mait)
48. 6 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 24.01[1] (“It is well settled that condemnation proceedings, although more analogous to a suit in equity than to an action at law (and although
equitable rights are recognized and protected in such proceedings), are brought on the law,
and not the equity, side of the court. Nevertheless, it has been said that a condemnation proceeding is not a common law action.”).
49. Thomas W. Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1630 (2015).
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body of formal rules and doctrines that are bundled together under
the label “equity.” Such a suggestion would be both implausible—
since there is little evidence that prior references to takings compensation as having an “equitable” basis had this technical meaning in
mind—and fruitless—since it is hardly clear how equity’s formal
apparatus could offer much help in addressing the specific problem
of binary takings doctrine being compelled to address non-binary
issues. Indeed, Roscoe Pound believed that equity in this first sense
was a late, “decadent” historical development that had strayed from
the original motivations behind equity and that might someday be
replaced by some new set of doctrines that would meet the need for
flexibility no longer addressed by equity in its late, ossified form.50
A second meaning of “equity” in Salmond’s taxonomy was the polar
opposite of the first. Rather than identifying a particular set of formal
rules, “it is nothing more than a synonym for natural justice.”51
Salmond added, “This is the popular application of the term, and
possesses no special juridical significance.”52
This meaning no doubt has played a role in prompting requirements
of compensation when property is taken, and it too is reflected in influential understandings of the Takings Clause. Thus, for example,
Kent asserted that “[a] provision for compensation is a necessary
attendant on the due and constitutional exercise of the power of the
lawgiver to deprive an individual of his property without his consent; and this principle in American constitutional jurisprudence,
is founded in natural equity, and is laid down by jurists as an acknowledged principle of universal law.”53 And Story asserted that
the Takings Clause “is founded in natural equity, and is laid down by
jurists as a principle of universal law.”54
50. See Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 24 (1905) (“It was
remarked long ago that law and equity are in continual progression, that ‘a part of what is
now strict law was formerly considered as equity; and the equitable decisions of this age will
unavoidably be ranked under the strict law of the next.’ But in becoming law a principle of
equity loses its quality of elasticity. Hence we may look, not unreasonably, for an action and
reaction from law to equity behind this progression.”). Salmond likewise believed that equity
as a particular formal system was a third historical stage in the evolution of the meaning of
“equity.” SALMOND, supra note 45, at 50.
51. SALMOND, supra note 45, at 47.
52. Id.
53. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 339 (2d ed. 1832).
54. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1790,
at 569–70 (5th ed. 1891) [1833]. In a similar vein, see Youtzy v. Cedar Rapids, 129 N.W. 351,
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However, this very general sense of “equity” is not particularly
useful for addressing the problem at hand. Allowing the government
to pay whatever compensation seems “equitable” in this very vague
sense would naturally raise concerns about indeterminacy and arbitrariness, concerns which historically have accompanied even more
concrete implementations of equity.55 Moreover, its vagueness leaves
this sense of equity unable to point toward any particular solutions
to concrete problems of the sort at issue here.
More useful for present purposes is equity in Salmond’s third sense.
In this “legal sense equity means natural justice, not simply, but in
a special aspect, that is to say, as opposed to the rigour of inflexible
rules of law.”56 This sense of equity lies intermediate between the
relative rigidity of equity as a formal system of rules and doctrines,
and the relative vagueness of equity as general “natural justice.” It
takes the general moral orientation of the latter sense of equity and
makes it more specific by applying it within the existing context of
the law. In this sense, equity adapts the law to better serve the ends
of justice, stepping in where the law would otherwise be deficient in
certain ways.
Equity’s role in meeting the need for flexibility in the legal system
has long been recognized. For example, Pomeroy’s equity treatise
praised equity on the grounds that “[n]o doubt (and this is a point of
the highest importance) the system was, and is, much more elastic
and capable of expansion and extension to new cases than the common law.”57 Flexibility also played a central role in Roscoe Pound’s
summary of the historical development of equity: “Equity, then,
started as a reaction towards justice without law and in its development became a system wherein the element of judicial discretion
was given greater play, and the circumstances of particular cases
were more attended to than the fixety of legal rules would permit.”58
352 (Iowa 1911) (“[I]t is to be remembered that in such proceedings the lot owner is not a
willing seller of his property, and he is forced to yield his title and surrender his estate in the
interest of the general public, not infrequently to his great and irreparable inconvenience, if
not actual loss. It is therefore inevitable that juries looking at the apparent natural equities
of the case and deciding between the individual and the public at large are inclined to solve
the doubts if any in favor of the former.”).
55. See discussion infra Section III.B.
56. SALMOND, supra note 45, at 47.
57. 1 POMEROY, supra note 44, § 59, at 64.
58. Pound, supra note 50, at 22.
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And Douglas Laycock pithily summarized the “most general distinction between law and equity in the early days”: “Law was formal and
rigid; equity was flexible, discretionary—a court of conscience.”59 Nor
is this understanding of equity’s role merely historical. Samuel Bray
has recently argued that one of the two principal functions of the
system of equitable remedies in American law today is to “solve firstorder policy problems: i.e., the circumstances that demand a remedy
compelling action or inaction in flexible and open-ended ways.”60
The specific sort of flexibility that theorists saw equity providing
often was considered to be specific to each individual case. For example, E.C. Clark asserted that “‘a reasonable view of the circumstances of the case’ has been at the bottom of most of the decisions
upon which our rules of English equity were founded: nor do I see how
it can ever cease to be one ground of decision, until every possible
case can be provided for by a previous rule.”61 Similarly, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Hecht Co. v. Bowles commented, “The essence of
equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity
and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case.
Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it.”62
Although finely grained flexibility of this sort may have a useful
role to play in takings jurisprudence, the flexibility needed to mitigate problems created by the binary nature of takings doctrine could
be more general, offering standardized approaches for different types
of situations. The common thread connecting those approaches would
be that when a specific category of situation does not fit neatly into
existing takings categories, the compensation awarded could deviate
flexibly away from “fair market value” compensation to reflect that
fact. The deviation could be upward or downward—more or less
than market value—depending upon the type of case at hand. Such
an approach would mirror a particular sort of flexibility that Story
59. Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 71 (1992).
See also Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, 135 U. PENN. L. REV. 909,
934 (1987) (“Discretion and flexibility were at the heart of historic equity practice.”). Laycock
did express some reservations about the historical accuracy of this traditional understanding:
“I suspect that this historical stereotype is exaggerated, because we also say that the genius
of the common law was in its flexible stability and its capacity for growth within a tradition.”
Laycock, supra, at 71.
60. Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 534 (2016).
61. E.C. CLARK, PRACTICAL JURISPRUDENCE 246 (1883).
62. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
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identified as distinguishing courts of equity from courts of law, the
flexibility to “vary, qualify, restrain, and model the remedy so as to
suit it to mutual and adverse claims, controlling equities, and the
real and substantial rights of all the parties.”63
Flexibility in setting the amount of compensation owed would
allow the law to transform binary questions, such as “Was there a
taking?” or “Was the taking for public use?”, into graduated questions,
such as “How much of a taking was there?” and “How public was the
use?” As a result, questions that demand “yes” or “no” answers that
in reality are impossible to give would be replaced with questions
that are more tractable.
Part IV, below, will discuss how this sort of flexibility might help
address the difficulties posed by hybrid public-private takings and
regulatory takings. But first it will be useful to address a traditional
concern about equitable approaches to legal problems: the danger of
arbitrariness.
B. Equity and Arbitrariness
Concerns have existed for centuries that equity, because it is
flexible, creates a danger of oppressively unpredictable and unconstrained judgments. In 1689, Selden charged that “[e]quity in Law
is the same that the spirit is in Religion, what ever one pleases to
make it.” Selden then drew his famous analogy between measuring
equity according to the idiosyncratic conscience of whoever happens
to be chancellor at the time, and making the linear measure “one
foot” equal to whatever happened to be the length of the current
chancellor’s foot. “[W]hat an uncertain measure would this be; One
Chancellor has a long foot another, a short foot a third an indifferent foot; this the same thing in the Chancellors Conscience.”64 A
century and a half later, Story raised similar concerns about equity’s potential for arbitrariness:
If, indeed, a Court of Equity in England did possess the unbounded jurisdiction, which has been thus generally ascribed to
it, . . . it would be the most gigantic in its sway, and the most
63. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 28, at 22 (2d ed. 1839)
[hereinafter COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE].
64. JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 43 (1689) (Pollock ed. 1927).
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formidable instrument of arbitrary power, that could well be
devised. It would literally place the whole rights and property of
the community under the arbitrary will of the Judge, acting, if you
please, arbitrio boni judicis [with the judgment of a good judge],
and it may be, ex aequo et bono [according to what is equitable
and good], according to his own notions and conscience; but still
acting with a despotic and sovereign authority.65

Story, however, was quick to add that these concerns were overstated, because equity jurisprudence included significant constraints
that limited its discretion to within certain bounds.66 Indeed, such
constraints are consistent with equity in general. Pomeroy vigorously defended equity against charges of arbitrariness, asserting
that fidelity to equity’s fundamental principles would limit the discretion of judges in equity.67 Over time, these principles came to be
reflected in a relatively limited set of central maxims. These equitable maxims were (and are) not supposed to determine the outcome
of cases. As we have already seen, avoiding the rigidity of such rules
is one of the very points of equity. Moreover, attempting to determine outcomes simply by applying maxims would often be futile. As
Austin Abbott noted over a century ago,
When the attempt is made, under our system of jurisprudence,
to solve a question by maxims, it usually results in resolving the
question into another double question quite as debatable as the
first, viz.: Which of two maxims is properly applicable? For
instance, “Equality is equity,” but on the other hand, “He who is
prior in time is stronger in right,” and “The law aids the vigilant,
not the negligent.” Upon almost every subject the maxims of
jurisprudence balance themselves against each other in this
way; and the function of justice is to hold the scales so that the
preponderating principle shall determine the cause.68
65. COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 63, § 19.
66. Id. (“So far, however, is this from being true, that one of the most common maxims,
upon which a Court of Equity daily acts, is, that Equity follows the law and seeks out and
guides itself by the analogies of the law.”).
67. 1 POMEROY, supra note 44, § 59 (“[Equity] has, therefore, as an essential part of its
nature, a capacity of orderly and regular growth, a growth not arbitrary, according to the will
of individual judges, but in the direction of its already settled principles.”).
68. Austin Abbott, The Virtue of Maxims, in GEORGE FREDERICK WHARTON, LEGAL MAXIMS
5 (1878). Cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) (noting that
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Since Abbott’s observation appeared in the foreword to a compendium of legal maxims, it is little surprise that he recognized that
maxims nevertheless do have a useful role to play in legal analysis:
“The best use of maxims under our system is not as authorities, like
a statute or precedent, but as aids to counsel in the investigation of
the controversy, and in determining in preparation for trial what is
the central principle involved, and where the weight of justice lies.”69
One might add that maxims in equity have an additional, more
concrete utility. They help direct equity analysis in directions that are
productive of the aims of equity in general, focusing equitable discretion on particular categories of concerns that equity exists to address.
These general observations, however, do not by themselves address
whether understanding “just compensation” to incorporate an aspect
of “equitable compensation” might, in the specific context of eminent
domain, still raise indeterminacy worries. In this context, two different
types of indeterminacy might be of particular concern: indeterminacy
about the amount of compensation that would be awarded when
deviations from the fair-market-value standard occur, and indeterminacy about when those deviations would occur at all.
With respect to how much compensation would be awarded when
the fair-market-value standard is not used—i.e., the concern with how
flexibility in determining compensation would be used—permitting
such flexibility would not necessarily create any more room for arbitrariness than already exists in compensation calculations. “Fair
market value” calculations themselves are not purely mechanical
and can require determinations made under conditions of considerable uncertainty if, for example, the taken property is significantly
dissimilar to property that has recently traded on the market. Even
in the 1930s, Orgel’s treatise on the valuation of property in eminent domain ran over eight hundred pages.70
Moreover, flexible deviations from fair market value need not be
unconstrained. Indeed, such deviations already exist in takings law.
canons of statutory construction often can point in contrary directions). Samuel Bray has described equitable maxims as “not rules, in the sense of outcome-determinative legal propositions.
Rather they are concerns, topics of interest, matters on the agenda when judges are deciding
whether to give equitable remedies.” Bray, supra note 60, at 582.
69. Abbott, supra note 68, at 5.
70. LEWIS ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1st ed. 1936). The
second edition expanded to two volumes. LEWIS ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (2d ed. 1953). The length of Orgel’s treatise was not unique; Bonbright’s general treatise
on valuation also filled two volumes. JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937).
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In the aftermath of Kelo, several states enacted statutes or constitutional amendments that required paying compensation at specified
fixed percentages above fair market value.71 States also established
distinctions among circumstances which would require additional
compensation. For example, Indiana’s statute applied one bonus to
taken agricultural property and a different bonus to taken residential
property.72 Hence, establishing flexibility to deviate from fair market value does not preclude the existence of frameworks governing
how that flexibility is to be exercised, nor of general rules applicable
to every case in specified categories of takings situations.
The possibility of constraints on how deviations from fair market
value would occur does not, however, address the distinct concerns
of arbitrariness in decisions about when such deviations are allowed
in the first place. As Blackstone noted:
[T]he liberty of considering all cases in an equitable light must
not be indulged too far, lest thereby we destroy all law, and leave
the decision of every question entirely in the breast of the judge.
And law, without equity, though hard and disagreeable, is much
more desirable for the public good than equity without law;
which would make every judge a legislator, and introduce most
infinite confusion; as there would then be almost as many different rules of action laid down in our courts, as there are differences of capacity and sentiment in the human mind.73

To allay those concerns, some additional principle is needed that
would help guide those decisions.
To begin, there is good reason to apply the well-established fairmarket-value measure to compensation in core takings cases—e.g.,
when the government straightforwardly confiscates real property for
use by the government. Academics have debated the adequacy of
fair-market-value compensation in ordinary takings cases, but even
if some modification of that standard might be desirable in general,
there are several reasons why that modified standard still provides
71. E.g., Michigan amended its constitution to require payment of at least 125% of fair
market value for taken residential property. MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2 (2020). Missouri enacted
a similar provision in a statute. Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 523.001, 523.039 (2020).
72. Ind. Code Ann. §§ 32-24-4.5–8 (2020).
73. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at 62.
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an appropriate default baseline from which flexible deviations would
need to be justified.74
First, as noted earlier, the fair-market-value standard has intuitive plausibility to those who conceive of eminent domain as a forced
sale, as well as the obvious advantages of familiarity and being the
subject of firmly established expectations.75 However, the standard
also has clear functional advantages. In general, paying compensation equal to the market value of what was lost can often enable the
person who lost the property to purchase a replacement that is at
least roughly equivalent.76 Moreover, using a standard—market
value—that is outside the control of the parties or the government
reduces the risk of opportunistic “strategic” behavior to manipulate
the amount of compensation paid.77 And because a property’s market
value can be determined, at least in theory, without going to court,
it is relatively easy for private parties and the government to use
when making plans.
Taken together, these familiar facts about market value compensation make it understandable why the fair-market-value standard
is so often used throughout the law, and why it would be desirable
to retain that standard in ordinary takings cases, where the binary
74. For examples of this controversy, see, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain
Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957 (2004); Gideon Kanner, Fairness & Equity or Judicial Baitand-Switch—It’s Time to Reform the Law of “Just” Compensation, 4 ALBANY GOV. L. REV. 38,
42 (2011); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 83 (1986).
75. Even someone steeped in equity can recognize the importance of certainty and predictability. Thus Gibson’s equity treatise noted,
It is more important to a people to have their laws known and fixed than to have
them precisely just; for our conceptions of justice differ, but what is fixed is
certain, and can be conformed to. . . . It is better that the individual conform to
the law than that the law conform to the individual; and it is better that a
particular case of hardship be unredressed than that the law be violated, when
the violation would occasion much mischief, and especially would unsettle the
foundations of property rights, and disturb the landmarks of the law.
HENRY R. GIBSON, A TREATISE ON SUITS IN CHANCERY § 59, at 49 (2d ed. 1907).
76. In Douglas Laycock’s terminology, such compensation, like money damages in general,
is a “substitutionary” remedy. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103
HARV. L. REV. 687, 696 (1990). See also Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 315 (C.C.
Pa. 1795) (noting as an advantage of monetary compensation in takings cases that money “is
a[ ] universal medium, easily portable, liable to little variation, and readily exchanged for any
kind of property”).
77. See Rose, supra note 5, at 591 (“Crystalline rules have a related advantage that has been
much discussed of late: They discourage what is called ‘rent-seeking’ behavior in decisionmakers, particularly when those decision-makers are legislators.”).
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nature of takings doctrine comfortably applies to situations that fall
neatly into one category or another. Even Pomeroy’s equity treatise
conceded that
it is also true that from the very necessities of the case there is
another large part of the law which is and must be founded upon
expediency rather than upon morality. The influence of ancient
institutions, the motives of policy, the primary importance of
certainty, the necessity of rules which shall correspond with the
average conduct of men, . . . these and other facts of equal importance must exist in every society . . . . This inherent necessity of
a constituent part which is arbitrary and expedient, rather than
just and righteous, is a most important distinction between the
“law” and “equity.”78

C. When “Full,” When “Equitable”?
Given that fair market value is a useful default baseline for “ordinary” takings cases, two questions now naturally arise: First, how
to know when flexibly deviating from that baseline is appropriate,
and, second, in what direction those deviations should occur. Avoiding
arbitrariness requires having some principle or principles to provide
coherent guidance in answering those questions.
Space does not permit an exhaustive exploration of principles that
might count for or against deviations from the fair-market-value
standard. However, discussing one candidate principle may illuminate how a constrained, principled flexibility could be possible. And
in applying this principle to the specific examples of hybrid publicprivate takings and regulatory takings, the relevance of traditional
aspects of equity will become apparent.
I have argued elsewhere that the government’s authority to take
private property rests most plausibly on the existence of reciprocal
duties among members of a political community.79 Property law has
long recognized those duties. Consider, for example, the law of nuisance or of riparian water rights.80 In the eminent domain context,
78. 1 POMEROY, supra note 44, § 66.
79. See Brian Angelo Lee, Uncompensated Takings: Insurance, Efficiency, and Relational
Justice, 97 TEXAS L. REV. 935 (2019).
80. See, e.g., Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 577 (N.Y. 1876) (“Persons living in organized
communities must suffer some damage, annoyance and inconvenience from each other. For
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these duties explain both why property owners may be required to
relinquish their property to the community when it is needed for
public use, and why the community in turn is obligated to compensate the owner upon whom it has imposed this loss.81
Thus, as the relative weights of the parties’ duties toward each
other wax or wane, the amount of compensation owed for takings
might grow or diminish correspondingly. At one extreme, the amount
owed might be zero; at the opposite extreme, it might be however
much the property owner cares to demand, no matter how large that
sum might be.
For example, if Jones’s activities on Jones’s own property violate
duties that Jones has toward his or her neighbors, Jones can be
compelled to cease those activities without receiving any compensation for losses caused by that cessation. Thus Jones is owed zero
compensation for being compelled to remove a structure deemed to
be a public nuisance or that blocks the flow of water in a natural
stream running through multiple properties, including Jones’s.82 At
the other extreme, if the government wished to take Jones’s property solely to transfer it to some private person, the taking would
not be allowed at all, because (absent some special circumstance)
Jones has no duty to contribute toward that other person’s private
projects.83 As a practical matter, then, that person could acquire
Jones’s property only by convincing Jones to sell it, which would
require paying whatever price Jones chose to demand.
Some situations, however, fall somewhere between these two extremes. In such cases, considering the relative weights of the parties’
these they are compensated by all the advantages of civilized society. . . . But every person is
bound to make a reasonable use of his property so as to occasion no unnecessary damage or
annoyance to his neighbor.”); Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 492, 495 (1842) (“Each
riparian proprietor is bound to make such a use of running water, as to do as little injury to
those below him, as is consistent with a valuable benefit to himself.”).
81. See Lee, supra note 79, at 967–70.
82. See, e.g., Pucci v. Algiere, 106 R.I. 411, 261 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1970) (affirming a court order
requiring demolition of a building deemed to be a public nuisance); GIBSON, A TREATISE ON
SUITS IN CHANCERY § 50, at 44 (2d ed. 1907) (“A man cannot so divert a stream on his own land
as to turn water injuriously upon a neighbor’s land; and he cannot dig so near the land of his
neighbor as to cause the latter’s land to cave in, or so near as to endanger his neighbor’s wall;
he cannot pollute a stream that flows through his neighbor’s land; nor can he so stop, or change,
the current of a stream as to prevent its ordinary flow through the land of another.”).
83. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (“[I]t has long been
accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring
it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.”).
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duties toward each other might naturally seem relevant to determining what level of compensation would produce an appropriate resolution. Here the equitable aspect of “just compensation” naturally
comes to the fore, since addressing situations in which competing
legitimate interests require accommodation has long been a fundamental part of equity. As Story’s equity treatise noted:
[T]here are many cases in which a simple judgment for either
party, without qualifications or conditions or peculiar arrangements, will not do entire justice ex aequo et bono to either party.
Some modifications of the rights of both parties may be required;
some restraints on one side, or on the other, or perhaps on both
sides; some adjustments involving reciprocal obligations or duties;
some compensatory or preliminary or concurrent proceedings to
fix, control, or equalize rights; some qualifications or conditions,
present or future, temporary or permanent, to be annexed to the
exercise of rights or the redress of injuries.84

For example, a standard general maxim of equity is “He who seeks
equity must do equity.”85 This maxim, Pomeroy elaborated, “says, in
effect, that the court will give the plaintiff the relief to which he is
entitled, only upon condition that he has given, or consents to give,
the defendant such corresponding rights as he also may be entitled
to in respect of the subject-matter of the suit.”86 Pomeroy further
observed that “[t]his principle is not confined to any particular kind
of equitable rights and remedies, but pervades the entire equity
jurisprudence, so far as it is concerned with the administration of
equitable remedies.”87 In a more specific context, the U.S. Supreme
Court has used a doctrine of “equitable apportionment” to resolve
disputes between states concerning rights to water and other natural resources.88 And whenever an injunction is sought, courts will
84. COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 63, § 27.
85. See, e.g., JAMES W. EATON & ARCHIBALD H. THROCKMORTON, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 19, at 57 (2d ed. 1923); 1 POMEROY, supra note 44, § 385; COMMENTARIES ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 63, § 59.
86. 1 POMEROY, supra note 44, § 385.
87. Id. § 388.
88. See, e.g., Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025 (1983) (“At the root of the
doctrine is the same principle that animates many of the Court’s Commerce Clause cases: a
State may not preserve solely for its own inhabitants natural resources located within its
borders. . . . Consistent with this principle, States have an affirmative duty under the doctrine

2021] “EQUITABLE COMPENSATION” AS “JUST COMPENSATION”

341

grant that equitable relief only after “balancing the hardships” that
would result from issuing or denying an injunction.89
Because of the fundamental role that reciprocal duties play in
justifying eminent domain, it is not surprising that discussions of how
much compensation is appropriate when eminent domain is exercised have echoed this basic equitable approach, albeit without explicitly invoking equity.90 Thus, in Searl v. School District No. 2 in
Lake County, the U.S. Supreme Court commented that
[the right of eminent domain] cannot be exercised except upon
condition that just compensation shall be made to the owner,
and it is the duty of the state, in the conduct of the inquest by
which the compensation is ascertained, to see that it is just not
merely to the individual whose property is taken, but to the
public which is to pay for it.91

And while Lewis’s early twentieth-century eminent domain treatise
observed that “‘Just compensation,’ . . . as used in the constitution,
means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained by the taking
for public use,” Lewis immediately added:
It may be more or it may be less than the mere money value of
the property actually taken. The exercise of the power being
necessary for the public good, and all property being held subject
of equitable apportionment to take reasonable steps to conserve and even to augment the
natural resources within their borders for the benefit of other States. . . . Even though Idaho
has no legal right to the anadromous fish hatched in its waters, it has an equitable right to
a fair distribution of this important resource.”).
89. See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (“A preliminary
injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right. . . . In each case, courts
‘must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the
granting or withholding of the requested relief.’”) (quoting Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell,
480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987)); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)
(“According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction
must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: . . . that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a
remedy in equity is warranted . . . .”).
90. The lack of explicit mention of equity, of course, does not imply that eminent domain
lacks a fundamentally equitable dimension. It may show instead only that such a dimension
has sometimes been overlooked. Cf. 1 POMEROY, supra note 44, § 65 (“[A]t the present day a
large part of the ‘law’ is motived by considerations of justice, based upon notions of right, and
permeated by equitable principles, as truly and to as great an extent as the complementary
department of the national jurisprudence which is technically called ‘equity.’”).
91. Searl v. School District, 133 U.S. 553, 562 (1890).
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to its exercise when, and as the public good requires it, it would
be unjust to the public that it should be required to pay the owner
more than a fair indemnity for the loss he sustains by the appropriation of his property for the general good. On the other hand,
it would be equally unjust to the owner if he should receive less
than a fair indemnity for such loss. To arrive at this fair indemnity, the interests of the public and of the owner and all the
circumstances of the particular appropriation should be taken
into consideration.92

IV. APPLICATIONS
These somewhat abstract theoretical considerations have significant potential practical benefits. The two challenging categories of
cases noted earlier—hybrid public-private takings and regulatory
takings—provide examples of how attending to the relative weights
of the parties’ reciprocal duties, and equitably adjusting compensation in response, can plausibly address difficult cases.
A. Hybrid Public-Private Takings
As noted earlier, the doctrinal difficulty with hybrid public-private
takings cases is that they do not seem neatly categorizable as either
“public” uses or “private” uses. Instead, they are a mixture of the two,
with the result that placing them in either category seems to lead to
results that are intuitively unjust. If the use is categorized as “private,” the taking becomes impermissible, and the public benefit that
the project would have provided is lost. If the use is categorized as
“public,” then the property owners are forced to relinquish their
property—sometimes their homes—for a price lower than the property may have been worth to them, and a private company increases
its profits as a result. Neither result seems quite just, but no other
alternative seems available.
Intuitively, these situations call for an intermediate solution that
recognizes both the extent to which the project in question has public
benefits and the extent to which it merely enhances private profit.
Adjusting the amount of compensation paid for property taken in
such cases is a natural way to effectuate that result. If the taking is
92. 2 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 685, at 1174 (3d ed. 1909).
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permitted, but the compensation required is increased, then the public
gets the benefit of the project’s completion, and the extent to which
private profit is increased at the expense of the taken property’s
owner diminishes.
This diminution may not only seem more just but also may reduce
incentives for strategic behavior by private entities that might otherwise face greater temptation to try to exploit the state’s eminent
domain power for their own private ends.93 Such a benefit would not
be merely incidental to an equitable measure of compensation. For
example, in Henry Smith’s recent account of equity as a second-order
system overseeing law, avoiding opportunistic exploitation of law’s
limitations is in fact a central function of equity.94
The idea of varying compensation for hybrid public-private takings
is not new. During the Supreme Court’s oral argument for Kelo, Justice Kennedy asked,
Are there any writings or scholarship that indicates that when you
have property being taken from one private person ultimately to go
to another private person, that what we ought to do is to adjust the
measure of compensation, so that the owner—the condemnee—can
receive some sort of a premium for the development?95

As fate would have it, James Krier and Christopher Serkin had
addressed that very question at approximately the same time,
93. The existence of strategic behavior can be difficult to prove, but it is sometimes suspected. For example, a newspaper column by Malcolm Gladwell, commenting on a controversial
use of eminent domain to take property in Brooklyn for use by private developers in an urban
development project, reported speculation that the project had included a sports arena (the
present-day Barclays Center) merely to enable the developer to claim that the entire project
was a “public” use and thus to use eminent domain to acquire the needed land. Malcolm
Gladwell, The Nets and NBA Economics, GRANTLAND (Oct. 10, 2011), https://grantland.com/fea
tures/the-nets-nba-economics/. And in a similar case in northern Manhattan, a New York trial
judge suggested that Columbia University had deliberately acquired and then failed to
maintain properties in a specific neighborhood in order to justify a finding that the entire
neighborhood was “blighted,” which would enable Columbia to use eminent domain to acquire
the remaining properties for use in Columbia’s expansion plans. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban
Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), rev’d 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010). See also
Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1717 (2011) (“it is often less
expensive for [a land] assembler to convince a local government to exercise eminent domain
on its behalf than to purchase the parcels in the real estate market”).
94. Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, 130 YALE L.J. 1050 (2021).
95. Oral Argument at 21:43, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-108 (question from Kennedy, J.).
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suggesting that “to avoid the clumsy all-or-nothing property rule
approaches to public use . . . together with their high error costs, we
propose a shift to liability rules, with compensation increasing as
skepticism about the public nature and benefits of government action
grows.”96 (The advocate who answered Justice Kennedy’s question
replied prudently but vaguely, “There may be some scholarship
about that.”97)
Recognizing the role of reciprocal duties in justifying eminent domain enables us to see more clearly why it is that increased compensation is appropriate in these sorts of cases: Members of a community,
including owners of property in that community, have obligations to
the community as a whole that they do not have toward private
businesses with which they are not involved. Suzette Kelo had civic
duties toward the city of New London and the state of Connecticut
that she did not have toward shareholders in the Pfizer pharmaceutical company and the Corcoran real estate group. Thus, to the extent
that the project that required taking her property was not fully public,
her duty to relinquish her property was less, and thus the reciprocal
duty to compensate for the loss incurred by the taking was greater.98
The net result is that compensation in a hybrid taking case should be
higher than the compensation that would have been owed for a purely
public taking, by an amount that reflects the relative amounts of
public benefit and private profit expected from the project.
These considerations echo equity’s concern, noted above, for attaining outcomes that reflect the extent of both parties’ duties toward
each other. It also reflects the equitable principle that unjust enrichment is to be avoided, a principle sometimes stated as a maxim that
one shall not profit from imposing a loss on another.99 In the context
96. Krier & Serkin, supra note 14, at 874.
97. Oral Argument at 22:05, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-108 (answer by Bullock).
98. Whether this analysis further implies that takings for use by public utilities or common carriers, such as railroads, should also require paying compensation greater than the
taken property’s market value is a question that space does not permit considering here.
Historically, such takings have been a significant fraction of exercises of eminent domain. See,
e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 77 (3d ed. 2008).
99. The maxim is derived from Roman law and in the past was invoked in Latin phrasing
such as nemo debet locupletari aliena jactura [no one should be enriched by another’s loss].
See, e.g., KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 91–92 (1825). In the context of property law, cases invoking this maxim commonly involve potential unjust enrichment from mistaken improvements.
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of hybrid public-private takings, this equitable principle would prohibit the private beneficiary from profiting from a wrongful taking.
Ordinarily, the state commits no wrong in merely exercising its power
of eminent domain, because that power is well-established as legitimate, provided that the state pays just compensation for what it takes.
Thus, payment of an appropriate amount of compensation is not compensation for a wrong but rather is a necessary element in preventing a wrong from occurring in the first place.100 But to the extent
that a special private benefit results from a hybrid public-private
taking—for example, the benefit enjoyed by a private land developer
as a result of takings used in an economic development project—
paying an amount of compensation that is less than the owner would
have demanded in a voluntary private exchange seems insufficient
to avoid wrongdoing. Hence, to prevent the “private” part of the hybrid
public-private taking from becoming wrongful—and thus to prevent
the private beneficiary from unjustly enriching itself—an equitable
approach to compensation would require that the private beneficiary
pay more than fair market value compensation, to the extent that the
benefit from the taking is private rather than public.101
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Barnum, 31 Md. 425, 453 (1869) (“In such cases a Court of Equity
practically enforces the rule of the civil law, founded in natural justice, ‘nemo debet locupletari
aliena jactura,’ as well as the cherished maxim of equity jurisprudence itself, that ‘he who
seeks equity must do equity.’”); Mickles v. Dillaye, 17 N.Y. 80, 92 (1858) (“Under such circumstances, he should not be allowed, in a court of equity, to enrich himself at the expense of one
who has acted innocently.”); Bright v. Boyd, 4 F. Cas. 127, 132–33 (C.C.D. Me. 1841) (Story, J.)
(“Upon the general principles of courts of equity, acting ex aequo et bono [according to what
is equitable and good], . . . compensation, under such circumstances, ought to be allowed to the
full amount of the enhanced value, upon the maxim of the common law, ‘nemo debet locupletari
ex alterius incommodo’ [no one should be enriched by the inconvenience of another]. . . .”).
100. I have elaborated on this point elsewhere. See Brian Angelo Lee, Emergency Takings,
114 MICH. L. REV. 391, 403–04 (2015).
101. Exactly how to calculate the proper amount of extra compensation is a significant
question, challenging in ways that valuation questions in the law are commonly challenging.
Space does not permit thorough consideration of this question, but one natural possibility
would be to determine or stipulate what percentage above fair market value would have been
demanded by an owner in order to agree to relinquish the property voluntarily—absent
holding out strategically—and then to reduce that percentage by the extent to which the
project was public rather than private. For example, if a payment of 50% above fair market
value is what would have induced a voluntary transfer, and the project is determined to be
60% public and 40% private, then the awarded compensation would be 100% of fair market
value plus (40%)*(50%), for a total of 120% of fair market value. If the project was purely
public, then compensation would then simply be 100% of fair market value, since (0%)*(50%)
equals 0%, and thus zero bonus would be added to the property’s fair market value. In the
aftermath of Kelo, Connecticut enacted a less nuanced but easily administrable version of this
approach, requiring that all property taken by redevelopment agencies receive compensation
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B. Regulatory Takings
Considering the equitable dimension of takings compensation may
also help trim the thickets of regulatory takings doctrine. The jurisprudence and scholarship on regulatory takings are now vast, but
for purposes of illustrating the potential usefulness of an equitable
approach to just compensation, discussion of one landmark case will
be sufficient—Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.
At issue in Penn Central was a challenge to New York’s landmarks
preservation law, which prevented the Penn Central railroad company
from constructing a tall office tower above Grand Central Terminal
but granted Penn Central transferable development rights to mitigate the burden of not being able to build the desired addition.102 In
addressing this challenge, the Court explicitly declined to answer
whether the transferable development rights constituted “just compensation.”103 Instead, the Court concluded that the regulation was
not a taking, and thus there was no need for compensation at all.
However, the compensation issue did not disappear. It was merely
pushed into the shadows, and it implicitly became a basis for the
Court’s decision:
Stated baldly, appellants’ position appears to be that the only
means of ensuring that selected owners are not singled out to
endure financial hardship for no reason is to hold that any
restriction imposed on individual landmarks pursuant to the
New York City scheme is a “taking” requiring the payment of
“just compensation.” Agreement with this argument would, of
course, invalidate not just New York City’s law, but all comparable landmark legislation in the Nation. We find no merit in it.104

The Court’s assertion that deeming the law to be a taking requiring
payment of “just compensation” would “invalidate” landmark-preservation statutes implied that concerns about compensation were
equal to 125% of the taken property’s fair market value. Act of June 25, 2007, Pub. Act No. 07141, § 8, 2007 Conn. Acts 407, 421 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-129(a)(2)).
Rhode Island required compensation of at least 150% of fair market value for “property taken
for economic development purposes.” Rhode Island Home and Business Protection Act of 2008,
ch. 64.12, sec. 1, § 42-64.12-8, 2008 R.I. Pub. Laws 1080, 1082 (codified at R.I. Gen. Laws § 4264.12-8(a)).
102. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
103. Id. at 122–23.
104. Id. at 131.
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central to the Court’s decision, since merely finding that a regulation
had effected a taking would not by itself invalidate the regulation.
Takings become impermissible only if they are not for public use or
if just compensation is not paid, and there was no suggestion that
landmarks preservation laws were not for public use.105 The Court’s
reasoning seems ultimately to rest upon two tacit assumptions: first,
that “just compensation” meant “full” compensation; and, second,
that governments could not afford to pay full compensation for the
burdens imposed by landmark-preservation legislation.
These assumptions were plausible in light of both existing takings
doctrine, which requires full compensation for all takings, and the
limited budgets of state and local governments. New York City, in
particular, at this time was in especially dire fiscal straits.106
However, as a matter of logic, these assumptions are peculiar considerations for determining whether a taking has occurred. While
the government’s ability to pay compensation might seem relevant
to determining how much compensation to require, it is not obviously relevant to determining the nature of the loss that the government has imposed. How much money a city is capable of paying for
“taken” property seems irrelevant to determining whether the city
has in fact taken property, just as whether a trespass or theft has
occurred is independent of whether the alleged trespasser or thief
is wealthy enough to pay compensation for those acts.
Moreover, it is analytically incomplete to move, as the court’s discussion tacitly did, from the assumption that governments could not
afford to pay full compensation for the costs imposed by landmarkspreservation legislation to the conclusion that therefore they must not
be obligated to pay any compensation. An alternative, more natural
conclusion would have been that the inability to pay full compensation
105. The validity of the landmarks preservation law was uncontested. Id. at 129 (“[A]ppellants do not contest that New York City’s objective of preserving structures and areas with
special historic, architectural, or cultural significance is an entirely permissible governmental
goal. They also do not dispute that the restrictions imposed on its parcel are appropriate
means of securing the purposes of the New York City law.”).
106. The dissent in Penn Central acknowledged this fact explicitly. Id. at 152 (“The city of
New York is in a precarious financial state . . . .”) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). Just three years before this case was decided, New York City had sought a federal bailout. President Gerald Ford’s
refusal to grant a bailout prompted a classic New York tabloid headline: “Ford To City: Drop
Dead.” Ford to City: Drop Dead in 1975, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.nydaily
news.com/new-york/president-ford-announces-won-bailout-nyc-1975-article-1.2405985 (originally published by Frank Van Riper, Ford to City: Drop Dead, DAILY NEWS, Oct. 30, 1975).
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might have justified an obligation to pay only partial compensation.
While the established doctrinal assumption that “just compensation”
necessarily means “full compensation” obscured that possibility, recognizing the equitable dimension of takings compensation could have
brought it to light.
Compensation considerations played an additional peculiar role
in the Court’s reasoning. Following the lead of Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon, where a regulation’s producing (or not producing) an “average reciprocity of advantage” was a factor in determining whether
the regulation had created a taking, the Penn Central Court argued
that Grand Central Terminal’s owners’ having enjoyed benefits from
the regulation argued against the landmark law’s having effectuated a taking.107 Whether a regulation has provided benefits as well
as burdens, with the result that the regulation’s net burden is less
than it might otherwise have been, is obviously relevant for determining the amount of compensation that would be necessary to
make whole the loss created by that regulation. Less obvious, however,
is its relevance to determining whether any compensation is owed at
all. The assumption, in both Mahon and Penn Central, that whether
an owner has received some compensation illuminates whether the
government owes any compensation again involves an unmotivated
logical leap.
A more natural and plausible way to address the Court’s concerns
about non-monetary compensation received by the burdened owner,
and about the government’s ability to pay monetary compensation,
would have been to treat those concerns as questions about the
amount of compensation owed, rather than as questions about
whether compensation was owed at all. Such quantity questions, in
turn, would naturally have lent themselves to resolution by “balancing the equities” of the situation. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted
in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, “The qualities of mercy and practicality have
made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation
between the public interest and private needs as well as between
competing private claims.”108
107. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134–35
(“we cannot conclude that the owners of the Terminal have in no sense been benefited by the
Landmarks Law”).
108. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329–30 (1944). See also Case Note, Injunction.
Trespass to Land. Balance of Convenience, 33 YALE L.J. 205, 206 (1923) (“It is not always
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Thus freed to consider what amount of compensation would be
equitable, given the circumstances of the case, the Court could more
naturally have considered the dispute’s intuitively salient features:
the hardship to the public if the government had to pay a practically
infeasible amount of compensation, with the result that a unique
public landmark would be irretrievably lost at a time when trends
in architecture ensured that nothing similar would arise to replace
it; the hardship to the railroad if it was limited in its ability to seek
sources of revenue ancillary to its struggling railroad business; and
the fact that the landmark-preservation law required Penn Central
to continue to provide a benefit to others—in the form of maintaining Grand Central Terminal in its original Beaux Arts glory—rather
than discontinue inflicting a harm, contrary to American law’s typical
tendency to impose negative duties rather than positive duties.109
And the Court could then have compared the required amount of
compensation to the amount of compensation already received in the
form of transferable development rights.
Ultimately, with multiple demands on public coffers, and not
enough money to go around, a balancing of the equities between the
railroad and the city might have produced the same outcome as
actually occurred: the restriction was permitted and the railroad
received partial, non-monetary compensation in the form of transferable development rights. However, the reasoning that led to that
result might have been more straightforward and predictable, allowing the Court to use traditional equitable considerations to determine
how much compensation was owned, rather than offering a potentially
realized that in applying the doctrine of the ‘balance of convenience’ courts not only compare
the relative loss and gain to the parties in this litigation, but consider also the effect upon the
community at large.”).
109. In law-and-economics terminology, the landmark-preservation regulation required
continuing to provide a positive externality rather than requiring cessation of a negative
externality. Observations about the law’s imposing negative duties more often than positive
duties are well-established in the torts context. See, e.g., Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty
to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 219 (1908) (“There is no
distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more fundamental than that between
misfeasance and non-feasance, between active misconduct working positive injury to others
and passive [inaction], a failure to take positive steps to benefit others, or to protect them from
harm not created by any wrongful act of the defendant.”) Cf. KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY
88 (1825) (“equity never obliges any man, whether by acting or suffering, to increase the estate
of another.”). But see Kenneth S. Abraham & Leslie Kendrick, There’s No Such Thing as Affirmative Duty, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1649 (2019) (challenging the viability in tort law of the distinction
between misfeasance and non-feasance).
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arbitrary miscellany of considerations that somehow together pointed
toward a conclusion that no taking had occurred, and therefore that
zero compensation was required.110 An equitable approach might have
laid a more coherent and solid foundation for future development of
regulatory takings jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
If the foregoing discussion has been convincing, then eminent
domain doctrine can benefit from greater attention to the equitable
aspect of takings compensation for types of cases that do not fall
neatly within established takings doctrines’ binary categories. Compensation’s natural amenability to gradation can mitigate the all-ornothing nature of the other elements that determine whether an
exercise of government power qualifies as a valid taking. And equity
can provide established, principled guides in flexibly adjusting that
compensation to address novel or atypical categories of cases—
principles that can both reduce arbitrariness and direct the exercise
of this flexibility in directions productive of takings compensation’s
underlying purposes.

110. Henry Smith has argued that the proliferation of unhelpful multifactor balancing tests
in the law in general is, at least in part, a consequence of equity’s eclipse following the fusion
of law and equity. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 94, at 1137. Smith’s argument might recommend
a more equity-based approach to regulatory takings jurisprudence in general. This Paper’s
suggestion is narrower, suggesting only that the compensation aspect of regulatory takings
might benefit from an equitable approach. Whether equity might have potential benefits for
other aspects of regulatory takings law is a question that lies beyond the scope of this Paper.
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INTRODUCTION
The article below was written following the 17th Annual BrighamKanner Property Rights Conference, held virtually over a Zoom
conference by host William & Mary Law School, on October 2, 2020.
Four panelists presented on the subject “The Risk of Unjust Compensation”: Professor James W. Ely Jr.,1 Professor Brian Angelo Lee,2
Andrew Prince Brigham, Esq., and Jonathan D. Brightbill, Esq.3
The purpose of this Article is to bring the multifaceted insights of
the academy, the condemnee, and the condemnor into focus on a
theme raised in all four of the panel’s presentations: the significance
attached to the measure of compensation when property is taken
under the eminent domain power. This, the second of constitutional
protections, is seldom commented upon and is more typically assumed
to somehow materialize of its own accord when private property is
taken by a public or quasi-public condemning authority.4
In retrospect of our conference, I draw upon the historical background elucidated by Professor Ely, the contemporary ethical issues
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engaged upon by Professor Lee, and even the cautionary case studies presented by Mr. Brightbill, to argue that the most sure way of
avoiding the risk of unjust compensation is to require that the
condemning authority exercising the power of eminent domain pay
for the reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and costs incurred
by the property owner in determining the just measure of compensation for the taking.
My invitation is to not assume, once a court orders a taking, that
“just compensation” is somehow automatically served up as some
ready-made dish, but to step into the kitchen and really see what is
going on in the preparation of such a meal.
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I. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS: COMMENT ON
PROFESSOR ELY’S PRESENTATION
The 2006 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Prize recipient, Professor
James W. Ely, Jr., provided those of us attending the conference with
an adept review of historical jurisprudence on the “just compensation”
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norm in eminent domain. His commentary suggested that, from the
earliest formation of American jurisprudence, the trial process itself
has been considered integral in defining the scope of “just compensation” matched against the specific facts and circumstances of a particular case.
Professor Ely began with an overview of the common law and
natural law origins of the compensation requirement. He pointed
out that the principle was widely accepted in the American colonies
before being incorporated into the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights
or in respective state constitutions. According to Ely, the incorporation of the principle into the Fifth Amendment was not viewed so
much as an innovation, but more as a declaration of the government’s obligation to pay for what it takes as a fundamental right of
private ownership, rooted in the rationale of natural law theorists
who reasoned that individuals should only be expected to contribute
their “fair share” for public benefits and that anything beyond that
should be refunded as part of a “natural equity.” He further noted
this same rationale appeared in a number of early judicial opinions
where courts recognized that the compensation requirement prevented property owners from being singled out so as to disproportionally contribute to the public good simply because it was their
property that was being taken.
Regarding the measure of compensation, Professor Ely also cited to
a sort of glossary of historical terms used by lawmakers and commentators alike prior to the drafting of the Fifth Amendment. Terms such
as “true worth,” “due satisfaction,” “full compensation,” and “full indemnification and equivalent” were employed to provide a benchmark
for what the government was obligated to pay. But, because neither
the U.S. Constitution nor state constitutions that used the term “just
compensation” provided any greater specificity as to its meaning,
early judicial decisions were required to describe its measure more
fully or provide a framework to determine the appropriate amount
of compensation. These opinions reasoned through various issues:
(a) “Who was to determine the amount of compensation?”
(b) “What would be the standard under which to consider its
measure?”
(c)

“How might imputed benefits associated with a public
project be offset against any monetary award?”
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Professor Ely’s historical insights parallel my own experience as
a legal practitioner, wherein, in every takings case, property theory
meets practical application. It is not as though the amount of compensation can be determined either by reference to a manual or by use
of some ready-made formula. In considering the questions Ely traced
above in a number of judicial decisions, practitioners must necessarily consider how answers to these questions may differ among the
jurisdictions in which we practice.
For example, jurisdictions often differ as to who determines the
amount of compensation. Some jurisdictions have the measure of
compensation determined by jury, some by a judge, and still others
by appointed commission.5 As another example, jurisdictions may
differ as to the exclusivity of the fair market value standard; some
jurisdictions hold fast to fair market value as an exclusive standard
by which to measure compensation while other jurisdictions, although
considering fair market value to be a reliable tool of measurement,
allow fact-finders to consider more robust word pictures to set the
appropriate mark for the amount of compensation to be paid.6
5. For instance, in federal courts, Rule 71.1(h) of the Fed. R. Civ. Pro. allows a district
court judge the discretion to either appoint a commission or empanel a jury to determine the
measure of compensation.
6. In my jurisdiction, Florida, our state constitution requires the payment of “full compensation” and our standard jury instructions, as the measure of compensation is determined
by jury, explains to jurors that fair market value is not an exclusive standard of measure, but
a helpful tool. See, e.g., Behm v. Div. of Admin., Dep’t of Transp., 383 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1980);
Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Henry G. Du Pree Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 291 (Fla. 1959) (“Although fair market value is an important element in the compensation formula, it is not an
exclusive standard in this jurisdiction. Fair market value is merely a tool to assist us in
determining what is full or just compensation, within the purview of our constitutional
requirement”); Dade Cnty v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602, 604 (Fla. 1959) (“Full compensation is
guaranteed by the Constitution to those whose property is divested from them by eminent
domain. The theory and purpose of that guaranty is that the owner shall be made whole so
far as possible and practicable.”); see also THE FLORIDA BAR,FLORIDA EMINENT DOMAIN PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, §§ 11.3.C., 3.E. (10th ed. 2017). The standard Florida jury instructions place
emphasis on more organic concepts of indemnity, such as “making the owner whole” or
requiring “the owner to be put in as good a position financially as the owner would have been
if the property had not been taken,” than an exclusive standard of measure such as fair market
value. See id.
By contrast, the standard federal jury instructions define “just compensation” to mean fair
market value as an exclusive standard of measurement. See, e.g., Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 467 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1984) (“‘Just compensation,’ we have held, means in most
cases the fair market value of the property on the date it is appropriated.”); United States v.
564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (“The Court . . . has employed the concept of
fair market value to determine the condemnee’s loss. Under this standard, the owner is entitled to receive ‘what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller’ at the time of the
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Professor Ely also discussed the origin of reducing the measure of
compensation paid to the owner in partial taking cases through offsetting of benefits which may accrue to the owner resulting from the
project for which property is taken.7 In most jurisdictions, while general benefits are not offset, special benefits, which result from the
project and particularly enhance the value of a remainder property,
may be offset against severance damages but not against the value of
the property taken. Practitioners recognize that these limits on compensation present some rather complicated evidentiary challenges.
During a trial, testimony may differ on whether benefits are general
or special and often add multiple layers of disputed expert testimony
to opposing valuation opinions on the extent of offsets, if any.
Likewise, jurisdictions differ over what is commonly referred to
as “the scope of the project rule,” which holds that any increase in value
due to the anticipation of the project, as of the date of the formal
announcement of the project’s location, be excluded from the value
of the property taken.8 The scope of the project rule is a separate rule
of valuation in eminent domain from the offset of special benefits,
applying in both whole and partial takings, and typically manifesting itself as an exclusionary rule of evidence regarding sales which
are transacted in the neighborhood after the date of the project’s
announcement. Some jurisdictions, however, have soundly rejected
the scope of the project rule.9
In preparing a case for trial, practitioners must consider how
these valuation rules shape the evidence that may be considered by
the fact-finder in the valuation of the real estate in its “before” and
“after” conditions. Essentially, when applied to the measure of compensation, these rules seek to indemnify an owner for what is lost,
but consider as well what may be gained.
As Professor Ely’s comments suggested, the trial process and the
work of the attorney have always been required to mediate between
taking.”) (quoting United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943)); United States v. W.G.
Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970); see also 3A KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 154.30 (6th ed.).
7. See, e.g., Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897); State Road Dep’t v. Daniels, 170 So.
2d 846 (Fla. 1964).
8. See, e.g., Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368 (1924); United States v. Miller, 317
U.S. 369 (1942).
9. See, e.g., Sunday v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 57 So. 351 (Fla. 1912); Dep’t of Transp.,
State of Fla. v. Nalven, 455 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1984).
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an owner’s constitutional rights and the particular facts and circumstances of an owner’s case—a relationship which continues to this day.
II. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES: COMMENT ON
PROFESSOR LEE’S SCHOLARSHIP
Professor Brian Angelo Lee moved the purview of our panel from
a review of historical jurisprudence to an examination of more contemporary perspectives over the measure of compensation looking
from a vantage point of both law and economics.
Over the past decade, Professor Lee has written a number of articles
on the measure of compensation and how it is determined. Beginning
in 2013 with his article Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic
Premium in Eminent Domain,10 Lee addresses a number of academic
sources that suggest that owners are “undercompensated” by the fair
market value standard when market prices do not reflect an owner’s
own personal valuations of the owner’s own particular property. He
cites to both a number of respected legal scholars11 and also examples of emerging legislation from several states which propose to
rectify this perceived unfairness through adding fixed-percentage
bonuses above fair market value.
To illustrate, the bonus in some legislation was equal to a percentage point for each year the owner or owner’s family has continuously
occupied a home, business, or farm. Professor Lee questions this
solution by arguing that:
(a) fair market value, to some extent, already includes compensation for more subjective value than what has been
previously recognized;
10. Brian A. Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain,
113 COLUMBIA L. REV. 3 (2013).
11. At least three of these scholars are also past Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Prize
winners—see, e.g., The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 122 (2005) (statement of Thomas
W. Merrill, Charles Keller Beekman Professor, Columbia Law School) (“Another promising
reform idea would be to require . . . that when occupied homes, businesses or farms are taken,
the owner is entitled to a percentage bonus above fair market value, equal to one percentage
point for each year the owner has continuously occupied the property.”); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 183 (1985) (“Bonus values . . .
have a great deal to recommend them.”); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants,
Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 736–37 (1973) (suggesting use of market value damages plus “bonus award” to compensate nuisance claims).
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(b) what fair market value may leave uncompensated is not
altogether unfair; and
(c)

fixed-percentage bonuses, themselves, may undermine the
civic and moral equality of rich and poor property owners
by relatively overcompensating the rich while undercompensating the poor for losses which have equal value to rich
and poor alike.

Instead of a bonus based on a fixed-percentage of market value, Lee
suggests that a more just alternative would be to pay each displaced
resident of the taken property a fixed amount wherein the compensation paid is scaled to the number of persons affected, not to the
price of the property that they own.
In his 2015 article Emergency Takings,12 Professor Lee turns his
scholarly attention toward a perceived gap in the understanding of
takings laws with respect to the non-payment of compensation concerning “emergency takings.” In so doing, he identified three pivotal,
but commonly overlooked, distinctions from which he forged a general
theory of compensation for emergency takings. More specifically,
Lee examines the distinctions existing between:
(a) the different roles that the payment of compensation plays
in any given situation;
(b) the different types of perceived “necessity” for takings, of
which he distinguished two and discussed what is implied
under each type; and
(c)

the different amounts of compensation that might be owed.

Lee ultimately concludes that when the need to destroy property in
an emergency is accompanied by grave constraints on the ability to
pay compensation, then an obligation to pay “just compensation” for
the destroyed property remains, but the amount of that compensation
changes. Under such circumstances, he argues that justice requires
that a “partial compensation” be paid.
Finally, in his most recent article in 2019 titled Uncompensated
Takings: Insurance, Efficiency, and Relational Justice,13 Professor
12. Brian A. Lee, Emergency Takings, 114 MICH. LAW REV. 391 (2015).
13. Brian A. Lee, Uncompensated Takings: Insurance, Efficiency, and Relational Justice,
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Lee responds to legal scholars who suggest that government not be
obligated to compensate for taken property and, instead, that property owners be left to purchase insurance from private companies.
These scholars hold that substituting the latter compensation thesis
for the former would benefit society, reduce moral hazards, and promote greater efficiency in administrative costs. Lee explains that
such an “anti-compensation thesis” is a staple of an economic analysis of the law. He then delves into why, from his own analysis, the
anti-compensation thesis through insurance is false. More specifically, the thesis fails to recognize the important aspects of “relational justice” when property is taken under the eminent domain
power. In order to support his critique, Lee points to a fundamental
distinction between relationships within the contrasting contexts of
insurance and eminent domain. With insurance, the relationship is
between (a) the party suffering a loss and (b) the party paying to
alleviate such loss. With eminent domain, the relationships are
among (a) the property’s owner, (b) the community that took the property, and (c) the entity that pays compensation.
Professor Lee’s synthesis of the subject matter leads to his conclusion that considerations of economic efficiency offer no true reason
to disregard the requirements of “relational justice.” Emphasizing
the importance of “relational justice,” he finds the critical oversight
in the assumption that takings compensation can be reduced to some
form of government-provided insurance is that it loses sight of “the
intrinsic value that is inextricably tied to the legitimacy of the power
of eminent domain, a connection that springs from the particular relationships that exist between property owners and the rest of the
community.”14 In such manner, Lee effectively brings to light “the
indispensable role that compensation plays in making a transfer of
ownership be legitimate.”15
III. A PRACTITIONER’S PERSPECTIVE (ANDREW PRINCE BRIGHAM)
It is from the scholarship presented by Professor Lee that I, as a
legal practitioner, wish to pivot. I would like for us to take a step or
two further in considering the measure of “just compensation” paid
97 TEXAS L. REV. 935 (2019).
14. Id. at 989.
15. Id. at 940.
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when private property is taken under the exercise of the eminent
domain power. In my opinion, in order to satisfy concerns over “undercompensation” or address adequately “the risk of unjust compensation,” there is something even more vital than making an addition
or adjustment to the measure of compensation under the standard
of fair market value. So too, what I am about to suggest furthers the
concept that “relational justice,” or that which makes legitimate the
use of the eminent domain power, rests in part on how the public
perceives how justly it is that owners are compensated for a taking.
For myself, my thirty years of law practice has been primarily
devoted to representing owners in property rights cases. While I
cannot profess to know all in the world of real property theory, I
have seen my share of what goes on in the trenches where the issue
before the judicial branch is the measure of compensation as determined in the ad hoc workings of the particular facts and circumstances of a given case. My experience is somewhat peculiarly derived from a law practice in the jurisdiction of Florida, wherein the
state substantive measure of compensation includes having the condemnor pay for the owner’s reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees
and costs.
A. Stepping into the Kitchen
Professor Lee’s first article on Just Undercompensation: The
Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain16 referenced those who
suggest adding fixed-percentage bonuses above fair market value or
making some other adjustment to compensation as a remedy for
potential “undercompensation” when the taking involves a long-held
family home, business property, or farm. To this let me say, “Not so
fast.”17
My reservation over rectifying perceived unfairness in the compensation paid for a long-held family home, business property, or farm
16. See Lee, supra note 10.
17. While the phrase, “Not so fast . . .” has established its way into the Merriam-Webster
Dictionary as an informal idiom “to say that one disagrees with what someone has said or to
tell someone to stop or slow down,” it has become, of course, iconic to those of us who gravitate
on Saturday mornings in the fall toward ESPN’s College Gameday telecasts as the phrase is
used almost on weekly basis by long-time co-host analyst, Lee Corso. See not so fast,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/not%20so%20fast (last
visited Mar. 19, 2021).
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by adding fixed-percentage bonuses above fair market value springs
from my own well of practical experience as a trial practitioner.18
After representing both small and large property owners in case after
case, I have come to know that concerns over “undercompensation”
or the risk of “unjust compensation” in most eminent domain takings
does not involve some incremental percentage over what is ultimately
determined to be fair market value in a case. Opposing parties, the
condemnor and the property owner, simply do not agree on fair market
value. In a good number of cases, it is not just percentage differences
between competing valuation theories, but orders of magnitude.
This is particularly the case when the initial amount offered by
the government or other condemnor is inconceivably low. From there,
insult may be followed by greater injury if the condemnor also puts
forth the same figure at trial. In most cases, the difference between
appraisers is not within a few percentage points. It is between “night”
and “day” and, in some cases, between what is “right” and “wrong.”
It is this haplessly routine occurrence that, in my mind, has missed
scholarly attention.
Beyond the notion that eminent domain results in a taking without the owner’s consent, it is the risk of “undercompensation” or
“unjust compensation” that raises the equitable stakes of eminent
domain to an even higher level. Eminent domain deprives the private
property owner from being able to say, “No, thank you!” when receiving an inconceivably low offer from the condemnor. This significantly adds to the harshness associated with the eminent domain
power. Often, because of the extent of investment that most owners
have in their real estate, the risk of being “undercompensated”
transcends obvious monetary concerns and unfairly threatens the
core of an owner’s financial security and standing.
18. Briefly, before moving on, I wish to also comment on Professor Lee’s suggestion that,
instead of adding a fixed-percentage bonus paid to the property owner, the compensation paid
should be scaled instead to the number of persons affected, not to the price of the property in
which they have an ownership interest. The alternative Professor Lee suggests, driven by a
concern to compensate loss resulting from a taking for rich and poor alike, may be already
addressed, at least in my mind, by acquisition programs in federally funded projects which
require condemnors to pay relocation benefits to displaced persons under the Uniform
Relocation Assistance and Real Property Act (“URA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4601 et seq., 49 C.F.R. part
24. This, of course, is in addition to compensation paid to owners of the private property taken
and is a program that is based upon a non-adversarial administration of entitlements, paying
actual or estimated costs incurred to those displaced by condemnation when relocating or
establishing a replacement home or business location.
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Once again, Professor Lee’s scholarship is helpful to me as a practitioner because of his elucidating upon the important aspect of “relational justice” when property is taken under eminent domain. While
he is not the only member of the academy to delve into this theoretical
property concept, it is the central theme of his article Uncompensated
Takings: Insurance, Efficiency, and Relational Justice.19 I could not
agree more with Professor Lee that the legitimacy of the power of
eminent domain has an intrinsic value that depends, to a great
extent, on how well the relationships between property owners and
the rest of the community are respected or highly regarded. I would
add that the payment to the property owner of a measure of compensation that the community would agree is just and fair is part of
what gives legitimacy to the eminent domain power or satisfies the
social conscience which accepts that the public good, at times, is only
accomplished at some individual’s private expense. Rest assured,
this informing principle is alive and well in the courtroom. It is in
the air we breathe.
What if, then, the assumption that owners whose private properties are taken for public good receive a just or fair amount of
compensation isn’t true?
If not true, would this undermine the presumed legitimacy of
the government’s exercise of the eminent domain power?
Returning to my concern over the risk of “unjust compensation,”
let me home in on exactly what it is that I contend responds best or
counteracts such risk.
The condemnor should be required to pay for an owner’s
attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in the defense of eminent domain proceedings as part of the measure of compensation.
Presently, attorneys’ fees and costs are not customarily part of the
measure of compensation in federal takings unless specifically provided for in the enabling legislation that authorizes the use of the
eminent domain power. This is certainly the case in most direct condemnation cases wherein the condemnor is the federal government.20
19. See Lee, supra note 13.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1946).
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There are, however, a few exceptions within federal jurisprudence
where the owner’s attorneys’ fees and costs are recoverable. These
exceptions concern more particularized legislative schemes, such as
the Rails to Trails Act, 16 U.S.C.S. § 1241 et seq., where jurisdiction
is conferred through the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1491(a)(1), upon
the United States Federal Court of Claims to determine the measure
of compensation. In such instance, attorneys’ fees and costs are recoverable by the owner pursuant to the Uniform Relocation Assistance
and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (“URA”), 42 U.S.S.
4601 et seq. Still in other federal takings cases, the Equal Access to
Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 et seq., may have applicability.21
Even so, in most federal takings cases, because the owner’s attorneys’ fees and costs are either unrecoverable or subject to limitations
or uncertainties that make their prospect unattractive to private
legal counsel, except those who perhaps have more altruistic purpose,
it generally holds true that only owners with the economic means to
pay their own attorneys’ fees and costs or who possess more substantial property interests secure legal representation in federal takings
cases. Owners without economic wherewithal proceed in an unrepresented fashion and are typically forced to accept a compromise close
to the amount of the condemnor’s low offer because they are not
otherwise with the means to prepare their own valuation estimate
and defend their constitutional entitlement to compensation.
With respect to state jurisdictions, the law varies from state to
state. Presently, only twenty-one of fifty states have meaningful
constitutional or statutory provisions that allow owners to recover
attorneys’ fees and costs as part of the measure of compensation
that the condemnor must pay in direct condemnation cases.22
21. For the EAJA to apply, the owner must have a net worth not to exceed $2,000,000 and
must be a “prevailing party” (wherein the difference between the owner’s estimate of value and
the final amount is equal to or less than the difference between the condemnor’s estimate and
the final award) unless the court finds that the government’s position was “substantially justified” or “special circumstances makes an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(B).
Attorneys’ fees under EAJA, although based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and
quality of the services furnished, are also not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the
court determines that the cost of living or a special factor, such a limited availability of qualified
attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).
22. See William G. Blake, Fifty-State Survey—The Law of Eminent Domain, 2012 AM. BAR
ASS’N; see also Law and Policy Resource Guide—A Survey of Eminent Domain Law in Texas
and the Nation, 2016 TEXAS A&M UNIV. SCH. OF LAW. In review of respective state jurisdictions, these two sources, the former prepared by legal practitioners from each state in 2012,
and the latter, prepared by a group of dedicated law students in 2016, allow a starting point
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Of the twenty-one, a total of five states, Alaska, Idaho, Iowa,
Oklahoma, and Washington, require the condemnor to pay the
owner’s attorneys’ fees and costs when the final award exceeds the
condemnor’s pre-suit offer by 110%.23 Three, Nebraska, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming, require the condemnor to pay the owner’s attorneys’
fees and costs when the final award exceeds the condemnor’s presuit offer by 115%.24 Two, Arkansas and South Dakota, require the
condemnor to pay the owner’s attorneys’ fees and costs when the
final award exceeds the condemnor’s pre-suit offer by 120%.25 One,
Colorado, requires the condemnor to pay the owner’s attorneys’ fees
and costs when the final award exceeds the condemnor’s pre-suit
offer by 130%.26
Minnesota makes mandatory the payment of the owner’s attorneys’ fees and costs if the final award is in excess of 140% of the
condemnor’s pre-suit offer and discretionary if the final award is
between 120% and 140% of the condemnor’s pre-suit offer.27
South Carolina allows the owner to recover attorneys’ fees and
costs if the amount awarded by the court is as close to the highest
valuation of the property attested to at trial by the owner as it is to
the highest amount attested to at trial by the condemnor.28
Michigan and Utah allow the owner to recover attorneys’ fees and
costs if the compensation awarded exceeds the condemnor’s settlement
offer, but the additional amount awarded to the owner for attorneys’
fees and costs may not exceed one-third the difference between the
compensation awarded and the condemnor’s settlement offer.29
Louisiana and Montana allow the owner to recover attorneys’ fees
and costs if the amount awarded by the court exceeds the expropriating or condemning authority’s highest offer prior to trial.30
from which to update one’s consideration to current law.
23. See ALASKA R. CIV. PRO. 72(k); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-711A; IOWA CODE ANN. § 6B.33;
OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, §§ 11–12; WASH. REV. CODE § 8.25.075 and WASH. REV. CODE § 8.25.070(1)(b).
24. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-720 (Nebraska); WIS. STAT. § 32.28(1) (Wisconsin); WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1-26-502 to 1-26-817 (Wyoming).
25. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-15-103(b)(11)(A); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-35-33 (Arkansas).
26. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-122 (Colorado).
27. See MINN. STAT. § 117.031 (Minnesota).
28. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-11-3-(2)(b) (South Carolina).
29. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 213.66 (Michigan); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-B-6-509(7) and
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-B-6-509(8) (Utah).
30. See LA. REV. STAT. § 19:8 (Louisiana); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-30-305(2)–306 (Montana).
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Oregon allows the owner to recover attorneys’ fees and costs if the
amount awarded by the court exceeds the condemnor’s highest offer
prior to filing its condemnation suit.31
New York gives the court discretion to award attorneys’ fees and
costs to the owner if the compensation award is substantially in
excess of the amount of the condemnor’s proof at trial and where an
additional award to the condemnee is deemed necessary to achieve
just and adequate compensation.32
North Dakota also gives discretion to the court to award attorneys’
fees and costs to the owner in addition to the compensation awarded.33
Florida, more demonstrably than any other state jurisdiction, includes the owner’s attorneys’ costs as part of its constitutional
measure of “full compensation.”34 As such, whether or not the owner
prevails at trial, the owner is entitled to have all necessary and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs paid by the condemning authority.35
Florida, though, like many other states, has an offer of judgment provision in its rules of civil procedure that allows parties to shift the
burden of the costs incurred after rejection of the offer and a subsequent jury verdict which is at or below the amount of the offer.36
The roll call leaves off Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia,
and West Virginia.37 If having constitutional or statutory provisions
31. See OR. REV. STAT. § 35.346(7) and OR. REV. STAT.§ 35.300 (Oregon).
32. See N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 701 (New York).
33. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-35 and N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-32 (North Dakota).
34. See Dade Co. v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1950); §§ 73.092, 73.091 FLA. STAT.
(Florida).
35. Id.
36. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442; see also § 73.032 FLA. STAT.
37. See ALA. CODE, §§ 18-1A-3(12), 18-1A-95, and 18-1A-290; White v. State, 319 So.2d 247
(Ala. 1975), cert. den. 424 U.S. 954 (Alabama); State ex rel. Morrison v. Helm, 86 Ariz. 275,
345 P.2d 2020 (1959); State ex rel. Morrison v. Jay Six Cattle Co., 88 Ariz. 97, 353 P.2d 185
(1960) (Arizona); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1250.410 (California); C.G.S. § 48-17a, C.G.S.§§ 48-26
and 13a-76 (Connecticut); 29 DEL. C. § 9503 and 10 DEL. C. § 6111; 29 DEL. C. § 9504 (Delaware);
DeKalb County v. Trustees, B.P.O. Elks, 242 Ga. 707, 251 S.E.2d 243 (1978); DeKalb County
v. Daniels, 174 Ga. App. 319, 329 S.E. 2d 620 (1985); O.C.G.A. § 22-4-8 (Georgia); State v. Davis,
53 Haw. 582, 499 P.2d 663 (1972); HAW. REV. STAT. § 101-27 (Hawaii); 735 ILCS 30/10-5-110
(Illinois); IC 32-24-1-14 (Indiana); Gault v. Board of County Comm’rs, 208 Kan. 578, 493 P.2d
238 (1972); Schwartz v. Western Power & Gas Co., Inc., 208 Kan. 844, 494 P.2d 113 (1972);
City of Wichita v. B G Products, 252 Kan. 367, 855 P.2d 956 (1993) (Kansas); Department of
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that address the recovery of the owner’s attorneys’ fees and costs as
part of the measure of compensation outside of abandonment or inverse condemnation, these twenty-nine states either entirely exclude
recovery or only provide for recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs from
the condemnor to a de minimis extent.38
Similar to takings cases under federal law, owners without the
economic means to pay their own attorneys’ fees and costs or who do
not possess more substantial property interests forego legal representation. Private legal counsel typically seek attorneys’ fees equal to
one-third of the difference between the final award and the condemnor’s initial offer. This amount does not include appraisal fees
or fees of other expert witnesses. Without attorneys’ fees and costs
being included in the measure of compensation that the condemnor
is required to pay, such amounts are typically subtracted from the
final award of compensation disbursed to the owner. This explains
why owners without economic wherewithal and whose property interest is not of great substance can only marginally afford to retain
private legal counsel.
As more recent scholarship has found social justice lacking with
respect to blight removal, economic development condemnations, or
certain targeted highway projects, the discordant trumpet of injustice resounds most steadily in routine direct condemnations when
private property is taken from those situated within poor or minority communities where applicable jurisdictional law does not allow
for the recovery attorneys’ fees and costs as part of the measure of
Transportation, Bureau of Highways v. Knieriem, 707 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1986); KY. REV. STAT.
§ 416.560(3) (Kentucky); 23 M.R.S. § 154; 23 M.R.S. § 157 (Maine); ANN. CODE MD. § 12-106(a),
(b)(1)–(4), Real Property Article (Maryland); Griefen v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 390
Mass 674 (1983); (Massachusetts); Maples v. Miss. State Hwy. Comm’n, 617 So.2d 265 (Miss.
1993) (Mississippi); City of St. Louis v. Meintz, 107 Mo. 611, 18 S.W. 30 (1891); but see MO. REV.
STAT. §§ 523.256– 523.259 (Missouri); NEV. CONST. Art. I, § 22(4); but see NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 37.185 (Nevada); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 498-A-26-a; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 498-A-26-b (New
Hampshire); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 20:3-35, 20:3-24, 20:3-26(b) (New Jersey); N.M. STAT. § 42-2-1;
§ 42A-1-25(A)(1) (New Mexico); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 40A-8, 40A-13, 40A-56, 136-119, 136-121,
and 1-209.1 (North Carolina); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 163.51(B), 163.62 (Ohio); PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 710; PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 709 (Pennsylvania); Bibeault v. Hanover Insurance Co.,
417 A.2d 313 (R.I. 1980) (Rhode Island); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-16-106, 29-17-912; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-16-123 (Tennessee); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 21.019, 21.0195 (Texas); Raymond
v. Chittenden County Circumferential Highway, 158 Vt. 100 (1992); VT. STAT. tit. 19, § 514; VT.
STAT. tit. 19, § 512(b) (Vermont); VA. CODE §§ 25.1-249, 25.1-419, 25.1-245; VA. CODE §§ 8.01-187,
25.1-420 (Virginia); West Virginia Dep’t of Transp. v. Dodson Mobile Home Sales & Services,
Inc., 218 W. Va. 121, 624 S.E.2d 468 (2005); W. VA. CODE §§ 54-3-1-5 (West Virginia).
38. See sources cited supra note 37.
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compensation. Equal footing is not afforded to those who are unable
to contest the value placed upon their taken property or the damages estimated for their remaining property who so not have the
means to pay for their own lawyers and appraisers and whose case,
frankly, is not sufficiently attractive to private legal counsel to take
on the matter other than on a pro bono basis. Social justice amplifies the concern over “undercompensation,” because not only are
such owners forced to pay a disproportionate share of the burden
imposed for the public good than society at large but also because
these owners are already disadvantaged because of their belonging
to an impoverished economic, racial, or ethnic community.
For those truly concerned about unfairness in the measure of
compensation paid for private property taken under the power of
eminent domain, what merits consideration is how best to assure that
an owner is equipped to contend with the condemnor’s low estimate
of value. My invitation is not to look at the exercise of eminent
domain assuming that, once a court determines a taking, “just compensation” is automatically served, but to step into the kitchen and
really see what is going on in preparation of such a meal. This seems
to me to be the most compelling of arguments for inclusion of the
owner’s attorneys’ fees and costs as part of the measure of compensation paid for the taking of private property for public use or purpose.
It is because I have practiced law for my entire career in a jurisdiction that includes payment of an owner’s attorneys’ fees and costs
as part of the constitutional measure of compensation that makes
my thinking on this credible. Instead of just taking my word for it,
however, let me provide you as well with some experiential evidence
on the matter.
Because I have not seen any academic scholarship proposing what
I’ve stated above, I am, to use another kitchen analogy, seeking “to
stir the pot” on this subject matter. If you permit me, I’ll make a
proffer. I’ve selected two different case studies that I believe illustrate what is typically involved when representing private property
owners in eminent domain proceedings.
B. Case Study #1: Sabal Trail Natural Gas Pipeline
The first of my two case studies is current and, in fact, remains
ongoing in that a number of subject matters are still pending in
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appeals before the United States Eleventh Circuit. It involves the
use of eminent domain to acquire both temporary and permanent
easements for the Sabal Trail Natural Gas Pipeline.
Commencing in March 2016, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC
(“Sabal Trail”)39 filed 263 condemnation cases in federal courts for
a lineal corridor of some 247 miles through Florida needed to construct a thirty-six-inch diameter pipeline capable of transmitting up
to one billion cubic feet of natural gas a day. As a private licensee
pipeline company, Sabal Trail was authorized to use the eminent
domain power under the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”)40 and to file its
condemnation cases in either state or federal court.
Figure 1. Sabal Trail Natural Gas Pipeline Project41

39. Sabal Trail is a joint venture of Spectra Energy Partners, NextEra Energy, Inc., and
Duke Energy, which has now constructed an interstate pipeline to service electrical power
plants owned by Florida Power and Light (“FPL”) and Duke Energy of Florida (“DEF”). See
About Sabal Trail, SABAL TRAIL TRANSMISSION, https://www.sabaltrailtransmission.com/about/
(last visited Mar. 19, 2021). More recently, Enbridge, Inc., acquired Spectra Energy Partners.
See SPECTRA ENERGY, http://www.spectraenergy.com (“We are now Enbridge”) (Spectra Energy
alone, via its merger with Enbridge Inc., has an enterprise value of $126 billion.).
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z (2012).
41. Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit No. 1: Sabal Trail v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County
(Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-000178-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2018). Photo credit:
FPL, http://www.FPL.com (2019); SABAL TRAIL TRANSMISSION, http://www.sabaltrailtrans mis
sion.com (2013).
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Sabal Trail is only the fourth interstate natural gas pipeline system
in Florida. Over the past fifty years, at least in Florida, natural gas
pipeline companies consistently chose to file their condemnation
cases in state court because state law provided for “quick-taking”
authority while federal law, until recently, was uncertain on this
point.42 Beginning in 2004, federal courts began allowing pipeline
companies to file for “immediate possession” at the initial stage of
federal eminent domain proceedings.43 Because of this, Sabal Trail
filed all of its condemnation cases in the U.S. Northern and Middle
District Courts of Florida. As it happens, this became the first
instance in Florida that a lineal corridor project of this scope and
nature proceeded with eminent domain in federal, not state, courts.
In April and May 2016, following the precedent case of East
Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Sage,44 federal courts in both the U.S.
Northern and Middle Districts entered orders granting partial
summary judgment motions on the “right to take” and motions for
injunctive relief requesting “immediate possession” filed concurrently
with Sabal Trail’s complaints in all of Sabal Trail’s pending cases.45
Securing these rights of possession at the initial stage of litigation is
paramount to any condemning authority because it allows a project’s
construction to commence immediately. Once accomplished, however,
Sabal Trail, like other condemnors, is in position to slow burn its
litigation with property owners over the measure of compensation.
Notwithstanding, a year after initial proceedings began, the Sabal
Trail litigation took a significant turn in favor of the property owners.
In June 2017, federal courts in both the U.S. Northern and Middle
Districts entered orders holding that state substantive law, not
federal, would serve as the federal rule of decision for determining the
measure of compensation when private licensee companies exercised
the delegated use of the eminent domain power under the NGA.46
42. “Quick-taking” authority allows vesting of title at the initial stage of the state eminent
domain proceedings prior to payment of compensation which occurs at the final stage.
43. See East Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 828 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543
U.S. 978 (2004); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir. 2018).
44. 361 F.3d 808, 828 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 978 (2004).
45. See, e.g., Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. Real Estate, No. 1:16-CV-063-MW-GRJ,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192660 (N.D. Fla. May 23, 2016).
46. Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. Real Estate, No. 1:16-CV-063-MW-GRJ, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 99370, at *2 (N.D. Fla. June 27, 2017); Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 1.127
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These cases followed a prior precedent of the Fifth Circuit in Georgia
Power v. Sanders,47 which held that state law controls regarding
condemnation cases filed under the Federal Power Act (“FPA”).48 As
will be discussed later, the significance of the ruling is best understood
by recalling that under Florida’s substantive law the condemnor’s
payment of the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in defense of eminent
domain proceedings is part of its “full compensation” measure.

Figure 2. Sabal Trail Pipeline49

Acres of Land, No. 3:16-CV-263-J-20PDB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92003 (M.D. Fla. June 15,
2017).
47. 617 F.2d 1112, 1113 (5th Cir. 1980).
48. Because the creating and defining the scope of property interests, especially in real
property, is a quintessential area in which state law has historically provided the source of
pertinent authority, the courts found that principles of federalism inform the choice-of-law
analysis so as to favor state substantive law. Also, because the condemnor was a private
licensee company and not the federal government, there was neither the presence of a federal
policy or federal interest strong enough to dislodge the presumption of utilizing state substantive property law as the federal rule of decision.
49. Unless otherwise indicated, all photographs and figures in this Article are the
property of the author and the Brigham Property Rights Law Firm (on file at the Brigham
Property Rights Law Firm).
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Peering behind the curtain of the condemnor’s program of acquisition, truth be told, Sabal Trail was able to acquire easements from
1,248 of 1,582 property owners in Florida for its project through
voluntary acquisition without having to file eminent domain. Because of this, when arriving in federal court, Sabal Trail was not
silent about its success with “willing sellers” when filing its initial
pleadings in federal court. In an all too familiar sense, Sabal Trail
considered the 263 property owners who were made defendants in
its federal condemnation case to be “hold-outs” of sorts. Owing to the
fact that they did not consent to voluntary acquisitions, these owners were subjected to the exercise of eminent domain power.
• Why was it that these owners did not voluntarily consent to
Sabal Trail’s taking?
• Stated otherwise, were these owners irrationally standing in
the way of progress or, perhaps, completely unreasonable in
their expectations of what constitutes a just or fair measure
of compensation?
As I have previously commented,50 in nearly all pipeline easement
acquisitions, there is a substantial dispute as to the measure of compensation insofar as the issue of damages to the remainder property
is concerned—particularly when purported damages result from
proximity to the pipeline in and of itself, or based on market fear,
perception, or stigma.
Simply put, most in the pipeline industry maintain that, because
the pipeline’s infrastructure is located underground, severance damages of this kind or nature are extremely minimal or non-existent.
Their mantra, effectively, is: out of sight, out of mind. The industry
maintains that property owners are compensated sufficiently by
pipeline companies that only pay a percent of the fee value for the
land acquired within the right of way because there are no damages
to the remainder property based upon proximity to the pipeline.
50. Andrew P. Brigham, Natural Gas Pipeline Easements: An Overview of the Takings
Jurisprudence Associated with the Acquisition of a Lineal Corridor When the Condemnor Is
a Private Licensee of the Eminent Domain Power Under the Natural Gas Act, 8 BRIGHAMKANNER PROPERTY RIGHTS J. 121 (2019).
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Property owners, however, disagree. They contend that a pipeline
transmitting one billion cubic feet of natural gas a day just three to
four feet underground is a classic “Not-In-My-Backyard” (“NIMBY”)
use and that property encumbered with a natural gas pipeline easement is less valuable than property not so encumbered.
As part of my first case study, I am including some of the trial
exhibits depicting the subject property, the location of the permanent
and temporary easements taken by Sabal Trail, as well as photographs of the “before” and “after” conditions.51 These exhibits are representative of what is typically shown to the fact-finder at trial in the
condemnation of a lineal pipeline corridor through rural lands.
Figure 3. Sunderman Groves, Inc.

51. See Andrew P. Brigham, Michael F. Faherty & Dwight H. Merriam, How to Avoid
Problems and Persuade the Jury as to the Measure of Compensation (Natural Gas Pipeline
Takings in Federal Court: Compensation Pitfalls), AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Jan. 24–26, 2019
(PowerPoint presentation for ALI-CLE Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Course of Study).
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Figure 5. After Taking
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Figure 6. Lee Thomas Trust—Pipeline Taking

Figure 7. Ryan Thomas—Pipeline Taking
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Figure 8. Lee Thomas Trust/Ryan Thomas—Before Taking
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Figure 9. Lee Thomas Trust/Ryan Thomas—After Taking
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Of the 263 condemnation cases filed by Sabal Trail, my law firm
represented private property owners in 51 of those cases, most of
whom owned rural real estate.52 While representing property owners within the same project allows for certain economies of scale,
such economies are lost when any one particular case proceeds to
trial and then proceeds further on to an appeal. In such instance,
although common legal arguments or theories apply to representing
property owners collectively, one cannot lose sight of the specific
facts and circumstances associated with the case at bar. These must
be fully accounted for in the preparation of each individual owner’s
legal defense. For purposes of this case study, though, a more general overview of how these cases were resolved in sequence provides
an understanding of the condemnation process as a whole, with a
particular focus on the acquisition strategies or tactics used by the
condemning authority, which, in this instance, is a private, licensee
company that is authorized to use eminent domain under the NGA.
In pre-suit negotiations, Sabal Trail based all of its initial offers on
the valuation opinions of three independent-fee appraisers each of
whom had found there to be “zero damages” resulting from proximity
to the pipeline in and of itself or based on market fear, perception, or
stigma.53 In so doing, Sabal Trail advocated that the measure of compensation that the company need pay include only a percentage fee
payment for the land lying within its temporary and permanent easements and exclude payment of any severance damages to the owner’s
remaining land on either side of its taken lineal pipeline corridor.
All three appraisers retained by Sabal Trail prepared damage studies
using paired-sales analysis which purportedly supported their “zero
damages” opinions.
Digging deeper, discovery in the case revealed that, although two
of Sabal Trail’s appraisers had more than twenty years of experience
in natural gas pipeline projects, they had always prepared appraisals for the pipeline companies, always opining to “zero damages,”
never in their studies finding in the market data there to be any
negative perception of pipelines which affected the price negotiated
52. See BRIGHAM PROPERTY RIGHTS LAW FIRM PLLC, http://www.propertyrights.com (last
visited March 25, 2021) (Indeed, I am indebted to the efforts of all the attorneys in my law
firm—Chris C. Bucalo, Esq., E. Scott Copeland, Esq., Trevor S. Hutson, Esq., and Brett S.
Tensfeldt, Esq.).
53. Doc. 280 Declaration at 20–21, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres in Levy
County, Fla. (Lee Thomas Trust), No. 1:16-CV-093-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2021).
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between willing buyers and willing sellers. Indeed, it seemed that, in
all of their verifications, these appraisers never found a single person
who said anything negative about natural gas pipelines. Sabal Trail’s
third appraiser had a different story. Although having little experience with natural gas pipelines, he had past experience with petroleum pipelines. He, though, admitted that he would commence his
work in these other pipeline projects on a “first come, first served”
basis as between working for the condemnor or for property owners.
Upon further investigation, his experience showed that his estimate
of damages was almost negligible when retained by a condemnor pipeline company and quite substantial when retained by a condemnee
private property owner.54
In all, Sabal Trail paid its three appraisers an extraordinary
amount of over $8.3 million for their appraisal services for its project.55 Notwithstanding this extraordinary expense for appraisal
services, in the view of opposing counsel, all three of Sabal Trail’s
appraisers had one thing in common: flawed studies. Upon investigation and research, it seemed quite apparent that the quality of the
data was so poor that their appraisal conclusions concerning severance damages lacked credibility—so much so that it was almost
inconceivable that a jury would give such testimony any weight in
determining the measure of compensation.56
Yet, any owner opposing the “zero-damages” estimate was required
to run the gauntlet of litigation, starting with prolonged discovery
and motion practice prior to trial. Only if the private property owner
can outlast a condemning authority with unlimited resources during
these stages of the litigation can the owner finally proceed to a jury
trial and have a level playing field with the condemnor. This, then,
54. Id.
55. An opinion of “zero damages” allows the private licensee condemnor to start at the
lowest point conceivable in each and every case. At the start of negotiations and, in most
cases, continuing on to trial, these pipeline companies only offer to pay a percent of fee value
for the encumbered area within their permanent and temporary easements, leaving out entirely
any severance damages to the remainder. It is a pervasive and perpetual “industry bias”
which occurs in almost every pipeline condemnation case across the nation. It is the billiondollar private energy company using eminent domain against small and large private property
owners alike and basically saying, “just you go ahead and try to stop us.”
56. As a trial practitioner, there is a certain amount of skill and experience one needs to
acquire so as to accurately size up the credibility, or believability, of the evidence supporting
an expert valuation opinion. However, if the supporting predicate is deemed to be “incredible”
or “unbelievable,” the next step is to ask by what means you can expose it for what it is or
what it lacks.
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is why the risk of “unjust compensation” is felt most by property
owners in the peril of just “getting there” and making it to a trial.
Accordingly, one is able to see why the prior ruling on the controlling law issue was so significant to the property owners. Specifically,
the order of Florida’s district court held that “[b]ecause state substantive law governs the compensation measure in eminent domain
condemnation proceedings brought by private parties against private
property owners, Florida’s ‘full compensation’ measure governs here.”57
(These district court opinions are well worth reading regarding the
basis of the judicial decision on controlling law.) Consequently, as
part of the constitutional measure under the state substantive law of
Florida, the district courts ruled that Sabal Trail, as a private licensee
condemning authority, was required to pay for the attorneys’ fees
and costs incurred by each of the respective private property owners.58
As a result, the owners had both equal footing with Sabal Trail and
staying power to defend their case.
Even so, it was over a little over a year after the district courts
granted Sabal Trail “immediate possession” and following both discovery and exchange of appraisal reports that lawyers from my firm
attended court-ordered mediations in each of the 51 cases. Settlements were hard to come by. Only 11 of the 51 cases were resolved
in confidential mediated settlements.59 Another 5 cases were resolved
after continued negotiations in the several months which followed.
The balance of 35 cases trudged along in litigation, the wheels of justice “turning slowly but grinding exceedingly fine.”60 For most owners, except those with more considerable means, there would have
been no way to stay in the fight over the measure of compensation
unless the condemning authority was obligated to pay the owner’s
attorneys’ fees and costs.
Following impasse at mediation, Sabal Trail filed Daubert motions and a considerable array of additional motions in limine in
57. See Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. Real Estate, No. 1:16-CV-063-MW-GRJ, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99370, at *20 (N.D. Fla. June 27, 2017).
58. Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602, 604 (Fla. 1950); Joseph B. Doerr Trust v.
Cent. Fla. Expressway Auth., 177 So. 3d 1209, 1216–17 (Fla. 2015).
59. By requiring the terms of settlement to remain, the condemnor, of course, is still able
to track results, but leaves a trail without any blazes for other condemnees to follow. It is only
those cases that proceed to trial where the factual details are subject to later public scrutiny
or examination.
60. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE, Issue One (March 1852).
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each of the remaining cases. Both U.S. Northern and Middle District
Courts considered the parties’ briefing and oral arguments on all of
these motions, made rulings, and set cases for separate jury trials.
Such litigation consumed an additional two years before trial.
During this same time, Sabal Trail successfully completed construction of its pipeline and began operations in June 2017.
Consistent with the rulings in both the U.S. Northern and Middle
District Courts, the property owners’ appraiser amended previously
exchanged appraisal reports in all 35 remaining cases to comply
with various rulings on admissible evidence. With the completion of
motion practice, the cases were, at long last, ready for trial. In 2018,
3 cases of the remaining 35 cases proceeded to two jury trials, one
in the U.S. Northern District and the other in the U.S. Middle
District.61 A summary of the jury trial outcomes from the Sabal
Trail Natural Gas Pipeline Project appears below:
Sabal Trail Natural Gas Pipeline: Jury Trial Outcomes

61. See Jury Panel Rejects Sabal Trial Transmission’s Zero Damages, CISION PRWEB
(Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.prweb.com/releases/jury_panel_rejects_sabal_trail_transmissions
_zero_damages/prweb15924440.htm; Jury Sides with Property Owners in Eminent Domain
Suit with Sabal Trail Pipeline, CISION PRWEB (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.prweb.com/re
leases/2018/03/prweb15330348.htm.
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In each of the above cases, the amount in controversy was driven
by Sabal Trail’s appraisers nailing the issue of severance damages to
the floor by having an opinion of “zero damages” resulting from proximity to the pipeline in and of itself or based on market fear, perception,
or stigma.62
Now armed with the jury verdicts in 3 cases, the parties attended
court-ordered settlement conferences before U.S. Magistrate judges in
each of the 32 cases waiting for trial throughout 2018 and 2019. The
parties were able to resolve another 30 cases in this fashion.63 However, these conferences also proceeded in a slow march, case by case,
one at a time. Of the final 2 cases that were not resolved in settlement conferences, Sabal Trail unilaterally filed stipulations to accept the owner’s appraiser’s estimate of value shortly before the
start of trial.64
Parenthetically, the controlling law issue has been the subject of
5 separate appeals taken up by Sabal Trail before the U.S. Eleventh
Circuit. My law firm, together with another law firm respected for
its federal appellate practice,65 represented the private property
owners in all 5 appeals.
Earlier this year, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the verdicts and
final judgments entered in all 3 cases which proceeded in the two
jury trials, but dismissed all 5 appeals relating to the controlling law
issue concerning whether state or federal substantive law controls
the determination of the measure of compensation and the entitlement to attorneys’ fees and costs because, without the district courts
determining the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs, the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction.66
62. See Brigham, supra note 50. A full description of the competing valuation theories
together with a summary of the testimony and evidence presented at trial was the subject of
a previous article in Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Journal.
63. By stipulation, the terms of settlement in each of these settled cases remain
confidential with two of the cases being resolved without waiver of Sabal Trail’s right to
appeal the issues relating to entitlement or amount of attorneys’ fees and costs.
64. Sabal Trail, however, retained the right to appeal the issues relating to entitlement
or amount of attorneys’ fees and costs in these cases as well.
65. See TRUE NORTH LAW, http://truenorthlawgroup.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2021)
(federal appellate practitioners Mark F. (“Thor”) Hearne and Stephen S. Davis).
66. See Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, Fla. (Thomas
Trust) and Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 2.468 Acres of Land in Levy County, Fla. (Ryan
Thomas), 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 24348 (11th Cir. August 3, 2020); see also Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), 947 F.3d 1362 (11th Cir. 2020).
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The 5 cases are yet pending on remand before Florida’s district
courts for a determination of the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs
incurred at both the district trial court and circuit appellate court
levels. It is anticipated that Sabal Trail will file an appeal or appeals on the controlling law issue,67 once having final orders on both
the entitlement and amount of attorneys’ fees and costs.
The chief point I wish to make regarding my first case study is this:
When determining the measure of compensation for the
taking of private property for public use through an
adversarial system of justice, the most practical and
effective means by which to attenuate the risk of unjust
compensation is to require that the condemnor pay the
attorneys’ fees and costs of the private property owner.
While it is by no means perfect or without error, the adversarial
system of justice—particularly in jury trial proceedings—is the most
effectual “check and balance” on the failings in our human nature
that beset all human endeavor, even the judicial system itself. Yet,
if private property owners are neither represented by legal counsel
nor supplied with the reasonable and necessary means to retain
expert witnesses, the risk of unjust compensation is, for all practical
purposes, without meaningful “check or balance.”
Consider these questions which my first case study raises:
• What comes of authorizing a billion-dollar private licensee
company to exercise the eminent domain power where its
decision-making is understandably motivated primarily by
seeking its own profit as a private company which is far removed from the principal of social contract that exists between
the government and those who are governed?
• How else could it have been that the private property owners
whose property was taken for the new pipeline would have
been able to obtain a just or fair measure of compensation?
67. Significantly, during Sabal Trail’s appeals to the Eleventh Circuit, the Third Circuit
has now held that state law would supply the federal rule as to the measure of compensation
under the NGA in its decision in Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., LLC v. Permanent Easement
for 7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d 237 at 241 (3d Cir. 2019).
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• What means would these property owners have to recognize
the mixed questions of law and fact upon which the measure
of compensation is grounded if not represented by legal counsel
and reimbursed for the reasonable and necessary costs incurred
in retaining expert witnesses?
Far from hypothetical, the 51 cases I have described all concern real
people owning real property. Nothing is made up. In at least three instances, cases proceeded to jury trials wherein the court had to determine what was admissible evidence prior to the parties presenting
testimony and evidence for the jurors to consider and deliberate upon
to reach their collective determination of the measure of compensation.
Jury verdicts were rendered. Final judgments were entered, appealed, and affirmed. Sabal Trail’s initial offers of $12,000, $6,800,
and $56,800, respectively, are held for comparison to corresponding
jury verdicts of $861,254, $463,469, and $309,500.
Again, considering all that has been said, the real crucible was the
“getting there” which required the private owners to run through the
gauntlet of litigation before being able to finally present their valuation cases to jurors who decisively rejected Sabal Trail’s contention
of “zero damages.” As indicated before, stepping into the kitchen,
one is able to see exactly how the meal was made and what came of
it once served at the table.
• But what if the state substantive law of Florida had not
provided these private property owners with an “equal footing”
to contest the unjust estimate of compensation pressed upon
them by the pipeline company?
• What if the federal courts had not ruled that the owners’ attorneys’ fees and costs would be paid by Sabal Trail?
(Answer: Forced taking and forced (unjust) compensation.)
In representing owners over the past five years in these Sabal
Trail cases, I am once more convinced that requiring the condemning authority exercising the power of eminent domain to pay for the
reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by the
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property owner makes all the difference. Without same being included in the measure of compensation, these owners would not
have been able to stand against the private licensee condemnor and,
because of that, would have been forced to accept an amount less than
the full and just measure of compensation.
C. Case Study #2: Wonderwood Connector Project
The second of my case studies happened some time ago but examples a frequently occurring fact pattern when eminent domain is
used in road widening projects. It involves a road expansion project
which connected and widened several neighborhood local roads to
create a new evacuation route between communities located on
Florida’s Atlantic Coast, including the Mayport Naval Station, and
Interstate 95.
In 2006 and 2007, my law firm and I represented more than 20
single-family homeowners in partial takings cases for the Wonderwood
Connector Project in Jacksonville, Florida. Many of the homes were
located on beautifully canopied Ft. Caroline Road, a 2-lane road situated along the St. Johns River, which prior to the project was voted
the third prettiest street in Jacksonville.
The Jacksonville Transportation Authority (“JTA”) took the homeowners’ front yards to construct a new 4-lane, major arterial roadway.
The project’s construction completely removed the canopy trees on
either side of the roadway and resulted in a change of grade in the
new road by as much as 8 feet.68
JTA’s perception of value was driven to a large extent by JTA’s
mistaken legal interpretation over what is commonly known as “the
general rule of severance damages.” The rule is prevalent in federal
and the majority of state jurisdictions. It holds that an owner is
generally entitled to such damages to the remainder as are attributable to the use or activity on the land which is taken from the individual owner and not entitled to such consequential damages from
activity occurring on land which is taken from others.69 However,
68. See Order Taxing Costs at 1–6, Jacksonville Transp. Auth. v. McEldowney et al., Case
No. 02-02083-CA (4th Judicial Circuit, Fla. Dec. 28, 2007).
69. Lee County v. Exchange Nat’l Bank, 417 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), review denied,
426 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1983) (applying the general rule of severance damages).
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the rule is subject to a frequent exception, illustrated best by takings
for road widening projects, which authorizes an award for damages
to the remainder “where the use of the land taken constitutes an
integral and inseparable part of a single use to which the land taken
and other adjoining land is put.”70
JTA’s initial offers were only a few thousand dollars in damages
for the taking each owner’s front yard. The offers recognized little
or no severance damages to the residential homes. After all, JTA was
only seeking to purchase the front yard, and not the home, so a few
thousand dollars to JTA seemed to be a fair price.71
The owners, however, considered the impact of expanding the road,
removing the tree canopy, and elevating all road structure 8 feet
above existing grade to completely change the character of the neighborhood. For the owners, the thought of going out to get the daily
mail and seeing a 4-lane highway instead of the majestic oaks was
devastating.72 More than that, what would that do to the value of
their entire residential property? And, worst of all, none of the owners
could say, “No, thank you!”
Practically speaking, if applying the general rule, JTA’s offers only
compensated for the damages attributable to the use of the permanent drainage easement for a lineal trench in the home’s front yard
running parallel to the newly expanded road facility. By contrast, if
applying the exception, the homeowner is entitled to damages
attributable to the single use of the project, which includes all of its
component parts: the expansion from two to four lanes, the substantial change in grade to 8 feet above the elevation of adjoining land,
and the aesthetic loss related to the removal of the tree canopy on
either side of the roadway. Instead of the appraiser solely considering the loss of use of a small portion of the front yard, the appraiser
considers the entire change of character in the neighborhood, recognizing that while the home itself hasn’t moved, everything about its
location has changed.
70. Id. at 169–271; see also Taylor v. State, 701 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2d 1997) (applying the
exception to the general rule of severance damages).
71. See Order Taxing Costs, supra note 68, at 1–6.
72. See Andrew P. Brigham & J. “Jack” Sperber, Identifying the Key Differences in Your
Case, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Jan. 26–27, 2012 (PowerPoint Presentation, ALI–ABA
Condemnation 101 Course of Study).
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Without legal counsel advocating for the homeowners, who would
know or appreciate the significant difference in compensation
between the rule and the exception when receiving the government’s initial offer?
Once again, as part of my second case study, I am including some
of the trial exhibits depicting the subject property, the area of taking, as well as photographs of the “before” and “after” conditions.
Photographs, such as these, often provide the fact-finder the most
clear understanding of what is going on with respect to the exercise
of eminent domain.
Figure 10. Wonderwood Connector73

73. Wonderwood Corridor Project Map/Images attributed to the Jacksonville Transportation
Authority (“JTA”); see also JACKSONVILLE TRANSP. AUTH. (2007), http://www.jtafla.com.
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Figure 11. Fort Caroline Road—Before Taking
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Figure 12. Wonderwood Connector—After Taking
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Figure 14. Glaser—After Taking

389

390

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:351

Because homeowners were not able to successfully settle with
JTA, the dispute over fair market value “before” and “after” the taking
had to be decided by jury trials so the storyline continues.
Before trial, JTA retained a second appraiser and updated its appraisal estimate so as to value the measure of compensation applying the exception instead of the general rule. While nearly tripling
its initial offers, JTA’s appraisals were still flawed in their analysis
of the market data. JTA’s appraiser used a paired-sales analysis of
impacted and non-impacted sale comparisons from which he estimated severance damages. In some instances, the appraiser utilized
pairings with impacted properties which he considered to be “after”
sales because the transaction occurred subsequent to the seller
receiving compensation from JTA and where the seller and buyer
had some knowledge of the project and the taking because of receiving JTA’s plans. However, such knowledge was limited, because the
sale occurred before construction actually commenced and before the
project was actually completed to see the removal of the tree-canopy
and the increased elevation of the road grade.
It was only in the context of a jury trial where the homeowners’
appraiser could explain that he, too, utilized a paired-sales analysis,
but that his impacted properties were true “after” sales, located upon
earlier phases of the project, where construction was already completed at the time of transaction and the new road infrastructure
was in place. He characterized JTA’s impacted properties as neither
being true “before” nor “after” sales, but just kind of somewhere “in
between.” While construction plans may have been available, true
knowledge of the impacts of the project awaited its actual completed
construction. The jury was persuaded that such was the case and
awarded damages recognizing a loss in both the residential land and
improvements reflecting severance damages between 25% to 50% of
homes value which ranged in value between $180,000 to $280,000
before the taking. After the project was completed, most of the homes
along the new road transitioned from owner-occupied to rentals.
A summary of the jury trial outcomes from the Wonderwood
Connector Project appears on the following page.
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JTA Wonderwood Connector Project: Jury Trial Outcomes

Considering all of the foregoing, my case study concludes with the
following questions:
• Again, without legal counsel advocating for the homeowners,
who would know or appreciate the significant difference in compensation when receiving the government’s updated appraisals?
• If the takings for this project had occurred in a jurisdiction
outside of Florida, one in which attorneys’ fees and costs were
not included in the measure of compensation, would these
homeowners have retained legal counsel upon the initial offer
of the government?
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• Indeed, in jurisdictions that do not include the award of attorneys’ fees and costs as part of the measure of compensation,
is it more likely that such private property owners are undercompensated, perhaps, even without their ever knowing it?
IV. CONSIDERING COUNTEREXAMPLES: COMMENT ON
JONATHAN BRIGHTBILL’S PRESENTATION
Jonathan D. Brightbill completed our panel discussion in fine
fashion. If my presentation was at all compelling, his presentation
counterpunched with a more cautionary narrative. In response to
our topic of the potential “unjust compensation,” he brought to the
forefront two examples of cases involving the U.S. Department of
Justice that show, in some instances, it is the government that needs
protection against, perhaps, an overreaching party.
As a practitioner of some tenure, I readily affirm that the scales
of “relational justice” require both condemnor and condemnee to strike
the balance in their opposing contentions over the measure of compensation. There is evil in either extreme, whether of the government
lowballing or the property owner overreaching. The barometric pressure that corresponds to whether the exercise of the eminent domain
power is, indeed, legitimate may crush an extreme position taken by
either party. I can tell you that the weight of such air increases all
the more if such positions are brought into the courtroom.
Notwithstanding the above, I believe Mr. Brightbill’s two examples continue to afford me the opportunity to emphasize what I have
said about including the owner’s attorneys’ fees and costs in the
measure of compensation as a means to resolve concern over potential “undercompensation” or the risk of “unjust compensation.”
A. Case Study #1: Flight 93 National Memorial
Mr. Brightbill presented on the United States’ taking of a reclaimed
strip mine in Pennsylvania to be part of the Flight 93 National
Memorial following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.74
74. United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34416, at *2 (Order on
Evidentiary Motions) and 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40307, at *22 (Order Adopting Report of
Commission).
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The Flight 93 National Memorial is a stirring memorial to ordinary
citizens who bravely fought against terrorist hijackers who overtook
United Airlines Flight 93.
Figure 15. Flight 93 National Memorial75

The memorial itself is a 400-acre bowl-shaped area with 1,800 acres
surrounding it as a buffer.76 The original six acres that included the
crash site were privately donated.77 Much of the land thereafter was
acquired privately through the Families of Flight 93 organization
75. Photographs below are attributed in the order in which they appear as follows: Photo
Gallery, FRIENDS OF FLIGHT 93 NAT’L MEM’L, https://www.flight93friends.org/#/gallery/flight
-93-national-memorial (last visited Sept. 10, 2021); Flight 93 National Memorial: Flight Path
Walkway and Main Walls of the Visitor Center, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/media
/photo/gallery-item.htm?pg=4001156&id=D220FC95-155D-451F-67B560669C072F36&gid
=9BFED77A-155D-451F-67F13F033F550534 (last visited Sept. 20, 2021).
76. See Flight 93 National Memorial: Design Competition, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Flight_93_National_Memorial#cite_ref-phl-20060910_13-0 (last visited Sept. 10, 2021).
77. See Amy Worden, Flight 93 memorial gets momentum; The purchase of land near
Shanksville, Pa., began with “a first small step” of three acres, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept.10, 2006.
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from 2006 to 2008.78 Approximately 1,000 acres of the 2,200 is held
by others but protected through private partnership agreements.79
The United States filed a complaint in 2009 for the condemnation
of the fee simple estate in the one remaining 275.81-acre parcel owned
by Svonavec, Inc., whose principals included the family’s spokesman
Michael Svonavec.80
Local and national news media reported on the acquisition process from its beginning.81 Apparently, Mr. Svonavec, who operated
a coal mining and rock quarry operation on a larger parcel of which
the 275.82 acres was a part, felt pressure from the court of public
opinion with respect to the acquisition of the property, which had been
owned by his family since 1961 and upon which he operated the family’s business.82 His brother, Patrick Svonavec, represented the family as one of its lawyers.83 From the beginning, it was reported that
the Svonavecs informed the Families of Flight 93 that they would
only negotiate with the National Park Service.84
The reported decisions of the Pennsylvania District Court provides insight into how the measure of compensation paid to the
Svonavec family was determined.85 The appraiser retained by the
United States determined the highest and best use of the property
to be for a variety of uses, such as open space for cropland, grazing,
hunting and recreation, farmettes, and large-tract home sites.86 While
considering a private memorial among the uses to which the property

78. See Flight 93 National Memorial: Design Competition, supra note 76.
79. See NAT’L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, FLIGHT 93 MEMORIAL FINAL GENERAL
MANAGEMENT PLAN/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (June 2007); see also FRIENDS OF
FLIGHT 93 NAT’L MEM’L, https://www.flight93friends.org (last visited Sept. 10, 2021); see also
State Game Lands 93, THE CONSERVATION FUND, https://www.conservationfund.org/projects
/state-game-lands-93 (last visited Sept. 10, 2021).
80. United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40307, at *1–2 (Order
Adopting Report of Commission).
81. See, e.g., Kirk Swauger, ‘Difficult’ week for Flight 93 landowner, THE TRIBUNE-DEMOCRAT (June 9, 2007), https://www.tribdem.com/news/local_news/difficult-week-for-flight-93
-land =owner/article_7810e2a3-02eb-5707-a7cf-6fef996e8d77.html.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34416, at *9–10 (Order
on Evidentiary Motions).
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could be put, he concluded that there was no support for such use
being financially feasible.87 His estimate of value was $600,000.88
The valuation expert retained by the Svonavec family, a nationally
renowned real estate appraiser and expert witness, determined the
highest and best use to be a private memorial and related visitor
center.89 To support his conclusion, he studied revenues generated
at 20 locations around the world, including Gettysburg, the Johnstown
Flood Museum, and the site of the 1995 domestic-terrorist bombing
at an Oklahoma City federal building.90 Other sites included Memphis’s Graceland; and the National Civil Rights Museum, the site of
Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination; the Dallas Book Depository,
from where the shot that killed President Kennedy in 1963 is said
to have been fired; the USS Arizona at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; and
Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum in Japan.91 Apparently to tie
value back to the local real estate market, the appraiser also considered sales of a number of large parcels of land across Pennsylvania
intended to house shopping centers, a hospital, green space, and a
landfill.92 All sold for amounts comparable to $1.94 per square foot.93
His estimate of value was $23 million.94
In pretrial rulings, the district court found that the opposing
Daubert criticisms against the appraisal opinions of both experts went
to the weight, not the admissibility, of their testimony.95 The highest
and best uses considered by the United States’ appraiser were not
found to be speculative simply because he did not agree with the
Svonavec family’s appraiser or considered use as a private memorial
to not be financially feasible.96 Likewise, the highest and best use as
a private memorial and visitors’ center opined by the Svonavec family’s appraiser was found not to be speculative as well.97 Essentially,
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at *15–*122 (Order on Evidentiary Motions).
90. See Jason Cato, Owner of property where Flight 93 crashed sues government over land
value, THE TRIBUNE-DEMOCRAT (Oct. 8, 2013), https://archive.triblive.com/news/owner-of
-property-where-flight-93-crashed-sues-government-over-land-value/.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34416, at *9–10
(Order on Evidentiary Motions).
95. Id. at *14–15, *19–20.
96. Id.
97. Id.

396

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:351

the district court allowed both the government and the property owner
to have their day and make their respective case to the fact-finder.
The case was tried before an appointed three-member commission
as the fact-finder but was administered over by the district judge with
respect to all evidentiary rulings.98 The commission determined that
just compensation for the fee simple estate of the 275.81 acres, including oil and gas rights and eight acres of coal, to be $1,535,000. In
addressing the objections of the parties following publication of the
commission’s report, the district court found that the commission had
considered a museum/visitor’s center as a potential use, but rejected
it because, unlike a private memorial only, there was not sufficient
evidence presented to conclude the use of a museum/visitor’s center
was financially feasible.99 The commission found that credible evidence
was lacking to show and evaluate the costs, expenses, and risks associated with constructing and operating a private museum/visitor’s
center on the site.100
The district judge affirmed rulings made during the proceedings
with respect to excluding admission of the National Park Service’s
projected annual visitation number of 230,000 under application of
the “scope of the project rule.”101 Such a projection was not generic to
the market but was projected solely for a fully developed public
museum and visitor’s center to be operated by the National Park
Service.102 The district judge also found the owner’s reliance on
United States v. 6.45 Acres of Land (“the Gettysburg Tower case”),103
to be misplaced because the private memorial in that case was already
developed with a privately owned and operated 307-foot observation
tower, gift shop, restaurant and parking lot.104
In determining the measure of compensation, the commission did,
in fact, base its valuation of the property considering its highest and
best use to be a private, not public, memorial applying a scaleddown income approach.105 In this sense, the commission rejected the
98. United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40307, n.2 at *17 (Order
Adopting Report of Commission).
99. Id. at *7–15.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 409 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2005).
104. United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40307 at *7–15, 17
(Order Adopting Report of Commission).
105. Id.
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valuation theories of both parties in their original form.106 The
commission did not limit its consideration to only the highest and
best uses testified to by the United States’ appraiser nor exclude
consideration of an income-approach tied to a private museum yet
to be developed.107 The commission, however, was in no way prepared
to go the distance suggested by the Svonavec family’s appraiser,
finding that his opinion lacked credible support for the design of the
museum, the suitability of the site and market, and the contents of
the museum.108 The district court further commented that the commission simply could not find the appraiser’s projected numbers to
be plausible.109
In light of the foregoing, the district court fully adopted the commission’s report and determined the just compensation measure to
be $1,535,000.110
Now, the pivotal question to be asked is this:
“Could anyone disagree with the judicial system’s determination
of the measure of compensation in this matter?”
B. Case Study #2: Groom Mine: Area 51 Overlook
Mr. Brightbill likewise presented on the United States’ taking of
patented mining claims totaling 87.49 acres known as the Groom
Mine for the expansion of the Nevada Test and Training Range
(“NTTR”) at Nellis Air Force Base.111
The takings saga associated with the Groom Mine has also been
the subject of local and national media reports.112 It is difficult to
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40307 at *7–15, 17
(Order Adopting Report of Commission); see also David Hurst, Judge agrees with appraised
value of Flight 93 crash site, THE TRIBUNE-DEMOCRAT (Aug. 7, 2014), https://www.times-news
.com/news/local_news/judge-agrees-with-appraised-value-of-flight-93-crash-site/article_42cac
809-1f92-522c-b316-531d0646ba6f.html.
111. United States v. 400 Acres of Land, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161894 (Order on Plaintiff’s
Motions to Exclude and Defendants’ Motions to Preserve Issues for Jury); 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 148130 (Order on Evidentiary Motions); and 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156193 (Order
Adopting Commissioners’ Report).
112. See, e.g., Tyler Rogoway, The Unlikely Struggle of the Family Whose Neighbor Is Area
51, JALOPNIK (Nov. 9, 2015), https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-unlikely-struggle-of-the-fam
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even imagine a case with a more colorful background. The test range
is undoubtably better known in modern folklore as “The Box,” “The
Ranch,” “Dreamland,” or, by the name of its world-famous atomic
test site, “Area 51.”113
For much of the first half of the twentieth century, the Sheahan
family operated the Groom Mine as a successful mining operation.
At the start of World War II, however, the federal government surveyed the entire area and began military training operations which,
by 1950, including atomic testing.114 Since mining operations were
all but impossible to continue, the Groom Mine turned into a parttime retreat for the Sheahan family.115
In 1984, the U.S. Air Force (“USAF”) restricted public access to all
lands surrounding Area 51.116 At that time, a stipulation was made
to the Sheahan family that the USAF “would have no authority to
deny access to any employees or business visitors of the Sheahans,”
and “could only terminate the Sheahans’ rights to Groom Mine by
initiating condemnation proceedings or purchasing the property.”117
Since that time, the Groom Mine has achieved notoriety for its
unobstructed mountain-top view of the dried-up lake-bed of Area 51
that is six miles away.118 After USAF’s acquisition in the 1990s of
Freedom Ridge, twelve miles away, the nearest overlook of the base
is Tikaboo Peak, some twenty-six miles away.119 The Groom Mine is
now virtually an enclave of private property, an intruding island, deep
within the boundaries of the military installation. In the intervening
years, popular interest in Area 51 has ebbed and flowed based upon
both made-up myth and actual history associated with the base.120
ily-whose-neighbor-is-a-1741346156; see also Glen Meek, How the Storm Area 51 phenomenon
could be an alien benefit to family that once owned the land, THE NEV. INDEP. (Aug. 18, 2019),
https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/storm-area-51-how-this-internet-phenomenon
-could-bolster-the-case-of-a-nevada-family-fighting-the-government-over-land-adjacent-to-the
-secret-base.
113. While it is obvious that Mr. Brightbill put the case forward as another exemplar in
which the owner’s valuation contention was overreaching, he should receive some credit for
his restraint in not characterizing the owner’s estimate for being “out of this world.”
114. Rogoway, supra note 112.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Although the mystique behind Area 51 is most often associated with rumors of the
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Figure 16. Groom Mine Area 51 Overlook121



government secretly storing extraterrestrial artifacts, the base’s long history of testing exotic
military and aerospace technologies is highly regarded by military aircraft enthusiasts. The
base has an impressive line-up of past aircraft testing including the U-2, A-12 Oxcart and SR
-71 Blackbird, Tacit Blue, the F-117 Nighthawk, Boeing’s Bird of Prey, and Stealth Black
Hawk helicopters.
121. Photographs appearing below are attributed to the following sources: Rogoway, supra
note 112, crediting the Sheehan family for various photographs; “Groom Lake” aerial photograph,
Groom Lake (salt flat), WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Groom_Lake_(salt_flat) (last
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In 2015, the United States initially offered $1.2 million to the
Sheahan family and its twenty-two claimants. At some point, a final
offer of $5.2 million followed. Without acceptance, the United States
filed its complaint to condemn the patented mining claims totaling
87.49 acres owned by the Sheahan family on September 10, 2015.122
When filing the action, as reflected in its declaration of taking, the
United States lowered its valuation back to the appraised amount
of $1.2 million.123
visited Sept. 10, 2021); Federal Lands in Southern Nevada, MAPSOF.NET, https://www.mapsof
.net/nevada/federal-lands-in-southern-nevada (last visited Sept. 10, 2021); “Restricted Area
No Trespassing” sign, Area 51 Groom Lake, ATLAS OBSCURA, https://www.atlasobscura.com
/places/area-51 (last visited June 27, 2021).
122. United States v. 400 Acres of Land, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161894, at *5–6 (Order on
Plaintiff’s Motions to Exclude and Defendants’ Motions to Preserve Issues for Jury).
123. Id.
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Anticipating that the Sheahans would contend their property to
be of extraordinary value, in evidentiary motions before the Nevada
District Court, the United States argued that the family should be
precluded from valuing the property based upon a premium above
the private marketplace because of either (a) the burden (or savings)
the United States would be relieved of by taking the landowner’s
property or (b) because of its being adjacent to military facilities.124
The Nevada District Court ruled that, in the case of the former,
a premium based upon the value to the government cannot be
considered in determining the market value of the property; however, in the case of the latter, so long as demand is not driven by the
need of the property by the government to complete its project, evidence in the marketplace that drives a premium may be properly
considered, if independent of the government’s project and instead
premised upon the property’s adjacency to a military facility.125
Stated otherwise, the Sheahan family was not foreclosed from
showing value based upon a market premium due to property’s accessibility and commanding vantage point of Area 51. Thus, as in
the case before, the district court allowed both the government and
the property owner to have their day and make their respective case
to the fact-finder.
After nearly three additional years of litigation, it was apparent
that the parties had completely divergent opinions of value. The
case was tried in 2019 before an appointed three-member commission.126 On one hand, the government presented appraisal testimony
that was only a quarter of its initial appraisal in the case. On the
other hand, the property owner presented appraisal testimony that
pushed “the outer limits.” The United States contended that the
highest and best use of the Groom Mine was its existing use at the
time of taking as rural residential, and that just compensation for
the taking was $254,000.127 The United States’ appraiser opined
that comparable substitute sales of rural recreational property in
the area of the Groom Mine sold for between $1,668 per acre and
124. Id. at *17–23.
125. Id.
126. United States of America v. 400 Acres of Land, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156193 (Order
Adopting Commissioners’ Report).
127. Id. at *40–41.
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$10,000 per acre.128 He concluded the market value on the date of
value was $2,900/acre or $254,000 ($2900/acre x 87.49 = $253,721
rounded to $254,000).129
The Sheahan family contended that the highest and best use of
the Groom Mine was tourist commercial—“a use where 250 people
a day visit the property for a fee, with no capital improvements,
drawing on the established market interest in, and demand to see
Area 51 and drawing on the regional tourism hub of Las Vegas.”130
Based on his determination of highest and best use the Sheahan
family contended the just compensation owed by the United States
was $49,870,000.131 The family’s appraiser testified the Groom Mine
had the potential for generating $41,062,500 in annual tourist
revenue because it is the only private property in the world with a
clear and unobstructed view of the Air Force operating base commonly referred to in popular culture as Area 51.132 Because there
were no other large acreage properties with tourist commercial
highest and best use in Lincoln County or surrounding rural counties, the appraiser selected sales of tourist commercial properties in
the Las Vegas metropolitan area to find sales with a similar highest
and best use and potential to draw visitors similar in number to the
Groom Mine.133 He testified comparable tourist commercial properties in the Las Vegas metropolitan area would sell for between
$125,320 per acre and $1,187,931 per acre.134 After making adjustments to his selected comparable sales, he concluded the fair market
value on date of taking was $570,000/acre for the patented acres or
$49,870,000 ($570,000/acre x 87.49 = $49,870,000).135
The findings of the commission confirmed its view of the evidence.
While finding that the Groom Mine was “the only private and legally accessible property in the world with a clear and unobstructed
view of Area 51,” the commission also found, from the directions
given, that the Groom Mine was somewhat off the beaten path:
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at *41–43.
131. Id.
132. United States of America v. 400 Acres of Land, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156193, at
*41–43 (Order Adopting Commissioners’ Report).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *40–41.
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approximately 150 road miles from Las Vegas, a drive of about
2.5 hours, with the last 27 miles off State Highway 375, 15 miles
thereafter on a gravel road, one mile then to the NTTR checkpoint,
eight miles on a paved road inside the NTTR, until, finally, a
three-mile ascent on a narrow dirt road.136

The commission further noted that “the nearest town, Rachel, is about
52 miles away, with a population of 60, and no school, gas station,
grocery store, or post office.”137 The only commercial establishment
in Rachel, the commission noted, is “the Little A’Le’Inn, which was
a small alien-themed restaurant and gift shop.”138
Additionally, the commission found that for the sixty years preceding the taking, the Sheahan family had used the property for an
occasional recreational retreat and had never developed any business plans for tourist use or charged anyone to visit the property.139
Notwithstanding, the commission found that “Area 51 is a secret
military base located on Groom Lake that had become the location
widely believed in a segment of popular culture to be where UFOs
or alien technology have been stored by the government and where
alien technology is tested.”140 Moreover, the commission found that
“it is believed in a segment of popular culture that in the 1950’s a
UFO crashed in Roswell, New Mexico, and those remains were
transported to Area 51 for testing.”141
Given all of the above findings, as it related to value, the commission found that the highest and best on the date of value was its
existing rural residential use.142 The commission found that “the
owners did not present sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that the property’s existing use on the date of value was its highest and best use.”143 Although the Sheahan family did present evidence to the contrary, the commission determined that they did not
meet their burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence
that there was market demand or the prospect of market demand
136. Id. at *49–54.
137. Id.
138. United States of America v. 400 Acres of Land, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156193, at
*49–54 (Order Adopting Commissioners’ Report).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *105–08.
143. Id. at *60–83.
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for their proposed large-scale tourist commercial use in the reasonably foreseeable future.144 The commission particularly noted that
the Sheahan family had not, in all of the years owning the property,
applied to Lincoln County for a special use permit for any type of
tourist operation.145 The commission did not find the assumption
that 91,250 people a year would come to the Groom Mine every year
paying an entrance fee of $400 and an additional $50 for “knickknacks,” generating a revenue of $41.1 million (91,250 x $450 =
$41,062,500) to be credible.146
To the contrary, the commission found that the United States’
appraiser correctly concluded that the highest and best use of the
Groom Mine on the date of value was rural recreational.147 However,
because the commission found that the United States’ appraiser
failed to give sufficient consideration to the unique one-of-a-kind
nature of the Groom Mine, which would command a premium in the
real estate market to account for its view of Area 51 and its historic
use as a family-owned mining operation, the commission determined
that such a premium would be above the highest price ($10,000/acre)
shown in the comparable sales considered by the United States’ appraiser.148 Thus, the commission concluded just compensation for
the taking was $12,500 per acre or $1,100,000 (87.49 x $12,500/acre
= $1,093,625, rounded to $1,100,000).149
In light of the foregoing, the district court fully adopted the commission’s report and determined the just compensation measure to
be $1,100,000 for the patented mining claims totaling 87.49 acres
and $104,000 for mineral rights (as separately agreed between the
parties), for a total of $1,204,000.150
As before, the pivotal question remains:
“Could anyone disagree with the judicial system’s determination
of the measure of compensation in this matter?”
144. United States of America v. 400 Acres of Land, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156193, at
*60–83 (Order Adopting Commissioners’ Report).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *105–08.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. United States of America v. 400 Acres of Land, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156193, at *36
(Order Adopting Commissioners’ Report).
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C. Concluding Remarks
My own response to the pivotal questions asked after each of the
two preceding case studies is that there would be near-universal
agreement that the measure of compensation determined in each of
the judicial proceedings presented was just or fair. So it is that our
judicial system really does protect against the risk of “unjust compensation,” both for the condemnee and for the condemnor. Justice
and fairness operate on two-way streets.
In regards to the Flight 93 National Memorial, apparently, no
warning lights flashed concerning whether such an extraordinary
value ($23 million) invites additional consideration as to whether too
direct a line is being drawn between profit and national tragedy. And,
in regards to the Groom Mine: Area 51 Overlook, even having the most
intriguing fact pattern in the world (or even beyond it) is not enough
to excuse having a credible predicate for value. The more extraordinary value ($41.1 million) requires the more extraordinary credible
proof. As they say, comparable sales must truly be comparable.
And how is it then that Mr. Brightbill’s two examples would
detract from my contention that, as a means to address concerns
over unfairness in compensation, an owner’s attorneys’ fees and
costs be included in the measure of compensation?
Overreaching rarely ever pays, not even for the lawyers. The attorneys representing the private property owners in both cases were
most likely retained on a contingency or result-oriented basis, which
is typical in jurisdictions where the condemnor is not obligated to
pay the owner’s attorneys’ fees and costs. If the attorneys lose on an
overreaching valuation theory advanced on behalf of their clients,
then they, too, get the “just compensation” they have earned—or, to
employ one last kitchen analogy, receive their “just desserts.”
From my own experience, I would attest that overreaching by an
owner is not commonplace. It is ill-advised for a practitioner representing a property owner to build up false expectations. If the house
of cards falls over, the lawyer, of course, is to blame. Suffice it to say,
it is not a solid foundation upon which to build a law practice. It is
more typically the case that the owner is having to respond to an
extremely low offer made by the condemning authority and is without
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sufficient means to risk the time and the expense necessary to
“check and balance” the use of the eminent domain power. In most
instances, it is likely that owners are not knowledgeable about the
mixed questions of law and fact that shape the measure of compensation or seek legal counsel unless the case is substantial and they
have the means to engage in litigation against a party that quintessentially has both the time and resources to engage in tactics of
delay or attrition (“the act of wearing or grinding down by friction”).
In light of this, it is the small property or business owner that is
more at risk of receiving “unjust compensation”—but they rarely
realize it is happening to them, and we likely will never hear about
it. It is only those that have the knowledge and experience in these
matters that see this for what it is: it is unjust.
V. INCLUDING AN OWNER’S ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS IN THE
MEASURE OF COMPENSATION: AN OVERVIEW OF FLORIDA’S
FULL COMPENSATION MEASURE
If the foregoing serves as a clarion call for property rights reform,
some may be left wondering: What does the landscape look like when
the owner’s attorneys’ fees and costs are included in the measure of
compensation as a means to address concerns over unfairness in
compensation? Again, I will turn to Florida which includes the owner’s
attorneys’ fees and costs as part of the measure of compensation for
the condemnor to pay under the state’s substantive law.151
Note, at the same time that the measure of compensation has
included payment of the owner’s attorneys’ fees and costs when
defending eminent domain proceedings, public infrastructure projects have not been impeded in a state that has been among the
largest demographic giants in the country. Florida has ranked in the
151. Although within a minority of jurisdictions that include payment of the owner’s
attorneys’ fees and costs as part of the measure of compensation, the state of Florida is not
alone. Shortly before the publication of this Article, the Supreme Court of Louisiana decided
Bayou Bridge Pipeline, LLC v. 38.00 Acres, More or Less, Located in St Martin Parish et al.,
2021 La. LEXIS 1140* (La. May 13, 2021) in which the court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs
to landowners in a pipeline company’s condemnation action pursuant to Const. Art. I, § IV of
the Louisiana Constitution. The Court reasoned that, because the Louisiana Constitution requires that landowners be compensated “to the full extent” of their loss, which “shall include,
but not be limited to, the appraised value of the property and all costs of relocation, inconvenience, and any other damages actually incurred by the owner because of the expropriation,”
attorneys’ fees and litigation costs may be awarded separate from any statutory authority explicitly authorizing such an award by virtue of the constitutional compensation requirement.
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top 10 since 1960, holding better than a fourth-place ranking since
the 1990 U.S. Census, and recently overtaking New York in 2014 for
its current third-place ranking, which it still holds today.152
In Florida, the condemnor’s obligation to pay for the owner’s attorneys’ fees and costs is said to spring forth from the state’s constitutional guarantee of “full compensation.” What follows below is a brief
overview of the state’s constitution, statutes, and relevant case law
regarding the entitlement and amount of attorneys’ fees and costs.
Article X, Section 6(a) of the Florida Constitution provides:
No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and
with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by
deposit in the registry of the court and available to the owner.153

In 1950, the Florida Supreme Court in Dade County v. Brigham,154
held that payment of the owner’s attorneys’ fees and costs is part of
the constitutional measure of Florida’s “full compensation.” The high
court of the state reasoned that
[s]ince the owner of private property sought to be condemned is
forced into court by one to whom he owes no obligation, it cannot
be said that he has received “just compensation” for his property
if he is compelled to pay out of his own pocket the expenses of
establishing the fair value of the property, which expenses in some
cases could conceivably exceed such value.155

The Court further discerned that the private property owners should
be compensated for the reasonable and necessary costs that had “use
value” in meeting the condemning authority with an “equal footing.”156
To explain its reasoning, the state’s high court quoted the trial
judge in the case that had included the following in his ruling below:
Freedom to own and hold property is a valued and guarded right
under our government. Full compensation is guaranteed by the
152. See Kelvin Pollard, Florida Poised to Pass New York as Nation’s 3rd Most-Populous
State, PRB (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.prb.org/resources/florida-poised-to-pass-new-york-as-na
tions-3rd-most-populous-state/; U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2021).
153. Fla. Const. art. X, § 6(a).
154. 47 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1950).
155. Id. at 604–05.
156. Id.
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Constitution to those whose property is divested from them by eminent domain. The theory and purpose of that guaranty is that
the owner shall be made whole so far as possible and practicable.
The courts should not be blind to the realities of the condemnation process. Any excuse which the Court might have for disclaiming knowledge of just what goes on, is entirely removed by
the fact that the Court itself views the trial and proceedings and
has personal knowledge of all such matters. The Court sees that
the County is armed with engineering testimony, engineering
data, charts and drawings prepared by expert draftsmen.
The court sees that the County produces appraisers, expert witnesses relating to value, usually more than one in number, whose
elaborate statement of their qualifications, training, experience
and clientele indicate a painstaking and elaborate appraisal by
them calling for an expenditure by the County of fees to such
experts and appraisers which are commensurate therewith, and
customary for like services of such persons. A lay defendant whose
property is to be taken is called upon to defend against such preparation and expert testimony of the County. It is unreasonable to
say that such a defendant must suffer a disadvantage of being
unable to meet this array of able, expert evidence, unless he shall
pay for the same out of his own pocket.157

Capturing the ethos of a taking, the Florida Supreme Court further
cited to a case from New York, In re Water Supply in City of New
York,158 within its opinion in Dade County v. Brigham that aptly
described the plight of a private property owner who falls subject to
the exercise of eminent domain:
He does not want to sell. The property is taken from him through
the exertion of the high powers of the statute, and the spirit of
the Constitution clearly requires that he shall not be thus compelled to part with what belongs to him without the payment,
not alone of the abstract value of the property, but of all the
necessary expenses incurred in fixing that value. This would
seem to be dictated by sound morals, as well as by the spirit of
the Constitution; and it will not be presumed that the Legislature has intended to deprive the owner of the property of the full
protection which belongs to him as a matter of right.159
157. Id. at 604.
158. Id. at 605 (citing 125 App. Div. 219, 109 N.Y.S. 652, 654 (1908)).
159. Id.
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In extending its concern over constitutional private property rights,
eight years after deciding Dade County v. Brigham, the Florida Supreme Court again addressed the state’s constitutional measure of
“full compensation” in the case styled Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry J. Dupree Company. In an oft-cited special concurrence
by Justice Drew, the Florida jurist wrote:
The fact that the sovereign is now engaged in great public enterprises necessitating the acquisition of large amounts of private
property at greatly increasing costs is no reason to depart from
the firmly established principle that under our system the rights
of the individual are matters of the greatest concern to the
courts. The powerful government can usually take care of itself;
when the courts cease to protect the individual—within, of course,
constitution and statutory limitations—such individual rights
will be rapidly swallowed up and disappear in the maw of the
sovereign. If these immense acquisitions of lands point to anything, it is to the continuing necessity in the courts of seeing to it
that, in the process of improving the general welfare, individual
rights are not completely destroyed.160

The opinions in Dade County v. Brigham and Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry J. Dupree Company are still regarded as the
bedrock cases in which Florida Supreme Court has interpreted the
constitutional standard for its state’s measure of compensation.
When considering the inclusion of attorneys’ fees and costs as
part of the measure of compensation, it is important to consider not
only the owner’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees and costs, but also how
is it that a reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees and costs is determined under the substantive law of a jurisdiction. Although maintaining that it is judicial function to ultimately determine whether
the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs is reasonable, the Florida
Supreme Court has upheld the Florida Legislature’s adoption of
reasonable parameters for the determination of attorneys’ fees and
costs as codified in Chapter 73 & 74, Florida Statutes, also referred
to as Florida’s Eminent Domain Code.161
As to reasonableness, Florida law has a base fee that is resultoriented, awarding attorneys’ fees based upon a “benefits-achieved
160. Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Henry J. Dupree Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 293 (Fla. 1958).
161. See, e.g., Joseph B. Doerr Trust v. Cent. Fla. Expressway Auth. (Doerr Trust), 177 So.
3d 1209, 1216–17 (Fla. 2015).
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formula” that uses a sliding percentage scale applied to the “benefits”
meaning the difference, exclusive of interest, between the final judgment or settlement and the last written offer made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney. It may include
both the monetary and non-monetary benefits achieved on the
owner’s behalf. This baseline attorney’s fee based upon “benefitsachieved formula” is set forth in § 73.092(1).162 Florida law also
provides for additional attorneys’ fees to be awarded for supplemental proceedings and, more recently, for attorneys’ fees relating to
defense counsel being required to contend with any excessive litigation tactics employed by the condemnor’s attorneys.163 This additional attorney’s fee is set forth in section 73.092(2).164 Once again,
keep in mind that these attorneys’ fees do not come out of the condemnation award paid to the private property owner, but are “paid on
top” of such award to the private property owner.
As model legislation, I am citing below to Chapter 73 & 74, Florida
Statutes. The payment of an owner’s attorneys’ fees is, again, set forth
in section 73.092.165
In pertinent part, the provisions are as follows:
73.092 Attorneys’ fees.—
(1)Except as otherwise provided in this section and s. 73.015,
the court, in eminent domain proceedings, shall award attorneys’
fees based solely on the benefits achieved for the client.
(a) As used in this section, the term “benefits” means the
difference, exclusive of interest, between the final judgment or
settlement and the last written offer made by the condemning
authority before the defendant hires an attorney. If no written
offer is made by the condemning authority before the defendant
hires an attorney, benefits must be measured from the first
written offer after the attorney is hired.
1. In determining attorneys’ fees, if business records as
defined in s. 73.015(2)(c)2. and kept by the owner in

162.
163.
164.
165.

FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1) (2020).
See, e.g., Doerr Trust, 177 So. 3d at 1216–17.
FLA. STAT. § 73.092(2) (2020).
FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (2020).
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the ordinary course of business were provided to the
condemning authority to substantiate the business
damage offer in s. 73.015(2)(c), benefits for amounts
awarded for business damages must be based on the
difference between the final judgment or settlement
and the written counteroffer made by the condemning
authority provided in s. 73.015(2)(d).
2. In determining attorneys’ fees, if existing business
records as defined in s. 73.015(2)(c)2. and kept by the
owner in the ordinary course of business were not provided to the condemning authority to substantiate the
business damage offer in s. 73.015(2)(c) and those
records which were not provided are later deemed
material to the determination of business damages,
benefits for amounts awarded for business damages
must be based upon the difference between the final
judgment or settlement and the first written counteroffer made by the condemning authority within 90 days
from the condemning authority’s receipt of the business records previously not provided.
(b) The court may also consider nonmonetary benefits
obtained for the client through the efforts of the attorney, to the
extent such nonmonetary benefits are specifically identified
by the court and can, within a reasonable degree of certainty,
be quantified.
(c) Attorneys’ fees based on benefits achieved shall be
awarded in accordance with the following schedule:
1. Thirty-three percent of any benefit up to $250,000; plus
2. Twenty-five percent of any portion of the benefit between $250,000 and $1 million; plus
3. Twenty percent of any portion of the benefit exceeding
$1 million.
(2) In assessing attorneys’ fees incurred in defeating an order
of taking, or for apportionment, or other supplemental proceedings, when not otherwise provided for, the court shall consider:
(a) The novelty, difficulty, and importance of the questions involved.
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(b) The skill employed by the attorney in conducting the
cause.
(c)

The amount of money involved.

(d)

The responsibility incurred and fulfilled by the attorney.

(e) The attorney’s time and labor reasonably required
adequately to represent the client in relation to the benefits
resulting to the client.
(f) The fee, or rate of fee, customarily charged for legal
services of a comparable or similar nature.
(g)

Any attorney’s fee award made under subsection (1).

(3) In determining the amount of attorneys’ fees to be paid
by the petitioner under subsection (2), the court shall be guided
by the fees the defendant would ordinarily be expected to pay for
these services if the petitioner were not responsible for the payment of those fees.
(4) At least 30 days prior to a hearing to assess attorneys’
fees under subsection (2), the condemnee’s attorney shall submit
to the condemning authority and to the court complete time
records and a detailed statement of services rendered by date,
nature of services performed, time spent performing such services, and costs incurred.
(5) The defendant shall provide to the court a copy of any fee
agreement that may exist between the defendant and his or her
attorney, and the court must reduce the amount of attorneys’
fees to be paid by the defendant by the amount of any attorneys’
fees awarded by the court.
History.—s. 1, ch. 76-158; s. 37, ch. 85-180; s. 3, ch. 87-148; s. 54,
ch. 90-136; s. 3, ch. 90-303; s. 3, ch. 94-162; s. 1370, ch. 95-147;
s. 61, ch. 99-385.166

Insofar as the payment of costs, Florida law establishes that the
condemnor is responsible to pay for “all necessary and reasonable
166. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (2020).
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costs” of the owner in the defense of eminent domain proceedings.
This includes the payment of any expert fees and costs incurred in
preparing the owner’s valuation estimate. This payment of an owner’s
costs is set forth in section 73.091.167
In pertinent part, the provisions are as follows:
73.091 Costs of the proceedings.—
(1) The petitioner shall pay attorneys’ fees as provided in s.
73.092 as well as all reasonable costs incurred in the defense of the
proceedings in the circuit court, including, but not limited to, reasonable appraisal fees and, when business damages are compensable, a reasonable accountant’s fee, to be assessed by that court.
No prejudgment interest shall be paid on costs or attorneys’ fees.
(2) At least 30 days prior to a hearing to assess costs under
this section, the condemnee’s attorney shall submit to the condemning authority for each expert witness complete time records
and a detailed statement of services rendered by date, nature of
services performed, time spent performing such services, and costs
incurred, and a copy of any fee agreement which may exist between the expert and the condemnee or the condemnee’s attorney.
(3) In assessing costs, the court shall consider all factors
relevant to the reasonableness of the costs, including, but not
limited to, the fees paid to similar experts retained in the case
by the condemning authority or other parties and the reasonable
costs of similar services by similarly qualified persons.
(4) In assessing costs to be paid by the petitioner, the court
shall be guided by the amount the defendant would ordinarily
have been expected to pay for the services rendered if the petitioner were not responsible for the costs.
(5) The court shall make specific findings that justify each
sum awarded as an expert witness fee.
History.—s. 1, ch. 65-369; s. 2, ch. 87-148; s. 52, ch. 90-136; s. 1,
ch. 90-303; s. 2, ch. 94-162; s. 60, ch. 99-385.168
167. Id. § 73.092(1).
168. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (2013).
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The Florida Supreme Court recently addressed the circumstance
wherein the Court did not find it just to limit the amount of the
owner’s attorneys’ fees to the “benefits-achieved” formula when the
condemnor’s attorneys engaged in what was referred to as overlitigation or excessive litigation tactics, not necessarily equating
with bad faith or illegal motive. The opinion also provided opportunity for the Florida Supreme Court to “renew its vows” with respect
to the principles set forth in earlier decisions such as Dade County
v. Brigham and Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry J.
Dupree Company.
In the case styled, Joseph B. Doerr Trust v. Central Florida Expressway Authority,169 the Florida Supreme Court held that, in such
instance, additional attorneys’ fees should be paid along with the
baseline attorneys’ fees measured under the “benefits-achieved formula.” In its reasoning, the state’s high court cited one of its earlier
decisions in Shell v. State Road Department170 to show that the
Court is, once again, not blind to the realities of what may be at stake
when private property is taken without consent of an owner and
made its decision to encourage “fair play” in litigation to determine
the measure of compensation.
The opinion reads as follows:
We have previously emphasized the importance of fair play in
eminent domain proceedings because of the inherent disadvantage to the property owner:
It must be borne in mind that in a condemnation proceeding the
property of the landowner is subject to taking by the condemnor
without the owner’s consent. The condemnee is a party through
no fault or volition of his own. Our Declaration of Rights, Section
12, Constitution of the State of Florida, F.S.A., makes it incumbent upon the condemnor to award “just” compensation for the
taking. In view of this constitutional mandate, the awarding of
compensation which is “just” should be the care of the condemning
authority as well as that of the party whose land is being taken.
Unlike litigation between private parties condemnation by any
governmental authority should not be a matter of “dog eat dog” or
“win at any cost.” Such attitude and procedure would be decidedly
169. 177 So. 3d 1209 (Fla. 2015).
170. 135 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1961).
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unfair to the property owner. He would be at a disadvantage in
every instance for the reason that the government has unlimited
resources created by its inexhaustible power of taxation. Moreover it should be remembered that the condemnee is himself a
taxpayer and as such contributes to the government’s “unlimited
resources.”171

Under Florida’s full compensation measure, it is evident that its
underpinnings are deeply rooted in the concept of “relational justice.”
So too, in order to preserve the community’s regard as to the legitimacy of the use of eminent domain, the payment of a measure of
compensation that is just or fair is of a fundamental concern. And
therefore, I believe there is no more efficacious way to resolve concern
over potential “undercompensation” or the risk of “unjust compensation” than to require that the condemnor pay an owner’s attorneys’
fees and costs as part of the measure of compensation.
Practically speaking, under such a framework, condemnors have
incentive to refrain from lowballing initial pre-suit offers and to
resolve cases early on to avoid costs which, if remaining in dispute,
are incurred on both sides of the case. By using a “benefits-achieved
formula,” the condemnor is also not subject to paying hourly rate
attorneys’ fees for projects with small, lineal takings where acquisition costs soar if having to pay attorneys who may otherwise expend
inordinate or unreasonable time on matters of minimal controversy.
Once again, Florida, the third most populous state in the nation,
has not been slowed in its growth or development with respect to
either its private or public sectors by requiring condemning authorities under state law to pay for an owner’s attorneys’ fees and costs
in condemnation cases. Everyone pays his or her fair share; those
who have private property taken for public benefit or purpose are
not made to incur a greater cost than all others who benefit from
public infrastructure by having to pay the attorneys’ fees and costs
for their defense against eminent domain.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, if advocating for an appropriate baseline target for
property rights reform, one that addresses concerns over “undercompensation” or the risk of “unjust compensation,” I suggest the inclusion
171. Joseph B. Doerr Trust v. Cent. Fla. Expressway Auth., 177 So. 3d at 1216 (citing Shell
v. State Rd. Dep’t, 135 So. 2d 857, 861 (Fla. 1961)).
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of the owner’s attorneys’ fees and costs as part of the measure of
compensation in those state jurisdictions that presently lack such
provision in their constitutional jurisprudence or eminent domain
statutory codes.
Beyond this, I also advocate for reform to the enabling legislation
found at either the state or federal level wherein a private licensee
is authorized to exercise the eminent domain power. As a condition
of the authorization to exercise eminent domain, the private licensee
condemnor should be made to pay the reasonable and necessary
attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by the owner as part of the measure of compensation. This, for example, would resolve tremendous
inequities in community redevelopment takings that do not yet place
the responsibility upon the private developer to pay for the owner’s
reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and costs. So too, Congress
is fully capable of providing that an owner’s attorneys’ fees and costs
be included in the measure of compensation as a condition of a private
licensee company exercising the eminent domain power under either
the FPA or NGA. If amending the statutory framework for condemnation in both the FPA and NGA, there would be no reason for the
federal courts to decide controlling law because Congress would no
longer remain silent on the matter.
In so far as the specific changes to be made or provisions to be
added, Florida’s “full compensation” measure and correlating statutory framework certainly provide a tried and true model.
So, having “stirred the pot” † a little, I will now take my leave from
the kitchen, hoping that others may apply their culinary skills in
cooking up the next jurisprudential dish regarding this topic.

† Boiling pot icon created by Alexandr Cherkinsky, NOUN PROJECT, https://thenounproj
ect.com.

SUPPORT GROUNDED IN LITIGATION EXPERIENCE
FOR USING THE FAIR MARKET VALUE MEASURE OF
JUST COMPENSATION IN CASES INVOLVING THE
UNITED STATES

JONATHAN BRIGHTBILL & PETER MCVEIGH*
INTRODUCTION
The Environment and Natural Resources Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“ENRD”) files condemnation actions on behalf of
the United States. It also defends the United States in inverse condemnation cases. The United States Constitution requires the United
States to pay “just compensation” when it acquires (or “takes”) real
property from its owners.1 The United States has this obligation, both
when exercising the prospective power of eminent domain and when
a “taking” is adjudicated to have occurred by an inverse condemnation.
Under Supreme Court precedent, the measure of just compensation is the “fair market value” of the taken property on the date of the
taking.2 “Fair market value” means the amount that a willing buyer
would have paid on the date of taking to purchase the property from
a willing seller on the open market.3 In its litigation, ENRD’s attorneys are committed to seeing the United States meet its constitutional obligation to pay just compensation. The Division’s experience
is that the fair market value is the most objective of possible measures of just compensation for a number of reasons. Other possible
measures would be more difficult, time-consuming, and expensive
to apply.4 Subjective measures are more susceptible to manipulation
and can result in excessive, and thus unjust, compensation. While
ENRD is often successful in defeating such claims, even litigation
* From July 2017 to January 2021, Jonathan Brightbill served at the Environment and
Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice, initially as Deputy Assistant Attorney
General and then as Acting Assistant Attorney General. Peter McVeigh is an attorney advisor
in the Law and Policy Section of the Division.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”).
2. Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
3. Id.
4. See Kirby Forest Indus., 467 U.S. at 10, n.15; United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land,
441 U.S. 506, 511–12 (1979).
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under the well-established fair market value measure can result in
excessive theories and claims of compensation. Some are discussed
further below. Departure from the venerable fair market value standard is likely to increase the risk of overcompensation and may result
in less overall social welfare.
I. THE ENVIRONMENT DIVISION
ENRD has a broad mission, employing approximately 425 attorneys who handle approximately 6,500 cases and matters.5 Two areas
of the Division’s work are relevant to this Essay. First, ENRD’s Land
Acquisition Section files condemnation actions in federal district
courts to acquire real property for important public needs, such as
for military installations.6 In the past several years, for example, this
work has included acquiring property for the border wall. ENRD’s
condemnations are governed by Rule 71.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and laws enacted by Congress, such as the Declaration of
Takings Act, codified at 40 U.S.C. § 3114.
In addition, ENRD’s Natural Resources Section defends “takings
cases” in which plaintiffs (or “landowners”7) allege that the United
States has taken real property without providing just compensation.8
Landowners file these cases in either the Court of Federal Claims or
federal district courts.9 The cases may involve, for example, alleged
water rights takings, alleged takings related to so-called “rails-totrails” conversions, alleged overflight-related takings, and hurricane
and other flood-related litigation.10 There can be many disputed issues
in these cases, including whether there was a compensable taking
5. See About the Division, ENV’T & NAT. RES. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/about-division; Jonathan D. Brightbill, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP,
https://www.winston.com/en/who-we-are/professionals/brightbill-jonathan-d.html (last visited
Sept. 20, 2021).
6. Land Acquisition Section, ENV’T & NAT. RES. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 31, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/land-acquisition-section.
7. For convenience, this Essay refers to the persons who receive, or at least seek,
compensation from the United States in ENRD’s cases as “landowners,” even though that
term does not accurately describe all of the individuals and entities involved in the cases.
8. The World of Inverse Condemnation, ENV’T & NAT. RES. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
(May 12, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/enrd/world-inverse-condemnation.
9. Id.
10. See Significant Cases, ENV’T & NAT. RES. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (May 12, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/significant-cases.
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and, if so, what property interest was taken, as well as the measure
of just compensation owed for a taking.
II. POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND REQUIREMENTS THAT SERVE TO
PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF LANDOWNERS
When discussing the fair market value measure of just compensation, it is appropriate to consider the context in which the measure
is applied. Importantly, in ENRD’s condemnation actions and takings
cases, numerous applicable policies, practices, and requirements serve
in part to protect the interests of landowners.
As an initial matter, ENRD does not approach its condemnation
actions and takings cases like ordinary litigants. The United States
does not “game” its valuations. For example, the United States does
not present the lowest plausible valuation arguments for determining
the fair market value of the property on the date of taking. Nor does
it submit expert reports reflecting half the value of a property—
hoping a jury or land commission will split the difference out of empathy for a landowner and still get the ultimate judgment correct.
Rather, ENRD’s and the federal government’s policy is to be open,
transparent, objective, and uniform in the approach used to determine fair market value. Attorneys of the Department of Justice take
an oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United
States. They take seriously all of these responsibilities, including
the United States’ constitutional responsibility to pay just compensation for taken real property. However, while ENRD attorneys must
respect and address the United States’ constitutional obligation,
they also must be mindful of their obligation to the taxpayer to ensure
landowners are not overcompensated.
To this end, in developing appraisals of fair market value and litigating positions in their cases, ENRD’s Land Acquisition and Natural Resources Sections adhere to the Uniform Appraisal Standards
for Federal Land Acquisitions.11 This is known as the “Yellow Book,”
because the paper copy historically has had a yellow cover. The Yellow
Book, which is frequently cited in legislation and court rulings, has
11. See INTERAGENCY LAND ACQUISITION CONFERENCE, UNIFORM APPRAISAL STANDARDS
FOR FEDERAL LAND ACQUISITIONS (2016), https://www.justice.gov/file/408306/download [here-

inafter YELLOW BOOK].
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guided appraisals of land being acquired by the United States since
its original publication in 1971. The Yellow Book is written by the
Interagency Land Acquisition Conference under the leadership of
ENRD’s Land Acquisition Section. ENRD makes an electronic version available on the Department of Justice’s website. ENRD’s reliance on the Yellow Book is consistent with and furthers ENRD’s
and the federal government’s policy of being open, transparent, objective, and uniform in the approach used to determine fair market value.
There are also laws enacted by Congress that serve in part to
ensure fair treatment of landowners. For example, under the federal
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies
Act, federal agencies generally seek to acquire land by direct purchase before ENRD files a condemnation action.12 Also, under the
Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), when a court awards just compensation to a landowner in a condemnation action, the United States
may be obligated to pay attorneys’ fees and costs. The award to the
landowner must be closer to the landowner’s trial testimony on
value than the United States’ testimony, provided the United States’
position cannot be considered “substantially justified.”13 To be sure,
landowners are rarely awarded attorneys’ fees and costs under
EAJA. ENRD believes that is because its attorneys attempt to get
valuations right in the first place.
III. EXCESSIVE CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION BY LANDOWNERS
The above policies, practices, and requirements serve in part to
protect landowners. They do not, however, discourage landowners
from challenging government valuations if they question the compensation. In fact, ENRD must defend many cases each year based on
speculative and excessive theories of valuation. This is one of the
primary reasons why ENRD supports the use of the fair market
value measure of just compensation. ENRD attorneys expend considerable resources responding to theories of excessive compensation
made against the United States. It is also common that when ENRD’s
cases are actually litigated, landowners are awarded more than an
order of magnitude—and often several orders of magnitude—less
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 4651.
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(H).
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compensation than they argued for before the court. Absent new facts
or information coming to light during discovery, final judgments tend
to be far closer to the United States’ initial offers of compensation
without litigation than what litigants who pursue claims in court
tend to recover.
Described in the remaining sections of this Essay are several
examples of approaches ENRD has seen used to attempt recovery of
excessive compensation. Two specific cases are described where the
approaches and/or similar ones were unsuccessfully deployed. The
fact that ENRD must address these kinds of efforts under the fair
market value measure of just compensation, which is recognized as
limiting the potential for subjectivity and inefficiencies, strongly
suggests that other potential measures of just compensation could
open the door to more excessive compensation. In other words, these
examples raise concern that other possible measures of just compensation may be unjust to the United States and its taxpayers.
A. Landowner Approaches
ENRD regularly addresses varied approaches used by landowners
seeking to recover excessive compensation from the United States.
One such approach is manipulation of the highest and best use of
property. Under federal law, before fair market value can be determined, an appraiser must first evaluate the uses to which the property feasibly, reasonably, and legally can be put.14 The appraiser
then determines fair market value based on the “highest and best
use.”15 ENRD frequently is called upon in its cases to address inflated
valuations that are based on speculative, impracticable, impossible
and/or illegal uses.
Another approach ENRD expends considerable resources addressing is reliance on irrelevant sales of property. The preferred method
for determining fair market value involves analysis of open market
sales of properties that are comparable to the taken property.16
ENRD frequently responds to inflated valuations that rely improperly on sales of property that are not at all “comparable” to the
14. YELLOW BOOK, supra note 11, §§ 1.4.3–1.4.7.
15. See id.
16. Id. §§ 1.5, 4.4.
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taken property. ENRD also is sometimes forced to address reliance
on sales that are not “open market” sales. Such sales are often not
representative of what a willing buyer would offer a willing seller in
a free and open transaction.
A third approach regularly addressed by ENRD involves the derivation of opinions of value largely or entirely from projections of
future income. This attempts to value property based on the profitable cash flow the taken properties purportedly would have generated in the future, rather than on “comparable sales.”17 ENRD often
must respond to such valuation approaches even when there is no
such business operating on the property when taken. Contrary to the
age-old real estate adage of “location, location, location,” landowners
may seek to inflate such valuations, for example, by inappropriately
incorporating elements of value from a business located on other
property better suited for such commerce. Landowners may use such
approaches even where the value of the business located on other
property substantially reflects a superior location, as compared with
the taken property. If successful, these varied kinds of approaches
by landowners would result in inflated awards of compensation and
impacts on the taxpayer.
B. Case Examples
ENRD has a strong track record of success in defeating these
types of efforts in litigating cases under the fair market value measure of compensation. One example is United States v. 275.81 Acres
of Land (W.D. Pa.), a condemnation action filed by ENRD to acquire
land for the Flight 93 National Memorial.18 On September 11, 2001,
United Airlines Flight 93 was carrying passengers from Newark to
San Francisco, when it was hijacked by four al-Qaeda terrorists. The
plane crashed into a field in rural Somerset County, Pennsylvania,
during an attempt by passengers to regain control of the cockpit.
This killed all forty-four people aboard.
At the time of this tragedy, the area where Flight 93 crashed was a
vacant field. There were three dilapidated metal panel buildings in
17. See id. § 4.4.4.
18. United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No. 09-233, 2014 WL 1248205, at *1 (W.D. Pa.
Mar. 26, 2014).
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the area. The landowners nonetheless sought $30 million for the taken
property in the condemnation action based on a claimed potential
for future development of a private memorial. The landowners assumed minimal construction and operational costs. Further, in developing estimates of revenue and income, they relied on comparisons
to public memorials, such as those at Pearl Harbor, Oklahoma City,
and Gettysburg. However, those sites are located in heavily trafficked
areas and were otherwise not comparable to the taken property. The
landowners’ valuation thus relied upon, among other things, inappropriate comparisons to public memorials and unsupported speculation concerning the income the memorial purportedly would have
generated. After a weeklong trial, the landowners were awarded $1.5
million, much less than the $30 million they had sought.19
A second example is United States v. 400 Acres of Land (D. Nev.).
ENRD filed this condemnation action to acquire land located in a remote desert area within the borders of the Nevada Test and Training
Range.20 The property is a two-and-a-half-hour drive through the
desert from Las Vegas, Nevada. Many years ago, the area had been
used for mining. The surrounding training range’s operations are
often key to developing capabilities of war fighters engaged in current conflicts. Nevertheless, the federal government must cancel all
missions when private parties are present on the property to avoid the
risk of exposing classified military activity and for safety reasons.
This condemnation was important for national security purposes.
The landowners asserted a range of excessive valuations, seeking
as much as $2 billion. The landowners assumed, among other things,
that as of the date of the taking, the property’s highest and best use
would have been conversion of the desert scrub into a “tourism mecca.”
They hypothesized that alien enthusiasts would be eager to vacation
in view of the purported “Area 51” hangers located six to seven miles
in the distance.
The landowners’ income approach to valuation speculated that—
but for the government condemnation of the land, which then merely
had several decrepit miners’ cabins on it—tens of thousands of people per month would have traveled hours through the hot desert
19. Id. at *1, *7–8.
20. United States v. 400 Acres of Land, No. 15-1743, 2020 WL 5074255, at *1 (D. Nev.
Aug. 29, 2019).
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from Las Vegas to view these buildings and pay anywhere from $200
per person to as much as $1,000 per person for this opportunity. The
court excluded most of the landowners’ valuations in connection with
motion practice, including the aggressive and easily manipulated
income-based approach.
The court nevertheless allowed the landowners to advance a $50
million valuation based on a more traditional comparable sales technique. Because the court still allowed theoretical “tourism” as highest
and best use, the valuation nevertheless relied upon five purportedly
“comparable” sales of “commercial tourism” land in the Las Vegas
metro area. These comparable sales included one just off the Las
Vegas Strip, on Tropicana Boulevard next to the MGM Grand.
The landowners pursued this valuation even though the nearest
town to the landowners’ cabins, the town of Rachel (with a population
of fifty-four), is located forty miles away from their desert site—and
forty miles closer to Las Vegas. The property is also located fifteen
miles from the nearest roadway, and gravel and dirt roads must be
traversed to reach it. Further, the landowners had done nothing to
pursue the potential use of their property for tourism during their
many years of ownership. Nor had any interest been expressed by
others in putting the property to such use. Indeed, anyone attempting to do so would have faced a broad range of impediments.
After a lengthy trial, the landowners were awarded $1.1 million
for their non-mineral interests and recovered an additional agreed-to
$100,000 for their mineral interests.21 This was close to the amount
the United States was prepared to pay without the time, expense,
and burden of litigation.
CONCLUSION
ENRD and other Department of Justice attorneys take seriously
their oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the
United States. That includes their recognition of the United States’
responsibility to pay just compensation for taken property. Through
the application of the Yellow Book’s standards and hundreds of years
of case law, ENRD and the federal government work diligently to
satisfy the United States’ constitutional responsibility to pay fair
21. See id. at *1, *10.
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market value in a manner that is open, transparent, objective, and
uniform. By doing so, they promote what is “just” to landowners, the
taxpayer, and the government. Considerable resources are nevertheless expended addressing certain landowner attempts to recover
excessive compensation even under the relatively objective fair market
value measure of just compensation. While ENRD has a strong track
record of rebuffing such efforts and resolves many cases through
mutual resolution, the continuing need for this work suggests that
other, potentially more subjective measures of just compensation
could open the door to more aggressive claims and potential abuse.
While the fair market value standard has its critics, other standards
may lead to less consistent, more expensive, and more arbitrary
outcomes with less overall societal benefit.

